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Viewing cable 08DAMASCUS842, SYRIAN DISSIDENT TAKES DIM VIEW OF ORGANIZED

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08DAMASCUS842 2008-11-25 15:01 2011-05-04 00:00 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Damascus
Appears in these articles:
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/10402
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/10403
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/10404
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/10405
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/10406
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/11322
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/11323
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/11324
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/11325
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/11326
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/11327
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/11328
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/11329
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/11330
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/11331
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/11332
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/11333
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/11336
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/11337
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/11338
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/11339
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/11340
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/11341
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/11342
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/11343
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/11344
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/11345
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/11346
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/11348
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/11349
VZCZCXRO9390
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK RUEHROV
DE RUEHDM #0842/01 3301501
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 251501Z NOV 08
FM AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5620
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0478
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 DAMASCUS 000842 
 
SIPDIS 
 
LONDON FOR WALLER, PARIS FOR TSOU 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/25/2018 
TAGS: PREL PHUM PGOV KPAO KDEM SY
SUBJECT: SYRIAN DISSIDENT TAKES DIM VIEW OF ORGANIZED 
POLITICAL ACTIVISM 
 
REF: A. DAMASCUS 00176 
     B. DAMASCUS 00224 
     C. DAMASCUS 00373 
     D. DAMASCUS 00757 
     E. DAMASCUS 00010 
     F. 07 DAMASCUS 00389 
 
Classified By: CDA Maura Connelly for reasons 1.4 b and d. 
 
1. (C) SUMMARY: Civil society activist and economist XXXXXXXXXXXX, released from prison on XXXXXXXXXXXX, met 
with us recently to share his bleak assessment of 
pro-democracy and human rights movements in Syria. His 
appraisals differ from other civil society leaders (refs 
A-C), especially regarding the Damascus Declaration (DD) 
movement, in that he sees little cohesion among activists. 
XXXXXXXXXXXX’s lawyer, XXXXXXXXXXXX (protect), and former 
detainee XXXXXXXXXXXX attended the meeting. XXXXXXXXXXXX's 
associates offered insight and sometimes dissenting opinions 
on the current status of civil society activism. END SUMMARY. 
 
---------- 
BACKGROUND 
---------- 
 
2. (U) SARG security forces arrested XXXXXXXXXXXX in 2001 
during the Damascus Spring, a fertile period of open 
political debate in the months following Bashar al-Asad's 
brief flirtation with a more liberal approach to governance. 
During this period, XXXXXXXXXXXX was an outspoken critic against 
SARG corruption and political oppression; he wrote for the 
banned journal XXXXXXXXXXXX, and actively participated in 
lectures and discussions with other reform-minded activists. 
His arrest reportedly resulted from a lecture he gave in 
XXXXXXXXXXXX in which he called for democracy and 
transparency. In XXXXXXXXXXXX, the Supreme State Security Court 
sentenced XXXXXXXXXXXX to 10 years in prison. After enduring more 
than six years of incarceration, most of it in solitary 
confinement, XXXXXXXXXXXX was released on XXXXXXXXXXXX, in part due to 
his health, which had deteriorated precipitously while he was 
in jail. 
 
------------- 
XXXXXXXXXXXX's VIEW 
------------- 
 
3. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX met with us on November 19 to discuss the 
SARG crackdown on political activism that began with the 
Damascus Spring and crescendoed with the sentencing of 12 
members of the Damascus Declaration National Council (DDNC) 
(ref D). XXXXXXXXXXXX stressed that activism at an individual level 
would continue despite the current climate, but attempts at 
coordination would meet little success. "The Damascus 
Declaration," XXXXXXXXXXXX said, "is finished as a movement. The 
people will continue working, but won't be able to 
gather...it is significant that they cannot organize." When 
asked whether these individuals could, acting alone, effect 
reform at any level, XXXXXXXXXXXX replied cautiously: "I don't see 
an open door, but I don't think it is impossible." 
 
4. (C) Recent VIP visits by European leaders to Damascus only 
reinforce the SARG's belief that human rights have no real 
significance to the West, XXXXXXXXXXXX lamented.  "We are afraid 
the authorities can use the new situation to oppress the 
opposition.  I heard that when Miliband was here, they 
sentenced (Mustafa) al-Dalati," he said.  "Asad (now) thinks 
the West depends on him, needs him, and will close their eyes 
to these (civil society reform) problems." For the West, 
XXXXXXXXXXXX asserted, the "human rights" issue was merely "one of 
many goods for trade at the table of international relations." 
 
