Currently released so far... 97115 / 251,287
Articles
Brazil
Sri Lanka
United Kingdom
Sweden
00. Editorial
United States
Latin America
Egypt
Jordan
Yemen
Thailand
Browse latest releases
2010/12/01
2010/12/02
2010/12/03
2010/12/04
2010/12/05
2010/12/06
2010/12/07
2010/12/08
2010/12/09
2010/12/10
2010/12/11
2010/12/12
2010/12/13
2010/12/14
2010/12/15
2010/12/16
2010/12/17
2010/12/18
2010/12/19
2010/12/20
2010/12/21
2010/12/22
2010/12/23
2010/12/25
2010/12/26
2010/12/27
2010/12/28
2010/12/29
2010/12/30
2011/01/01
2011/01/02
2011/01/04
2011/01/05
2011/01/07
2011/01/09
2011/01/11
2011/01/12
2011/01/13
2011/01/14
2011/01/15
2011/01/16
2011/01/17
2011/01/18
2011/01/19
2011/01/20
2011/01/21
2011/01/22
2011/01/23
2011/01/24
2011/01/25
2011/01/26
2011/01/27
2011/01/28
2011/01/29
2011/01/30
2011/01/31
2011/02/01
2011/02/02
2011/02/03
2011/02/04
2011/02/05
2011/02/06
2011/02/07
2011/02/08
2011/02/09
2011/02/10
2011/02/11
2011/02/12
2011/02/13
2011/02/14
2011/02/15
2011/02/16
2011/02/17
2011/02/18
2011/02/19
2011/02/20
2011/02/21
2011/02/22
2011/02/23
2011/02/24
2011/02/25
2011/02/26
2011/02/27
2011/02/28
2011/03/01
2011/03/02
2011/03/03
2011/03/04
2011/03/05
2011/03/06
2011/03/07
2011/03/08
2011/03/09
2011/03/10
2011/03/11
2011/03/13
2011/03/14
2011/03/15
2011/03/16
2011/03/17
2011/03/18
2011/03/19
2011/03/20
2011/03/21
2011/03/22
2011/03/23
2011/03/24
2011/03/25
2011/03/26
2011/03/27
2011/03/28
2011/03/29
2011/03/30
2011/03/31
2011/04/01
2011/04/02
2011/04/03
2011/04/04
2011/04/05
2011/04/06
2011/04/07
2011/04/08
2011/04/09
2011/04/10
2011/04/11
2011/04/12
2011/04/13
2011/04/14
2011/04/15
2011/04/16
2011/04/17
2011/04/18
2011/04/19
2011/04/20
2011/04/21
2011/04/22
2011/04/23
2011/04/24
2011/04/25
2011/04/26
2011/04/27
2011/04/28
2011/04/29
2011/04/30
2011/05/01
2011/05/02
2011/05/03
2011/05/04
2011/05/05
2011/05/06
2011/05/07
2011/05/09
2011/05/10
2011/05/11
2011/05/12
2011/05/13
2011/05/14
2011/05/15
2011/05/16
2011/05/17
2011/05/18
2011/05/19
2011/05/20
2011/05/21
2011/05/22
2011/05/23
2011/05/24
2011/05/25
2011/05/26
2011/05/27
2011/05/28
2011/05/29
2011/05/30
2011/05/31
2011/06/01
2011/06/02
2011/06/03
2011/06/04
2011/06/05
2011/06/06
2011/06/07
2011/06/08
2011/06/09
2011/06/10
2011/06/11
2011/06/12
2011/06/13
2011/06/14
2011/06/15
2011/06/16
2011/06/17
2011/06/18
2011/06/19
2011/06/20
2011/06/21
2011/06/22
2011/06/23
2011/06/24
2011/06/25
2011/06/26
2011/06/27
2011/06/28
2011/06/29
2011/06/30
2011/07/01
2011/07/02
2011/07/04
2011/07/05
2011/07/06
2011/07/07
2011/07/08
2011/07/10
2011/07/11
2011/07/12
2011/07/13
2011/07/14
2011/07/15
2011/07/16
2011/07/17
2011/07/18
2011/07/19
2011/07/20
2011/07/21
2011/07/22
2011/07/23
2011/07/25
2011/07/27
2011/07/28
2011/07/29
2011/07/31
2011/08/01
2011/08/02
2011/08/03
2011/08/05
2011/08/06
2011/08/07
2011/08/08
2011/08/10
2011/08/11
2011/08/12
2011/08/13
2011/08/15
2011/08/16
2011/08/17
2011/08/19
2011/08/21
2011/08/22
