Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 97115 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
ETRD EAGR ETTC EAID ECON EFIN ECIN EINV ELAB EAIR ENRG EPET EWWT ECPS EIND EMIN ELTN EC ETMIN EUC EZ ET ELECTIONS ENVR EU EUN EG EINT ER ECONOMICS ES EMS ENIV EEB EN ECE ECOSOC EK ENVIRONMENT EFIS EI EWT ENGRD ECPSN EXIM EIAD ERIN ECPC EDEV ENGY ECTRD EPA ESTH ECCT EINVECON ENGR ERTD EUR EAP EWWC ELTD EL EXIMOPIC EXTERNAL ETRDEC ESCAP ECO EGAD ELNT ECONOMIC ENV ETRN EIAR EUMEM ENRGPARMOTRASENVKGHGPGOVECONTSPLEAID EREL ECOM ECONETRDEAGRJA ETCC ETRG ECONOMY EMED ETR ENERG EITC EFINOECD EURM EENG ERA EXPORT ENRD ECONEINVETRDEFINELABETRDKTDBPGOVOPIC EGEN EBRD EVIN ETRAD ECOWAS EFTA ECONETRDBESPAR EGOVSY EPIN EID ECONENRG EDRC ESENV ETT EB ENER ELTNSNAR ECHEVARRIA ETRC EPIT EDUC ESA EFI ENRGY ESCI EE EAIDXMXAXBXFFR EETC ECIP EIAID EIVN EBEXP ESTN EING EGOV ETRA EPETEIND ELAN ETRDGK EAIDRW ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS EPEC ENVI ELN EAG EPCS EPRT EPTED ETRB EUM EAIDS EFIC EFINECONEAIDUNGAGM EAIDAR ESF EIDN ELAM EDU EV EAIDAF ECN EDA EXBS EINTECPS ENRGTRGYETRDBEXPBTIOSZ EPREL EAC EINVEFIN ETA EAGER EINDIR ECA ECLAC ELAP EITI EUCOM ECONEFINETRDPGOVEAGRPTERKTFNKCRMEAID EARG ELDIN EINVKSCA ENNP EFINECONCS EFINTS ECCP ETC EAIRASECCASCID EINN ETRP EAIDNI EFQ ECOQKPKO EGPHUM EBUD ECONEINVEFINPGOVIZ ENERGY ELB EINDETRD EMI ECONEFIN EIB EURN ETRDEINVTINTCS EIN EFIM ETIO ELAINE EMN EATO EWTR EIPR EINVETC ETTD ETDR EIQ ECONCS EPPD ENRGIZ EISL ESPINOSA ELEC EAIG ESLCO EUREM ENTG ERD EINVECONSENVCSJA EEPET EUNCH ECINECONCS ETRO ETRDECONWTOCS ECUN EFND EPECO EAIRECONRP ERGR ETRDPGOV ECPN ENRGMO EPWR EET EAIS EAGRE EDUARDO EAGRRP EAIDPHUMPRELUG EICN ECONQH EVN EGHG ELBR EINF EAIDHO EENV ETEX ERNG ED
KMDR KPAO KPKO KJUS KCRM KGHG KFRD KWMN KDEM KTFN KHIV KGIC KIDE KSCA KNNP KHUM KIPR KSUM KISL KIRF KCOR KRCM KPAL KWBG KN KS KOMC KSEP KFLU KPWR KTIA KSEO KMPI KHLS KICC KSTH KMCA KVPR KPRM KE KU KZ KFLO KSAF KTIP KTEX KBCT KOCI KOLY KOR KAWC KACT KUNR KTDB KSTC KLIG KSKN KNN KCFE KCIP KGHA KHDP KPOW KUNC KDRL KV KPREL KCRS KPOL KRVC KRIM KGIT KWIR KT KIRC KOMO KRFD KUWAIT KG KFIN KSCI KTFIN KFTN KGOV KPRV KSAC KGIV KCRIM KPIR KSOC KBIO KW KGLB KMWN KPO KFSC KSEAO KSTCPL KSI KPRP KREC KFPC KUNH KCSA KMRS KNDP KR KICCPUR KPPAO KCSY KTBT KCIS KNEP KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KNNB KGCC KINR KPOP KMFO KENV KNAR KVIR KDRG KDMR KFCE KNAO KDEN KGCN KICA KIMMITT KMCC KLFU KMSG KSEC KUM KCUL KMNP KSMT KCOM KOMCSG KSPR KPMI KRAD KIND KCRP KAUST KWAWC