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Viewing cable 08RABAT1100, SCENESETTER FOR CODEL HASTINGS

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08RABAT1100 2008-11-25 14:09 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Rabat
VZCZCXRO9186
OO RUEHNP RUEHTRO
DE RUEHRB #1100/01 3301409
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 251409Z NOV 08
FM AMEMBASSY RABAT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9367
INFO RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS 4932
RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN 0631
RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN 0684
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 2462
RUEHLI/AMEMBASSY LISBON 1229
RUEHMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID 6070
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME 1615
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 3551
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 0377
RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS 9746
RUEHCL/AMCONSUL CASABLANCA 4399
RUEHFT/AMCONSUL FRANKFURT 4039
RUEHJM/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM 1971
RUEHMIL/AMCONSUL MILAN 0050
RUEHNP/AMCONSUL NAPLES 0008
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE 0026
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 RABAT 001100 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR H, NEA/RA AND NEA/MAG 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: OREP PGOV PHUM PREL PBTS KDEM AG WI MO
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR CODEL HASTINGS 
 
------- 
Summary 
------- 
 
1.  (SBU) Representative Hastings, my staff and I warmly 
welcome your visit.  As you are aware, Morocco is a member of 
the OSCE Mediterranean Partnership and has hosted OSCE 
meetings in Rabat, but there is potential for more 
engagement.  Morocco has given us exemplary cooperation in 
the struggle against terrorism and it serves as a regional 
model for economic change and democratic reform.  Our 
military and political cooperation is growing, and as a 
result, Morocco has been designated as a "Major Non-NATO 
Ally."  Morocco also maintains low-key contacts with Israel 
due in part to the many Israelis of Moroccan origin. 
Morocco's principal foreign tie is with Europe and has 
advanced status with the European Union (EU).  Morocco is one 
of our strongest allies in the Broader Middle East and North 
Africa (BMENA) region, and its top priority is U.S. support 
for its position on the Western Sahara territorial dispute 
and for integration in North Africa. 
 
2.  (SBU) Since your last visit in 2004, Morocco has remained 
a country "on the move", in the throes, albeit unevenly, of 
change and reform.  Economic growth has averaged about six 
percent per year and investment, tourism and remittances have 
boomed, although they could be threatened by the downturn in 
Europe.  Slums are coming down, and according to official 
statistics, so is unemployment.  Freedom of the press has 
expanded to a level not seen here ever before and beyond the 
rest of the region, but there are still some restrictions, 
and those who challenge them can suffer heavy fines, libel 
judgments and more rarely, jail.  Political freedoms have 
grown as well, although they remain constrained by a system 
with roots going back hundreds of years.  Neither the 
Parliament nor the 33 political parties with seats in it have 
much power.  Most voters stayed away from the last 
parliamentary election, in 2007, which saw the first 
international observation ever, largely achieved and funded 
by the USG.  (The OSCE indicated it did not have enough 
notice to participate.)  Additional reforms could lead to 
democracy, but, with stability a priority, it could take 
decades.  End Summary. 
 
--------------- 
External Issues 
--------------- 
 
3.  (SBU) OSCE:  Morocco maintains a limited but growing role 
as a Mediterranean Partner for Cooperation with the 
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). 
Both the executive and legislative branches of government 
have participated in OSCE meetings and activities at high 
levels.  At the November 2007 OSCE Ministerial in Madrid, the 
Moroccan representative reiterated the Government of 
Morocco's (GOM's) commitment to partnership with the OSCE, 
particularly in combating terrorism, organized crime, illegal 
migration and human trafficking.  In December 2007, Morocco 
and Spain co-hosted an OSCE/International Labor Organization 
(ILO) seminar in Rabat to launch the Mediterranean edition of 
the Handbook on Establishing Effective Labor Migration 
Policies (with Israeli participation).  Morocco hosted an 
earlier Mediterranean Seminar in Rabat in 2005. 
 
4.  (SBU) OSCE Continued:  More recently, OSCE Mediterranean 
Partners for Cooperation Parliamentary Assembly President 
Goran Lennmarker and Vice President Joao Soares visited 
Morocco in April 2008 and met with the Speaker of the 
parliament's lower house, other parliamentarians, the Foreign 
Minister, and the President of the Consultative Council of 
Human Rights.  In October 2008, Morocco sent three 
representatives to the Man-Portable Air Defense Systems 
(MANPADS) conference in Vienna, where they discussed concerns 
over the threat that MANPADS pose to the region and the 
 
RABAT 00001100  002 OF 004 
 
 
movement of these weapons from conflict zones into the Sahara 
basin. 
 
