Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 97115 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
ETRD EAGR ETTC EAID ECON EFIN ECIN EINV ELAB EAIR ENRG EPET EWWT ECPS EIND EMIN ELTN EC ETMIN EUC EZ ET ELECTIONS ENVR EU EUN EG EINT ER ECONOMICS ES EMS ENIV EEB EN ECE ECOSOC EK ENVIRONMENT EFIS EI EWT ENGRD ECPSN EXIM EIAD ERIN ECPC EDEV ENGY ECTRD EPA ESTH ECCT EINVECON ENGR ERTD EUR EAP EWWC ELTD EL EXIMOPIC EXTERNAL ETRDEC ESCAP ECO EGAD ELNT ECONOMIC ENV ETRN EIAR EUMEM ENRGPARMOTRASENVKGHGPGOVECONTSPLEAID EREL ECOM ECONETRDEAGRJA ETCC ETRG ECONOMY EMED ETR ENERG EITC EFINOECD EURM EENG ERA EXPORT ENRD ECONEINVETRDEFINELABETRDKTDBPGOVOPIC EGEN EBRD EVIN ETRAD ECOWAS EFTA ECONETRDBESPAR EGOVSY EPIN EID ECONENRG EDRC ESENV ETT EB ENER ELTNSNAR ECHEVARRIA ETRC EPIT EDUC ESA EFI ENRGY ESCI EE EAIDXMXAXBXFFR EETC ECIP EIAID EIVN EBEXP ESTN EING EGOV ETRA EPETEIND ELAN ETRDGK EAIDRW ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS EPEC ENVI ELN EAG EPCS EPRT EPTED ETRB EUM EAIDS EFIC EFINECONEAIDUNGAGM EAIDAR ESF EIDN ELAM EDU EV EAIDAF ECN EDA EXBS EINTECPS ENRGTRGYETRDBEXPBTIOSZ EPREL EAC EINVEFIN ETA EAGER EINDIR ECA ECLAC ELAP EITI EUCOM ECONEFINETRDPGOVEAGRPTERKTFNKCRMEAID EARG ELDIN EINVKSCA ENNP EFINECONCS EFINTS ECCP ETC EAIRASECCASCID EINN ETRP EAIDNI EFQ ECOQKPKO EGPHUM EBUD ECONEINVEFINPGOVIZ ENERGY ELB EINDETRD EMI ECONEFIN EIB EURN ETRDEINVTINTCS EIN EFIM ETIO ELAINE EMN EATO EWTR EIPR EINVETC ETTD ETDR EIQ ECONCS EPPD ENRGIZ EISL ESPINOSA ELEC EAIG ESLCO EUREM ENTG ERD EINVECONSENVCSJA EEPET EUNCH ECINECONCS ETRO ETRDECONWTOCS ECUN EFND EPECO EAIRECONRP ERGR ETRDPGOV ECPN ENRGMO EPWR EET EAIS EAGRE EDUARDO EAGRRP EAIDPHUMPRELUG EICN ECONQH EVN EGHG ELBR EINF EAIDHO EENV ETEX ERNG ED
KMDR KPAO KPKO KJUS KCRM KGHG KFRD KWMN KDEM KTFN KHIV KGIC KIDE KSCA KNNP KHUM KIPR KSUM KISL KIRF KCOR KRCM KPAL KWBG KN KS KOMC KSEP KFLU KPWR KTIA KSEO KMPI KHLS KICC KSTH KMCA KVPR KPRM KE KU KZ KFLO KSAF KTIP KTEX KBCT KOCI KOLY KOR KAWC KACT KUNR KTDB KSTC KLIG KSKN KNN KCFE KCIP KGHA KHDP KPOW KUNC KDRL KV KPREL KCRS KPOL KRVC KRIM KGIT KWIR KT KIRC KOMO KRFD KUWAIT KG KFIN KSCI KTFIN KFTN KGOV KPRV KSAC KGIV KCRIM KPIR KSOC KBIO KW KGLB KMWN KPO KFSC KSEAO KSTCPL KSI KPRP KREC KFPC KUNH KCSA KMRS KNDP KR KICCPUR KPPAO KCSY KTBT KCIS KNEP KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KNNB KGCC KINR KPOP KMFO KENV KNAR KVIR KDRG KDMR KFCE KNAO KDEN KGCN KICA KIMMITT KMCC KLFU KMSG KSEC KUM KCUL KMNP KSMT KCOM KOMCSG KSPR KPMI KRAD KIND KCRP KAUST KWAWC