KTER KCHG KRDP KPAS KITA KTSC KPAOPREL KWGB KIRP KJUST KMIG KLAB KTFR KSEI KSTT KAPO KSTS KLSO KWNN KPOA KHSA KNPP KPAONZ KBTS KWWW KY KJRE KPAOKMDRKE KCRCM KSCS KWMNCI KESO KWUN KPLS KIIP KEDEM KPAOY KRIF KGICKS KREF KTRD KFRDSOCIRO KTAO KJU KWMNPHUMPRELKPAOZW KEN KO KNEI KEMR KKIV KEAI KWAC KRCIM KWCI KFIU KWIC KCORR KOMS KNNO KPAI KBWG KTTB KTBD KTIALG KILS KFEM KTDM KESS KNUC KPA KOMCCO KCEM KRCS KWBGSY KNPPIS KNNPMNUC KWN KERG KLTN KALM KCCP KSUMPHUM KREL KGH KLIP KTLA KAWK KWMM KVRP KVRC KAID KSLG KDEMK KX KIF KNPR KCFC KFTFN KTFM KPDD KCERS KMOC KDEMAF KMEPI KEMS KDRM KEPREL KBTR KEDU KNP KIRL KNNR KMPT KISLPINR KTPN KA KJUSTH KPIN KDEV KTDD KAKA KFRP KWNM KTSD KINL KJUSKUNR KWWMN KECF KWBC KPRO KVBL KOM KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KEDM KFLD KLPM KRGY KNNF KICR KIFR KM KWMNCS KAWS KLAP KPAK KDDG KCGC KID KNSD KMPF KPFO KDP KCMR KRMS KNPT KNNNP KTIAPARM KDTB KNUP KPGOV KNAP KNNC KUK KSRE KREISLER KIVP KQ KTIAEUN KPALAOIS KRM KISLAO KWM KFLOA
PHUM PINR PTER PGOV PREL PREF PL PM PHSA PE PARM PINS PK PUNE PO PALESTINIAN PU PBTS PROP PTBS POL POLI PA PGOVZI POLMIL POLITICAL PARTIES POLM PD POLITICS POLICY PAS PMIL PINT PNAT PV PKO PPOL PERSONS PING PBIO PH PETR PARMS PRES PCON PETERS PRELBR PT PLAB PP PAK PDEM PKPA PSOCI PF PLO PTERM PJUS PSOE PELOSI PROPERTY PGOVPREL PARP PRL PNIR PHUMKPAL PG PREZ PGIC PBOV PAO PKK PROV PHSAK PHUMPREL PROTECTION PGOVBL PSI PRELPK PGOVENRG PUM PRELKPKO PATTY PSOC PRIVATIZATION PRELSP PGOVEAIDUKNOSWGMHUCANLLHFRSPITNZ PMIG PREC PAIGH PROG PSHA PARK PETER POG PHUS PPREL PS PTERPREL PRELPGOV POV PKPO PGOVECON POUS PGOVPRELPHUMPREFSMIGELABEAIDKCRMKWMN PWBG PMAR PREM PAR PNR PRELPGOVEAIDECONEINVBEXPSCULOIIPBTIO PARMIR PGOVGM PHUH PARTM PN PRE PTE PY POLUN PPEL PDOV PGOVSOCI PIRF PGOVPM PBST PRELEVU PGOR PBTSRU PRM PRELKPAOIZ PGVO PERL PGOC PAGR PMIN PHUMR PVIP PPD PGV PRAM PINL PKPAL PTERE PGOF PINO PHAS PODC PRHUM PHUMA PREO PPA PEPFAR PGO PRGOV PAC PRESL PORG PKFK PEPR PRELP PREFA PNG PGOVPHUMKPAO PRELECON PINOCHET PFOR PGOVLO PHUMBA PRELC PREK PHUME PHJM POLINT PGOVPZ PGOVKCRM PGOVE PHALANAGE PARTY PECON PEACE PROCESS PLN PRELSW PAHO PEDRO PRELA PASS PPAO PGPV PNUM PCUL PGGV PSA PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA PGIV PRFE POGOV PEL PBT PAMQ PINF PSEPC POSTS PHUMPGOV PVOV PHSAPREL PROLIFERATION PENA PRELTBIOBA PIN PRELL PGOVPTER PHAM PHYTRP PTEL PTERPGOV PHARM PROTESTS PRELAF PKBL PRELKPAO PKNP PARMP PHUML PFOV PERM PUOS PRELGOV PHUMPTER PARAGRAPH PERURENA PBTSEWWT PCI PETROL PINSO PINSCE PQL PEREZ PBS

