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Viewing cable 08HELSINKI541, SCENESETTER FOR SECRETARY RICE'S VISIT TO FINLAND,

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08HELSINKI541 2008-11-25 15:05 2011-04-24 00:00 SECRET Embassy Helsinki
VZCZCXYZ0018
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHHE #0541/01 3301505
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 251505Z NOV 08
FM AMEMBASSY HELSINKI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 4683
INFO RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE
RUCNOSC/ORGANIZATION FOR SECURITY COOPERATION IN EUROPE
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0075
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 4931
RUEHSI/AMEMBASSY TBILISI 0207
S E C R E T HELSINKI 000541 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/23/2018 
TAGS: FI MARR PGOV PREL
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR SECRETARY RICE'S VISIT TO FINLAND, 
DEC 4, 2008 
 
REF: HELSINKI 431 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Barbara Barrett for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
1. (C) SUMMARY. You will arrive in Finland as the Finns enjoy 
considerable international acclaim for their efforts in 
international crisis management, not only as a result of 
their effective Chairmanship of the OSCE, but also for the 
award of the Nobel Peace Prize to former President Martti 
Ahtisaari. While Finns are proud of their participation in 
peacekeeping operations, and the Government is committed to 
its comprehensive civilian-military approach to international 
crisis management, there remain divisions within the 
government on how to pursue its policies, in particular in 
relation to Afghanistan.  With the government currently 
reviewing its crisis management, development and Afghanistan 
policies, your visit provides an opportunity not only to 
thank Finnish leaders for the important role they have played 
within the OSCE, but also (1) to encourage Finland to 
continue to play a constructive role in promoting peace and 
security through Euro-Atlantic and other international 
institutions; (2) to contribute more military and development 
assistance to Afghanistan; (3) and to urge Finnish leaders to 
publicly support a common U.S.-EU policy on Russia. END 
SUMMARY. 
 
Political Overview 
------------------ 
 
2. (SBU) As the head of the Finnish Government, Prime 
Minister Matti Vanhanen and his cabinet share 
responsibility for the implementation of Finnish foreign 
policy with President Tarja Halonen. Vanhanen leads a 
center-right governing coalition that has placed high 
importance not only on working through the EU, but also on 
improving Finland,s partnership with NATO and its overall 
relationship with the United States. We share with the GOF 
the view that creating global economic wealth and defeating 
terrorism require Western nations to engage in international 
security operations and use diplomacy to 
promote democratic values beyond the borders of Europe and 
North America. 
 
Comprehensive approach to crisis management 
------------------------------------------- 
 
3. (U) Finnish participation in international peacekeeping 
operations dates back to the Sinai in the 1950s. As former 
President Martti Ahtisaari has stated, the Finns are 
internationally well-regarded because of their longstanding 
participation in operations and their reputation as "honest 
brokers and fair dealers."  Ahtisaari,s receipt of the Nobel 
Peace Prize and widespread praise for the Finns, 
Chairmanship of the OSCE support his assertion (OSCE 
scenesetter septel). 
 
4. (C) The Finns describe their approach to international 
crisis management as comprehensive, seeking to utilize all 
resources - civilian and military, public and private - to 
best advantage.  On the military side, the GOF aims to 
maintain its international military presence at approximately 
680 troops. Its key operations are KFOR (approximately 440), 
ISAF (100) and Chad (61).  With the expected scaledown of 
troops in Kosovo next year, the GOF has stated publicly it 
will consider an increase to 
operations in Chad and Afghanistan (though in meetings GOF 
officials say an increase to the Chad contribution is more 
likely).  The GOF estimates that its civilian participation 
will reach 150.  Approximately 60 xperts have been deployed 
to EULEX Kosovo, and 2 police experts are expected to 
participate in EUPOL in Afghanistan by early 2009. 
 
No unanimity on the comprehensive approach 
------------------------------------------ 
 
5. (C) As the GOF pursues this approach, it still grapples 
with how to realize it fully, and within the government and 
the Parliament there is no unanimity.  This in part results 
from long-held attitudes.  For example, the vast majority of 
Finnish military resources are devoted to territorial 
defense, with only a relatively small amount for crisis 
management operations; this flows from the deeply-entrenched 
notion that in war the Finns, always have stood alone. Also, 
development policy has not been coordinated with crisis 
management policy, a separation due in part from the idea 
held by some in the government that security operations 
necessarily precede delivery of development assistance. The 
GOF has undertaken reviews of its international crisis 
 
management and development policies, as well as Afghanistan 
policy (see below), with the results to be presented to 
Parliament in early 2009. 
 