KTER KCHG KRDP KPAS KITA KTSC KPAOPREL KWGB KIRP KJUST KMIG KLAB KTFR KSEI KSTT KAPO KSTS KLSO KWNN KPOA KHSA KNPP KPAONZ KBTS KWWW KY KJRE KPAOKMDRKE KCRCM KSCS KWMNCI KESO KWUN KPLS KIIP KEDEM KPAOY KRIF KGICKS KREF KTRD KFRDSOCIRO KTAO KJU KWMNPHUMPRELKPAOZW KEN KO KNEI KEMR KKIV KEAI KWAC KRCIM KWCI KFIU KWIC KCORR KOMS KNNO KPAI KBWG KTTB KTBD KTIALG KILS KFEM KTDM KESS KNUC KPA KOMCCO KCEM KRCS KWBGSY KNPPIS KNNPMNUC KWN KERG KLTN KALM KCCP KSUMPHUM KREL KGH KLIP KTLA KAWK KWMM KVRP KVRC KAID KSLG KDEMK KX KIF KNPR KCFC KFTFN KTFM KPDD KCERS KMOC KDEMAF KMEPI KEMS KDRM KEPREL KBTR KEDU KNP KIRL KNNR KMPT KISLPINR KTPN KA KJUSTH KPIN KDEV KTDD KAKA KFRP KWNM KTSD KINL KJUSKUNR KWWMN KECF KWBC KPRO KVBL KOM KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KEDM KFLD KLPM KRGY KNNF KICR KIFR KM KWMNCS KAWS KLAP KPAK KDDG KCGC KID KNSD KMPF KPFO KDP KCMR KRMS KNPT KNNNP KTIAPARM KDTB KNUP KPGOV KNAP KNNC KUK KSRE KREISLER KIVP KQ KTIAEUN KPALAOIS KRM KISLAO KWM KFLOA
PHUM PINR PTER PGOV PREL PREF PL PM PHSA PE PARM PINS PK PUNE PO PALESTINIAN PU PBTS PROP PTBS POL POLI PA PGOVZI POLMIL POLITICAL PARTIES POLM PD POLITICS POLICY PAS PMIL PINT PNAT PV PKO PPOL PERSONS PING PBIO PH PETR PARMS PRES PCON PETERS PRELBR PT PLAB PP PAK PDEM PKPA PSOCI PF PLO PTERM PJUS PSOE PELOSI PROPERTY PGOVPREL PARP PRL PNIR PHUMKPAL PG PREZ PGIC PBOV PAO PKK PROV PHSAK PHUMPREL PROTECTION PGOVBL PSI PRELPK PGOVENRG PUM PRELKPKO PATTY PSOC PRIVATIZATION PRELSP PGOVEAIDUKNOSWGMHUCANLLHFRSPITNZ PMIG PREC PAIGH PROG PSHA PARK PETER POG PHUS PPREL PS PTERPREL PRELPGOV POV PKPO PGOVECON POUS PGOVPRELPHUMPREFSMIGELABEAIDKCRMKWMN PWBG PMAR PREM PAR PNR PRELPGOVEAIDECONEINVBEXPSCULOIIPBTIO PARMIR PGOVGM PHUH PARTM PN PRE PTE PY POLUN PPEL PDOV PGOVSOCI PIRF PGOVPM PBST PRELEVU PGOR PBTSRU PRM PRELKPAOIZ PGVO PERL PGOC PAGR PMIN PHUMR PVIP PPD PGV PRAM PINL PKPAL PTERE PGOF PINO PHAS PODC PRHUM PHUMA PREO PPA PEPFAR PGO PRGOV PAC PRESL PORG PKFK PEPR PRELP PREFA PNG PGOVPHUMKPAO PRELECON PINOCHET PFOR PGOVLO PHUMBA PRELC PREK PHUME PHJM POLINT PGOVPZ PGOVKCRM PGOVE PHALANAGE PARTY PECON PEACE PROCESS PLN PRELSW PAHO PEDRO PRELA PASS PPAO PGPV PNUM PCUL PGGV PSA PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA PGIV PRFE POGOV PEL PBT PAMQ PINF PSEPC POSTS PHUMPGOV PVOV PHSAPREL PROLIFERATION PENA PRELTBIOBA PIN PRELL PGOVPTER PHAM PHYTRP PTEL PTERPGOV PHARM PROTESTS PRELAF PKBL PRELKPAO PKNP PARMP PHUML PFOV PERM PUOS PRELGOV PHUMPTER PARAGRAPH PERURENA PBTSEWWT PCI PETROL PINSO PINSCE PQL PEREZ PBS

