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Viewing cable 08STATE116943, DIPLOMATIC SECURITY DAILY
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| Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 08STATE116943 | 2008-11-03 18:12 | 2010-12-04 18:00 | SECRET//NOFORN | Secretary of State |
ORIGIN DS-00
INFO LOG-00 MFA-00 EEB-00 AF-00 AIT-00 A-00 CIAE-00
INL-00 DNI-00 DODE-00 DOEE-00 WHA-00 EAP-00 DHSE-00
EUR-00 OIGO-00 OBO-00 TEDE-00 INR-00 IO-00 JUSE-00
LAB-01 L-00 MMP-00 MOFM-00 MOF-00 NEA-00 DCP-00
ISN-00 NSCE-00 NSF-01 OES-00 OIG-00 P-00 ISNE-00
DOHS-00 FMPC-00 SP-00 IRM-00 SSO-00 SS-00 DPM-00
USSS-00 NCTC-00 CBP-00 DSCC-00 PRM-00 DRL-00 SCA-00
SAS-00 FA-00 /002R
P 031812Z NOV 08
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO SECURITY OFFICER COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI PRIORITY
INFO AMCONSUL CASABLANCA PRIORITY
XMT AMCONSUL JOHANNESBURG
AMCONSUL JOHANNESBURG
S E C R E T STATE 116943
NOFORN
E.O. 12958: DECL: MR
TAGS: ASEC
SUBJECT: DIPLOMATIC SECURITY DAILY
Classified By: Derived from Multiple Sources
SECRET//FGI//NOFORN//MR
Declassify on: Source marked 25X1-human, Date of source:
October 30, 2008
¶1. (U) Diplomatic Security Daily, November 1-3, 2008
¶2. (U) Significant Events ) Paragraphs 7-13
¶3. (U) Key Concerns ) Paragraphs 14-18
¶4. (U) Threats & Analysis ) Paragraphs 19-31
¶5. (U) Cyber Threats ) Paragraphs 32-45
¶6. (U) Suspicious Activity Incidents ) Paragraphs 46-49
¶7. (U) Significant Events
¶8. (SBU) EUR - Ireland - Emergency Action Committee (EAC)
Belfast met October 31 to discuss the armed forces homecoming
parade scheduled for November 2 and the planned simultaneous
counter-demonstrations by Sinn Fein and the dissident
republican group Eirigi. Discussions centered on the parade
route and the possibility of confrontations and violence in
different areas, as well as the presence of AmCits along the
parade and demonstration routes. The EAC decided the U.S.
Consulate General should release a Warden Message to warn
AmCits in Belfast. (Belfast 0137)
¶9. (SBU) Sweden - Approximately 12 to 15 protesters, carrying
banners and flags requesting fair treatment for the &Cuban
Five8 in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, made an unscheduled
appearance at U.S. Embassy Stockholm November 1. The group
emerged from the nearby German Embassy and stopped briefly in
front of Post. The RSO monitored the group; they did not
attempt to contact Embassy officials, but appeared more
interested in photographing the front of Post. The protesters
departed within a few minutes before Embassy police could
respond. No damages or injuries were reported. (RSO Stockholm
Spot Report)
¶10. (S//NF) NEA - Egypt - EAC Cairo convened October 20 to
review recent threat reporting and access any threats
specific to the planned visit by U.S. Secretary of State
Condoleezza Rice on November 8 and 9. The EAC agreed there is
no new, specific, and/or credible threat to U.S. interests in
Egypt, but also assessed that Egypt remains a very tempting
target for both indigenous and transnational terrorist
elements. EAC members also agreed to enhance security
measures at the American Presence Post in Alexandria. The EAC
continues to assess the Government of Egypt,s (GoE)
counterterrorism efforts as effective, and Post has a close
relationship with the GoE on security matters. (Appendix 1)
¶11. (S//NF) Kuwait - EAC Kuwait City convened November 2 to
discuss the security impact of recent threat reporting,
Embassy Kuwait election coverage, U.S. Marine Corps Birthday
Ball, and the upcoming visit of the former U.S. President
William J. Clinton. The EAC was briefed on the recent
reporting of possible terrorist surveillance of housing areas
within Kuwait City. Post is coordinating the release of this
information to the Kuwait Security Service for further
action. The RSO stated the Local Guard Force (LGF) Mobile
Patrol unit will increase coverage in the housing occupied by
Chief of Mission personnel within the named areas, defensive
counterintelligence training with be given to locally
employed staff, and a Security Notice reminding personnel to
remain vigilant in their personal security procedures will be
released. The EAC concluded that Post,s current security
posture is appropriate for the planned events. (Appendix 2)
¶12. (S//NF) EAP - Indonesia - EAC Jakarta convened October 30
to discuss the security implications of the anticipated
execution of the Bali bombers. The Government of Indonesia
(GoI) recently announced they would be executed during the
first week of November. Rumors are circulating around Jakarta
that retaliatory attacks and demonstrations by those who
support the bombers are possible. However, there is no
specific or credible information regarding the planning of
these types of attacks. One report mentioned possible suicide
bomber attacks on shopping malls in Jakarta, specifically the
Kelapa Gading mall in northern Jakarta, but without details.