5.  (SBU) Regional Military and Political Engagement:  The 
GOM is also working toward a NATO Mediterranean Partnership 
Agreement.  In October, Morocco signed an Advanced Status 
Agreement with the European Union, which could give Morocco 
complete free market access to the European Economic Area 
when finally implemented.  It also provides for greater 
co-ordination on other issues.  This is a unique enhancement 
of the Barcelona Process status, but many details will be 
filled in only through the course of lengthy discussions. 
Morocco also participates in French President Sarkozy's 
nascent Mediterranean Union. 
 
6.  (SBU) Peacekeeping:  The GOM has robust experience in the 
realm of peacekeeping operations dating back to the 1960s. 
It has signed on to Operation Active Endeavor and is 
contributing to peacekeeping operations in Kosovo, under NATO 
leadership.  Morocco also partnered with NATO in peacekeeping 
operations in Bosnia and with the United Nations (UN) in 
Angola, Cambodia, Haiti and Somalia.  Current UN deployments 
are in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Cote 
d'Ivoire.  The GOM has expressed interest in expanding its 
peacekeeping capacity. 
 
7.  (SBU) Border Troubles with Algeria:  The Moroccan 
relationship with Algeria is difficult, and the border 
between the two countries was closed by Algeria and remains 
closed.  While the King and other GOM officials have publicly 
proposed opening the border and upgrading bilateral relations 
between the two countries, their entreaties have been 
repeatedly rebuffed.  The GOA has linked progress on the 
border to "all issues," particularly the Western Sahara. 
 
8.  (SBU) Western Sahara:  Moroccan foreign policy is 
dominated by defending and seeking international recognition 
of its sovereignty claims over Western Sahara.  The issue 
remains the most visible source of tension with Algeria, 
which has historically supported the POLISARIO's quest 
efforts for independence by way of a UN-sponsored referendum. 
 The issue led Morocco to leave the African Union and has 
been an obstacle to regional integration through the Arab 
Maghreb Union.  In April 2007, Morocco proposed a new 
autonomy plan for Western Sahara, and a series of 
UN-sponsored negotiations with the POLISARIO began in 
Manhasset, New York.  The Moroccan proposal, deemed "serious 
and credible" by the USG, would provide Sahrawis, the 
indigenous people of Western Sahara, autonomy in 
administering local affairs while respecting Moroccan 
sovereignty over the territory.  There have been four rounds 
of talks but none since March 2008.  After the April 2008 
renewal of the mandate of the UN peacekeeping mission, the 
USG announced it considered independence for the territory 
"not realistic." 
 
9.  (SBU) Western Sahara Continued:  Following the 
controversial lapsing of the contract of the former UN 
Secretary General's Personal Envoy, the UN selected retired 
U.S. Ambassador Chris Ross to be the new Personal Envoy, but 
the GOM has withheld its endorsement, pending review of a 
mandate from the UN that it hopes would favor its position. 
The USG has called for the new envoy to maintain past 
progress. 
 
10.  (SBU) Western Sahara Continued:  Sahara experienced 
gross violations of human rights from 1975 until the end of 
the Hassan II regime and repression intensified after the 
short-lived Sahrawi "intifada" of 2005.  Since late 2006, 
Morocco has slowly improved the human rights situation in the 
territories.  Arbitrary arrests have sharply diminished and 
beatings and physical abuse by security forces have all but 
disappeared.  Even dissenters now can travel freely.  They 
cannot, however, publish or speak publicly in support of 
 
RABAT 00001100  003 OF 004 
 
 
independence, or a vote on self-determination.  In 2008, 
known abusers were transferred, further easing the situation. 
 
--------------- 
Internal Issues 
--------------- 
 
11.  (SBU) Current Government:  Prime Minister Abbas El 
Fassi's government, formed after the September 2007 
legislative elections, is built on a minority coalition. 
There has been periodic speculation that it might not last 
for the full five-year mandate of Parliament.  El Fassi's 
government, filled with young technocrats from within and 
outside his Istiqlal party, has performed better than many 
expected, however, and it now looks capable of a full term. 
El Fassi has participated extensively in international events 
and diplomacy.  Internal democracy is growing within 
political parties.  A political formation founded by Fouad 
Ali El Himma, an intimate of the King, has evolved into a new 
Party of Authenticity and Modernity (PAM) by grouping several 
smaller parties.  It has now constituted the largest 
political bloc in Parliament, and could be prepared to lead 
should the current coalition falter.  We currently see no 
prospect for a significant shift in Morocco's foreign and 
security policies.  However, neither Parliament nor the Prime 
Minister has much say in these issues, which are managed by 
the Throne directly with concerned ministries. 
 