2011/08/23
2011/08/24
2011/08/25
Browse by creation date
Browse by origin
Embassy Athens
Embassy Asuncion
Embassy Astana
Embassy Asmara
Embassy Ashgabat
Embassy Apia
Embassy Antananarivo
Embassy Ankara
Embassy Amman
Embassy Algiers
Embassy Addis Ababa
Embassy Accra
Embassy Abuja
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Embassy Abidjan
Consulate Auckland
Consulate Amsterdam
Consulate Alexandria
Consulate Adana
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embasy Bonn
Embassy Bujumbura
Embassy Buenos Aires
Embassy Budapest
Embassy Bucharest
Embassy Brussels
Embassy Bridgetown
Embassy Brazzaville
Embassy Bratislava
Embassy Brasilia
Embassy Bogota
Embassy Bishkek
Embassy Bern
Embassy Berlin
Embassy Belmopan
Embassy Belgrade
Embassy Beirut
Embassy Beijing
Embassy Banjul
Embassy Bangui
Embassy Bangkok
Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan
Embassy Bamako
Embassy Baku
Embassy Baghdad
Consulate Belfast
Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Cotonou
Embassy Copenhagen
Embassy Conakry
Embassy Colombo
Embassy Chisinau
Embassy Caracas
Embassy Canberra
Embassy Cairo
Consulate Curacao
Consulate Ciudad Juarez
Consulate Chiang Mai
Consulate Chennai
Consulate Chengdu
Consulate Casablanca
Consulate Cape Town
Consulate Calgary
Embassy Dushanbe
Embassy Dublin
Embassy Doha
Embassy Djibouti
Embassy Dili
Embassy Dhaka
Embassy Dar Es Salaam
Embassy Damascus
Embassy Dakar
DIR FSINFATC
Consulate Dusseldorf
Consulate Durban
Consulate Dubai
Consulate Dhahran
Embassy Guatemala
Embassy Grenada
Embassy Georgetown
Embassy Gaborone
Consulate Guayaquil
Consulate Guangzhou
Consulate Guadalajara
Embassy Helsinki
Embassy Harare
Embassy Hanoi
Consulate Hong Kong
Consulate Ho Chi Minh City
Consulate Hermosillo
Consulate Hamilton
Consulate Hamburg
Consulate Halifax
Embassy Kyiv
Embassy Kuwait
Embassy Kuala Lumpur
Embassy Kolonia
Embassy Kinshasa
Embassy Kingston
Embassy Kigali
Embassy Khartoum
Embassy Kathmandu
Embassy Kampala
Embassy Kabul
Consulate Krakow
Consulate Kolkata
Consulate Karachi
Consulate Kaduna
Embassy Luxembourg
Embassy Lusaka
Embassy Luanda
Embassy London
Embassy Lome
Embassy Ljubljana
Embassy Lisbon
Embassy Lima
Embassy Lilongwe
Embassy Libreville
Embassy La Paz
Consulate Leipzig
Consulate Lahore
Consulate Lagos
Mission USOSCE
Mission USNATO
Mission UNESCO
Mission Geneva
Embassy Muscat
Embassy Moscow
Embassy Montevideo
Embassy Monrovia
Embassy Mogadishu
Embassy Minsk
Embassy Mexico
Embassy Mbabane
Embassy Maseru
Embassy Maputo
Embassy Manila
Embassy Manama
Embassy Managua
Embassy Malabo
Embassy Madrid
Consulate Munich
Consulate Mumbai
Consulate Montreal
Consulate Monterrey
Consulate Milan
Consulate Merida
Consulate Melbourne
Consulate Matamoros
Consulate Marseille
Embassy Nouakchott
Embassy Nicosia
Embassy Niamey
Embassy New Delhi
Embassy Ndjamena
Embassy Nassau
Embassy Nairobi
Consulate Nuevo Laredo
Consulate Naples