The U.S. Embassy assesses the likelihood of a terrorist
attack conducted against U.S. or other Western interests in
direct response to the executions is low. (Appendix source 3)
¶13. (SBU) SCA - Pakistan - A motorcade carrying Pakistani
Deputy Inspector General of Police Syed Akhtar Ali Shah was
targeted by a suicide vehicle-borne improvised explosive
device (IED) attack in Marden Province on October 31 at
around 2:30 p.m. Ali Shah and 20 others were wounded, and
nine police officers were killed in the attack. On November
1, at approximately 2:33 a.m., an explosion occurred at a
police substation approximately 2,000 meters from the U.S.
Consulate Peshawar residential area and official annexes. One
police officer was killed and several other individuals were
badly wounded. It is undetermined at this time whether the
explosion was from a rocket or an explosion charge placed at
the structure. The RSO will monitor these attacks. (RSO
Peshawar Spot Report)
¶14. (U) Key Concerns
¶15. (S//FGI//NF) NEA - Lebanon - Al-Qa,ida affiliate to
attack U.S. Embassy motorcade: According to a source of the
Jordanian General Intelligence Directorate, as of
mid-October, al-Qa,ida-affiliated elements in the Ayn
al-Hilwah Palestinian refugee camp plan to attack a U.S.
Embassy motorcade in Beirut. The men planning the operation
had already collected an unspecified amount of explosives and
a white 1983 Mercedes, which was currently inside the Shatila
Palestinian refugee camp. The Mercedes was to be rigged with
the explosives. (Appendix source 4)
¶16. (S//FGI//NF) SCA - Maldives - Continued monitoring of
al-Qa,ida associates: The Maldives Police Service continued
to investigate and monitor the activities of Maldives-based
al-Qa,ida associates Yoosuf Izadhy, Easa Ali, and Hasnain
Abdullah Hameedh (a.k.a. Hameed). Izadhy was reportedly in
contact with a militant group in Waziristan, which allegedly
maintained unspecified links to al-Qa,ida. Izadhy was
clandestinely working to recruit others into his
organization, specifically seeking individuals who had
undergone basic terrorism training in Pakistan. Izadhy
planned to create a terrorist group in the Maldives with the
assistance of the Waziristan-based group. Izadhy planned to
send his members to Waziristan for training. Hameedh was in
close contact with a number of individuals who had undergone
training in Pakistan, including individuals who were members
of Jamaat-ul Muslimeen and completed basic and advanced
training by Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LT) in Pakistan. They followed
the ideology of Abu Easa.
¶17. (S//FGI//NF) DS/TIA/ITA notes, while the operational
aspirations of Yoosuf Izadhy (Terrorist Identities Datamart
Environment (TIDE) number 17312323), Easa Ali (TIDE number
17312652), and Hasnain Abdullah Hameedh (TIDE number
20686145) are unclear; past reporting suggests Maldivian
extremists have demonstrated interest in actively
participating in global jihadi activities by attempting to
arrange travel and terrorist training in Pakistan. While many
Maldivian participants of extremist online forums aimed to
ultimately fight Coalition forces in Iraq and Afghanistan,
mid-October 2007 debrief information following the September
29 bombing in Male that targeted tourists indicates at least
two of the operatives participated in the attack in exchange
for travel from the islands after the operation and arranged
study at a madrassa in Pakistan.
