Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 97115 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
ETRD EAGR ETTC EAID ECON EFIN ECIN EINV ELAB EAIR ENRG EPET EWWT ECPS EIND EMIN ELTN EC ETMIN EUC EZ ET ELECTIONS ENVR EU EUN EG EINT ER ECONOMICS ES EMS ENIV EEB EN ECE ECOSOC EK ENVIRONMENT EFIS EI EWT ENGRD ECPSN EXIM EIAD ERIN ECPC EDEV ENGY ECTRD EPA ESTH ECCT EINVECON ENGR ERTD EUR EAP EWWC ELTD EL EXIMOPIC EXTERNAL ETRDEC ESCAP ECO EGAD ELNT ECONOMIC ENV ETRN EIAR EUMEM ENRGPARMOTRASENVKGHGPGOVECONTSPLEAID EREL ECOM ECONETRDEAGRJA ETCC ETRG ECONOMY EMED ETR ENERG EITC EFINOECD EURM EENG ERA EXPORT ENRD ECONEINVETRDEFINELABETRDKTDBPGOVOPIC EGEN EBRD EVIN ETRAD ECOWAS EFTA ECONETRDBESPAR EGOVSY EPIN EID ECONENRG EDRC ESENV ETT EB ENER ELTNSNAR ECHEVARRIA ETRC EPIT EDUC ESA EFI ENRGY ESCI EE EAIDXMXAXBXFFR EETC ECIP EIAID EIVN EBEXP ESTN EING EGOV ETRA EPETEIND ELAN ETRDGK EAIDRW ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS EPEC ENVI ELN EAG EPCS EPRT EPTED ETRB EUM EAIDS EFIC EFINECONEAIDUNGAGM EAIDAR ESF EIDN ELAM EDU EV EAIDAF ECN EDA EXBS EINTECPS ENRGTRGYETRDBEXPBTIOSZ EPREL EAC EINVEFIN ETA EAGER EINDIR ECA ECLAC ELAP EITI EUCOM ECONEFINETRDPGOVEAGRPTERKTFNKCRMEAID EARG ELDIN EINVKSCA ENNP EFINECONCS EFINTS ECCP ETC EAIRASECCASCID EINN ETRP EAIDNI EFQ ECOQKPKO EGPHUM EBUD ECONEINVEFINPGOVIZ ENERGY ELB EINDETRD EMI ECONEFIN EIB EURN ETRDEINVTINTCS EIN EFIM ETIO ELAINE EMN EATO EWTR EIPR EINVETC ETTD ETDR EIQ ECONCS EPPD ENRGIZ EISL ESPINOSA ELEC EAIG ESLCO EUREM ENTG ERD EINVECONSENVCSJA EEPET EUNCH ECINECONCS ETRO ETRDECONWTOCS ECUN EFND EPECO EAIRECONRP ERGR ETRDPGOV ECPN ENRGMO EPWR EET EAIS EAGRE EDUARDO EAGRRP EAIDPHUMPRELUG EICN ECONQH EVN EGHG ELBR EINF EAIDHO EENV ETEX ERNG ED
KMDR KPAO KPKO KJUS KCRM KGHG KFRD KWMN KDEM KTFN KHIV KGIC KIDE KSCA KNNP KHUM KIPR KSUM KISL KIRF KCOR KRCM KPAL KWBG KN KS KOMC KSEP KFLU KPWR KTIA KSEO KMPI KHLS KICC KSTH KMCA KVPR KPRM KE KU KZ KFLO KSAF KTIP KTEX KBCT KOCI KOLY KOR KAWC KACT KUNR KTDB KSTC KLIG KSKN KNN KCFE KCIP KGHA KHDP KPOW KUNC KDRL KV KPREL KCRS KPOL KRVC KRIM KGIT KWIR KT KIRC KOMO KRFD KUWAIT KG KFIN KSCI KTFIN KFTN KGOV KPRV KSAC KGIV KCRIM KPIR KSOC KBIO KW KGLB KMWN KPO KFSC KSEAO KSTCPL KSI KPRP KREC KFPC KUNH KCSA KMRS KNDP KR KICCPUR KPPAO KCSY KTBT KCIS KNEP KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KNNB KGCC KINR KPOP KMFO KENV KNAR KVIR KDRG KDMR KFCE KNAO KDEN KGCN KICA KIMMITT KMCC KLFU KMSG KSEC KUM KCUL KMNP KSMT KCOM KOMCSG KSPR KPMI KRAD KIND KCRP KAUST KWAWC