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Viewing cable 08TOKYO3117, LITTLE PROGRESS IN U.S.-JAPAN CIV AIR TALKS

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08TOKYO3117 2008-11-10 07:45 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Tokyo
VZCZCXRO7147
RR RUEHFK RUEHKSO RUEHNAG RUEHNH
DE RUEHKO #3117/01 3150745
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 100745Z NOV 08
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 8695
INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 6316
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 2860
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 8619
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 2291
RUEHGP/AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE 7247
RUEHML/AMEMBASSY MANILA 1277
RUEHBK/AMEMBASSY BANGKOK 4532
RUEHHI/AMEMBASSY HANOI 1094
RUEHNH/AMCONSUL NAHA 3239
RUEHNAG/AMCONSUL NAGOYA 8914
RUEHOK/AMCONSUL OSAKA KOBE 4664
RUEHKSO/AMCONSUL SAPPORO 1450
RUEHFK/AMCONSUL FUKUOKA 0879
RUEHHK/AMCONSUL HONG KONG 6625
RUEHRC/DEPT OF AGRICULTURE WASHINGTON DC
RHMFIUU/DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY WASHINGTON DC
RUEHIN/AIT TAIPEI 7183
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RULSDMK/DEPT OF TRANSPORTATION WASHINGTON DC
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 TOKYO 003117 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR DAS JOHN BYERLY AND EAP/J 
DOT FOR KEITH GLATZ AND JENNIFER THIBODEAU 
USTR FOR MICHAEL BEEMAN 
DOC FOR EUGENE ALFORD AND DANIEL LEE 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: EAIR ELTN PGOV ETRD JA
SUBJECT: LITTLE PROGRESS IN U.S.-JAPAN CIV AIR TALKS 
 
REF: A. TOKYO 1432 
     B. TOKYO 2982 
 
1.  (SBU) Summary:  Government of Japan officials held out 
little promise of broader liberalization of Japan's civil 
aviation sector during bilateral talks in Tokyo October 
29-30.  As in past civil aviation negotiations, the GOJ 
eschewed broader discussion of Japan's decade-old commitment 
to "full liberalization."  Instead, the GOJ advocated a 
narrow, incremental proposal that would allow Japanese and 
U.S. carriers to operate only a handful of daily flights to 
the U.S. from Tokyo's Haneda Airport beginning in 2010 under 
tight restrictions, something the U.S. side noted was 
inherently discriminatory and would be immediately rejected 
by U.S. carriers.  The talks plowed familiar ground on a 
number of "doing-business" issues, but without forward 
movement in specific areas.  The U.S. delegation, led by DAS 
John Byerly, declined to set dates for a further round of 
negotiations.  End Summary. 
 
2.  (SBU) The USG and GOJ delegations met in Tokyo October 
29-30 to discuss civil aviation liberalization.  Deputy 
Assistant Secretary for Transportation Affairs John Byerly 
and Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport, and Tourism 
(MLIT) Civil Aviation Bureau (JCAB) Deputy Director-General 
Kenji Takiguchi led their respective delegations.  Keith 
Glatz was the senior Department of Transportation 
representative on the U.S. team.  DAS Byerly and Glatz also 
met separately with Japan Airlines, the American Chamber of 
Commerce in Japan (ACCJ), and Jiro Hanyu of the Sasakawa 
Peace Foundation, a former senior official at MLIT who 
remains deeply engaged in transportation policy issues. 
 
Vague MLIT Timeline for Liberalization 
-------------------------------------- 
 
3.  (SBU) Deputy Director-General Takiguchi noted the GOJ 
ideally would like to conclude agreements with its aviation 
partners by summer 2009 to prepare for expansions underway at 
both of Tokyo's airports -- Haneda and Narita -- which are 
expected to be completed in 2010.  He seriously questioned, 
however, whether a comprehensive agreement with the U.S. was 
possible by that time.  Discussion of the "full 
liberalization"  envisioned in the 1998 Memorandum of 
Understanding (MOU) requires an "equitable environment" in 
which to exercise those rights; it remains unclear whether 
fair competition can be achieved when the U.S. holds a 
disproportionately large number of slots at Narita, Takiguchi 
contended.  Further, the 1998 MOU on civil aviation does not 
set a target date for full liberalization.  Taking these 
factors in to consideration, Takiguchi argued the GOJ's 
proposal to begin service between Haneda and the United 
States (albeit only between 10 p.m. and 7 a.m.) would be a 
"step" toward liberalization.  He noted that it is "extremely 
difficult" to set a deadline for full liberalization due to 
the limited number of new slots available in 2010 at both 
Haneda and Narita Airports.  This might change in the future, 
but was contingent on technical issues and understandings 
with local communities. 
 