¶18. (S//NF) Specific links to al-Qa,ida remain unclear;
although, reporting from May detailed recruitment activity by
Maldivian national Ahmed Zaki of Maldivians into the Kashmiri
extremist group LT madrassas and training camps in Pakistan.
A variety of reports from 2006 details linkages between
Maldivians belonging to a group known as
Jama-ah-tul-Muslimeen (JTM) and individuals participating in
an anti-American Islamic extremist online forum called Tibyan
Publications. JTM is an extremist group based in the UK that
follows an extremist ideology known as Takfiir that actively
encourages violent jihad and supports criminality against
apostate states. (Appendix sources 5-18)
¶19. (U) Threats & Analysis
¶20. (S//NF) WHA - Mexico - Violence spikes again in Tijuana:
According to a mid-level Baja California state police
official, a turf war between the Arellano Felix Organization
(AFO) and the Sinaloa Cartel has caused another increase in
violence in Tijuana. The Mexican Government,s
counternarcotics efforts -- in the form of 3,300 military and
police assets patrolling the area under Operation Tijuana --
have severely weakened the AFO,s operations. The Sinaloa
Cartel, hoping to capitalize on the AFO,s weaknesses, is
battling for control of Tijuana,s drug plaza. While the AFO
assassins are skilled, Sinaloa Cartel hit men are poorly
trained and have no aversion to public shootings; however, if
the Sinaloa Cartel successfully ousts the AFO from Tijuana,
DS/TIA/ITA notes the levels of violence should decrease.
While residents and visitors are not being targeted, the
likelihood of being in the wrong place at the wrong time is
of increasing concern. Cartel targets are being killed during
daytime hours in public areas of Tijuana, including
restaurants, shopping centers, and near school buildings. The
DoS, Travel Alert for Mexico was extended for six months on
October 14 to reflect the current and widely reported crime
and violence occurring throughout Mexico. (Open sources;
Appendix sources 19-20)
¶21. (U) AF - Cameroon - An examination of the background,
goals, and tactics of the Niger Delta Defense and Security
Council and the Bakassi Freedom Fighters: (S//NF) The October
31 kidnapping of approximately 10 hostages off the shores of
the Bakassi Peninsula has magnified the role of two groups --
the Bakassi Freedom Fighters (BFF) and the Niger Delta
Defense and Security Council (NDDSC) -- in the increasing
insecurity in the Bakassi. The kidnappings, an overview of
the NDDSC,s and BFF,s background, and an examination of
their past operations, highlight the groups, possible intent
to use novel, deadly, and unprecedented tactics to achieve
their goals.
¶22. (SBU) In the early morning of October 31, a group of
armed men in three boats attacked a French Total vessel named
Bourbon Sagita, which was located off the Cameroonian shore
between Bakassi and Limbe. Although no Americans were
directly impacted, at least seven French citizens, one
Tunisian, one Senegalese, and several Cameroonian nationals
were kidnapped; five remaining oil workers were left on the
boat. Nobody was injured in the attack.
¶23. (SBU) According to unconfirmed media reports, shortly
after the raid, the BFF, part of a larger and shadowy
alliance of the NDDSC, claimed responsibility for the attacks
and threatened to kill the hostages, stating, &The 10 are in
our hands. If you don,t tell the government of Cameroon to
come here and discuss with us, we will kill them all in three
days.8 On November 1, the NDDSC/BFF withdrew the threat, but
stated it would hold the hostages until the government opened
negotiations with them.
¶24. (S//NF) The NDDSC/BFF is likely referring to discussions
over the status of the Bakassi Peninsula in its statement.
The region was transferred from Nigeria to Cameroon on August
14, per an International Court of Justice ruling. According
to e-mails it sent to media outlets, the NDDSC/BFF merged
into an official alliance at the end of July in an attempt to
forestall the hand over. Led by Commander Ebi Dari and
General A.G. Dasuo, who claim they are fighting for
&self-determination and freedom8 of the Bakassi Peninsula
which contains a majority of Nigerian citizens. They are also
demanding that two of their fighters captured in July be
released and that Nigerians on the Bakassi Peninsula be
compensated.