12.  (SBU) Parliamentary Reform:  Morocco's political parties 
and the bicameral parliament are weak and structurally 
hamstrung from taking legislative initiatives or strongly 
articulating dissent.  The Parliament provides no effective 
check on the monarchy or government.  Changing the 
Constitution would be necessary in order to change the power 
imbalance and institute formal democracy, but both Parliament 
and parties will have to improve their capacity and 
performance first.  Nonetheless, both parties and Parliament 
have made some technical improvements, largely thanks to 
USG-funded programs from the National democratic Institute 
(NDI) and the State University of New York (SUNY), which have 
modestly improved the body's administrative capacity.  These 
include establishment of a budget analysis office, a verbatim 
transcription service, and a consistent forum for training 
and debate among parliamentary members and staff. 
 
13.  (SBU) Parliamentary Reform Continued:  Although the 
September 2007 parliamentary elections were the most 
transparent in the country's history, record low 
participation (i.e., 37 percent of registered voters) 
reflects the lack of voter confidence in the institution. 
The State Department's Middle East Partnership Initiative 
(MEPI) funded NDI to run the first ever international 
observation.  Morocco only consented to this less than three 
months before voting; the OSCE, when consulted, declined to 
participate, as it was too little notice. 
 
14.  (SBU) Human Rights and Reform:  King Mohammed VI has 
embarked on an ambitious and continuous program of human 
rights reforms that includes the Arab world's first truth 
commission, a revised family code and growing governmental 
transparency and accountability.  2008 has seen some 
incidents of concern related to freedoms of expression and 
press.  Although Morocco is a paragon of reform in the 
region, the reforms are still not deeply rooted in law or 
Constitution and could be rolled back.  Continued support and 
encouragement from partners like the United States and Europe 
are essential. 
 
15.  (SBU) Counterterrorism:  The terrorism threat in Morocco 
emanates especially from small grassroots radical Islamic 
cells, which have shown some capacity to cause attacks, but 
there has been no major damage since 2003.  Security forces 
have arrested numerous terrorist cells.  The biggest threat 
is that attacks could deter tourists, an important component 
 
RABAT 00001100  004 OF 004 
 
 
of the economy.  The GOM's implementation of a comprehensive 
counterterrorism strategy emphasizing vigilant security 
measures, counter-radicalization policies, and robust 
international cooperation has been largely successful in 
containing the threat to date.  Economic disruption, whether 
from attacks or the global economic crisis, remains the 
principal threat to stability here, but most observers 
believe Morocco will manage absent catastrophic collapse. 
 
16.  (SBU) Counterterrorism Continued:  Under the King who as 
"Commander of the Faithful" leads Moroccan Muslims and Jews, 
Morocco has standardized religious doctrine, consolidated 
control over religious schools, and sent specially trained 
Imams to Europe to preach moderate messages to the Moroccan 
diaspora.  The vast majority of Morocco's population rejects 
Salafist and Wahhabist approaches to Islam and so does not 
support terrorist groups. 
 
17.  (SBU) Religious Freedom:  The Moroccan Constitution 
provides for the freedom to practice one's religion, although 
Islam is the official state religion.  The GOM prohibits the 
distribution of non-Muslim religious materials, bans all 
proselytizing, but tolerates several small religious 
minorities.  It also occasionally restricts Islamic 
organizations whose activities have exceeded the bounds of 
"acceptable religious practice" and become political in 
nature.  Morocco has become protective and even positive 
toward the tiny remnant of its once substantial Jewish 
minority. 
 
18.  (SBU) Military Reform:  The Moroccan Royal Armed Forces 
are modernizing but remain burdened by corruption, 
inefficient bureaucracy, and political marginalization.  The 
U.S. enjoys a robust military relationship, as evidenced by 
increased U.S.-Moroccan military training exercises and 
Morocco's purchase of sophisticated weapons from the U.S., to 
include 24 F-16s,(a counter to an earlier Algerian purchase 
of advanced aircraft from Russia) in the last year.  These 
point to a likely future reform of the military, along with 
greater prospects for positive engagement with the U.S. 
 
19.  (SBU) Drug Issues:  The GOM has achieved significant 
reductions in cannabis and cannabis resin production in 
recent years, although it remains Europe's primary supplier. 
Little, if any, is exported to the U.S. 
 
 
***************************************** 
Visit Embassy Rabat's Classified Website; 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/rabat 
***************************************** 
 
Riley