Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 97115 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
ETRD EAGR ETTC EAID ECON EFIN ECIN EINV ELAB EAIR ENRG EPET EWWT ECPS EIND EMIN ELTN EC ETMIN EUC EZ ET ELECTIONS ENVR EU EUN EG EINT ER ECONOMICS ES EMS ENIV EEB EN ECE ECOSOC EK ENVIRONMENT EFIS EI EWT ENGRD ECPSN EXIM EIAD ERIN ECPC EDEV ENGY ECTRD EPA ESTH ECCT EINVECON ENGR ERTD EUR EAP EWWC ELTD EL EXIMOPIC EXTERNAL ETRDEC ESCAP ECO EGAD ELNT ECONOMIC ENV ETRN EIAR EUMEM ENRGPARMOTRASENVKGHGPGOVECONTSPLEAID EREL ECOM ECONETRDEAGRJA ETCC ETRG ECONOMY EMED ETR ENERG EITC EFINOECD EURM EENG ERA EXPORT ENRD ECONEINVETRDEFINELABETRDKTDBPGOVOPIC EGEN EBRD EVIN ETRAD ECOWAS EFTA ECONETRDBESPAR EGOVSY EPIN EID ECONENRG EDRC ESENV ETT EB ENER ELTNSNAR ECHEVARRIA ETRC EPIT EDUC ESA EFI ENRGY ESCI EE EAIDXMXAXBXFFR EETC ECIP EIAID EIVN EBEXP ESTN EING EGOV ETRA EPETEIND ELAN ETRDGK EAIDRW ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS EPEC ENVI ELN EAG EPCS EPRT EPTED ETRB EUM EAIDS EFIC EFINECONEAIDUNGAGM EAIDAR ESF EIDN ELAM EDU EV EAIDAF ECN EDA EXBS EINTECPS ENRGTRGYETRDBEXPBTIOSZ EPREL EAC EINVEFIN ETA EAGER EINDIR ECA ECLAC ELAP EITI EUCOM ECONEFINETRDPGOVEAGRPTERKTFNKCRMEAID EARG ELDIN EINVKSCA ENNP EFINECONCS EFINTS ECCP ETC EAIRASECCASCID EINN ETRP EAIDNI EFQ ECOQKPKO EGPHUM EBUD ECONEINVEFINPGOVIZ ENERGY ELB EINDETRD EMI ECONEFIN EIB EURN ETRDEINVTINTCS EIN EFIM ETIO ELAINE EMN EATO EWTR EIPR EINVETC ETTD ETDR EIQ ECONCS EPPD ENRGIZ EISL ESPINOSA ELEC EAIG ESLCO EUREM ENTG ERD EINVECONSENVCSJA EEPET EUNCH ECINECONCS ETRO ETRDECONWTOCS ECUN EFND EPECO EAIRECONRP ERGR ETRDPGOV ECPN ENRGMO EPWR EET EAIS EAGRE EDUARDO EAGRRP EAIDPHUMPRELUG EICN ECONQH EVN EGHG ELBR EINF EAIDHO EENV ETEX ERNG ED
KMDR KPAO KPKO KJUS KCRM KGHG KFRD KWMN KDEM KTFN KHIV KGIC KIDE KSCA KNNP KHUM KIPR KSUM KISL KIRF KCOR KRCM KPAL KWBG KN KS KOMC KSEP KFLU KPWR KTIA KSEO KMPI KHLS KICC KSTH KMCA KVPR KPRM KE KU KZ KFLO KSAF KTIP KTEX KBCT KOCI KOLY KOR KAWC KACT KUNR KTDB KSTC KLIG KSKN KNN KCFE KCIP KGHA KHDP KPOW KUNC KDRL KV KPREL KCRS KPOL KRVC KRIM KGIT KWIR KT KIRC KOMO KRFD KUWAIT KG KFIN KSCI KTFIN KFTN KGOV KPRV KSAC KGIV KCRIM KPIR KSOC KBIO KW KGLB KMWN KPO KFSC KSEAO KSTCPL KSI KPRP KREC KFPC KUNH KCSA KMRS KNDP KR KICCPUR KPPAO KCSY KTBT KCIS KNEP KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KNNB KGCC KINR KPOP KMFO KENV KNAR KVIR KDRG KDMR KFCE KNAO KDEN KGCN KICA KIMMITT KMCC KLFU KMSG KSEC KUM KCUL KMNP KSMT KCOM KOMCSG KSPR KPMI KRAD KIND KCRP KAUST KWAWC