¶25. (S//NF) An intelligence and open media search of the BFF
provided negligible results. Meanwhile, although little
background information is known about the NDDSC, it claims to
have approximately 1,050 fighters. It has been in existence
since at least 2002 and previously conducted low-level
attacks against Cameroonian troops on the Bakassi. It can
also be linked to three deadly operations prior to the hand
over of the controversial region. In the most macabre raid,
on June 9, the NDDSC allegedly killed and mutilated six
members of a Cameroonian delegation visiting the Peninsula,
including the deputy subregional commander. It also claimed
responsibility for a November 2007 raid on a Cameroonian
military outpost which killed 21 soldiers; this claim remains
unconfirmed. (Please see the July 26 DS Daily for further
information on the pre-hand over security incidents in the
Bakassi.)
¶26. (S//NF) Although the post-hand over period has been
defined by a series of attacks, the NDDSC/BFF has released
statements denying culpability in some of those operations.
These include a September 28 bank robbery in Limbe and a
September 13 attack against a trawler off the Bakassi
Peninsula. The NDDSC/BFF may be responsible for some
post-hand over operations, while others may have been
conducted by different militants in the region, including in
the Niger Delta. Despite similar tactics in all these
operations, including the use of speedboats carrying heavily
armed masked men, at this time, there are no clear
indications the NDDSC/BFF has a defined relationship with the
Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) or
any other prominent Niger Delta group.
¶27. (S//NF) Instead, the series of raids by the NDDSC/BFF may
possibly signify new tactics being pursued in the Bakassi
region. In its early raids, the NDDSC/BFF primarily used
deadly and brutal force against the Cameroonian military, but
often spared expatriates and civilians. Two recent attacks,
however -- the June 9 attack and the October 31
hostage-taking operation -- have demonstrated its desire to
expand its targets. In the June 6 raid, the NDDSC targeted a
political delegation and mutilated a deputy subregional
commander, the equivalent of a governor. It is unclear if the
NDDSC was directly targeting the governor; but, nevertheless,
the group demonstrated its desire to also kill politicians.
For its part, the October 31 attacks was the first kidnapping
of expatriates off the coast of Cameroon.
¶28. (S//NF) Also of concern is the NDDSC/BFF,s intent to
hold hostages indefinitely after initially threatening to
kill them. Whereas MEND and other Delta groups kidnapped
hostages primarily to garner ransom money or to force oil
companies to scale back operations, they had seldom directly
harmed or threatened to kill hostages. They also often
released hostages shortly after their capture. Moreover,
given its intent to hold the hostages for a political
objective, the NDDSC/BFF may find it convenient to continue
operations against expatriates in the region to pressure the
Cameroonian Government and to ensure that its political
demands are met. (Open sources; Yaound 1071; 0754; 0706;
Appendix sources 21-28)
¶29. (S//FGI//NF) SCA - Bangladesh - Rejection of IDP to
register for December elections: As of late October, the
Bangladeshi Election Commission was set to reject the Islamic
Democratic Party,s (IDP,s) attempt to register for the
December parliamentary elections. The IDP is a nascent
political party formed by senior members of the Islamic
terrorist group Harakat-ul-Jihad-i-Islami Bangladesh
(HUJI-B). Bangladesh,s Directorate General of Forces
Intelligence (DGFI) supported the formation of the IDP as a
way to bring HUJI-B into the mainstream and reported it
tightly monitored the group,s activities; although, HUJI-B
has never renounced the use of violence to implement its
vision of transforming Bangladesh into a Muslim theocracy.
According to U.S. Embassy Dhaka, which strongly opposed the
creation of the IDP, the party and its leadership will likely
be angered by the decision and may respond with violence
possibly against the commission or the U.S. Mission or
interests.
