Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 97115 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
ETRD EAGR ETTC EAID ECON EFIN ECIN EINV ELAB EAIR ENRG EPET EWWT ECPS EIND EMIN ELTN EC ETMIN EUC EZ ET ELECTIONS ENVR EU EUN EG EINT ER ECONOMICS ES EMS ENIV EEB EN ECE ECOSOC EK ENVIRONMENT EFIS EI EWT ENGRD ECPSN EXIM EIAD ERIN ECPC EDEV ENGY ECTRD EPA ESTH ECCT EINVECON ENGR ERTD EUR EAP EWWC ELTD EL EXIMOPIC EXTERNAL ETRDEC ESCAP ECO EGAD ELNT ECONOMIC ENV ETRN EIAR EUMEM ENRGPARMOTRASENVKGHGPGOVECONTSPLEAID EREL ECOM ECONETRDEAGRJA ETCC ETRG ECONOMY EMED ETR ENERG EITC EFINOECD EURM EENG ERA EXPORT ENRD ECONEINVETRDEFINELABETRDKTDBPGOVOPIC EGEN EBRD EVIN ETRAD ECOWAS EFTA ECONETRDBESPAR EGOVSY EPIN EID ECONENRG EDRC ESENV ETT EB ENER ELTNSNAR ECHEVARRIA ETRC EPIT EDUC ESA EFI ENRGY ESCI EE EAIDXMXAXBXFFR EETC ECIP EIAID EIVN EBEXP ESTN EING EGOV ETRA EPETEIND ELAN ETRDGK EAIDRW ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS EPEC ENVI ELN EAG EPCS EPRT EPTED ETRB EUM EAIDS EFIC EFINECONEAIDUNGAGM EAIDAR ESF EIDN ELAM EDU EV EAIDAF ECN EDA EXBS EINTECPS ENRGTRGYETRDBEXPBTIOSZ EPREL EAC EINVEFIN ETA EAGER EINDIR ECA ECLAC ELAP EITI EUCOM ECONEFINETRDPGOVEAGRPTERKTFNKCRMEAID EARG ELDIN EINVKSCA ENNP EFINECONCS EFINTS ECCP ETC EAIRASECCASCID EINN ETRP EAIDNI EFQ ECOQKPKO EGPHUM EBUD ECONEINVEFINPGOVIZ ENERGY ELB EINDETRD EMI ECONEFIN EIB EURN ETRDEINVTINTCS EIN EFIM ETIO ELAINE EMN EATO EWTR EIPR EINVETC ETTD ETDR EIQ ECONCS EPPD ENRGIZ EISL ESPINOSA ELEC EAIG ESLCO EUREM ENTG ERD EINVECONSENVCSJA EEPET EUNCH ECINECONCS ETRO ETRDECONWTOCS ECUN EFND EPECO EAIRECONRP ERGR ETRDPGOV ECPN ENRGMO EPWR EET EAIS EAGRE EDUARDO EAGRRP EAIDPHUMPRELUG EICN ECONQH EVN EGHG ELBR EINF EAIDHO EENV ETEX ERNG ED
KMDR KPAO KPKO KJUS KCRM KGHG KFRD KWMN KDEM KTFN KHIV KGIC KIDE KSCA KNNP KHUM KIPR KSUM KISL KIRF KCOR KRCM KPAL KWBG KN KS KOMC KSEP KFLU KPWR KTIA KSEO KMPI KHLS KICC KSTH KMCA KVPR KPRM KE KU KZ KFLO KSAF KTIP KTEX KBCT KOCI KOLY KOR KAWC KACT KUNR KTDB KSTC KLIG KSKN KNN KCFE KCIP KGHA KHDP KPOW KUNC KDRL KV KPREL KCRS KPOL KRVC KRIM KGIT KWIR KT KIRC KOMO KRFD KUWAIT KG KFIN KSCI KTFIN KFTN KGOV KPRV KSAC KGIV KCRIM KPIR KSOC KBIO KW KGLB KMWN KPO KFSC KSEAO KSTCPL KSI KPRP KREC KFPC KUNH KCSA KMRS KNDP KR KICCPUR KPPAO KCSY KTBT KCIS KNEP KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KNNB KGCC KINR KPOP KMFO KENV KNAR KVIR KDRG KDMR KFCE KNAO KDEN KGCN KICA KIMMITT KMCC KLFU KMSG KSEC KUM KCUL KMNP KSMT KCOM KOMCSG KSPR KPMI KRAD KIND KCRP KAUST KWAWC