4.  (SBU) DAS Byerly said the U.S. seeks full Open Skies with 
Japan.  The large expansion of Tokyo slots in 2010 presents 
Japan and the United States a "historic opportunity" to 
realize full liberalization of their aviation relations, 
consistent with the commitment of both countries in the 1998 
MOU as well as with the APEC Bogor Declaration.  Rather than 
seek a "mini-deal" that only addresses narrow issues, the GOJ 
 
TOKYO 00003117  002 OF 004 
 
 
should work with the United States on a roadmap to a 
comprehensive agreement, which could include transitional or 
phased-in steps to Open Skies, DAS Byerly said.  He noted it 
was difficult to envision how Japan would reach full 
liberalization if a comprehensive agreement cannot be 
concluded by 2010.  Open Skies is possible even with space 
constraints and a shortage of slots, a point made clear by 
the Open Skies relationship between the U.S. and the UK 
notwithstanding slot constraints at London-Heathrow.  Japan 
and the United States should focus on the broader interests 
of consumers and the U.S. and Japanese economies, and not 
just the narrow interests of carriers, DAS Byerly said. 
 
Haneda Airport 
-------------- 
 
5.  (SBU) Takiguchi noted MLIT's support of Haneda's 
expansion, as evidenced by new regulations to 
internationalize Tokyo's "in-town" airport, covering such 
areas as slot allocation and time curfews for international 
flights (ref A).  Operating hours and other details of 
Haneda's operations cannot be changed, he claimed, since the 
Council of Economic and Fiscal Policy (CEFP), chaired by the 
Prime Minister, has already approved the plan.  (Note:  On 
October 30, the second day of the talks, MLIT 
Director-General Maeda announced at a Council for the 
Promotion of Regulatory Reform (CPRR) meeting a possible 
further increase of 20,000-30,000 international slots at 
Haneda Airport.  End note.) 
 
6.  (SBU) Based on MLIT's new regulations, Takiguchi proposed 
three nighttime flights per day for U.S. carriers at Haneda, 
with a prohibition against the aircraft flying to beyond and 
from behind points.  (Note: Takiguchi subsequently conceded 
that MLIT would not limit beyond rights if requested by the 
U.S. carriers.  End note.)  His proposal also included ending 
limitations on charter flights.  (Note: ANA flies nighttime 
charters from Haneda Airport to Guam.  End note.)  Takiguchi 
claimed U.S. and Japanese carriers would benefit equally from 
the proposed new opportunities at Haneda.  When pressed, 
Takiguchi conceded that under the new MLIT rules, Japanese 
carriers could theoretically fly up to twenty flights per day 
-- in comparison to the three he was offering for U.S. 
carriers -- but asserted Japanese carriers were very unlikely 
to do so. 
 
Narita Airport 
-------------- 
 
7.  (SBU) Takiguchi said the GOJ did not at this time intend 
to allocate to U.S. carriers any of the 20,000 new slots at 
Narita after the airport's 2010 expansion.  He suggested the 
GOJ might even consider asking (or requiring) U.S. carriers 
to return some of their slots.  DAS Byerly made clear that 
the United States would view an MLIT decision to preclude 
U.S. carriers from consideration for new Narita slots as 
contrary to the IATA (International Air Transport 
Association) World Scheduling Guidelines, the principle of 
fair and equal opportunity, and the specific understandings 
reached at the time of the 1998 MOU. 
 