¶30. (S//NF) Arrests and monitoring have undoubtedly hindered
HUJI-B,s capabilities in recent years, and it is entirely
plausible the group is pursuing the creation of a political
wing to improve its ability to support and carry out
terrorist activity. A late-September assessment from
Bangladesh,s National Security Intelligence Organization
(NSI) voiced concern that the party,s creation would free
extremists to pursue extremist activity under the cover of a
moderate front organization. Indeed, there are no indications
IDP would garner a significant number of votes. Analysis from
the DoS, Office of Research noted the majority of
Bangladeshis want Awami League and Bangladesh National Party
leaders Sheikh Hasina and Khaleda Zia to participate in the
December elections. Interestingly, 80 percent stated they
would ignore a call by either party to boycott the vote.
One-third further stated they would join street protests in
the face of a cancellation of elections.
¶31. (S//FGI//NF) Although there is little information
available regarding HUJI-B,s current capabilities, its
membership likely does retain the ability to manufacture and
use explosives and has previously favored targeting
high-profile individuals for attack. While there is no
specific reporting at the present time detailing plots
against U.S. interests in Bangladesh, the group has publicly
articulated its anti-Western and -Indian stance, including
signing Usama Bin Ladin,s 1998 fatwa against the West. In
regards to HUJI-B,s capabilities, DGFI,s, Rapid Action
Battalion,s (RAB,s), and NSI,s assessments vary
significantly. Following the early-March U.S. designation of
HUJI-B as a foreign terrorist organization, RAB assessed
HUJI-B would not respond with violence due to the severe
degradation of the group,s capability and leadership
structure from arrests and active surveillance. Some member
who wanted to independently attack Western interests,
however, remained technically capable of carrying out
low-level attacks using small arms, grenades, and IEDs. DGFI
likewise reported HUJI-B was &an organization on the run8
and that it did not pose a threat to U.S. interests in
Bangladesh. NSI conversely assessed HUJI-B would react
violently to the designation and would attempt to conduct an
attack against the U.S. official presence in Dhaka; although,
there was no information available detailing such an
operation. Thus far, HUJI-B has not carried out an attack
against American interests in Bangladesh, but the group has
been linked to assassination attempts on intellectuals,
journalists, and politicians, including two thwarted attempts
on the life of Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina during public
addresses and a grenade attack that injured the British high
commissioner in May 2004. (&Bangladeshis have high hopes for
national elections,8 DoS Office of Research; Appendix
sources 29-40)
¶32. (U) Cyber Threats
¶33. (S//REL TO USA, FVEY) WHA - CTAD comment: On October 16,
at least one e-mail account within the Government of Canada
received a Trojanized message from a Yahoo account claiming
to represent a U.S. embassy. The bogus subject line was an
invitation for a private meeting with a named DoS employee.
The attached Microsoft Word document was a malicious
&invitation8 file that, when opened, attempts to beacon and
create a connection to &jingl.cable.nu8 via port 8080. The
&cable.nu8 domain remains one of concern, as it has
historically been associated with activity from Chinese
hacker organizations.
¶34. (U) EUR - CTAD comment: The European Commission (EC) this
week proposed legislation to establish a Critical
Infrastructure Warning Information Network (CIWIN) to improve
information sharing among European Union (EU) member nations.
The proposed legislation would enable the EC to launch and
manage the CIWIN, a secure information technology (IT) system
aimed at sharing knowledge on threats, vulnerabilities, and
protection of critical infrastructures. The CIWIN would be a
voluntary tool for transmitting sensitive information and
would also include a rapid alert system for critical
infrastructure, allowing EU nations to post alerts on
immediate threats.
¶35. (U) AF - CTAD comment: Sudanese law enforcement recently
reported the arrest of three hackers who have allegedly
attacked more than 300 government and public websites during
the last few months. Among the hacked sites was that of the
National Telecommunication Corporation, which is responsible
for oversight of telecommunication service providers as well
as many other aspects of Sudanese IT and network stability.
The three highly skilled hackers, all of whom are Sudanese,
reportedly caused significant damage to their targets, but
their motivation for the attacks and any potential group
affiliations are yet undetermined.
¶36. (C) NEA - CTAD comment: On October 21, officials from the
Kuwaiti Central Agency for Information (CAIT) and the
National Security Bureau (NSB) expressed concerns for foreign
and domestic threats to Kuwaiti information systems.