Consulate Naha
Consulate Nagoya
Embassy Pristina
Embassy Pretoria
Embassy Praia
Embassy Prague
Embassy Port Of Spain
Embassy Port Moresby
Embassy Port Louis
Embassy Port Au Prince
Embassy Podgorica
Embassy Phnom Penh
Embassy Paris
Embassy Paramaribo
Embassy Panama
Consulate Ponta Delgada
Consulate Peshawar
REO Mosul
REO Kirkuk
REO Hillah
REO Basrah
Embassy Rome
Embassy Riyadh
Embassy Riga
Embassy Reykjavik
Embassy Rangoon
Embassy Rabat
Consulate Rio De Janeiro
Consulate Recife
Secretary of State
Embassy Suva
Embassy Stockholm
Embassy Sofia
Embassy Skopje
Embassy Singapore
Embassy Seoul
Embassy Sarajevo
Embassy Santo Domingo
Embassy Santiago
Embassy Sanaa
Embassy San Salvador
Embassy San Jose
Consulate Surabaya
Consulate Strasbourg
Consulate St Petersburg
Consulate Shenyang
Consulate Shanghai
Consulate Sapporo
Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis
Embassy Tripoli
Embassy Tokyo
Embassy Tirana
Embassy The Hague
Embassy Tel Aviv
Embassy Tehran
Embassy Tegucigalpa
Embassy Tbilisi
Embassy Tashkent
Embassy Tallinn
Consulate Toronto
Consulate Tijuana
Consulate Thessaloniki
USUN New York
USMISSION USTR GENEVA
USEU Brussels
US Office Almaty
US Mission Geneva
US Mission CD Geneva
US Interests Section Havana
US Delegation, Secretary
US Delegation FEST TWO
UNVIE
UN Rome
Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Embassy Vilnius
Embassy Vientiane
Embassy Vienna
Embassy Vatican
Embassy Valletta
Consulate Vladivostok
Consulate Vancouver
Browse by tag
AF
ADANA
ASEC
AFIN
AMGT
AE
AORC
AID
AR
AO
AU
ASEAN
AGOA
AFGHANISTAN
AFFAIRS
AMED
APER
ASECARP
APEC
AEMR
AS
AA
ANET
AFLU
ABLD
AL
ASUP
AJ
APECO
AMER
ABUD
AODE
AM
AFSN
AESC
AND
AG
ALOW
AROC
AVIANFLU
ATRN
ACOA
AEGR
AMGMT
AADP
AFSI
ACABQ
APRM
AZ
AIDS
ASE
AGAO
ADCO
ABDALLAH
ARF
AIDAC
ACOTA
ASCH
AC
ASEG
AGR
ACS
AMCHAMS
AN
AMIA
ASIG
ADPM
ADB
ANARCHISTS
ALOWAR
ARM
AUC
AINF
AINT
AORG
AY
AVIAN
AMEDCASCKFLO
AK
ARSO
ARABBL
ASO
ANTITERRORISM
ARABL
AOWC
AGRICULTURE
ALJAZEERA
AMTC
AFINM
AOCR
ABER
ARR
AFPK
ASSEMBLY
ASSK
AZE
AORCYM
AINR
AGMT
AEC
ACKM
APRC
AIN
ASCC
AFPREL
ASED
APERTH
ASFC
ASECTH
AFSA
AOMS
AORCO
ANTXON
ARC
AFAF
ADIP
AIAG
AFARI
AEMED
AORL
AX
ASECAF
AOPC
ASECAFIN
AFZAL
APCS
AMB
AGUIRRE
AEMRASECCASCKFLOMARRPRELPINRAMGTJMXL
AIT
ARCH
AMEX
ALI
AQ
ATFN
AMBASSADOR
AORCD
AVIATION
ARAS
AINFCY
ACBAQ
AOPR
AREP
ALEXANDER
ATRD
AEIR
AOIC
ABLDG
ASEX
AFR
ASCE
ATRA
ASEK
AER
ALOUNI
AMCT
AVERY
APR
AMAT
AEMRS
ASPA
AFU
AMG
ATPDEA
ALL
AECL
ACAO
ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
AORD
AFL
AME
ADM
ASECPHUM
AGIT
ABT
ASECVE
AGUILAR
AT
ABMC
ALZUGUREN
ANGEL
ASR
ANTONIO
BMGT
BEXP
BM
BG
BL
BA
BR
BTA
BO
BY
BBSR
BLUE
BK
BF
BTIO
BELLVIEW
BE
BU
BN
BH
BD
BC
BTC
BILAT
BT
BX
BRUSSELS
BP
BB
BRPA
BUSH
BURMA
BMENA
BESP
BIT
BBG
BGD
BMEAID
BAGHDAD
BEN
BIO
BMOT
BWC
BLUNT
BURNS
BUT
BGMT
BAIO
BCW
BOEHNER
BFIF
BOL
BASHAR
BIMSTEC
BOU
BIDEN
BZ
BFIN
BTRA
BI
BHUM
BOIKO
BERARDUCCI
BOUCHAIB
BORDER
BEXPC
BTIU
BTT
BIOS
BEXB
BGPGOV