KTER KCHG KRDP KPAS KITA KTSC KPAOPREL KWGB KIRP KJUST KMIG KLAB KTFR KSEI KSTT KAPO KSTS KLSO KWNN KPOA KHSA KNPP KPAONZ KBTS KWWW KY KJRE KPAOKMDRKE KCRCM KSCS KWMNCI KESO KWUN KPLS KIIP KEDEM KPAOY KRIF KGICKS KREF KTRD KFRDSOCIRO KTAO KJU KWMNPHUMPRELKPAOZW KEN KO KNEI KEMR KKIV KEAI KWAC KRCIM KWCI KFIU KWIC KCORR KOMS KNNO KPAI KBWG KTTB KTBD KTIALG KILS KFEM KTDM KESS KNUC KPA KOMCCO KCEM KRCS KWBGSY KNPPIS KNNPMNUC KWN KERG KLTN KALM KCCP KSUMPHUM KREL KGH KLIP KTLA KAWK KWMM KVRP KVRC KAID KSLG KDEMK KX KIF KNPR KCFC KFTFN KTFM KPDD KCERS KMOC KDEMAF KMEPI KEMS KDRM KEPREL KBTR KEDU KNP KIRL KNNR KMPT KISLPINR KTPN KA KJUSTH KPIN KDEV KTDD KAKA KFRP KWNM KTSD KINL KJUSKUNR KWWMN KECF KWBC KPRO KVBL KOM KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KEDM KFLD KLPM KRGY KNNF KICR KIFR KM KWMNCS KAWS KLAP KPAK KDDG KCGC KID KNSD KMPF KPFO KDP KCMR KRMS KNPT KNNNP KTIAPARM KDTB KNUP KPGOV KNAP KNNC KUK KSRE KREISLER KIVP KQ KTIAEUN KPALAOIS KRM KISLAO KWM KFLOA
PHUM PINR PTER PGOV PREL PREF PL PM PHSA PE PARM PINS PK PUNE PO PALESTINIAN PU PBTS PROP PTBS POL POLI PA PGOVZI POLMIL POLITICAL PARTIES POLM PD POLITICS POLICY PAS PMIL PINT PNAT PV PKO PPOL PERSONS PING PBIO PH PETR PARMS PRES PCON PETERS PRELBR PT PLAB PP PAK PDEM PKPA PSOCI PF PLO PTERM PJUS PSOE PELOSI PROPERTY PGOVPREL PARP PRL PNIR PHUMKPAL PG PREZ PGIC PBOV PAO PKK PROV PHSAK PHUMPREL PROTECTION PGOVBL PSI PRELPK PGOVENRG PUM PRELKPKO PATTY PSOC PRIVATIZATION PRELSP PGOVEAIDUKNOSWGMHUCANLLHFRSPITNZ PMIG PREC PAIGH PROG PSHA PARK PETER POG PHUS PPREL PS PTERPREL PRELPGOV POV PKPO PGOVECON POUS PGOVPRELPHUMPREFSMIGELABEAIDKCRMKWMN PWBG PMAR PREM PAR PNR PRELPGOVEAIDECONEINVBEXPSCULOIIPBTIO PARMIR PGOVGM PHUH PARTM PN PRE PTE PY POLUN PPEL PDOV PGOVSOCI PIRF PGOVPM PBST PRELEVU PGOR PBTSRU PRM PRELKPAOIZ PGVO PERL PGOC PAGR PMIN PHUMR PVIP PPD PGV PRAM PINL PKPAL PTERE PGOF PINO PHAS PODC PRHUM PHUMA PREO PPA PEPFAR PGO PRGOV PAC PRESL PORG PKFK PEPR PRELP PREFA PNG PGOVPHUMKPAO PRELECON PINOCHET PFOR PGOVLO PHUMBA PRELC PREK PHUME PHJM POLINT PGOVPZ PGOVKCRM PGOVE PHALANAGE PARTY PECON PEACE PROCESS PLN PRELSW PAHO PEDRO PRELA PASS PPAO PGPV PNUM PCUL PGGV PSA PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA PGIV PRFE POGOV PEL PBT PAMQ PINF PSEPC POSTS PHUMPGOV PVOV PHSAPREL PROLIFERATION PENA PRELTBIOBA PIN PRELL PGOVPTER PHAM PHYTRP PTEL PTERPGOV PHARM PROTESTS PRELAF PKBL PRELKPAO PKNP PARMP PHUML PFOV PERM PUOS PRELGOV PHUMPTER PARAGRAPH PERURENA PBTSEWWT PCI PETROL PINSO PINSCE PQL PEREZ PBS