KTER KCHG KRDP KPAS KITA KTSC KPAOPREL KWGB KIRP KJUST KMIG KLAB KTFR KSEI KSTT KAPO KSTS KLSO KWNN KPOA KHSA KNPP KPAONZ KBTS KWWW KY KJRE KPAOKMDRKE KCRCM KSCS KWMNCI KESO KWUN KPLS KIIP KEDEM KPAOY KRIF KGICKS KREF KTRD KFRDSOCIRO KTAO KJU KWMNPHUMPRELKPAOZW KEN KO KNEI KEMR KKIV KEAI KWAC KRCIM KWCI KFIU KWIC KCORR KOMS KNNO KPAI KBWG KTTB KTBD KTIALG KILS KFEM KTDM KESS KNUC KPA KOMCCO KCEM KRCS KWBGSY KNPPIS KNNPMNUC KWN KERG KLTN KALM KCCP KSUMPHUM KREL KGH KLIP KTLA KAWK KWMM KVRP KVRC KAID KSLG KDEMK KX KIF KNPR KCFC KFTFN KTFM KPDD KCERS KMOC KDEMAF KMEPI KEMS KDRM KEPREL KBTR KEDU KNP KIRL KNNR KMPT KISLPINR KTPN KA KJUSTH KPIN KDEV KTDD KAKA KFRP KWNM KTSD KINL KJUSKUNR KWWMN KECF KWBC KPRO KVBL KOM KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KEDM KFLD KLPM KRGY KNNF KICR KIFR KM KWMNCS KAWS KLAP KPAK KDDG KCGC KID KNSD KMPF KPFO KDP KCMR KRMS KNPT KNNNP KTIAPARM KDTB KNUP KPGOV KNAP KNNC KUK KSRE KREISLER KIVP KQ KTIAEUN KPALAOIS KRM KISLAO KWM KFLOA
PHUM PINR PTER PGOV PREL PREF PL PM PHSA PE PARM PINS PK PUNE PO PALESTINIAN PU PBTS PROP PTBS POL POLI PA PGOVZI POLMIL POLITICAL PARTIES POLM PD POLITICS POLICY PAS PMIL PINT PNAT PV PKO PPOL PERSONS PING PBIO PH PETR PARMS PRES PCON PETERS PRELBR PT PLAB PP PAK PDEM PKPA PSOCI PF PLO PTERM PJUS PSOE PELOSI PROPERTY PGOVPREL PARP PRL PNIR PHUMKPAL PG PREZ PGIC PBOV PAO PKK PROV PHSAK PHUMPREL PROTECTION PGOVBL PSI PRELPK PGOVENRG PUM PRELKPKO PATTY PSOC PRIVATIZATION PRELSP PGOVEAIDUKNOSWGMHUCANLLHFRSPITNZ PMIG PREC PAIGH PROG PSHA PARK PETER POG PHUS PPREL PS PTERPREL PRELPGOV POV PKPO PGOVECON POUS PGOVPRELPHUMPREFSMIGELABEAIDKCRMKWMN PWBG PMAR PREM PAR PNR PRELPGOVEAIDECONEINVBEXPSCULOIIPBTIO PARMIR PGOVGM PHUH PARTM PN PRE PTE PY POLUN PPEL PDOV PGOVSOCI PIRF PGOVPM PBST PRELEVU PGOR PBTSRU PRM PRELKPAOIZ PGVO PERL PGOC PAGR PMIN PHUMR PVIP PPD PGV PRAM PINL PKPAL PTERE PGOF PINO PHAS PODC PRHUM PHUMA PREO PPA PEPFAR PGO PRGOV PAC PRESL PORG PKFK PEPR PRELP PREFA PNG PGOVPHUMKPAO PRELECON PINOCHET PFOR PGOVLO PHUMBA PRELC PREK PHUME PHJM POLINT PGOVPZ PGOVKCRM PGOVE PHALANAGE PARTY PECON PEACE PROCESS PLN PRELSW PAHO PEDRO PRELA PASS PPAO PGPV PNUM PCUL PGGV PSA PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA PGIV PRFE POGOV PEL PBT PAMQ PINF PSEPC POSTS PHUMPGOV PVOV PHSAPREL PROLIFERATION PENA PRELTBIOBA PIN PRELL PGOVPTER PHAM PHYTRP PTEL PTERPGOV PHARM PROTESTS PRELAF PKBL PRELKPAO PKNP PARMP PHUML PFOV PERM PUOS PRELGOV PHUMPTER PARAGRAPH PERURENA PBTSEWWT PCI PETROL PINSO PINSCE PQL PEREZ PBS