5. (C) Like many Syrians we have met, XXXXXXXXXXXX, XXXXXXXXXXXX, and 
XXXXXXXXXXXXi decried the U.S. sanctions against Syria as hurting 
the Syrian people more than anyone else. XXXXXXXXXXXX argued the 
sanctions had become a tool for controlling popular opinion 
in the SARG's hands. The Asad regime held up the sanctions as 
an example of how the West opposed the people of Syria, 
thereby reinforcing the idea that Asad and the Ba'ath Party 
alone had the Syrian people's interests at heart, XXXXXXXXXXXX said. 
 
6. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX added that the West demanded reform, but it 
actually prefered an Asad regime to an alternative 
government, primarily because the West feared any alternative 
would be Islamist and/or violent, or simply would not 
willingly follow the policies of the West. He argued the West 
was afraid of a fully democratic country anywhere in the 
Middle East. Both XXXXXXXXXXXX, who spent five years in prison for 
 
DAMASCUS 00000842  002 OF 002 
 
 
his role in the Damascus Spring and is now involved with the 
Damascus Declaration, and XXXXXXXXXXXX, who is XXXXXXXXXXXX's lawyer 
and the president of the XXXXXXXXXXXX, echoed XXXXXXXXXXXX's sentiments in their own comments. 
XXXXXXXXXXXX argued the "regime always uses this relationship with 
the West to project an image of importance...It allows him 
(Asad) to tell people: 'see, I'm needed and the West isn't 
interested in these (human rights) issues.'" 
 
-------------------------- 
MINOR DISSENT IN THE RANKS 
-------------------------- 
 
7. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX disagreed with XXXXXXXXXXXX on the DD's future 
effectiveness during the meeting, while XXXXXXXXXXXX withheld 
comment until afterwards when he could speak to us in 
private. XXXXXXXXXXXX said "The regime will not stop the 
movement through acts of dictatorship." The SARG crackdown, 
he argued, had not prevented the DD from continuing work and 
extending their organization.  XXXXXXXXXXXX told us after the 
meeting XXXXXXXXXXXX was "a little out of touch" with the political 
reform movement as a whole, and the DD movement in 
particular, as a result of his imprisonment. He pointed out 
that XXXXXXXXXXXX had been put in jail before the DD was signed and 
was not fully informed of the organization's current status. 
 
8. (C) When asked what concrete steps the DD would take in 
the future, XXXXXXXXXXXX said people were still very afraid of SARG 
reprisals and were currently focused on providing assistance 
to the families of political prisoners. He and XXXXXXXXXXXX 
requested U.S. monetary assistance in these efforts. 
 
---------- 
NEXT STEPS 
---------- 
 
9. (C) Both XXXXXXXXXXXX and XXXXXXXXXXXX insisted the U.S. should work 
through the U.N. to pressure Syria instead of pursuing 
sanctions.  They also said Western democracies could only 
foster civil society reform in Syria if they made human 
rights and civil society reform pre-conditions to engagement. 
 XXXXXXXXXXXX pointed to CODELs Pelosi and Specter as examples of 
incidences where Western leaders came without any guarantees 
on human rights cases, received promises from the SARG for 
the release of specific individuals (refs E & F), only to 
have the SARG deny promises were made.  Regarding CODEL 
Pelosi, XXXXXXXXXXXX stated that had Pelosi requested the release of 
Kamal Labwani prior to her arrival, the SARG might have done 
it. "To come and then ask for promises will get nothing; 
promises will be made, but will be worthless," XXXXXXXXXXXX said. 
 
10. (C) When asked whether the National Salvation Front 
(NSF), a political opposition group in exile headed by former 
Syrian Vice President Khaddam and Muslim Brotherhood general 
supervisor Ali Sadr al'Din al-Bayanouni, represented a 
potential ally in political action, XXXXXXXXXXXX clearly stated 
they were not: "They are outside the country; what can they 
do without people inside the country?" 
 
11. (C) COMMENT: Meeting activists of any stripe in Syria has 
always been fraught with difficulties. Since the SARG 
crackdown on the DD, however, activists have been 
particularly gun-shy; and after the alleged U.S. attack on 
Abu Kamal, direct contact with Syrians all but ceased. 
Therefore, Post considers the XXXXXXXXXXXX meeting to be a positive 
sign. While the "lenient" sentence of the DDNC might have 
played an encouraging role (ref D), fears that European 
engagement with SARG may go forward without human rights 
issues being front and center could also be a motivating 
factor. As the SARG steps from the wings onto the main 
international stage, activists may seek increased exposure as 
well. Post encourages the Department continue finding ways to 
provide direct financial assistance to the families of 
political prisoners through the Human Rights Defenders Fund. 
END COMMENT. 
CONNELLY