BOND
BLR
CE
CG
CH
CVR
CASC
CU
CI
CD
CO
CDG
CB
CJAN
CPAS
COM
CVIS
CMGT
CT
CENTCOM
CNARC
CTERR
COUNTER
CHIEF
CDC
CTR
CBW
COUNTRY
CLEARANCE
CY
CA
CM
CS
CWC
CN
CITES
CF
CWG
CIVS
CFIS
CASCC
CROATIA
CONS
COUNTERTERRORISM
CASA
COE
CJ
CHR
CODEL
CR
CBC
CACS
CHERTOFF
CAS
CONTROL
CONDITIONS
CONDOLEEZZA
CITEL
CV
CLINTON
CHG
CZ
CON
CTBT
CEN
CRIMES
COMMERCE
CLOK
CRISTINA
CFED
CARC
CND
CTM
CARICOM
COUNTRYCLEARANCE
CBTH
CHINA
CSW
CICTE
CJUS
CYPRUS
CW
CAMBODIA
CENSUS
CIDA
CRIME
CBG
CBE
CMGMT
CAIO
CEC
CARSON
CPCTC
CEDAW
COMESA
CVIA
CWCM
CEA
COSI
CAPC
CGEN
COPUOS
CGOPRC
COETRD
CKGR
CFE
CQ
CITT
CIC
CARIB
CVIC
CLO
CAFTA
CVISU
CHRISTOPHER
CACM
CIAT
CDB
CIS
CUL
CHAO
CNC
CL
CSEP
COMMAND
CENTER
COL
CAN
CAJC
CUIS
CONSULAR
CLMT
CIA
CBSA
CEUDA
CAC
CROS
CIO
CPUOS
CKOR
CVPR
CONG
CONTROLS
CEPTER
CVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGKIRF
CDCE
DPOL
DEMARCHE
DHS
DR
DA
DISENGAGEMENT
DEMOCRATIC
DEFENSE
DJ
DY
DARFUR
DHRF
DEA
DTRO
DPRK
DO
DARFR
DOC
DRL
DK
DOJ
DTRA
DOMESTIC
DAC
DOD
DEAX
DIEZ
DEOC
DELTAVIOLENCE
DCOM
DMINE
DRC
DCG
DPKO
DOMESTICPOLITICS
DE
DB
DOT
DEPT
DOE
DHLAKAMA
DHSX
DS
DKEM
DAO
DCM
DANIEL
DEM
DAVID
DCRM
ETRD
EAGR
ETTC
EAID
ECON
EFIN
ECIN
EINV
ELAB
EAIR
ENRG
EPET
EWWT
ECPS
EIND
EMIN
ELTN
EC
ETMIN
EUC
EZ
ET
ELECTIONS
ENVR
EU
EUN
EG
EINT
ER
ECONOMICS
ES
EMS
ENIV
EEB
EN
ECE
ECOSOC
EK
ENVIRONMENT
EFIS
EI
EWT
ENGRD
ECPSN
EXIM
EIAD
ERIN
ECPC
EDEV
ENGY
ECTRD
EPA
ESTH
ECCT
EINVECON
ENGR
ERTD
EUR
EAP
EWWC
ELTD
EL
EXIMOPIC
EXTERNAL
ETRDEC
ESCAP
ECO
EGAD
ELNT
ECONOMIC
ENV
ETRN
EIAR
EUMEM
ENRGPARMOTRASENVKGHGPGOVECONTSPLEAID
EREL
ECOM
ECONETRDEAGRJA
ETCC
ETRG
ECONOMY
EMED
ETR
ENERG
EITC
EFINOECD
EURM
EENG
ERA
EXPORT
ENRD
ECONEINVETRDEFINELABETRDKTDBPGOVOPIC
EGEN
EBRD
EVIN
ETRAD
ECOWAS
EFTA
ECONETRDBESPAR
EGOVSY
EPIN
EID
ECONENRG
EDRC
ESENV
ETT
EB
ENER
ELTNSNAR
ECHEVARRIA
ETRC
EPIT
EDUC
ESA
EFI
ENRGY
ESCI
EE
EAIDXMXAXBXFFR
EETC
ECIP
EIAID
EIVN
EBEXP
ESTN
EING
EGOV
ETRA
EPETEIND
ELAN
ETRDGK
EAIDRW
ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS
EPEC
ENVI
ELN
EAG
EPCS
EPRT
EPTED
ETRB
EUM
EAIDS
EFIC
EFINECONEAIDUNGAGM
EAIDAR
ESF
EIDN
ELAM
EDU
EV
EAIDAF
ECN
EDA
EXBS
EINTECPS
ENRGTRGYETRDBEXPBTIOSZ
EPREL
EAC
EINVEFIN
ETA
EAGER
EINDIR
ECA
ECLAC
ELAP
EITI
EUCOM
ECONEFINETRDPGOVEAGRPTERKTFNKCRMEAID
EARG
ELDIN
EINVKSCA
ENNP
EFINECONCS
EFINTS
ECCP
ETC
EAIRASECCASCID
EINN
ETRP
EAIDNI
EFQ
ECOQKPKO
EGPHUM
EBUD
ECONEINVEFINPGOVIZ
ENERGY
ELB
EINDETRD
EMI
ECONEFIN
EIB
EURN
ETRDEINVTINTCS
EIN
EFIM
ETIO
ELAINE
EMN
EATO
EWTR
EIPR
EINVETC
ETTD
ETDR
EIQ
ECONCS
EPPD
ENRGIZ
EISL
ESPINOSA
ELEC
EAIG
ESLCO
EUREM
ENTG
ERD
EINVECONSENVCSJA
EEPET
EUNCH
ECINECONCS
ETRO
ETRDECONWTOCS
ECUN
EFND
EPECO
EAIRECONRP
ERGR
ETRDPGOV
ECPN
ENRGMO
EPWR
EET
EAIS
EAGRE
EDUARDO
EAGRRP
EAIDPHUMPRELUG
EICN
ECONQH
EVN
EGHG
ELBR
EINF
EAIDHO
EENV
ETEX
ERNG
ED
FR
FREEDOM
FINREF
FJ
FI
FRELIMO
FOREIGN
FAA
FETHI
FAS
FTAA
FRB
FAO
FCS
FINANCE
FWS
FTA
FEMA
FDA
FLU
FRANCISCO
FBI
FORCE
FO
FARC
FK
FT
FCSC
FAC
FM