KTER KCHG KRDP KPAS KITA KTSC KPAOPREL KWGB KIRP KJUST KMIG KLAB KTFR KSEI KSTT KAPO KSTS KLSO KWNN KPOA KHSA KNPP KPAONZ KBTS KWWW KY KJRE KPAOKMDRKE KCRCM KSCS KWMNCI KESO KWUN KPLS KIIP KEDEM KPAOY KRIF KGICKS KREF KTRD KFRDSOCIRO KTAO KJU KWMNPHUMPRELKPAOZW KEN KO KNEI KEMR KKIV KEAI KWAC KRCIM KWCI KFIU KWIC KCORR KOMS KNNO KPAI KBWG KTTB KTBD KTIALG KILS KFEM KTDM KESS KNUC KPA KOMCCO KCEM KRCS KWBGSY KNPPIS KNNPMNUC KWN KERG KLTN KALM KCCP KSUMPHUM KREL KGH KLIP KTLA KAWK KWMM KVRP KVRC KAID KSLG KDEMK KX KIF KNPR KCFC KFTFN KTFM KPDD KCERS KMOC KDEMAF KMEPI KEMS KDRM KEPREL KBTR KEDU KNP KIRL KNNR KMPT KISLPINR KTPN KA KJUSTH KPIN KDEV KTDD KAKA KFRP KWNM KTSD KINL KJUSKUNR KWWMN KECF KWBC KPRO KVBL KOM KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KEDM KFLD KLPM KRGY KNNF KICR KIFR KM KWMNCS KAWS KLAP KPAK KDDG KCGC KID KNSD KMPF KPFO KDP KCMR KRMS KNPT KNNNP KTIAPARM KDTB KNUP KPGOV KNAP KNNC KUK KSRE KREISLER KIVP KQ KTIAEUN KPALAOIS KRM KISLAO KWM KFLOA
PHUM PINR PTER PGOV PREL PREF PL PM PHSA PE PARM PINS PK PUNE PO PALESTINIAN PU PBTS PROP PTBS POL POLI PA PGOVZI POLMIL POLITICAL PARTIES POLM PD POLITICS POLICY PAS PMIL PINT PNAT PV PKO PPOL PERSONS PING PBIO PH PETR PARMS PRES PCON PETERS PRELBR PT PLAB PP PAK PDEM PKPA PSOCI PF PLO PTERM PJUS PSOE PELOSI PROPERTY PGOVPREL PARP PRL PNIR PHUMKPAL PG PREZ PGIC PBOV PAO PKK PROV PHSAK PHUMPREL PROTECTION PGOVBL PSI PRELPK PGOVENRG PUM PRELKPKO PATTY PSOC PRIVATIZATION PRELSP PGOVEAIDUKNOSWGMHUCANLLHFRSPITNZ PMIG PREC PAIGH PROG PSHA PARK PETER POG PHUS PPREL PS PTERPREL PRELPGOV POV PKPO PGOVECON POUS PGOVPRELPHUMPREFSMIGELABEAIDKCRMKWMN PWBG PMAR PREM PAR PNR PRELPGOVEAIDECONEINVBEXPSCULOIIPBTIO PARMIR PGOVGM PHUH PARTM PN PRE PTE PY POLUN PPEL PDOV PGOVSOCI PIRF PGOVPM PBST PRELEVU PGOR PBTSRU PRM PRELKPAOIZ PGVO PERL PGOC PAGR PMIN PHUMR PVIP PPD PGV PRAM PINL PKPAL PTERE PGOF PINO PHAS PODC PRHUM PHUMA PREO PPA PEPFAR PGO PRGOV PAC PRESL PORG PKFK PEPR PRELP PREFA PNG PGOVPHUMKPAO PRELECON PINOCHET PFOR PGOVLO PHUMBA PRELC PREK PHUME PHJM POLINT PGOVPZ PGOVKCRM PGOVE PHALANAGE PARTY PECON PEACE PROCESS PLN PRELSW PAHO PEDRO PRELA PASS PPAO PGPV PNUM PCUL PGGV PSA PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA PGIV PRFE POGOV PEL PBT PAMQ PINF PSEPC POSTS PHUMPGOV PVOV PHSAPREL PROLIFERATION PENA PRELTBIOBA PIN PRELL PGOVPTER PHAM PHYTRP PTEL PTERPGOV PHARM PROTESTS PRELAF PKBL PRELKPAO PKNP PARMP PHUML PFOV PERM PUOS PRELGOV PHUMPTER PARAGRAPH PERURENA PBTSEWWT PCI PETROL PINSO PINSCE PQL PEREZ PBS

