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Viewing cable 08STATE121002, RESPONSE TO CANADIAN REQUEST ON IMPLEMENTATION OF

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08STATE121002 2008-11-14 14:53 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED Secretary of State
VZCZCXYZ0000
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHC #1002 3191504
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O R 141453Z NOV 08
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA IMMEDIATE 0000
INFO RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0000
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0000
UNCLAS STATE 121002 
 
SIPDIS 
SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: EMIN ENRG ETTC IR KNNP MNUC PARM TRGY
SUBJECT: RESPONSE TO CANADIAN REQUEST ON IMPLEMENTATION OF 
NATIONAL MEASURES 
 
REF: (A) OTTAWA 1411 (B) STATE 112229 (C) OTTAWA 1368 
     (D) STATE 115454 
 
 1.  (U) This is an action request.  Please see paragraph 7. 
 
2.  (SBU) OBJECTIVE FOR OTTAWA: 
 
-- To inform appropriate Canadian Department of Foreign 
Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) interlocutors that 
ISN discussed coordination on Iran non-proliferation 
objectives with First Secretary (Political) David Hutchison 
on 5 November 2008. 
 
-- To request confirmation that Canada is willing to 
participate in the demarches recommended below. 
 
----------- 
BACKGROUND: 
----------- 
 
3. (SBU) Per reftels A, B, and C, the U.S. and Canada have 
been informally discussing two topics regarding the Iran 
nuclear issue: Iran,s upcoming nuclear conference on 30 
November, and preventing Iran,s acquisition of new supplies 
of uranium. On 5 November, ISN clarified these two issues and 
addressed how Canada might play an active role in assisting 
with coordinated demarche efforts in various countries. 
 
4. (SBU) Following the delivery of reftel B demarche to our 
interlocutors in Ottawa, DFAIT expressed interest in helping 
advocate against participation at Iran,s upcoming nuclear 
conference on 30 November. Canada also expressed interest in 
discouraging the sale of uranium to Iran by Kazakhstan (see 
REF A and non-paper at para 9). Both of these initiatives 
seek to prevent Iran from (a) legitimizing its nuclear 
program by preventing broad international participation in 
the conference, and (b) acquiring new supplies of uranium. 
 
5. (SBU) With respect to the nuclear conference, ISN offered 
its recommendation that demarches be undertaken first in NSG 
Participating Governments (PGs), and second, in a group of 
other countries of concern (See REF B).  The recommendation 
was made that the mechanics of delivery of these demarches be 
left in the hands of respective Embassies in demarche target 
posts (a separate instructions cable to those capitals will 
be provided upon confirmation of Canadian and French 
willingness to engage in these demarches. Note: France made a 
similar offer as Canada.) 
 
6. (SBU) Regarding the prevention of new uranium supplies to 
Iran, ISN clarified that this effort is the outgrowth of a 
separate project on the implementation of national measures 
on Iran.  ISN noted that Canada is a planned outreach country 
for this effort and that arrangements are being made now to 
brief Canada on the wider scope of possible activities in 
which Canada would be invited to participate (including 
demarches on countries whose firms intend to engage in 
oil/gas investments in Iran or where there are indications of 
significant financial or technical assistance relationships). 
 ISN conveyed the non-paper found at para 9 with suggested 
key messages and demarche assignments that have been agreed 
upon by the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy, and the 
United States.  ISN welcomed Canada's willingness to 
participate in this effort and requested Canada's views on 
both. 
 
-------------------------- 
ACTION REQUEST FOR OTTAWA: 
--------------------------- 
 
7.  (SBU) Using the background in paras 3-6, Post is 
requested to convey to the appropriate DFAIT officials the 
fact that ISN has discussed with the Canadian Embassy in 
Washington coordinated efforts on Iran nonproliferation 
objectives. During this meeting, the below list and non-paper 
was passed to our Canadian interlocutor and should be 
conveyed to the appropriate DFAIT officials for their 
information.  Post should also confirm Canadian willingness 
to participate in both efforts. 
 
8. (SBU) Begin List: 
 
Coordinated Demarche Strategy on Iranian Nuclear Conference: 
Canada 
 
Needing follow-up ) Recommend by 17 November: 
 
Brazil 
Greece 
Kazakhstan 
Romania 
S. Africa 
IAEA 
 
New approaches ) Recommend by 17 November: 
 
Algeria 
Egypt 
Indonesia 
Jordan 
 
End List: 
 
9: (SBU) Begin Nonpaper on Uranium Producers: 
 
-- As a consequence of its geology, Iran,s reported 
indigenous uranium reserves are insufficient to support its 
current nuclear power reactor program for a sustained period 
of time. 
 
-- The IAEA's report of 26 May 2008 indicates that over 
two-thirds of Iran's available uranium yellowcake has been 
processed at its Uranium Conversion Facility in Esfahan. 
Calculations based on Iran's rate of uranium conversion thus 
far suggest that Iran will run out of yellowcake in early 
2009. 
 
-- Iran could soon begin, or may have already begun, to look 
for outside suppliers of uranium to build up its stockpile of 
uranium. 
 
-- Under OP 3 of UNSC resolution 1737 and OP 8 of UNSC 
resolution 1803, states must prevent the export of specified 
items that could contribute to Iran,s enrichment-related, 
reprocessing or heavy water related activities, as described 
in S/2006/814, including uranium (unless low enriched, 
contained in fuel rods, and for a light water reactor). Given 
Iran,s publicly stated intention to pursue its 
enrichment-related activities, we believe it is critically 
important that the world's uranium suppliers prevent all/all 
exports of uranium to Iran unless contained in fuel rods and 
for an established light-water reactor. 
 
-- Moreover, Part 1, paragraph 10 of the NSG Guidelines now 
call for the suspension of all nuclear cooperation with a 
state that is found by the IAEA Board of Governors to be in 
noncompliance with its IAEA Safeguards Agreement. 
 
-- The Non-proliferation Principle included in paragraph 16 
of Part 1 of the NSG Guidelines provides that suppliers 
should allow transfers, notwithstanding all other provisions 
of the guidelines, only when satisfied that the transfers 
would not contribute to the proliferation of nuclear weapons 
or other nuclear explosive devices. 
 
-- Extreme vigilance in dealing with Iran and its nuclear 
program is necessary given the requirements of the UN 
Security Council and the significant threat Iran presents to 
international peace and security.  States, especially 
advanced nuclear countries, should not facilitate Iran's 
nuclear ambitions until all concerns regarding its intentions 
have been resolved and confidence in the exclusively peaceful 
nature of its program has been established. 
 
Major Producers ) Suggested Break-Out of Approaches 
 
United States:  India, Czech Republic, and Pakistan 
 
France: Namibia and Niger 
 
Germany: Romania and Ukraine 
 
United Kingdom:  Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan 
 
Canada:  Brazil and Russia 
 
Australia: China and South Africa 
 
End Nonpaper 
 
10.  (U) Post is requested to report any substantive 
responses by 21 November 2008.  Richard Nephew (ISN/RA, 
202-647-7680, NephewRM@state.sgov.gov) and Risa Mongiello 
(ISN/RA, 202-736-4730, MongiellRN@state.gov) are the 
Department's POC for this activity. Please include SIPDIS in 
your response. 
RICE