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 08KAMPALA1484, UGANDAN PRESIDENT INTERVENES IN NSSF SCANDAL TO

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #08KAMPALA1484.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08KAMPALA1484 2008-11-12 13:51 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Kampala
VZCZCXRO8900
RR RUEHGI RUEHRN RUEHROV
DE RUEHKM #1484/01 3171351
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 121351Z NOV 08
FM AMEMBASSY KAMPALA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0862
INFO RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE
RUEHXR/RWANDA COLLECTIVE
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 KAMPALA 001484 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV KCOR KDEM UG
SUBJECT: UGANDAN PRESIDENT INTERVENES IN NSSF SCANDAL TO 
SAVE MINISTERS, RULING PARTY 
 
REF: A. KAMPALA 1220 
     B. KAMPALA 1350 
 
1.  (SBU) Summary.  President Museveni stepped in to spare 
the ruling party from protracted and bitter infighting in the 
ongoing scandal involving the National Social Security Fund 
(NSSF).  In doing so, Museveni cleared the Ministers of 
Finance and Security of any wrongdoing after a parliamentary 
committee majority report recommended both men be sanctioned 
for their roles in a land purchase scandal.  Museveni told 
parliamentarians to adopt a parliamentary minority report, 
which had dubious authorship.  The saga might not be 
completely over, as the opposition walked out of Parliament 
over presidential interference and the Inspectorate General 
of Government could investigate the various leadership code 
violations.  Nonetheless, the scandal exposed deep divisions 
within the ruling party.  Last week's ruling party caucus 
meeting saw the First Lady, Janet Museveni, demand the 
ministers resign and pay back the funds from the land deal. 
She raised questions about the government's "zero tolerance 
of corruption."  Museveni's actions also raise doubts about 
his willingness to respect checks and balances, such as 
decisions of parliamentary oversight committees.  The 
President's backing of his longtime friend, Security Minister 
Amama Mbabazi, who is highly unpopular within the ruling 
National Resistance Movement (NRM), could have serious 
implications for the party, the President's primary vehicle 
for re-election in 2011.  End Summary. 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - - 
GAMES THAT WERE PLAYED 
- - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
2.  (SBU)  Daily twists and turns in the NSSF scandal have 
captivated Ugandans since August as a parliamentary committee 
investigated Minister of Security Amama Mbabazi and Finance 
Minister Ezra Suruma. (Ref A) The two ministers were 
investigated for conflict of interest and influence peddling 
in a land sale to the NSSF, which was under Suruma's 
authority.  From the outset, Mbabazi, the NRM Secretary 
General, pushed for the issue to be dealt with by the party. 
However, he was surprised when he met resistance at an NRM 
Central Executive Committee (CEC) meeting on September 9. 
(Ref B) By all accounts of the CEC meeting, the President had 
asked Mbabazi if he had followed the proper public 
procurement procedures.  Mbabazi's response did not satisfy 
Museveni.  CEC members pushed for Mbabazi and Suruma to 
resign.  The President and the CEC decided to punt and agreed 
to wait for the report of the parliamentary investigation 
before deciding on a course of action. 
 
3.  (SBU)  Mbabazi quickly went on the offensive, claiming to 
be the victim of an ethnic witch hunt within the party. (Ref 
B) When his accusations fell on deaf ears, Mbabazi co-opted a 
business associate to help him attempt to frame his 
archenemy, former Minister of Health Jim Muhwezi, who 
championed the call for Mbabazi's resignation, on bank 
robbery charges.  This too failed because the Director of 
Public Prosecutions, Richard Buteero, found no basis for 
charging Muhwezi.  The Parliamentary Committee on 
Commissions, Statutory Authorities, and State Enterprises 
conducted public hearings.  NSSF Chairman Chami Jamwa 
requested a closed door appearance.  Jamwa testified he was 
under considerable pressure from the ministers to buy the 
land so that they could save their bank, the National Bank of 
Commerce, from a Nigerian take-over.  Just prior to writing 
the committee report, NRM members of the committee were 
invited to meet with the Parliamentary Chief Whip and 
Mbabazi.  President Museveni also called them to State House 
to make Mbabazi's case that the land sale was an investment 
and did not need to follow public procurement procedures. 
Museveni argued that Mbabazi was not directly involved in the 
deal because he had given power of attorney to his business 
partner.  Suruma attempted to resign twice during this 
period, but Museveni refused to accept it. 
 