U.S. Carriers Disadvantaged 
--------------------------- 
 
8.  (SBU) DAS Byerly stated the GOJ's complex plans for 
partial internationalization of Haneda Airport would 
disadvantage U.S. carriers and run counter to the principle 
 
TOKYO 00003117  003 OF 004 
 
 
of fair and equal opportunity in Article 10 of the bilateral 
air transport agreement.  Japanese carriers would be 
advantaged by the plan, not only because of the disparity in 
the number of flights, but also because of their ability to 
make better use of the departure and arrival windows at 
Haneda offered by the new regulations.  For example, Japanese 
carriers could depart Haneda as early as 10 p.m.  In 
contrast, U.S. carriers could not realistically depart before 
midnight, as they would have to fly to Haneda first and would 
require at least two hours to "turn" their flights.  Japanese 
carriers could thus better appeal to Tokyo-area passengers 
(earlier, more convenient departure times), to behind-Japan 
passengers (shorter layovers at Haneda), and passengers 
wishing to fly beyond the U.S. gateway (10 p.m. departures 
from Haneda would allow Japanese carriers to connect to the 
last bank of flights from the west coast to the east; 
passengers on U.S. carriers arriving two hours later would 
likely be stuck on red-eye flights or have to overnight). 
DAS Byerly also noted the GOJ's proposed steps would saddle 
U.S. carriers with costly split operations between Haneda and 
Narita Airports, a concern that did not affect either JAL or 
ANA, each of which already has major operations at both 
airports.  He underscored the benefits of Open Skies for both 
Japanese and U.S. consumers and carriers and described the 
potential for antitrust immunity for airline alliance 
partners. 
 
Yokota Air Force Base Dual Use 
------------------------------ 
 
9.  (SBU) Having previewed the matter privately with Byerly, 
Takiguchi formally raised possible dual use of Yokota 
airspace, asserting use of Yokota's runway would alleviate 
crowding at Tokyo's metropolitan airports.  Takiguchi 
acknowledged DOD and MOFA have the lead on this issue, and 
the civ air talks are not the venue for further discussion, 
but nevertheless wished to inform the USG of MLIT's position. 
 (Note:  On October 29, a MOFA official told Econoff MOFA did 
not support raising this in the civ air talks, but that Tokyo 
Governor Ishihara pressured MLIT to do so.  End note.)  DAS 
Byerly said he would convey  MLIT's suggestion to Washington. 
 (Comment:  In a private meeting prior to the talks, former 
MLIT negotiator and now JCAB Director-General Maeda also 
informed Byerly and Glatz of the Tokyo government's interest 
in dual use of Yokota.  Both Maeda and Takiguchi gave the 
impression that they had no personal interest in pursuing the 
matter but instead were raising the issue on instruction and 
in order to report back that they had indeed done so.  End 
Comment.) 
 
"Doing-Business" Issues 
----------------------- 
 
10.  (SBU) As expected, Takiguchi raised several 
long-standing doing-business issues. 
 
--Backcatering:  He requested the U.S. to continue 
indefinitely its current rules on backcatering.  DAS Byerly 
assured Takiguchi the USG would inform the GOJ of any 
developments in this area and urged Japanese carriers to 
comment during the rule-making period. 
 
--JAL/Jalways stopovers in Hawaii:  Takiguchi asked whether 
Open Skies could lead to a change in U.S. cabotage rules so 
as to allow JAL/Jalways stopovers in Hawaii.  DAS Byerly 
answered "no" but noted that, if the GOJ were prepared to 
reach an Open Skies agreement if the law were amended, he 
 
TOKYO 00003117  004 OF 004 
 
 
would recommend to senior officials that they consider a 
narrow exception in this specific case.  (Comment:  Takiguchi 
did not bite.  End comment.) 
 
--Transit Without Visa (TWOV):  Takiguchi asserted TWOV 
restricts operation to beyond points and requested the USG 
lift this requirement.  DAS Byerly reviewed the history of 
this issue and the reasons for suspension of TWOV after the 
terrorist attack of September 11.  He noted that there were 
no prospects for near-term reinstatement of TWOV. 
 
--US-Exit:  Takiguchi raised concerns about the 
Administration proposal to require airlines to fingerprint 
departing passengers, arguing that this would place an 
unjustified burden on carriers.  In response, DAS Byerly 
described recently enacted legislation that defers 
implementation of this proposal pending further study. 
 
11.  (U) DAS Byerly cleared this message after he departed 
Tokyo. 
SCHIEFFER