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Viewing cable 08KABUL2970, The Details of Evolving the PRT Model in Afghanistan

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08KABUL2970 2008-11-10 04:17 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Kabul
VZCZCXRO6994
RR RUEHPW
DE RUEHBUL #2970/01 3150417
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 100417Z NOV 08
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 6104
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RUEHC/DEPT OF AGRICULTURE WASHINGTON DC 0109
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE
RUEKJCS/OSD WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RHMFIUU/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RHMFIUU/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC
RHEFHLC/DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY WASHDC
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 KABUL 002970 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/FO, SCA/A, EUR/RPM 
STATE PASS TO AID FOR ASIA/SCAA 
AGRICULTURE FOR EATON 
NSC FOR WOOD 
OSD FOR WILKES 
CENTCOM FOR CG CSTC-A, CG CJTF-101 POLAD 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL ETRD EFIN AF MOPS KDEM PINS
SUBJECT: The Details of Evolving the PRT Model in Afghanistan 
 
REF: KABUL 2784 
 
1.  (SBU) Summary.  Reftel lays out the Mission's ideas for evolving 
the PRT model in Afghanistan and expanding our civilian support for 
Operation Enduring Freedom.  This message provides a more in-depth 
look at the structures outlined in Kabul 2784, detailing the new 
initiatives and tailored growth we propose, and the accompanying 
policy issues.  As part of this proposal, we advocate evolving our 
presence at the Italian-led PRT in Herat into a Regional Embassy 
Office.  This message establishes the staffing we need to help 
create transformational effects; decisions on the geographical 
placement of new civilians will be made in consultation with the 
military.  A key concept behind this proposal is devolving authority 
and financial resources downrange to enable the new personnel to 
implement strategic programs in support of Mission objectives. 
 
2.  (SBU) We recommend expanding our civilian presence with 
particular emphasis in the provinces and districts.  In addition to 
existing PRTs with U.S. representation, we propose to: ensure all 
existing PRTs have State, USAID and USDA representation; establish 
Provincial Governance and Development Offices with economic, 
development, and agriculture experts in three of the more stable 
provinces of RC-East; enhance U.S. civilian representation at 
current U.S. Brigade Task Forces and provide U.S. civilian staff to 
new U.S. Brigade Task Forces as they are stood up; establish four 
new U.S. PRTs in priority locations; establish regional platforms 
for USAID technical offices at the Regional Command headquarters; 
create District Reconstruction Teams (DRTs) to provide 
capacity-building support to district-level governance and 
stabilization; form Fly-Away Teams to seize counterinsurgency (COIN) 
windows of opportunity; and establish specialized Tribal Engagement 
Teams.  The total number of new American positions proposed is 215, 
comprised of 82 State, 105 USAID and 28 USDA positions.  End 
summary. 
 
---------------- 
New Initiatives 
---------------- 
 
3.  (SBU) New PRTs.  This proposal incorporates support for civilian 
PRT staffing in three provinces where the U.S. military (or 
coalition forces) may establish a presence, including Dai Kundi and 
Nimroz.  Currently, the Parwan/Kapisa PRT exists as a combined PRT 
based at Bagram Air Field, with permanent USAID and USDA positions; 
CJTF-101 anticipates splitting the responsibilities to create PRTs 
in each province, and we propose to support each PRT with State, 
USAID and USDA positions.  Finally, we recommend creating a PRT in 
Kabul city:  USAID is reviewing its Mission Strategy, and a Kabul 
PRT would enable USAID to enhance its Kabul-based urban services 
programs and initiatives in the world's fastest growing city. 
 
4.  (SBU) REO Herat.  We advocate evolving our presence at the 
Italian-led PRT in Herat into a Regional Embassy Office (REO), led 
by a Principal Officer (re-hatting the State PRT Officer) with two 
political/economic positions and one each for consular, public 
diplomacy, diplomatic security, rule of law, and USAID.  These eight 
positions would all be FSOs.  The USAID representative would 
complement the work of the eight USAID representatives we propose 
locating at RC-West, also in Herat. 
 
5.  (SBU) Community/tribal engagement.  In addition to the Subject 
Matter Experts (SMEs) described in reftel, we recommend adding 
tribal/cultural engagement experts to extend and deepen our 
understanding of and engagement with tribal and traditional 
leadership structures.  These experts would also play supportive 
roles in conflict transformation, peace building efforts and 
improving essential linkages between the tribes and local formal 
government institutions.  We would build six Tribal Engagement 
Teams, with a total staffing of six State and 12 USAID American 
positions.  We would anticipate using these experts principally in 
the Pashtun areas of RC-East and RC-South, and foresee the need to 
be flexible about their locations to respond to changing needs over 
time.  They would operate out of existing U.S. platforms (such as 
brigade headquarters, PRTs, DRTs, etc.) as circumstances warrant. 
 
 
KABUL 00002970  002 OF 003 
 
 
6.  (SBU) District Reconstruction Teams.  We recommend creating 20 
DRTs, each with an American and Afghan representative for State and 
USAID.  DRTs would provide localized platforms for civilians to 
engage and mentor sub-provincial GIRoA governance structures as well 
as local and community leaders.  The DRTs would be located in 
"tipping point" districts in provinces with multiple population 
centers requiring consistent attention, or where a critical window 
of opportunity exists for the DRT to effectively target attention on 
a population center.  As such, the locations of the DRTs will depend 
largely on joint assessment and consultation among U.S. 
provincial-level civilian, military and GIRoA leadership.  Each DRT 
would be established after a joint decision by the Ambassador and 
COMUSFOR-A, or their designees, based on consultations with Bagram. 
 