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 08SURABAYA131, EAST JAVA: RAZOR THIN VICTORY IN RUN-OFF ELECTION SIGNALS

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #08SURABAYA131.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08SURABAYA131 2008-11-14 10:28 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Consulate Surabaya
VZCZCXRO0969
RR RUEHCHI RUEHCN RUEHDT RUEHHM
DE RUEHJS #0131/01 3191028
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 141028Z NOV 08
FM AMCONSUL SURABAYA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0329
RUEHJA/AMEMBASSY JAKARTA 0314
INFO RUEHZS/ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
RUEHWL/AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON 0150
RHHMUNA/HQ USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 0158
RUEHJS/AMCONSUL SURABAYA 0334
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 SURABAYA 000131 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR EAP/MTS, EAP/MLS, INR/EAP, DRL, DRL/AHW, EAP/PD 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM SOCI KISL ID
SUBJECT: EAST JAVA: RAZOR THIN VICTORY IN RUN-OFF ELECTION SIGNALS 
VOTER APATHY AND PARTY DISUNITY 
 
REF: A. SURABAYA 94 (EAST JAVA'S FIRST FEMALE GUBERNATORIAL CANDIDATE) 
     B. SURABAYA 88 (WEAK PARTY LOYALTY LEADS TO RUN-OFF ELECTION) 
     C. SURABAYA 51 (POLITICS IN EAST JAVA'S NU) 
 
SURABAYA 00000131  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
This message is sensitive but unclassified.  Please protect 
accordingly. 
 
1.  (SBU) Summary: In the November 4 run-off election to select 
East Java's governor, low turnout and a lack of party discipline 
saw former Provincial Secretary Soekarwo squeak out a narrow 
(less than 1%) victory over East Java's first female 
gubernatorial candidate Khofifah.  Although early exit polling 
unanimously called the election immediately for Khofifah, 
legally binding manual counts by the provincial election 
commission (KPUD) officially called the election for Soekarwo a 
week later.  East Java has avoided the sort of post election 
violence that has marred other recent hard-fought governors' 
races.  Most striking in this race was the clear failure of 
Indonesia's major national political parties to select viable 
candidates and get out the vote.  Local observers unanimously 
called this election in Indonesia's second largest province a 
message to presidential candidates that outreach to voters and 
focus on issues, rather than traditional party politics, is 
critical in direct elections. 
 
Too Close to Call 
---------------------- 
 
2.  (SBU) After none of the five original candidates garnered 
sufficient votes during the July 23 East Java Governor's 
election, a run-off between the top two tickets 
--Soekarwo/Syaifullah Yusuf (supported by the National Mandate 
Party (PAN), Party Democrat (PD), and the Prosperous Justice 
Party (PKS)) and Khofifah Indar Parawansa/Mudjiono (supported by 
the United Development Party (PPP), the Patriot Party, and a 
coalition of smaller parties) -- was held on November 4.  Early 
election-day exit polls suggested victory for Khofifah by less 
than 1% of the vote, well within the "quick counts" margin of 
error.  However, after a manual count of the votes, the KPU 
called the election for Soekarwo, by a margin of 0.4% or just 
60,233 votes (50.20% to 49.80%).  Observers credit unanimity 
among conservative NU voters on the island of Madura for 
Soekarwo's victory. 
 