4.  (SBU)  During the committee retreat to write the final 
report, its members came under intense pressure, with offers 
of money and women to entice members to clear the ministers, 
according to the committee member Abdu Katuntu.  The final 
committee report found the two Ministers had a conflict of 
interest and had peddled influence in the land deal. 
Fourteen committee members signed it, including nine NRM 
members.  The penalty recommended under the Leadership Code, 
upon which the committee relied for its recommendations, is 
removal from office.  The pro-Mbabazi forces scrambled to 
persuade six committee members from the NRM to sign a 
minority report.  Other committee members claimed that the 
minority report was not drafted by its own members, but 
instead, by Minister of General Duties, Adolph Mwesige, and 
 
KAMPALA 00001484  002 OF 003 
 
 
Mbabazi's sister-in-law, Hope Mwesigye, the Minister of State 
for Local Government.  The minority report also did not 
follow proper parliamentary procedures.  It exonerated the 
ministers of any wrongdoing, arguing that the NSSF deal was 
an investment and public procurement procedures did not 
apply.  It also argued that Parliament does not have the 
authority to enforce the Leadership Code. 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - - 
PRESIDENTIAL PREROGATIVE 
- - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
5.  (SBU) President Museveni chose to adopt the minority 
report.  Prior to the parliamentary floor debate on the 
majority and minority reports, he called an NRM parliamentary 
caucus meeting on November 3.  In another long, stormy 
meeting with NRM parliamentarians, the President continued to 
defend Mbabazi.  Museveni had ordered Mbabazi and Suruma to 
apologize to the caucus and ask for the parliamentarians to 
help the ministers for the sake of the party.  According to 
several members, Mbabazi fell short of apologizing, instead 
saying that he should have paid more attention to the 
transaction, while Suruma was on the verge of tears when he 
spoke.  Opposition from Janet Museveni, the First Lady and a 
parliamentarian, took the President completely by surprise. 
The First Lady stated that the two ministers should resign 
and pay back the money in order to save the principles of the 
party.  She said that the saga called into question the NRM's 
commitment to "zero tolerance on corruption."  Museveni was 
visibly shocked that his wife would openly oppose him in a 
public venue and told the caucus that Mrs. Museveni's 
statement was "not the family position."  He called for a 
recess.  According to NRM parliamentarians, the caucus was 
pressured into adopting the minority report and to argue that 
Parliament had no authority to enforce the leadership code, 
which was the responsibility of the Inspectorate General of 
Government.  The NRM then used its majority position during 
the floor debate, which prompted the opposition to walk out 
of Parliament. 
 
- - - - - - - 
IMPLICATIONS 
- - - - - - - 
 
6.   (SBU)  There will be significant fall-out from the 
scandal in days to come.  Museveni allegedly made several 
statements to ruling party members that he was in charge of 
the party and would not allow it to be torn apart.  Mbabazi 
and Suruma have kept their jobs for now, but allegations of 
other improprieties are surfacing.  Museveni enforced ruling 
party discipline to save Mbabazi in Parliament, but he will 
not be able to do so at the NRM party delegates' conference 
later this year where parliamentarians can vote their 
conscience.  We expect young NRM parliamentarians could 
combine forces with powerbroker historicals General Kahinda 
Otafiire and Defense Minister Crispus Kiyonga to remove 
Mbabazi from his position as Secretary General of the NRM. 
Museveni will need NRM parliamentarians to pass several 
amendments to the Constitution and electoral code.  Some have 
told us that presidential patronage will become more 
expensive in order to maintain discipline as ruling party 
divisions continue to grow. 
 
7.  (SBU) The ruling party will grapple with the long-term 
costs of the short-term move to spare Mbabazi and Suruma. 
The First Lady's statements critical of the signal that the 
President's rescue of his friend sent to the outside world 
and its impact on the ruling party's founding principles 
struck a note with many NRM members.  These concerns will 
likely deepen if Mbabazi exacts revenge, as expected, against 
party members who opposed him, such as Muhwezi.  Members of 
Mbabazi's staff have told us that corruption cases against 
the Minister's enemies will be stepped up.  The Public 
Accounts Committee says it will move ahead with 
investigations of other senior ruling party officials, such 
as Foreign Minister Sam Kutesa, which could make it difficult 
for Museveni to save all of his cronies. 
 
8.  (SBU) The opposition walk-out was stated to highlight 
Museveni's intervention as an example of his unwillingness to 
live with the checks and balances that come with multi-party 
democracy, according to Morris Latigo, the Leader of the 
Opposition.  For ordinary Ugandans, the outcome of the saga 
fit a predictable pattern of corruption within the inner 
circle and the lack of political will to sanction against the 
corrupt officials.  The outcome of the NSSF saga will 
reinforce the public opinion that President Museveni has 
failed to implement his promise to fight corruption.  A May 
2008 poll, indicates that 54% of Ugandans do not believe that 
Museveni has fulfilled his pledge to fight corruption, 36% 
 
KAMPALA 00001484  003 OF 003 
 
 
believe that he has implemented his pledge to a small degree, 
and only 4% said that they believe Museveni had fought 
corruption to a "great extent". 
BROWNING