7.  (SBU) Fly-Away Teams.  We would establish four Fly-Away Teams, 
each with State and USAID representatives; USDA would staff as 
required from in-country staff.  Drawing on the experience of OTI 
with quick impact, rapid disbursing and limited time on site, 
Fly-Away Teams would be modeled after USAID Office of Foreign 
Disaster Assistance (DART) Teams.  These specialty Teams would 
closely follow on military operations after areas are cleared and 
moving into the "hold" phase.  These teams would rapidly assess 
needs and organize community programs to provide essential services 
and community action programs to forward COIN efforts and foster 
stability in communities.  Fly-Away Teams would have access to rapid 
program development and implementation mechanisms in order to have 
immediate positive impact. 
 
8.  (SBU) Rule of Law.  An important component of increased American 
civilian support should be rule of law (ROL) expertise.  We see 
inherent value in creating sub-national positions with 
responsibilities for shaping and implementing U.S. and international 
efforts for ROL comprehensively throughout the country to advance 
our strategic goals.  These officers could, for example, mentor 
Afghan provincial officials on the importance of ROL, help the 
military design ROL components into CERP building efforts (e.g., 
include a courthouse with district center "green zones") and support 
"circuit rider" judges for provinces with inadequate numbers of 
judicial officials.  We propose placing ROL expertise at targeted 
U.S.-led PRTs, at each of the current U.S. brigades, and in Bamyan, 
Herat, Kandahar, Kunduz, and Mazar-e Sharif to support key non-U.S. 
led PRTs located near Provincial Justice Coordination Mechanism 
(PJCM) offices.  ROL experts may be INL or Department of Justice 
staff, FSOs, or LNAs. 
 
--------- 
Staffing 
--------- 
 
9.  (SBU) Kabul.  We propose adding State, USAID and USDA PRT 
positions at both the embassy and the Kabul PRT.  In addition, we 
would need to incorporate new Mission support and management 
positions into existing Mission ICASS structures in order to support 
the civilian surge in the field, including an increase in RSO 
staffing.  As mentioned in reftel, we would also need added housing 
and office space and an increase in air assets. 
 
10.  (SBU) RC-Headquarters and U.S. Brigades.  At each of the four 
Regional Commands, USAID proposes establishing eight-person 
platforms consisting of technical office representatives, a 
supervisor and a support position.  In addition to current State 
positions, we propose supporting current U.S. Brigades with a rule 
of law expert, a USAID representative and a USDA position.  And we 
propose supporting each incoming U.S. Brigade with four State 
positions and four USAID Technical Advisors.  As is the case with 
coalition-led PRTs (see para 13 below), we will need to reach an 
understanding with allies regarding support for additional positions 
at coalition-led Regional Commands. 
 
11.  (SBU) Provincial Level.  We would ensure all existing PRTs have 
State, USAID and USDA representation.  In Nangarhar, Bamyan and 
Panjshir, we would boost our American presence and establish 
Provincial Governance and Development Offices to ensure that greater 
economic/development focus is brought to bear on these more stable 
provinces (this would supplement, not replace, the PRTs, which 
 
KABUL 00002970  003 OF 003 
 
 
continue to have important security, civil affairs, ADT and other 
related functions).  At targeted non-U.S.-led PRTs, State would add 
a second American position.  State, USAID and USDA would each create 
one American position at each of the potential new PRTs in Dai 
Kundi, Nimroz and Parwan.  The Kabul PRT would consist of one State 
and two USAID positions. 
 
12. (SBU) Staffing Mechanisms.  In terms of FSO vice LNA positions, 
State and USAID would like to integrate FSOs throughout the country 
to mentor/supervise/manage LNA hires.  Our proposal calls for 
approximately 56% FSOs for State, and approximately 30% FSOs for 
USAID.  The total number of new positions proposed is 82 for State, 
105 for USAID and 28 for USDA.  We are forwarding to SCA a detailed 
breakdown of our staffing proposal, including locally-engaged staff 
(LES) positions. 
 
-------------- 
Policy Issues 
-------------- 
 
13.  (SBU) MOU with coalition allies.  In order to take full 
advantage of the additional U.S. investment in PRTs, we will need to 
pin down the responsibilities of host governments at coalition-led 
PRTs.  Absent codification of issues including force protection and 
life support, our allies may not be prepared to support an increased 
civilian presence.  As a matter of policy, we have recommended 
against creating bilateral MOUs.  To establish an increased civilian 
presence on a sound, regularized footing, we recommend that 
Washington establish a standard MOU with our coalition partners, 
detailing payment for specific services at PRTs.  We request 
Washington advise on the way ahead for an MOU. 
 
14.  (SBU) In order for our civilian representatives in the field to 
be most effective, we will need additional resources for these 
positions.  We will devolve authority and financial resources 
downrange to enable the new personnel to implement strategic 
programs in support of Mission objectives. 
 
15.  (SBU) We recognize that these proposals entail significant 
force and infrastructure implications for the military. 
Nonetheless, we believe these proposals are consistent with the 
level of effort to which we are committed in Afghanistan and are key 
to conducting a successful counter-insurgency campaign. 
 
WOOD