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 08KABUL3026, URUZGAN GOVERNOR PROMISES TO TAKE ON THRIVING POPPY

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #08KABUL3026.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08KABUL3026 2008-11-20 13:10 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Kabul
VZCZCXRO5685
RR RUEHPW
DE RUEHBUL #3026/01 3251310
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 201310Z NOV 08
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 6185
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE
RUEKJCS/OSD WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RHMFIUU/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KABUL 003026 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/FO, SCA/A, EUR/RPM 
STATE PASS TO AID FOR ASIA/SCAA 
NSC FOR WOOD 
OSD FOR WILKES 
CENTCOM FOR CG CSTC-A, CG CJTF-101 POLAD 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
 
TAGS: PGOV SNAR AF
 
SUBJECT: URUZGAN GOVERNOR PROMISES TO TAKE ON THRIVING POPPY 
INDUSTRY 
 
1.  (SBU) Summary:  Uruzgan Governor Hamdam has vowed to reduce 
poppy cultivation in his province by 25 percent this season.  Hamdam 
told the Deputy Minister of Counter Narcotics he planned to create a 
comprehensive CN strategy with goals in public awareness, 
alternative livelihood and eradication.  Hamdam said local strongman 
(and former governor) Jan Mohammad Khan and the Provincial Chief of 
Police would oppose his CN plan and requested more support from the 
Dutch and United States, particularly for alternative livelihoods 
and eradication.  Given the fact that Hamdam is on notice from the 
Independent Directorate of Local Governance (IDLG) to become more 
energetic or face being replaced, it is an open question whether he 
will be up to the task of matching his encouraging words with 
actions. 
 
MCN Visit Prompts Change in Thinking 
------------------------------------ 
 
2.  (SBU) The September 24 visit of Deputy Minister for Counter 
Narcotics (MCN) Zafar, his team, and the Embassy's NAS Director was 
clearly the catalyst for Governor Hamdam's new focus on tackling 
poppy cultivation in his province.  According to the 2008 UN Office 
of Drug and Crime (UNODC) report, 9,929 hectares of poppy were 
cultivated in Uruzgan, the fourth largest cultivation in 
Afghanistan, following that of Helmand, Kandahar, and Farah.  Poppy 
cultivation in the province increased 7 percent over the previous 
year.  Insecurity in Uruzgan made governor-led eradication extremely 
difficult. 
 
3.  (SBU) During the shura organized by Hamdam, Zafar underscored 
the innumerable adverse effects of the drug trade, the commitment of 
MCN and other ministries in Kabul to provide better support for the 
provinces and the economic benefits of eradication through the 
Governor-Led Eradication Program and Good Performance Initiative. 
Zafar addressed the complaints expressed by Hamdam and tribal elders 
that MCN did not provide enough support to the provinces, but the 
Deputy Minister effectively kept the spotlight focused on the 
critical role of the Governor and provincial leaders.  Hamdam agreed 
to accelerate the completion of his tailored proposals for CN action 
in Uruzgan. 
 
Indicators of Commitment 
------------------------ 
 
4.  (SBU) Since the MCN visit, Hamdam has privately admitted to 
PRTOff that he has not acted aggressively on CN, but he was 
determined to "gradually get tougher."  In addition to the increased 
pressure he feels from Kabul, Hamdam has become convinced of the 
inseparable link between the ongoing insurgency and the drug trade 
in Uruzgan.  Moreover, Hamdam is keen on advancing his development 
goals for the province by gaining access to the considerable funds 
available through the Good Performance Initiative (GPI).  For these 
reasons, he has taken the following steps to reduce poppy 
production: 
 
-- Development of a CN Plan.  Hamdam tasked his IDLG-supplied 
advisor for security to coordinate the creation of a comprehensive 
CN strategy for the next four years.  The Governor aims to reduce 
poppy cultivation in Uruzgan by 25 percent in 2009, and eliminate it 
completely by 2012.  In consultation with the INL-funded Counter 
Narcotics Advisory Team (CNAT) assigned to Uruzgan, the provincial 
authorities developed the first draft of a plan that focuses on 
steps to ratchet up public awareness, alternative livelihood 
programs and law enforcement and eradication.  The plan still 
requires some fine-tuning to make it more realistic in the near term 
-- namely, it depends heavily on the immediate allocation of 
financial resources and ANSF deployments from Kabul -- but it is a 
step in the right direction. 
 