According to these organizations, some of the issues plaguing
Government of Kuwait (GoK) networks are suspected attacks
from Iranian hackers, insider corruption and misuse of
resources, and a lack of sufficient interagency coordination
and guidance for monitoring users, activities and
investigating incidents. For example, the groups, inability
to adequately examine malicious software (malware) injections
or internal abuse of system access continues to hinder the
GoK,s capacity to ensure the protection of sensitive
information. Therefore, the CAIT and NSB are interested in
learning more about U.S. cyber security programs as well as
receiving additional training and support.
¶37. (S//NF) EAP - CTAD comment: Between September 29 and
October 2, a conference was held by the German Federal Office
for the Protection of the Constitution (BfV). During this
conference, the BfV delivered a briefing on its analysis of
the cyber threat posed by the People,s Republic of China
(PRC), which appears to mirror conclusions drawn by the U.S.
Intelligence Community. The BfV surmises the intention of PRC
actors is espionage, and the primary attack vector used in
their malicious activity is socially engineered e-mail
messages containing malware attachments and/or embedded links
to hostile websites. According to reporting, &from October
2006 to October 2007, 500 such e-mail operations were
conducted against a wide range of German organizations,8 and
the attacks appear to be increasing in scope and
sophistication. The socially engineered e-mail messages
delivered to German computer systems were spoofed to appear
to come from trusted sources and contain information
&targeted specifically to the recipient,s interests,
duties, or current events.8 This malicious activity has
targeted a wide variety of German organizational levels to
include &German military, economic, science and technology,
commercial, diplomatic, research and development, as well as
high-level government (ministry and chancellery) systems.8
In addition, German intelligence reporting indicates an
increase in activity was detected immediately preceding
events such as German Government, or commercial, negotiations
involving Chinese interests.
¶38. (U) SCA - CTAD comment: The National Science Foundation
and the Pakistan Higher Education Commission recently
announced the establishment of a Pakistan extension to an
international high-speed network already connecting U.S. and
EC systems. The new portion of the network links Pakistani
scientists and students to facilities in the U.S. through
additional connections to Singapore and Japan. This project
emerged from February 2007 discussions of the U.S.-Pakistan
Joint Committee on Science and Technology that sought to
promote cooperation and innovation among education and
business sectors. (Open sources; Appendix sources 41-43)
¶39. (S//NF) Worldwide - BC conducting CNE on USG systems:
¶40. (S//NF) Key highlights:
BC actively targets USG and other organizations via
socially engineered e-mail messages.
BC actors recently compromised the systems of a U.S. ISP
to carry out CNE on a USG network.
Additional IP addresses were identified this month as
compromised and used for BC activity.
BC has targeted DoS networks in the past and may again in
the future via spoofed e-mail.
¶41. (S//REL TO USA, FVEY) Source paragraph: &Byzantine
Candor (BC) actors have compromised multiple systems located
at a U.S. Internet service provider (ISP) and have used the
systems as part of BC,s U.S.-based attack infrastructure
since at least March, targeting multiple victims including at
least one USG agency.8
¶42. (S//NF) CTAD comment: Since late 2002, USG organizations
have been targeted with social-engineering online attacks by
BC actors. BC, an intrusion subset of Byzantine Hades
activity, is a series of related computer network intrusions
affecting U.S. and foreign systems and is believed to
originate from the PRC. BC intruders have relied on
techniques including exploiting Windows system
vulnerabilities and stealing login credentials to gain access
to hundreds of USG and cleared defense contractor systems
over the years. In the U.S., the majority of the systems BC
actors have targeted belong to the U.S. Army, but targets
also include other DoD services as well as DoS, Department of
Energy, additional USG entities, and commercial systems and
networks. BC actors typically gain initial access with the
use of highly targeted socially engineered e-mail messages,
which fool recipients into inadvertently compromising their
systems. The intruders then install malware such as
customized keystroke-logging software and command-and-control
(C&C) utilities onto the compromised systems and exfiltrate
massive amounts of sensitive data from the networks. This
month, BC actors attempted to compromise the network of a
U.S. political organization via socially engineered e-mail
messages (see CTAD Daily Read File dated October 16).
¶43. (S//REL TO USA, ACGU) CTAD comment: Also discovered this
month by USG analysts was the compromise of several computer
systems located at a commercial ISP within the United States.
