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Viewing cable 08PHNOMPENH932, CAMBODIA STILL CONSIDERING RESOLUTIONS ON IRAN,

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08PHNOMPENH932 2008-11-18 13:15 2011-07-11 00:00 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Phnom Penh
VZCZCXRO3645
OO RUEHCHI RUEHDT RUEHHM RUEHNH
DE RUEHPF #0932/01 3231315
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 181315Z NOV 08
FM AMEMBASSY PHNOM PENH
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0121
INFO RUCNASE/ASEAN MEMBER COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL PRIORITY 0684
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 3236
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 2333
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY 1676
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PHNOM PENH 000932 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EAP, DRL, IO, P, D 
USUN FOR AMB. PLAISTED 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/18/2018 
TAGS: PREL PHUM CB
SUBJECT: CAMBODIA STILL CONSIDERING RESOLUTIONS ON IRAN, 
BURMA, DPRK 
 
REF: STATE 117889 
 
Classified By: POLITICAL/ECONOMIC SECTION CHIEF GREG LAWLESS FOR REASON 
S 1.4 (B, D) 
 
1.  (C) SUMMARY:  MFA Secretary of State Oouch told DCM 
October 18 that the Royal Government of Cambodia (RGC) was 
probably still maintaining its position from last year on 
UNGA Third Committee human rights resolutions, noting that 
Japan had once again demarched in favor of the DPRK human 
rights resolution.  Ouch Borith indicated that there may be a 
distinction between the official Cambodian line (more 
consistent with NAM) and its actual votes.  Although Ouch 
Borith made representations that he would try to help change 
the official line to be more consistent with that of the 
U.S., it appears an appeal for strategic absences is likely 
the most fruitful course.  END SUMMARY. 
 
The U.S. is Watching 
-------------------- 
 
2.  (C) DCM made strong representations based on reftel, 
noting that the U.S. would be closely watching this UNGA 
Third Committee vote.  (NOTE:  Ouch Borith formerly served as 
Cambodia's USUN PermRep and has overall responsibility for 
the U.S. relationship.  END NOTE.)  Ouch Borith noted that 
Cambodia was inclined to maintain its official position of 
last year but that he would ask Deputy Prime Minister and 
Foreign Minister Hor Namhong to reconsider the overall stand. 
 Cambodia, a small country, felt that it was in a difficult 
position between the United States and like-minded states on 
the one hand and the NAM countries on the other.  Officially, 
Cambodia supported the proposition that human rights were the 
internal affairs of nations, except in those cases that were 
brought to the Human Rights Council (HRC).  The HRC's role, 
he averred, was to provide assistance to nations to address 
their human rights situations. 
 
3.  (C) On the DPRK, Ouch Borith stated that Japan had asked 
Cambodia to vote in favor of the resolution, as the RGC had 
done last year.  However, even there, Cambodia had different 
types of "close" relations with both countries and the 
decision was not easy.  (NOTE:  Japan is the largest provider 
of development assistance to Cambodia.  Former King Sihanouk 
had developed close relations with the DPRK and still depends 
on North Korean body guards.  Since the ascension of King 
Norodom Sihamoni, however, Cambodia has developed much 
stronger and growing economic and cultural relations with 
South Korea.  END NOTE.) 
 
Cambodia Considering 
-------------------- 
 
4.  (C) On Iran and Burma, Ouch Borith alluded to the 
collective pressure from states to support no-action motions. 
 Acknowledging that Burma was an increasing embarrassment for 
ASEAN, and that Cambodia wished for Burma to learn from the 
Cambodian experience in moving toward greater 
democratization, he noted the RGC's representations to 
Myanmar to exhibit greater flexibility. 
 
5.  (C) The RGC felt great pressure from both sides on this 
debate at the UN, Ouch Borith noted.  Nonetheless, he would 
ensure that the RGC gave the U.S. proposal the utmost 
consideration. 
 
UNSC Candidacy Going Well 
------------------------- 
 
6.  (C) On Cambodia's candidacy to become a non-permanent 
member of the UNSC in 2013-2014, Ouch Borith noted that some 
63 countries had already offered letters of support.  (NOTE: 
This includes all ASEAN nations.  END NOTE.) 
 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
7.  (C) In so many words, Ouch Borith was signaling it would 
be difficult for the RGC to shift from its official stance, 
reinforced in part by its own involvement with a special 
rapporteur in the Human Rights Council.  However, he clearly 
understood the import of the Iran vote and that Cambodia's 
yes vote could be seen to be deciding, whereas its absence 
could be strategically advantageous.  He seemed to apply the 
same calculus to Burma.  Hence our efforts to reinforce 
 
PHNOM PENH 00000932  002 OF 002 
 
 
strategic absences by Cambodia's PermRep might bear fruit. 
Whether Cambodia will vote in favor of a human rights 
resolution on North Korea, as it did last year, is by no 
means settled. 
 
8.  (C) Per reftel request, Post adjudges the best incentive 
to Cambodia is a call from Ambassador Khalilzad to the 
Cambodian PermRep, to reinforce the significance we attach to 
these Third Committee resolution votes. 
RODLEY