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 08KHARTOUM1612, NO PROGRESS IN DPA IMPLEMENTATION IN LAST TWO WEEKS

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #08KHARTOUM1612.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08KHARTOUM1612 2008-11-03 15:53 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Khartoum
VZCZCXRO1843
OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHGI RUEHKUK RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #1612/01 3081553
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 031553Z NOV 08
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2224
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 001612 
 
DEPT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, SE WILLIAMSON, AF/SPG 
NSC FOR PITTMAN AND HUDSON 
ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ASEC PGOV PREL KPKO SOCI AU UNSC SU
SUBJECT: NO PROGRESS IN DPA IMPLEMENTATION IN LAST TWO WEEKS 
 
1. (SBU) SUMMARY:  Contacts from the Sudan Liberation Movement of 
Minni Minnawi told poloffs November 2 that there has been no 
progress in implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) in 
the last two weeks, and limited overall progress since the September 
19 deal between Minnawi and Vice President Taha.  The GoS continues 
to stall on allocating money to the Darfur Reconstruction and 
Development Fund. Frustration within the movement is rising.  END 
SUMMARY. 
 
NO PROGRESS AT ALL IN LAST 2 WEEKS 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
2.  (SBU)  On November 2, SLM/MM General Counsel and the 
Transitional Darfur Regional Administration (TDRA) Legal Secretary, 
Abdulaziz Sam, told poloff that there has been absolutely no 
progress in implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) in 
the last two weeks.  Sam said that the travel of Atta Al-Mannan (one 
of the NCP's key brokers of the September 19 Minnawi-Taha agreement) 
has negatively impacted the negotiations.  Sam also stated that it 
is possible that some NCP hardliners within the NCP intentionally 
sent Al-Mannan outside of Sudan to slow the peace process.  Sam said 
that the others who worked with Al-Mannan on the peace deal "are 
worthless" and hinted that he sees NCP hardliners winning the battle 
to marginalize SLM/MM again. 
 
COMMON REFRAIN: WHERE'S THE MONEY? 
---------------------------------- 
3.  (SBU)  SLM/MM still has not received any money for the TDRA or 
the DRDF. This remains the primary point of contention with the GoS, 
stated Sam.  He added that the GoS has focused on bureaucratic 
impediments, legal minutiae, and the wording of the DPA to delay 
funding the DRDF.  For example, stated Sam, GoS officials told 
SLM/MM representatives that before funding is allocated to the DRDF 
a comprehensive development plan should be completed at both the 
state and federal levels.  Sam also noted that SLM/MM and GoS 
officials continue to dispute particular development projects, the 
employment of national construction companies, and the percentage of 
funds delivered in seed money vs. in-kind development.  Sam added 
that DRDF Chairman Abduljabar Dausa (also SLM/MM's former political 
chief) traveled to London approximately two weeks ago, and that he 
will not return to Sudan unless the DRDF is funded. 
 
"THIS IS A POLITICAL DECISION." 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
4.  (SBU)  Sam acknowledged that the problem of funding the DRDF is 
not one of mechanics, details, or bureaucracy, but rather a 
political decision by the NCP.  "They [the NCP] have told us [in the 
SLM/MM] that you will take the money we give to the DRDF, and go buy 
weapons in preparation for the next war," stated Sam.  Sam added 
that the NCP also fears that if they deliver money to SLM/MM, 
Minnawi may become less flexible in his willingness to accept a new 
Darfur Peace deal with non-signatory movements in the next round of 
negotiations. 
 
LITTLE PROGRESS IN OTHER AREAS 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
5.  (SBU)  Although there has not been direct conflict between 
SLM/MM and GoS forces in Darfur since September 19, Sam 
characterized GoS-SLM/MM military cooperation as "slow."  With 
respect to bringing the DPA into the national constitution, Sam said 
that the National Constitutional Review Commission has held up the 
process, and that he was less optimistic that the DPA would be 
legally recognized in the next month.  (Note: This represents a 
change from our last meeting with Sam two weeks ago when he was very 
confident that the DPA would be quickly adopted into the interim 
constitution.  End Note.)  Sam said that although there has been 
agreement on expanding Darfuri participation in the national civil 
service and senior diplomatic and government positions, SLM/MM has 
been slow to provide lists of names and put pressure on their NCP 
interlocutors. 
 
MINNAWI'S PLANS 
- - - - - - - - 
6.  (SBU)  Minnawi returned to Darfur on October 30 after 
participating in the Sudan People's Initiative, reported Sam.  The 
GoS authorized Minnawi to pursue outreach to non-signatory rebel 
movements.  While in Darfur, Minnawi will attempt to meet with JEM, 
SLA-Unity, and URF.  According to Sam, Minnawi realizes that the 
Government "used" him for their propaganda campaign, and that he 
received little in return.  Sam said that Minnawi will travel back 
and forth between his camps in North Darfur as well as to and from 
El-Fasher and Khartoum for the foreseeable future.  Sam added 
Minnawi recognizes that he needs to balance his attention on 
political matters in El-Fasher and Khartoum as well as focusing on 
his military organization.  (Note:  Minnawi is scheduled to speak 
 
KHARTOUM 00001612  002 OF 002 
 
 
with A/S Frazer on October 3 via satellite phone.  End Note) 
 
COMMENT 
- - - - - 
7.  (SBU)  Compared to our last meeting with Sam two weeks ago, 
there was a dramatic change in his tone, demeanor, and outlook. 
Increasingly frustrated and pessimistic, Sam may be representative 
of SLM/MM as a whole.  The NCP's tactic of focusing on the details 
and bureaucracy of a peace deal (while neglecting inconvenient 
passages, the timeframe of its implementation, and its overall 
spirit) has been all too evident in the DPA, CPA, and ESPA.  Given 
its weak position, SLM/MM will have to continue to cooperate with 
the NCP while also recognizing its supporting role in the latter's 
political strategy. 
 
FERNANDEZ