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Viewing cable 08KHARTOUM1707, SLM/MM ATTACKS LIKELY PROVOKED GOS BOMBING IN SOUTH DARFUR

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08KHARTOUM1707 2008-11-25 11:14 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Khartoum
VZCZCXRO9028
OO RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #1707/01 3301114
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 251114Z NOV 08
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2396
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 001707 
 
DEPT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, SE WILLIAMSON, AF/SPG, AF/C 
NSC FOR PITTMAN AND HUDSON 
ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ASEC PGOV PREL KPKO SOCI AU UNSC SU
SUBJECT: SLM/MM ATTACKS LIKELY PROVOKED GOS BOMBING IN SOUTH DARFUR 
 
1. (SBU) SUMMARY:  On November 23-24, members of the Sudan 
Liberation Movement of Minni Minnawi (SLM/MM) ruefully acknowledged 
that their movement attacked a GoS force on November 19. These 
sources claimed that the GoS then bombed SLM/MM positions on 
November 22, destroying stolen SLM/MM assets. UNDSS contacts 
asserted a Russian MiG most likely did bomb positions in South 
Darfur this past week, though UNAMID has not been able to confirm 
the details of this attack.  If true, these contacts stated that 
this is the first aerial bombardment in the state since July 2008 
and the first confrontation between SLM/MM and the GoS since the 
September 19 El-Fasher agreement.  END SUMMARY. 
 
2.  (SBU)  On November 23, SLM/MM South Darfur representative 
Mohaydin Younis told poloff that a joint SLM/MM-SLM/Unity force 
attacked a Central Reserve Police convoy north of Nyala between 
Thabit and Manawashi on November 19.  According to Younis, the 
aggressive Ali Karbino led SLA/Unity's forces in the attack.  Younis 
was reluctant to discuss SLM/MM involvement, but eventually 
acknowledged that SLM/MM  also participated and stole two GoS gas 
trucks in the attack.  Younis claimed that the Central Reserve 
Police have repeatedly targeted SLM/MM, and that "our problem is 
with the CRP," not with humanitarian organizations or the 
international community. Younis said that the janjaweed make up the 
largest percentage of the CRP and therefore deserve to be targeted 
by SLM/MM.  Younis added that SLM/MM also considers the CRP to be a 
target of opportunity (as it is the best equipped group,) and that 
the GoS's neglect of the DPA leaves SLM/MM with no other choice but 
to engage in banditry and robbery.  Younis reported that GoS air 
operations later in the week targeted SLM/MM positions, destroying 
the stolen gas tankers. 
 
3.  (SBU)  Younis also briefly discussed GoS military operations in 
other parts of Darfur.  According to Younis, SLA/Unity, URF, and 
SLA/AW were the primary rebel movements fighting the GoS near Helif 
the week of November 16.  He also that the GoS bombed a water well 
near Kurbia "intentionally targeting the people of the region." 
Younis said that the people of Kurbia now have to walk two days to 
retrieve water, and that "they are really suffering there." 
 
4.  (SBU)  SLM/MM members based in Nyala also confirmed that SLM/MM 
attacked GoS positions the week of November 16. SLM/MM Secretary 
General of South Darfur, Muhammad Adam Salim told poloffs that 
SLM/MM fought with Central Reserve Police in Darfur, but claimed 
that SLM/MM acted solely in self-defense.  Salim and his South 
Darfur SLM/MM colleagues added  that the GoS conducted operations in 
four areas throughout Darfur within the last week: Abu Dangal, 
Meidob, Jebel Adoula, and North of Kutum.  These SLM/MM 
representatives also claimed that the GoS has deployed troops South 
of Nyala to Gereida, and maintained  that the GoS is conducting oil 
exploration in the area. 
 
5.  (SBU)  Salim said that the security arrangement  following the 
September 19 Minnawi-Taha agreement has failed.  Contrary to the 
latter agreement  the Gos and SLM/MM have not informed each other of 
their military movements, the GoS has not paid compensation to 
SLM/MM for its attacks in September, and the GoS has certainly not 
restricted its flights over SLM/MM areas.  These contacts stated 
that the situation in Darfur has grown worse since President 
Bashir's announcement of a unilateral ceasefire.  "The NCP is 
playing for time right now - there is no change politically and the 
Minnawi-Taha El-Fasher agreement has failed just like the DPA," 
stated Salim. 
 
6. (SBU)  In developments along the strategic El Fasher-Malha road, 
Suleiman Marjan, a rebel commander recently aligned with 
SLA/AbdulWahid, and Abdalla Banda confirmed that although they have 
spotted SAF Antonov planes flying over the area in the last several 
days, there have been no attacks on villages or rebel encampments in 
the area.  As part of a larger SAF push in the region northeast of 
El Fasher, Marjan said that the SAF have consolidated their  control 
over Malha, using it as a base to supply troops and venturing 
further into rebel-held territory in North Darfur. This rebel-held 
strip in the particularly barren North serves as a strategic jumping 
off points for possible future rebel raids into the Nile Valley and 
Kordofan. 
 
7.  (SBU)  COMMENT:  Although many of the details remain unclear and 
the stories between SLM/MM's Younis and Salim do not exactly 
correspond, it is significant that SLM/MM contacts admitted to an 
SLM/MM attack on a GoS force.  If true, this would be the most 
direct engagement between SLM/MM and the GoS since the September 
agreement between Minnawi and Vice President Taha.  It also shows 
that SLM/MM continues to ally itself with non-signatory rebel groups 
making common cause against regime targets. These events, the 
 
KHARTOUM 00001707  002 OF 002 
 
 
competing versions of what actually happened, and UNAMID's inability 
to confirm their details, prove once more the need for an interim 
mechanism for monitoring and reporting violence in Darfur but also 
underscore the challenge such a mechanism will face: it could well 
uncover numerous instances of rebel instigated violence and outright 
banditry.  END COMMENT. 
 
FERNANDEZ