FMGT
FINV
FCSCEG
FARM
FERNANDO
FINR
FIN
FINE
FIR
FDIC
FOR
FOI
FCUL
FKLU
FMLN
FISO
FIXED
GM
GMUS
GG
GR
GE
GAZA
GT
GH
GZ
GJ
GLOBAL
GV
GABY
GOI
GA
GCC
GB
GY
GATT
GC
GUAM
GEORGE
GTIP
GOV
GOMEZ
GUTIERREZ
GL
GKGIC
GF
GU
GWI
GARCIA
GTMO
GN
GANGS
GIPNC
GAERC
GREGG
GUILLERMO
GASPAR
GERARD
GI
HK
HR
HUMANR
HUMAN
HO
HA
HUMANRIGHTS
HU
HHS
HIV
HUM
HRKAWC
HILLEN
HILLARY
HDP
HUMRIT
HSTC
HUMANITARIAN
HCOPIL
HADLEY
HURI
HL
HRETRD
HOURANI
HG
HARRIET
HESHAM
HI
HNCHR
HARRY
HRECON
HRC
HOSTAGES
HEBRON
HUMOR
HSWG
HYMPSK
HECTOR
HN
HYDE
HUD
HRPGOV
HIGHLIGHTS
ID
ILC
IS
IZ
ICAO
IMO
ITU
IR
IAEA
ICRC
IPROP
IT
IBRD
ISRAELI
IRAQI
ISSUES
ITRA
IV
IO
IGAD
IRAQ
IN
IMF
ICTR
ISCON
IADB
IDB
IEA
INR
IWC
ICCAT
ILO
INMARSAT
IOM
ICJ
IQ
ISPA
ITRD
IPR
INTELSAT
ISN
IAHRC
INTERNAL
IFAD
IICA
IHO
IRAN
IL
IRCE
IC
INTELLECTUAL
IRM
IE
ICTY
IDLI
IFO
ISCA
INF
INL
ISRAEL
INV
IBB
INFLUENZA
ISPL
ITER
ITIA
INRA
ISAF
IACHR
INTERPOL
IFR
IRS
INRB
IEF
ISAAC
ICC
INDO
IIP
IATTC
INAUGURATION
IND
INS
IZPREL
IACI
IEFIN
INNP
ILAB
IA
IMTS
ITALY
ITALIAN
IFIN
IRAJ
IX
ICG
IF
ITPHUM
ITA
IP
IACW
IK
IUCN
IZEAID
IRPE
IDA
ISLAMISTS
ITF
INRO
IBET
IDP
IRC
ISO
ICES
IRMO
ITPGOV
IQNV
IMSO
IRDB
IMET
INCB
IFRC
JA
JO
JP
JM
JCIC
JOHN
JE
JEFFERY
JS
JUS
JN
JOHNNIE
JAMES
JKUS
JOSEPH
JML
JAWAD
JSRP
JIMENEZ
JOSE
JKJUS
JK
JAPAN
KMDR
KPAO
KPKO
KJUS
KCRM
KGHG
KFRD
KWMN
KDEM
KTFN
KHIV
KGIC
KIDE
KSCA
KNNP
KHUM
KIPR
KSUM
KISL
KIRF
KCOR
KRCM
KPAL
KWBG
KN
KS
KOMC
KSEP
KFLU
KPWR
KTIA
KSEO
KMPI
KHLS
KICC
KSTH
KMCA
KVPR
KPRM
KE
KU
KZ
KFLO
KSAF
KTIP
KTEX
KBCT
KOCI
KOLY
KOR
KAWC
KACT
KUNR
KTDB
KSTC
KLIG
KSKN
KNN
KCFE
KCIP
KGHA
KHDP
KPOW
KUNC
KDRL
KV
KPREL
KCRS
KPOL
KRVC
KRIM
KGIT
KWIR
KT
KIRC
KOMO
KRFD
KUWAIT
KG
KFIN
KSCI
KTFIN
KFTN
KGOV
KPRV
KSAC
KGIV
KCRIM
KPIR
KSOC
KBIO
KW
KGLB
KMWN
KPO
KFSC
KSEAO
KSTCPL
KSI
KPRP
KREC
KFPC
KUNH
KCSA
KMRS
KNDP
KR
KICCPUR
KPPAO
KCSY
KTBT
KCIS
KNEP
KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KNNB
KGCC
KINR
KPOP
KMFO
KENV
KNAR
KVIR
KDRG
KDMR
KFCE
KNAO
KDEN
KGCN
KICA
KIMMITT
KMCC
KLFU
KMSG
KSEC
KUM
KCUL
KMNP
KSMT
KCOM
KOMCSG
KSPR
KPMI
KRAD
KIND
KCRP
KAUST
KWAWC
KTER
KCHG
KRDP
KPAS
KITA
KTSC
KPAOPREL
KWGB
KIRP
KJUST
KMIG
KLAB
KTFR
KSEI
KSTT
KAPO
KSTS
KLSO
KWNN
KPOA
KHSA
KNPP
KPAONZ
KBTS
KWWW
KY
KJRE
KPAOKMDRKE
KCRCM
KSCS
KWMNCI
KESO
KWUN
KPLS
KIIP
KEDEM
KPAOY
KRIF
KGICKS
KREF
KTRD
KFRDSOCIRO
KTAO
KJU
KWMNPHUMPRELKPAOZW
KEN
KO
KNEI
KEMR
KKIV
KEAI
KWAC
KRCIM
KWCI
KFIU
KWIC
KCORR
KOMS
KNNO
KPAI
KBWG
KTTB
KTBD
KTIALG
KILS
KFEM
KTDM
KESS
KNUC
KPA
KOMCCO
KCEM
KRCS
KWBGSY
KNPPIS
KNNPMNUC
KWN
KERG
KLTN
KALM
KCCP
KSUMPHUM
KREL
KGH
KLIP
KTLA
KAWK
KWMM
KVRP
KVRC
KAID
KSLG
KDEMK
KX
KIF
KNPR
KCFC
KFTFN
KTFM
KPDD
KCERS
KMOC
KDEMAF
KMEPI
KEMS
KDRM
KEPREL
KBTR
KEDU
KNP
KIRL
KNNR
KMPT
KISLPINR
KTPN
KA
KJUSTH
KPIN
KDEV
KTDD
KAKA
KFRP
KWNM
KTSD
KINL
KJUSKUNR
KWWMN
KECF
KWBC
KPRO
KVBL
KOM
KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KEDM
KFLD
KLPM
KRGY
KNNF
KICR
KIFR
KM
KWMNCS
KAWS
KLAP
KPAK
KDDG
KCGC
KID
KNSD
KMPF
KPFO