According to Air Force Office of Special Investigations
(AFOSI) reporting, hackers based in Shanghai and linked to
the PRC,s People,s Liberation Army (PLA) Third Department
have been using these compromised systems as part of the
larger BC attack infrastructure to facilitate computer
network exploitation (CNE) of U.S. and foreign information
systems. Since March, the responsible actors have used at
least three separate systems at the unnamed ISP in multiple
network intrusions and have exfiltrated data via these
systems, including data from at least one USG agency. AFOSI
reporting indicates, on March 11, BC actors gained access to
one system at the ISP, onto which the actors transferred
multiple files, including several C&C tools. From here, the
intruders used the tools to obtain a list of usernames and
password hashes for the system. Next, on April 22, BC actors
accessed a second system at the ISP, where they transferred
additional software tools. From April through October 13, the
BC actors used this computer system to conduct CNE on
multiple victims. During this time period, the actors
exfiltrated at least 50 megabytes of e-mail messages and
attached documents, as well as a complete list of usernames
and passwords from an unspecified USG agency. Additionally,
multiple files were transferred to the compromised ISP system
from other BC-associated systems that have been previously
identified collecting e-mail messages from additional
victims. The third system at the U.S. ISP was identified as
compromised on August 14, when BC actors transferred a
malicious file onto it named
&salaryincrease-surveyandforecast.zip.8 According to AFOSI
analysis, BC actors use this system to host multiple webpages
that allow other BC-compromised systems to download malicious
files or be redirected to BC C&C servers.
¶44. (S//REL TO USA, FVEY) CTAD comment: Additional DoD
reporting this month indicates BC actors have used multiple
other systems to conduct CNE against U.S. and foreign systems
from February through September. A October 23 DoD cable
states Shanghai-based hackers associated with BC activity and
linked to the PLA have successfully targeted multiple U.S.
entities during this time period. The cable details dozens of
identified Internet Protocol (IP) addresses associated with
BC activity as well as the dates of their activity. All of
the IP addresses listed resolve to the CNC Group Shanghai
Province Network in Shanghai, and all the host names of the
addresses contained Asian keyboard settings as well as China
time zone settings. Most of these IP addresses were
identified as responsible for direct CNE of U.S. entities,
including unspecified USG organizations, systems and
networks. Interestingly, although the actors using each IP
address practiced some degree of operational security to
obfuscate their identities, one particular actor was
identified as lacking in these security measures. On June 7,
the BC actor, using an identified IP address, was observed
using a Taiwan-based online bulletin board service for
personal use.
¶45. (S//NF) CTAD comment: BC actors have targeted the DoS in
the past on multiple occasions with socially engineered
e-mail messages containing malicious attached files and have
successfully exfiltrated sensitive information from DoS
unclassified networks. As such, it is possible these actors
will attempt to compromise DoS networks in the future. As BC
activity continues across the DoD and U.S., DoS personnel
should practice conscientious Internet and e-mail use and
should remain informed on BH activity. (Appendix sources
44-46)
¶46. (U) Suspicious Activity Incidents
¶47. (SBU) EUR - Azerbaijan - A vehicle with Iranian license
plates was parked adjacent to U.S. Embassy Baku October 29.
The driver was the only occupant in the car. Another subject
appeared and got into the car, which then took off. The
police have been asked to check the vehicle registration.
Post is awaiting the results. (SIMAS Event: Baku-00507-2008)
¶48. (SBU) EAP - Taiwan - An Asian male with a professional
video camera stood across the street from the American
Institute in Taiwan (AIT) October 29. He filmed a number of
buildings in the area and possibly the AIT. After a few
minutes, the subject departed the area on a motor scooter.
(SIMAS Event: Taipei-00194-2008)
¶49. (SBU) Taiwan - An Asian male stood in front of the Bank
of Taiwan and photographed various buildings -- including the
AIT -- on October 31. An LGF member stopped and questioned
the man, who refused to show identification or the pictures
he took. He left the area on foot shortly afterward. (SIMAS
Event: Taipei-00195-2008)
SECRET//FGI//NOFORN//MR
Full Appendix with sourcing available upon request.
RICE