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Viewing cable 08DHAKA1151, ADDRESSING THE ROHINGYA REFUGEE SITUATION IN THE

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08DHAKA1151 2008-11-04 09:45 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Dhaka
VZCZCXRO2474
OO RUEHCI
DE RUEHKA #1151/01 3090945
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 040945Z NOV 08
FM AMEMBASSY DHAKA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7666
INFO RUEHLM/AMEMBASSY COLOMBO PRIORITY 8700
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD PRIORITY 2427
RUEHKT/AMEMBASSY KATHMANDU PRIORITY 9938
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY 0916
RUEHGO/AMEMBASSY RANGOON PRIORITY 2683
RUEHCI/AMCONSUL KOLKATA PRIORITY 1538
RHHMUNS/COMSOCPAC HONOLULU HI PRIORITY
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY 0691
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0140
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 DHAKA 001151 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: EAID KDEM PGOV PHUM PINS PREF PREL BG BM
SUBJECT: ADDRESSING THE ROHINGYA REFUGEE SITUATION IN THE 
BANGLADESH-BURMA BORDER REGION 
 
REF: A. DHAKA 770 
     B. IIR 6-925-0229-08 
     C. IIR 9-925-0230-08 
     D. CIA CLASSIFIED REPORT DATED 8 APRIL 2008 
 
Summary 
======== 
 
1. (U) Previous international assistance for Burmese Muslim 
Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh has focused largely on those 
who have been formally registered with the United Nations 
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).   While this approach 
has improved the well being of the registered refugees, it 
has three important drawbacks.  First, it has not affected 
the roughly 100,000-500,000 Rohingya who are unregistered and 
live outside the camps.  Second, it has encouraged a culture 
of dependency among the registered refugees.  Finally, it has 
exacerbated conflict between the Rohingya and their 
Bangladeshi neighbors, who, in an already economically 
underdeveloped region, resent that conditions are sometimes 
better in the camps than in the surrounding villages.  Our 
proposed new strategy seeks to extend measured support to the 
unregistered Rohingya, while also taking steps to expand 
livelihood, health, security, and education programs to 
Bangladeshis living in the vicinity of the camps.  End 
Summary. 
 
 
Background 
=========== 
 
2. (U) Reftels describe the current situation of Rohingya 
refugees living in Cox's Bazar district and warn of the 
possibility that this vulnerable, predominantly Muslim 
population could prove an attractive target for recruitment 
into violent, religious extremist organizations.  UNHCR has 
registered and provides support to over 27,800 Rohingya 
refugees.  In the past year, the number of unregistered 
Rohingya residing in seprate sites has increased from 10,000 
to 15,000.  Overall, the Rohingya population in the Cox's 
Bazar area may be as high as 500,000, with the vast majority 
residing outside of the UNHCR camps.  Many Rohingya have been 
stateless for decades, and deteriorating conditions for 
Rohingya living in Burma has increased the rate of new 
migration into Bangladesh.  All are vulnerable. 
 
3. (U) The Dhaka Steering Group - comprised of UNHCR, the 
U.S., and western donor nations - formulates and coordinates 
strategies on Rohingya issues.  Donors have provided tens of 
millions of dollars in assistance to the Rohingya since the 
last large-scale refugee influx in the early 1990s.  The 
international community shares one goal: to find a durable 
solution to this persistent refugee situation.  Interagency 
efforts should focus on how USG assistance could be better 
targeted to address the underlying conditions that exacerbate 
vulnerabilities to extremist influence, while at the same 
time supporting overall development objectives in the area. 
 
 
Who are the Rohyinga? 
====================== 
 
4. (U) According to accepted estimates, between 
150,000-500,000 Rohingya live in South East Bangladesh.  They 
fall into three groups: 1) those registered and recognized as 
refugees, 2) those living in camps/sites that are not 
registered, and 3) those integrated into the general 
community.  Approximately 27,800 Rohingya live in two camps 
administered by the UNHCR.  These camps provide basic 
support, such as medical, shelter, food, education, and 
protection.  The Government of Bangaldesh (GOB) formally 
recognizes people in these as refugees.  In contrast, the 
number of unregistered refugees is approximately 15,000, with 
at least 10,000 people at the Leda site and approximately 
5,000 living outside of Kutapalong, one of the UNHCR camps. 
People in Leda receive support from the NGO Islamic Relief, 
which receives funding from the European Commission.  Those 
outside of Kutupalong receive no formal support and rely 
increasingly on charity from refugees living in the camp. 
Finally, integrated Rohingya live in villages throughout 
South East Bangladesh.  They share a common language and 
ethnic connection with Bengalis living in the Chittagong 
Division, yet during the government's voter registration 
 
DHAKA 00001151  002 OF 004 
 
 
drive in 2007 and 2008, Rohingya who could not document 
Bangladeshi citizenship were not allowed to register.  In 
some cases, village cheiftans who had allowed Rohyinga to 
settle in their villages apparently feared government 
retribution and forced those Rohingya out of their homes and 
into the camps. 
 
