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Viewing cable 08MOSCOW3391, RUSSIA WATCHES U.S. WITH A "WARY EYE" IN CENTRAL ASIA

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08MOSCOW3391 2008-11-24 13:50 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Moscow
VZCZCXRO8113
RR RUEHLN RUEHPOD RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHMO #3391/01 3291350
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 241350Z NOV 08
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0858
INFO RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 003391 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958:  N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV SENV SOCI AF RS ZK
 
SUBJECT: RUSSIA WATCHES U.S. WITH A "WARY EYE" IN CENTRAL ASIA 
 
1. (SBU) Summary:  Senior Russian analysts recently told SCA DAS 
Krol that while Moscow looked with suspicion upon U.S. activity in 
Central Asia, it was more concerned about the challenge presented by 
China, but was not sure how to counter a rival that had more 
resources at its disposal for winning over regional governments. 
The GOR could tolerate, or even cooperate with, U.S. efforts to 
maintain regional security, although Russians thought the U.S. would 
eventually leave Central Asia after it pulled out of Afghanistan. 
The analysts encouraged the U.S. and Russia to jointly stabilize 
Central Asia by addressing security needs, as well as the looming 
water and economic crises that also threatened the region.  They 
argued that Central Asian governments failed to balance the needs of 
water suppliers and consumers, and relied upon outdated technology 
that wasted limited water resources.  The global financial crisis 
would worsen an already poor employment situation that left large 
numbers of disaffected youth at risk of extremism.  End summary. 
 
China in Russia's Backyard 
-------------------------- 
 
2. (SBU) Moscow Carnegie Center Director Dmitri Trenin and Deputy 
Director of the Institute of World Economy and International 
Relations (IMEMO) Gennadi Chufrin told DAS Krol that China's growing 
presence in Central Asia worried Russia more than U.S. activity in 
the region.  Chufrin thought that many high-ranking GOR officials 
already realized that Central Asia was no longer an exclusive 
Russian region, whereas Trenin thought that Moscow had recently 
become more protective of Central Asia.  He said it was "naive and 
facile" for Russians to believe that Central Asia, or other parts of 
the CIS, was within their sphere of influence. 
 
3. (SBU) Trenin stressed that Russia saw China as the long-term 
threat in Central Asia, but was not sure how to counter Beijing's 
growing influence.  While Moscow invited Beijing into the Shanghai 
Cooperation Organization (SCO), it did not want China involved in 
Central Asian security or economic development because Russia could 
not match Chinese resources. 
 
U.S. Will Leave the Region 
-------------------------- 
 
4. (SBU) Trenin argued that although Russia would not accept a U.S. 
presence in areas it considered crucial, such as Ukraine, it could 
tolerate a certain level of U.S. activity in Central Asia, where it 
watched the U.S. with a "wary eye."  Russia thought that the U.S. 
would eventually leave the region, presumably after it pulled out of 
Afghanistan.  The GOR was not sure that the U.S. would succeed in 
Afghanistan, which led Moscow to "maintain a certain distance" from 
Washington under the assumption that Russia would have to deal with 
whoever came after Karzai.  Trenin added that while Afghanistan was 
an area where the U.S. and Russia had common interests, Moscow had 
received "signals" indicating that the U.S. did not really want 
Russia involved in stabilizing the country. 
 
Russia and U.S. Could Cooperate 
------------------------------- 
 
5. (SBU) Chufrin told DAS Krol that if the U.S. and Russia wanted to 
build a "cooperative model," Central Asia was the place to do so. 
Although Russia remained suspicious of U.S. goals in the region, the 
GOR leadership understood the potential Central Asia held for 
cooperation.  Both countries desired stability in the region, but 
were "not entirely sure" how to achieve it.  Chufrin warned against 
the current, dual approach to securing Central Asia, which could 
create separate Russian and U.S. security systems, neither of which 
would be most effective. 
 
Water Crucial to Regional Stability 
----------------------------------- 
 
6. (SBU) Chufrin argued that after security, the greatest threats to 
Central Asia stemmed from the misuse of water resources and growing 
unemployment.  The GOR recognized the importance of these issues, 
especially water, which had become more vital for Central Asia than 
energy resources.  The region failed to reach a compromise between 
upstream suppliers and downstream consumers of water, and continued 
to rely on outmoded technology that allowed excessive waste.  The 
answer was not in building new canals or diverting water from 
Siberia, but in obtaining better technology for the region, a goal 
the international community should embrace. 
 
Economic and Social Instability 
------------------------------- 
 
7. (SBU) Chufrin explained that the global financial crisis would 
hit Central Asia through rising unemployment felt by the migrants 
who worked in Russia and Kazakhstan.  The Kazakh economy, which is 
more dependent upon energy and raw materials than Russia, would 
suffer from falling prices. 
 
 
MOSCOW 00003391  002 OF 002 
 
 
8. (SBU) Chufrin said that growing unemployment and accompanying 
social unrest threatened all of Central Asia, including Kazakhstan, 
where the "myth of the Kazak miracle is falling apart."  Although 
Kazakhstan remained stronger economically than the rest of the 
region, the country already suffered a "loss of confidence" that 
threatened social stability.  The rest of Central Asia, particularly 
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, faced increasing numbers of unemployed 
youth who were most at risk of radicalization.  Chufrin proposed 
greater coordination of international efforts concentrated on 
education, job training, and a system of rural financing and credit 
assistance.  He thought India could get involved considering its 
experience in this field. 
 
9. (U) DAS Krol has cleared this cable.