3. (SBU)  Neither candidate generated much enthusiasm amongst 
the electorate before the run-off and the KPU's disorganization 
helped depress turnout.  Many voters in Surabaya and Sidoarjo, 
for example, received their voter registration cards just the 
night before the run-off.  According to the KPU, voter 
participation was only 54.32%, down from 61% during July's 
regular election.  Major party endorsements did not seem to help 
either candidate in the run-off. Most supporters of first-round 
losing candidates stayed home on November 4, according to data 
compiled by Indonesia's Survey Research Institution.  Alleging 
voter fraud in Madura, Khofifah has pledged to challenge the 
official results by filing a law suit with the Constitutional 
Court and the United Nations. 
 
Influence of Gender and Kiai 
------------------------------------ 
 
4. (SBU) Gender appears to have helped as well as hurt the first 
female gubernatorial candidate in East Java.  The Indonesian 
Survey Institute (LSI) noted that women chose Khofifah in large 
numbers. However, Soekarwo benefited from the reluctance of 
influential NU clerics, "Kiai", in the "Horse Shoe" regions 
ringing the Madura Sea to support a female candidate.  It also 
didn't hurt that Soekarwo's running mate has the "royal blood" 
of NU, as the grandson of one of the NU's founding fathers and 
nephew of former President Gus Dur.  With this patrimony, 
Soekarwo and Syaifullah Yusuf successfully overcame NU National 
Chairman Hasyim Muzadi's instruction to NU members to support 
Khofifah, head of the NU women's division.  Furthermore, PKS's 
decision to endorse Soekarwo was in part motivated by devout 
Muslim PKS rank and file unwilling to support a female 
candidate, according to a local party leader's press interview. 
 
What Happened to The Party Machines? 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
 
5.  (SBU) With their candidates defeated in the first round, the 
major parties were left flat-footed in choosing a candidate to 
endorse in the runoff.  Indonesia Democratic Party of Struggle 
(PDI-P) Chairman Megawati's endorsement of Khofifah in the 
run-off pulled some votes away from Soekarwo.  Khofifah garnered 
votes in the "Arek" and the "Mataram" areas of East Java, PDI-P 
 
SURABAYA 00000131  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
strongholds, suggesting PDI-P was successful in getting out the 
vote, at least in some areas.  Local observers told ConGen 
Surabaya that Megawati's instructions were followed by 100% of 
executive board members in East Java's regencies and cities, 
even if PDI-P voters did not necessarily vote as directed. 
Soekarwo received run-off endorsements from both the National 
Awakening Party (PKB) and Golkar, but in a repeat of the July 
election, neither party seemed able to deliver its voters to the 
polling stations in the face of internal party struggles. 
 
The Outlook for 2009 Presidential Election 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
 
6.  (SBU) Local political observers agreed that the election 
result would bolster President Yudhoyono's confidence about the 
ability of his small Democratic Party to compete with the 
political machines of large parties, such as PDI-P and Golkar. 
However, they argued the real message of this election was that 
voters were influenced more by issues and personal appeal than 
by political parties.  The low turnout indicates that voters 
were uninspired by the candidates on the ballot and unwilling to 
vote simply based on a party leader's instructions.  Neither 
candidate offered firm policy proposals, such as how to resolve 
the Sidoarjo mudflow crisis or address growing malnutrition 
rates, preferring instead to lobby religious leaders and others 
through gifts of cars and donations of food packages to poor 
communities.  In response, almost half of East Java's electorate 
decided there was no reason to vote.  How presidential 
candidates are able to reach these undecided/uninspired voters 
may be the key to success in 2009. 
MCCLELLAND