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 08KABUL3020, LEARNING LESSONS, LOOKING AHEAD ON ELECTION

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #08KABUL3020.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08KABUL3020 2008-11-19 06:02 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Kabul
VZCZCXRO4383
PP RUEHPW
DE RUEHBUL #3020/01 3240602
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 190602Z NOV 08
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6175
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KABUL 003020 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SCA/FO, SCA/A, S/CRS 
STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/DCHA/DG 
NSC FOR JWOOD 
OSD FOR MCGRAW 
CG CJTF-101, POLAD, JICCENT 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: KDEM PGOV AF
SUBJECT: LEARNING LESSONS, LOOKING AHEAD ON ELECTION 
SECURITY 
 
REF: KABUL 2914 
 
1.  (SBU)  Summary: As noted reftel, the Independent Election 
Commission (IEC) and the Afghan security forces continue to 
improve their cooperation on voter registration security.  In 
the wake of an attack on completed voter registration 
materials in Wardak province, representatives from the IEC, 
Ministry of Interior (MOI), Ministry of Defense (MOD), 
National Directorate of Security (NDS) and ISAF compared 
their incident logs, shared intelligence information and 
analysis, reviewed missteps, and collaboratively identified 
"lessons learned" for future incidents.  The developing 
spirit of cooperation and teamwork, as well as police pledges 
to improve performance, suggest that Phases 1 and 2 of voter 
registration are serving as a useful practice for the greater 
security challenges ahead in the south in Phases 3 and 4. 
 
----------------------------------- 
ARMED MEN SEIZE MATERIALS IN WARDAK 
----------------------------------- 
 
2.  (SBU)  On November 6, armed men of unknown affiliation 
attacked an unscheduled convoy transferring completed 
registration materials from Jalrayz district to the 
provincial capital of Wardak.  Cognizant of violence in the 
area, IEC headquarters had planned to move the material by 
air.  The Jalrayz district electoral official (district field 
coordinator, or DFC) decided, however, to accept the police's 
written invitation urging him to join their convoy as they 
departed the district.  The DFC did not contact IEC 
headquarters.  The police and the attackers fought for over 
four hours, with four attackers killed and three police 
wounded. The IEC's driver and his assistant, employees of a 
transport firm, were kidnapped and have not yet been 
released.  The attackers seized or burned data on 1,360 
voters as well as blank voter registration forms. 
 
3.  (SBU)  Many details of the attack remain unclear.  The 
security forces and the IEC agree that they cannot 
conclusively determine the affiliation of the attackers; some 
reports say the attackers were Taliban, some say "local 
Taliban," some say Hizb-e-Islami (HIG). On November 12 Afghan 
National Army Colonel Mo'men noted with exasperation that the 
Ministry of Defense had produced five reports on the 
incident, yet the motive of the attackers was still unknown. 
The NDS on November 12 reported that its sources confirmed 
that the transport driver had no connection to the Taliban, 
suggesting that the common scenario of complicity between 
transport drivers and their would-be attackers did not occur. 
 NDS also noted its sources reported no threat at the time of 
the movement.  The MOI has yet to determine why the police 
were departing Jalrayz. 
 