Afghanistan: policy deadlock 
---------------------------- 
 
6. (C) Afghanistan presents the Finns the opportunity to 
demonstrate the effectiveness of their approach, and the GOF 
has contributed comprehensively, through military and 
civilian personnel and development assistance (approximately 
12 million euros per year over the next six years).  While no 
one within the GOF is advocating a troop or assistance 
reduction, there are clear divisions in Vanhanen,s cabinet: 
One side advocates doing more (mainly within the Conservative 
party, Foreign Minister Stubb and Defense Minister Hakamies), 
and the other believes Finland is doing enough and that 
budgetary realities do not permit troop or aid increases. 
Vanhanen,s Center Party is part of the latter group, though 
Vanhanen himself may favor doing more.  At the NATO Summit in 
Bucharest last April, President Halonen spoke about 
continuation of Finland,s engagement through ISAF, and made 
a broad reference to Finland increasing "her contribution in 
Afghanistan."  However, Halonen has not offered the Finnish 
public a strong voice supporting Finland,s contributions to 
Afghanistan.  Halonen is part of the camp that believes 
Finland is already doing enough.  We do not agree. 
 
GOF responds to conflict in Georgia 
----------------------------------- 
 
7. (C) Russia is Finland,s largest bilateral trading partner 
and its primary energy supplier, and Finns are proud of the 
way they have managed their relations with Russia through the 
Cold War and up to the present day.  That management 
typically involves careful public statements by government 
officials calculated not to provoke.  Both PM Vanhanen and 
President Halonen employed such tactics as the recent 
conflict in Georgia unfolded, referring to the events as 
"highly unusual" and "unsettling phenomena"; 
neither offered explicit condemnation.  Stubb, who has argued 
for a more assertive foreign policy that abandons bland and 
ritualistic statements from officials, condemned the Russian 
incursion, albeit as OSCE Chairman. 
 
8. (SBU) The GOF has strongly supported both the OSCE,s and 
the EU,s role in responding to the crisis in Georgia. 
Vahanen was an early opponent of any economic sanctions 
against Russia.  The GOF supported the decision to undertake 
negotiations on a new partnership and cooperation agreement, 
saying that such negotiations would provide future leverage. 
(NOTE: Halonen has ruled out NATO membership for Finland 
during her tenure, which ends in 2012.  The Georgia conflict 
sparked debate about Finland,s relationship with NATO, and 
Vanhanen reiterated the GOF policy to maintain the "option" 
of membership.  Stubb publicly holds to the GOF policy, but 
acknowledged his own support for membership in a speech to 
Finnish diplomats last August.  A poll in September showed an 
increase in the number of Finns uncertain about Finland,s 
possible NATO membership, an increase that drew from both 
from supporters and opponents. END NOTE.) 
 
Finland seeks JASSM 
------------------- 
 
9. (S) Embassy Helsinki wholly endorses Finland's request for 
release and eventual Foreign Military Sale purchase of the 
Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile (JASSM) System. They 
deem such a system vital to their strategic national defense, 
as JASSM provides the Finnish military the means to defeat 
advanced air defense networks that would otherwise preclude 
the Finns' use of their own airspace to defend their border. 
We base our strong support on Finland's clearly articulate 
national defense needs, the war-fighting support requirements 
stipulated by Commander, U.S. European Command, General Bantz 
Craddock, and the importance of continuing the excellent 
relationship between the U.S. and Finland (REF).  Finnish 
leaders have raised JASSM previously with you, as well as 
with Vice President Cheney and Secretary Gates.  The Pentagon 
intends to respond before the Finns, stated deadline, the 
end of this year. 
 
Pharmaceutical Pricing 
---------------------- 
 
10. (SBU) The Finns tout their "international credentials," 
but those credentials suffered a setback in November when the 
Parliament approved a GOF proposal to amend a pharmaceutical 
 
pricing scheme in order to allow the substitution of lower 
priced generics for patent-protected drugs. The Health 
Minister proposed the change as a cost-cutting device but 
reimbursing only at generic drug prices undermines the patent 
rights of a number of protected medicines, including those of 
U.S. manufacturers.  The Foreign Ministry and Ministry of 
Economy saw the potential damage to Finland,s reputation and 
lobbied against the measure, although parliament passed the 
bill unanimously in November. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
11. (C) As the Finns end their much-lauded OSCE chairmanship, 
they look to other opportunities to act internationally and 
employ their brand of crisis management, e.g., a seat on the 
UN Security Council (2013-14).  The Finns offer a pragmatic 
voice and active presence that should not be lost.  By 
encouraging the Finns, robust internationalism and 
supporting strong trans-Atlantic ties we can advance our 
common interests in combining civilian and military tools to 
address global security challenges.  END COMMENT. 
 
BARRETT