-- Information Campaign.  During a November 10 MCN-sponsored 
workshop on eradication for governors, Hamdam stressed that public 
awareness is the most important component of his approach to CN.  He 
explained that the rare combination of high wheat prices, low poppy 
prices, possible measures taken by the Taliban to restrict the 
production of poppy (to limit oversupply) and renewed popular 
discontent with the drug trade created a unique opportunity this 
year to steer farmers away from poppy cultivation.  Taking advantage 
 
KABUL 00003026  002 OF 002 
 
 
of INL-provided funds and ISAF/OEF transportation and security, 
Hamdam and provincial officials are repeating this message in 
numerous shuras at the provincial and district level.  On November 
25, he will host a Peace Jirga involving 1,500 tribal elders and 
religious leaders and will seek to secure greater popular support 
for greater CN efforts.  Hamdam hopes to avoid conflict with tribal 
elders and farmers during the eradication season by encouraging them 
to make the right choice now. 
 
-- Alternative Livelihood.  Although Hamdam is frustrated with the 
level of alternative livelihood assistance he has received, he is 
determined to make the best out of the situation.  The Dutch 
Embassy, through the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), is 
distributing wheat seed and fertilizer to 20,000 families throughout 
the province, and despite FAO insistence that the assistance is 
humanitarian in nature, Hamdam is spinning the assistance as an 
alternative livelihoods program.  Hamdam has instructed his Director 
of Agriculture and Director of CN to solicit greater and more 
explicit alternative livelihood support from the Netherlands, 
Australia and U.S.  Uruzgan failed to put to good use previous USAID 
alternative livelihood assistance provided earlier this year, such 
as the donation of 12,000 almond seedlings and 10 tractors, but 
USAID is currently reviewing possible alternative livelihood 
programs for the province. 
 
-- Eradication.  UNODC estimates that only 113 hectares were 
eradicated in early 2008, down from 204 hectares in 2007.  Hamdam 
promises that this season will be different.  (Hamdam claims that 
last season he had convinced farmers to self-eradicate, but UNODC 
surveyors so not verify self-eradication; thus, he believes the 
number of eradicated fields is greater than 113.)  Recognizing that 
Uruzgan will not likely receive support from the Poppy Eradication 
Force (PEF) this season, Hamdam hopes to use the tractors donated by 
USAID to eradicate the largest concentrations of poppy in all five 
districts (these have been sitting idle at his compound).  He has 
asked the U.S. Embassy to repair the tractors and equip them with 
tines for eradication.  Hamdam will attempt to hire private 
contractors to operate the tractors and will call for ANSF support 
(hopefully from Kabul) to provide force protection.  He has agreed 
to use the target eradication maps provided by the UK Embassy to 
conduct the eradication operations in early 2009.  (Comment: Without 
the provision of more Afghan security forces, Hamdam is unlikely to 
make progress on the eradication front.  End Comment.) 
 
Obstacles to Progress 
--------------------- 
 
5.  (SBU) Hamdam remains concerned that former governor and local 
power broker Jan Mohammad Khan (JMK) will stand in the way of a more 
robust Governor-led Eradication.  JMK's widely speculated ties to 
the drug trade and his tight grip on the Provincial Chief of Police 
provide the former governor sufficient motive and means to resist 
Hamdam's efforts.  At a minimum, JMK's large tracts of land in 
eastern Tarin Kowt are likely be overlooked during any eradication 
efforts. 
 
6.  (SBU) Hamdam must reinvigorate his Counter Narcotics Working 
Group (CNWG) to sustain coordinated and comprehensive action by the 
relevant departments.  Hamdam tends to conduct coordination meetings 
on an ad hoc basis, but executing his CN strategy requires regular 
and close interaction with all of the players, including the 
relevant line ministry representatives, with whom he continues to 
have rocky relations.  As for the international community, in 
addition to the Dutch CN Police attached to the PRT, the U.S. Drug 
Enforcement Administration and Australian Federal Police recently 
concluded agreements with the PRT to deploy agents to Uruzgan to 
strengthen interdiction efforts.  Hamdam needs to meet the 
international community's increased commitment to Uruzgan's CN 
efforts by dedicating more attention to the CNWG. PRTOff have 
encouraged the Governor to initiate monthly CNWG meetings.  If 
Governor Hamdam follows through on his promises of decisive action 
on counter narcotics - a definite challenge - he could go some 
distance in answering the IDLG's demand that he improve his overall 
performance or face replacement. 
 
WOOD