 
A Population in Peril 
===================== 
 
5. (U) Underlying conditions that contribute to vulnerability 
of Rohingya include: lack of access to basic education, 
livelihoods, training, community mobilization, shelter, legal 
status, freedom of movement, and police protection.  Violent 
exchanges with local Bangladeshis may occasionally occur, 
further marginalizing Rohingya.  In addition, Rohingya 
insurgents and questionable international charities have also 
been active among the refugee populations, further 
contributing to increased vulnerability to extremism. 
 
 
6. (U) Significant political obstacles exist to changing the 
status quo regarding refugee treatment.  Most significantly, 
the GOB has not officially supported the integration of 
Rohingya refugees into Bangladeshi society.  While 
repatriation remains the ultimate goal of the UNHCR, the 
prospect of repatriation under current political realities in 
Burma is an unlikely outcome and many refugees do not welcome 
this option.  Moreover, the GOB asserted that such measures 
would attract additional Rohingya to the camps. 
 
 
Western Strategy at a Crossroads 
================================ 
 
7. (U) The UNHCR, supported by a Dhaka Steering Group (DSG) 
consisting of the diplomatic missions of Australia, the 
European Union, France, Norway, Sweden, the Netherlands, the 
United Kingdom, and the United States, is looking at 
extending additional support to the Rohingya.  Current 
efforts focus only on delivering assistance to the registered 
refugee population, but the DSG hopes to develop a more 
holistic, district-wide approach.  Key elements would include 
opening the camps by providing the refugees freedom of 
movement and the right to work.  Additionally, unregistered 
refugees would be registered and receive assistance, but at 
the same time would not be encouraged to move into camps. 
 
8. (U) The UNHCR has informally proposed ways that donors 
could assist in the refugee response effort.  (Note: In some 
cases, these proposals recommend extending or expanding 
existing support provided through PRM.  End Note)  Inside the 
camps, UNHCR invited the USG to do the following: 
 
-- Expand skills training to include income generating 
activities. 
 
-- Ensure that current medical support, to include support to 
the disabled, remains funded. 
 
-- Expand community mobilization programs in the camps. 
 
-- Improve physical infrastructure in the camps, to include 
construction of shelters and interior roads. 
 
9. (U) Outside the camps, UNHCR requested donors consider 
helping with the following measures: 
 
-- Expand access to justice by improving policing in the 
upazilas, or sub-districts, where the camps are located. 
This would include implementation of community policing 
initiatives, specifically addressing gender-based violence 
and victim support centers. 
 
-- Develop initiatives to limit the environmental impact of 
the Rohingya and find ways to involve the Rohingya in 
existing forestry programs. 
 
-- Expand access to education for refugee children by 
building new public schools in the area that would serve both 
Rohingya and Bangladeshi students. 
 
 
DHAKA 00001151  003 OF 004 
 
 
Where the USG Stands 
======================= 
 
10. (U) The USG currently has several development programs 
operating in the Cox,s Bazar area.  They include USAID,s 
environment, health and livelihood programs, as well as 
PRM-supported health, education and livelihood programming to 
registered refugees.  At this time, we want to expand 
educational opportunities to the 10,000 unregistered refugees 
near the Leda site.  The PACOM Augmentation Team (PAT) is 
preparing the FY09 Foreign Humanitarian Assistance plan, 
which could make up to $1M available for infrastructure 
projects in the area.  Additionally, the PAT's Information 
Support Team (IST) has anti-violence programs that might also 
be used to assist in police outreach to the community. 
 
11. (U) At the same time, USAID is developing targeted 
economic development activities in the Cox,s Bazar region. 
USAID supports the GOB,s protected area program under which 
the Teknaf reserve is a fundamental geographic focus.  The 
official Rohingya camps are near or abut the Teknaf reserve, 
and parts of the informal camps are actually located in the 
reserve itself.  USAID,s protected area approach includes 
co-management of the key natural resources with the local 
communities.  Bangladeshi Forestry Officials as well as local 
Bangladeshi leaders have resisted including the Rohingya 
population in these efforts in any way.  Previous USAID 
efforts to carry out livelihood activities and to introduce 
energy-saving technology in the camps were discouraged by 
both the government and the UNHCR for fear of attracting 
additional potential refugees.  As noted above, the 
government and the UNHCR strategy has changed. 
 