------------------------- 
LEARNING LESSONS TOGETHER 
------------------------- 
 
3.  (SBU)  In a series of meetings, the IEC, the Afghan 
security forces, ISAF, and UN technical advisors identified 
together three "lessons learned" from the Wardak incident. 
 
-- First, the greatest failure was a lack of communication 
through the chains of commands.  The Jelrayz DFC did not 
notify the Provincial Electoral Officer (PEO) or IEC 
headquarters of his decision to make an unscheduled move. 
The police in Jelrayz did not notify the provincial or 
regional security coordination centers of their decision to 
leave the district.  In turn, the Afghan National Army and 
ISAF forces learned of the move only after the attack was 
underway.  ANA and ISAF representatives noted that their 
organizations did not receive actionable information or a 
specific request for assistance. 
 
-- Second, the provincial and regional levels for all the 
organizations can play an immediate role in addressing 
problems, but only when officials respect the established 
chain of command.  In the November 6 incident, information 
flowed from those involved in the incident to the various 
headquarters, bypassing the levels closest to the scene and 
snarling efforts to deploy more forces. 
 
-- Third, only the IEC has authority to decide whether 
materials move or not.  The IEC must coordinate information 
from the security agencies and communicate its plans to them. 
 The police and the army do not, however, have the authority 
 
KABUL 00003020  002 OF 002 
 
 
to modify or overrule the IEC's plans, as the IEC is 
ultimately responsible for election materials. 
 
4.  (SBU)  Separately, the IEC is taking steps to improve its 
ability to respond to such incidents.  It is tightening 
procedures in its headquarters operations center, to create a 
more useful log of events and allow better decision-making. 
In current procedures for transport from the district to the 
provincial center, both copies of the completed voter 
registration forms move together; the IEC now is examining 
advantages and disadvantages to separating the forms at the 
district level and moving the two identical data sets 
separately. The IEC on November 17 again pressed its request 
that ISAF designate a liaison to the IEC operations center; 
ISAF's initial response on November 12 was negative. 
 
5.  (SBU) The election security players on November 17 
debated together how to adjust plans for the return of other 
Phase 1 materials from Wardak to avoid any recurrence of the 
failures of November 6. The PEO reports that materials in 
four districts are under threat and should be moved to the 
provincial capital and IEC headquarters as soon as possible. 
The IEC is investigating all transportation options, 
including requests for Afghanistan National Army Air Corps 
(ANAAC) and ISAF air support. 
 
--------------------------------------------- - 
PHASES 3 AND PHASE 4 LOOK TOUGHER BUT POSSIBLE 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
6.  (SBU)  Despite the greater security challenges ahead for 
the troubled Phase 3 provinces of Zabul, Paktika, and Khost 
(Farah, Nangarhar, and Laghman are relatively calm), and the 
substantially greater challenges in Nimroz, Uruzgan, Kandahar 
and Helmand for Phase 4, prospects for improved and 
integrated planning and response on voter registration 
security look good.  The IEC on November 12 shared its 
district-level threat assessments for Phases 3 and 4 with MOI 
and MOD representatives.  Reviewing this mixed picture, the 
MOI's Colonel Almas underscored the police's commitment to 
provide security to allow the IEC open and operate for thirty 
days every voter registration center, from the 43 sites the 
IEC has in "low threat" areas to the 9 sites it has plans for 
in areas "under enemy control."  Colonel Mo'men seconded this 
sentiment for the MOD.  He added that, unlike Phases 1 and 2, 
the Army has forces in every district of these provinces, 
giving it more capability and flexibility to support the 
police. 
 
WOOD