 
Recommendations from the Embassy,s Interagency Team 
============================================= ======= 
 
12. (U) Embassy Dhaka recommends that fugure USG efforts 
concentrate on the following: 
 
-- Increase access to education by constructing new school 
buildings in the vicinity of the camps.  Work with UNICEF and 
the government to allow Rohingya children to attend the 
schools.  In addition, immediately implement a program for 
the unregistered refugees that would train women to 
informally teach in their homes, with mentorship from capable 
registered refugees. 
 
-- Decrease the motivating factors that drive competition and 
violence between the Bangladeshi villagers and the Rohingya 
by expanding existing livelihood programs to focus on the 
parts of the district where the camps are located.  This 
could include existing and planned USAID livelihood programs 
and the expansion of PRM skills training to prepare people 
for employment in those sectors.  At the same time, improve 
community mobilization within the Rohingya population by 
supporting the existing community-based counsel system for 
conflict resolution and advocacy.  Also, implement 
anti-violence and civic responsibility messaging in the camps 
and surrounding communities. 
 
-- Decrease tension among local government, forestry 
officials, and Rohingya by reducing unregistered refugees, 
dependence on the forest lands for biomass fuel by providing 
them with high efficiency stoves and fuel.  Additionally, 
look for ways to integrate Rohingya into the Teknaf 
co-management committee and include Rohingya labor in 
forestry initiatives that would channel Rohingya labor 
towards reforestation. (Note: The UN Food and Agriculture 
Organization, UNFAO, is developing such a proposal.  End 
Note.) 
 
-- Increase police protection for Rohingya by working with 
the police to implement model police stations that include 
victim service centers.  Also, continue to exert political 
pressure on the GOB to reduce or eliminate restrictions on 
movement and work.  Additionally, improve local border 
security through targeted and sustained assistance to the 
Bangladesh Rifles, Bangladesh Coast Guard, and Bangladesh 
Navy. 
 
-- Increase awareness of civic rights and responsibilities 
through print media, sporting events, and local media that 
 
DHAKA 00001151  004 OF 004 
 
 
include environmental and anti-violence messages. 
 
-- Increase the prosperity of the area by encouraging 
improvements in trade, fisheries, tourism, and agriculture 
sectors through existing and new programming, such as 
public-private partnerships. 
 
-- Improve access to formal banking services to allow 
Rohingya to build wealth through work and remittances. 
 
Risks 
===== 
 
13. (U) This approach will raise a number of questions that 
will need to be answered.  First, it is necessary to reassure 
the GOB that this is not a scheme to lead refugees towards 
Bangladeshi citizenship.  Second, local Bangladeshi leaders 
want guarantees that the Rohingya population is not taking 
job opportunities away from the local Bangladeshi population. 
 Third, to protect the Teknaf reserve it is important to 
involve all stakeholders, including Rohingya, in its 
preservation.  Fourth, extremist elements could taint the 
best of efforts.  Involving the religious leadership in Cox's 
Bazar, a traditionally more conservative part of the country, 
could be a good counter-weight.  Inclusion of Imams from in 
and around the camps under USAID's Leader of Influence 
program could assist in developing greater tolerance and 
understanding between the Rohingya and local Bangladeshi 
groups.  Finally, Burma may see an improvement of conditions 
for its refugees in Bangladesh as an opportunity to open an 
escape valve and push more Rohingya into Bangladesh. 
Similarly, improved conditions in Bangladesh could serve as a 
magnet for disaffected populations within Burma.  Border 
security as well as diplomatic efforts will need to be 
deepened and strengthened to stem a potential tide of new 
refugees. 
 
Comment 
======== 
 
14. (U) With this proposal, Post plans to expand our "3-D" 
strategy * democracy, development, and denial of space to 
terrorists * to include this vulnerable population and 
geographic location.  Post's interagency, in this case 
consisting primarily of DOS, USAID, and DOD, have partnered 
together to develop this strategy.  To the extent possible, 
we will use existing resources and programs in pursuing this 
strategy.  Still, Post requests USG agencies and departments 
identify resources and programs to support this effort. 
Moriarty