KDP
KCMR
KRMS
KNPT
KNNNP
KTIAPARM
KDTB
KNUP
KPGOV
KNAP
KNNC
KUK
KSRE
KREISLER
KIVP
KQ
KTIAEUN
KPALAOIS
KRM
KISLAO
KWM
KFLOA
LE
LU
LH
LA
LG
LO
LY
LANTERN
LI
LABOR
LORAN
LTTE
LT
LAS
LAB
LAW
LVPR
LARREA
LEBIK
LAURA
LS
LOTT
LOVE
LR
LEON
LAVIN
LGAT
LV
LAOS
LOG
LN
LB
MOPS
MO
MARR
ML
MASS
MZ
MR
MNUC
MX
MV
MCC
MY
MEDIA
MTCRE
MG
MCAP
MOPPS
MP
MI
MK
MC
MD
MA
MU
MASC
MW
MT
MEPP
MN
MTCR
MH
MEPI
MIL
MNUCPTEREZ
MMAR
MICHAEL
MUNC
MDC
MPOS
MONUC
MAR
MGMT
MAS
MEPN
MENDIETA
MARIA
MONTENEGRO
MOOPS
MSG
MARITIME
MURRAY
MUKASEY
MOTO
MCA
MFO
MEX
MRSEC
MMED
MACP
MAAR
MINUSTAH
MCCONNELL
MAPP
MGT
MARQUEZ
MANUEL
MNUR
MCCAIN
MF
MOHAMMAD
MOHAMED
MNU
MFA
MILITANTS
MINORITIES
MTS
MLS
MILI
MIAH
MEETINGS
MERCOSUR
MED
MARAD
MNVC
MINURSO
MNUCUN
MIK
MARK
MBM
MPP
MILITARY
MAPS
MNUK
MILA
MTRRE
MACEDONIA
MICHEL
MASSMNUC
MUCN
MQADHAFI
MPS
MARRGH
MRCRE
MTRE
MORALES
MAP
MCTRE
MHUC
MOPSGRPARM
MOROCCO
MCAPS
NL
NU
NS
NI
NPT
NATO
NO
NG
NATEU
NSF
NZ
NAS
NP
NDP
NLD
NGO
NEPAD
NAFTA
NASA
NEA
NGUYEN
NIH
NK
NIPP
NONE
NR
NANCY
NEGROPONTE
NRR
NERG
NSSP
NSG
NSFO
NE
NATSIOS
NFSO
NATIONAL
NTDB
NT
NCD
NTSB
NRC
NELSON
NAM
NH
NPG
NEC
NSC
NFATC
NMFS
NATOIRAQ
NAR
NZUS
NARC
NCCC
NA
NC
NEW
NRG
NUIN
NOVO
NATOPREL
NEY
NV
NICHOLAS
NPA
NW
NARCOTICS
NORAD
NOAA
NON
NTTC
NKNNP
NMNUC
NUMBERING
ODIP
OIIP
OPRC
OSCE
OREP
OTRA
OPET
OSCI
OVIP
OECD
OCII
OUALI
OPDC
OEXC
OFPD
OPIC
OFDP
OPCW
OECV
OAS
OM
OMIG
ODAG
OPREP
ORA
OIC
OEXCSCULKPAO
OIG
OASS
OFFICIALS
ORTA
OSAC
OIL
OIE
OEXP
OPEC
OPDAT
OMS
OES
OHI
OMAR
OCRA
OFSO
OCBD
OSTA
OAO
ONA
OTP
ORC
OAU
OXEC
OA
ODPC
OPDP
OVIPPRELUNGANU
OASC
OSHA
OPCD
OTR
OPPI
OPCR
OF
OFDPQIS
OSIC
OHUM
OSTRA
OASCC
OBSP
OFDA
OPICEAGR
OIM
OGAC
OTA
OTRAORP
OPPC
OESC
OCEA
OVP
ON
OPAD
OTAR
OCS
ODC
OTRD
OCED
OSD
ORUE
OREG
PHUM
PINR
PTER
PGOV
PREL
PREF
PL
PM
PHSA
PE
PARM
PINS
PK
PUNE
PO
PALESTINIAN
PU
PBTS
PROP
PTBS
POL
POLI
PA
PGOVZI
POLMIL
POLITICAL
PARTIES
POLM
PD
POLITICS
POLICY
PAS
PMIL
PINT
PNAT
PV
PKO
PPOL
PERSONS
PING
PBIO
PH
PETR
PARMS
PRES
PCON
PETERS
PRELBR
PT
PLAB
PP
PAK
PDEM
PKPA
PSOCI
PF
PLO
PTERM
PJUS
PSOE
PELOSI
PROPERTY
PGOVPREL
PARP
PRL
PNIR
PHUMKPAL
PG
PREZ
PGIC
PBOV
PAO
PKK
PROV
PHSAK
PHUMPREL
PROTECTION
PGOVBL
PSI
PRELPK
PGOVENRG
PUM
PRELKPKO
PATTY
PSOC
PRIVATIZATION
PRELSP
PGOVEAIDUKNOSWGMHUCANLLHFRSPITNZ
PMIG
PREC
PAIGH
PROG
PSHA
PARK
PETER
POG
PHUS
PPREL
PS
PTERPREL
PRELPGOV
POV
PKPO
PGOVECON
POUS
PGOVPRELPHUMPREFSMIGELABEAIDKCRMKWMN
PWBG
PMAR
PREM
PAR
PNR
PRELPGOVEAIDECONEINVBEXPSCULOIIPBTIO
PARMIR
PGOVGM
PHUH
PARTM
PN
PRE
PTE
PY
POLUN
PPEL
PDOV
PGOVSOCI
PIRF
PGOVPM
PBST
PRELEVU
PGOR
PBTSRU
PRM
PRELKPAOIZ
PGVO
PERL
PGOC
PAGR
PMIN
PHUMR
PVIP
PPD
PGV
PRAM
PINL
PKPAL
PTERE
PGOF
PINO
PHAS
PODC
PRHUM
PHUMA
PREO
PPA
PEPFAR
PGO
PRGOV
PAC
PRESL
PORG
PKFK
PEPR
PRELP
PREFA
PNG
PGOVPHUMKPAO
PRELECON
PINOCHET
PFOR
PGOVLO
PHUMBA
PRELC
PREK
PHUME
PHJM
POLINT
PGOVPZ
PGOVKCRM
PGOVE
PHALANAGE
PARTY
PECON
PEACE
PROCESS
PLN
PRELSW
PAHO
PEDRO
PRELA
PASS
PPAO
PGPV
PNUM
PCUL
PGGV
PSA
PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA
PGIV
PRFE
POGOV
PEL
PBT
PAMQ
PINF
PSEPC
POSTS
PHUMPGOV
PVOV
PHSAPREL
PROLIFERATION
PENA
PRELTBIOBA
PIN
PRELL
PGOVPTER
PHAM
PHYTRP
PTEL
PTERPGOV
PHARM
PROTESTS
PRELAF
PKBL
PRELKPAO
PKNP
PARMP
PHUML
PFOV
PERM
PUOS
PRELGOV
PHUMPTER
PARAGRAPH
PERURENA
PBTSEWWT
PCI
PETROL
PINSO
PINSCE
PQL
PEREZ
PBS
RS
REFUGEES
RW
RP
RELFREE
RO
REGIONAL
RIGHTS
REACTION
REPORT
RU
RENAMO
RIGHTSPOLMIL
REFORM
RM
REFUGEE
REL
RELATIONS
ROW
RREL
REGION
RATIFICATION
RBI
RICE
ROOD
RODENAS
RUIZ
RODHAM
ROBERT
RGY
ROY
REUBEN
RELIGIOUS
RUEHZO
RODRIGUEZ
RUEUN
RELAM
RSP
RF
RSO
RCMP
REO
ROSS
RPTS
RENE
REID
RUPREL
RMA
RI
REMON
RPEL
RFE
RFIN
RA
RAFAEL
RAY
RUS
RPREL
ROBERTG
RECIN
RAMONTEIJELO
SNAR
SP
SN
SMIG
SL
SOCI
SU
SG
SF
SENV
SZ
SOE
SCUL
SY
SO
SR
SYR
SE
SA
SW
SIPDIS
SCIENCE
SADC
SI
SCI
SOCIETY
SC
SAARC
STR
SECRETARY
SANC
SSH
ST
SNA
SGWI
SEP
SOCIS
SETTLEMENTS
SPECIALIST
SK
SHUM
START
STET
SCVL
SREF
SCHUL
SCUIL
SYRIA
SECURITY
SPCE
SYAI
SMIL
SOWGC
STEPHEN
SNRV
SKCA
SENSITIVE
SECI
SNAP
SPP
SCUD
SOM
SPECI
SMIGBG
SENC
SCRM
SGNV
SECTOR
SENVEAGREAIDTBIOECONSOCIXR
SENVSXE
SASIAIN
SACU
SENVSPL
SWMN
STEINBERG
SOPN
SOCR
SCOI
SCRS
SILVASANDE
SWE
SARS
SNARIZ
SUDAN
SENVQGR
SM
SNARKTFN
SAAD
SD
SAN
SIPRNET
STATE
SENS
SUBJECT
SFNV
SECSTATE
SSA
SPCVIS
SOI
SOFA
SCULKPAOECONTU
SPTER
SKSAF
SENVKGHG
SHI
SEVN
SANR
SPSTATE
SMITH
SCOM
SH
SNARCS
SNARN
SIPRS
SNARM
SIPDI
SCPR
SNIG
SELAB
SULLIVAN
SENVENV
SECDEF
SOLIC
SOIC
SPAS
SASC
SOSI
SEC
SEN
SENVCASCEAIDID
TU
TH
TW
TSPA
TRGY
TPHY
TBIO
TIFA
TS
TZ
TX
TSPL
TT
TK
TC
TINT
TERFIN
TERRORISM
TIP
TURKEY
TI
TECHNOLOGY
TNGD
TRSY
TRAFFICKING
TOPEC
TPSL
TP
TD
TR
TA
TIO
TREATY
TO
THPY
TECH
TRADE
TPSA
TG
TAGS
TF
TRAD
THKSJA
TVBIO
TNDG
TN
TBIOZK
TWI
TV
TWL
TRT
TWRO
TSRY
TTPGOV
TAUSCHER
TRBY
TRBIO
TL
TPKO
TIA
TGRY
TSPAM
TREL
TNAR
TBI
TFIN
TPHYPA
TWCH
THOMMA
THOMAS
TERROR
TRY
TBID
TPP
TE
THANH
TJ
TBKIO
UNGA
USUN
UN
UG
UNSC
UK
UP
US
UNCTAD
UNVIE
UNHRC
USTR
UNAMA
UNCRIME
UNESCO
UV
UNDP
UNHCR
UNCSD
UNCHR
UZ
USAID
UNEP
UNO
UNPUOS
UY
UNDC
UNCITRAL
UNAUS
UNCND
UA
UNMIK
USTDA
USEU
USDA
UNICEF
UR
UNFICYP
USNC
USTRRP
UNODC
UNRWA
UNOMIG
USTRPS
USAU
USCC
UNEF
UNGAPL
UNFPA
UNSCE
USSC
UGA
UEU
UNMIC
UNTAC
UNION
UNCLASSIFIED
USPS
UNA
UMIK
USOAS
UNMOVIC
UNFA
UNAIDS
UNCHC
USGS
UNSE
UNRCR
UNTERR
USG
UE
UAE
UNWRA
UNCSW
UNSCR
UNCHS
UNDESCO
UNPAR
UNC
UB
UNSCS
UKXG
UNGACG
UNREST
UNHR
USPTO
UNFCYP
USCG
UNIDROIT
UNSCD
UPU
UNBRO
UNECE
USTRUWR
UNCC
UNESCOSCULPRELPHUMKPALCUIRXFVEKV
VM
VE
VT
VETTING
VN
VZ
VIS
VC
VTPREL
VIP
VTEAID
VTEG
VOA
VA
VTIZ
VANG
VISIT
VO
VENZ
VAT
VI
VEPREL
VEN
WFP
WTO
WHO
WTRO
WBG
WMO
WIPO
WA
WI
WSIS
WHA
WCL
WE
WMN
WEBZ
WS
WAR
WZ
WMD
WW
WILLIAM
WEET
WAEMU
WM
WWBG
WWT
WWARD
WITH
WMDT
WTRQ
WCO
WEU
WALTER
WRTO
WB
WHTI
WBEG
WCI
WEF
WAKI
WHOA
WGC
Browse by classification
Community resources
courage is contagious
Viewing cable 08BRASILIA1525, BRAZIL: MOVING FORWARD ON A NEW EXTRADITIONS
If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #08BRASILIA1525.
| Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 08BRASILIA1525 | 2008-11-24 19:48 | 2011-07-11 00:00 | UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY | Embassy Brasilia |
VZCZCXRO8463
RR RUEHRG
DE RUEHBR #1525/01 3291948
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 241948Z NOV 08
FM AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 2983
INFO RUEHAC/AMEMBASSY ASUNCION 7221
RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA 4793
RUEHBU/AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES 5940
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 4294
RUEHLP/AMEMBASSY LA PAZ 6701
RUEHPE/AMEMBASSY LIMA 4039
RUEHMN/AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO 7594
RUEHQT/AMEMBASSY QUITO 2657
RUEHSG/AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO 0721
RUEHRG/AMCONSUL RECIFE 8747
RUEHRI/AMCONSUL RIO DE JANEIRO 6923
RUEHSO/AMCONSUL SAO PAULO 3119
RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC
RUEABND/DEA HQS WASHDC
RHMCSUU/FBI WASHINGTON DC
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 06 BRASILIA 001525
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
STATE FOR L/LEI JOHNSON, WHA/BSC, WHA/CHRIS MCMULLEN,
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE FOR SWARTZ AND OIA
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: KJUS KCRM CJAN PREL CVIS SNA
SUBJECT: BRAZIL: MOVING FORWARD ON A NEW EXTRADITIONS
FRAMEWORK
REF: A. BRASILIA 1069
¶B. BRASILIA 1035
¶C. STATE 79928
¶D. BRASILIA 999
¶E. STATE 76939
¶1. (SBU) Summary: From October 27-29, Clifton Johnson,
Department of State Assistant Legal Adviser for Law
Enforcement and Intelligence, Thomas Black, Associate
Director for South American affairs of the Department of
Justice,s Office of International Affairs (OIA), and
Magdalena Boynton, and Nicolette Romano from OIA visited
Brasilia in order to address with issues that had been
complicating the successful execution of extraditions from
Brazil to the United States, particularly Brazilian requests
for assurances that fall outside the scope of the bilateral
extradition treaty (reftels). The delegation met with
Federal Police officials, Ministry of Justice, Public
Ministry officials, members of the Brazilian Congress,
Ministry of External Relations (Itamaraty) officials, and
Supreme Court (STF) justices and found a receptive audience
that, at least rhetorically, expressed a willingness to work
with the United States to prevent Brazil from becoming a
safehaven for criminals seeking to avoid punishment. The
delegation accomplished its four main objectives, which were
to reinforce the need to continue our strong law enforcement
partnership; to sensitize Brazilian audiences to the problems
Brazil,s extra-treaty requests impose on the U.S. legal
system; to seek out ways to ameliorate some of the legal
hurdles by negotiating new standard language to be used in
extradition cases; and finally, to develop a long-term
engagement strategy towards lowering Brazilian barriers to
the extradition of nationals. End summary.
---------------
Assurances
---------------
¶2. (SBU) A principal objective of the delegation was to find
a way to minimize Brazilian requests for assurances in
extradition cases. As indicated in reftels, a series of
recent extradition cases were jeopardized by Brazilian
requests for assurances that were not necessary, beyond the
scope of the bilateral treaty, and/or inconsistent with our
extradition practice with other countries around the world.
The discussions focused on the following six assurances that
Brazil has been requesting as a routine matter in all
extradition cases:
-- That United States guarantee that a person extradited from
Brazil will not serve more than 30 years.
-- That the United States agrees to comply with the five
provisions of Article 91 of Brazilian Law 6815/80, which
states that countries requesting extradition will: not charge
the extradite with a crime not included in the extradition
request; compute the time in prison that the extradite served
in Brazil; commute to a life sentence any death penalty
sentence, except in cases where Brazilian law allows its
application (superseded by STF requirement to commute to 30
years sentences longer than that); not extradite to a third
country without Brazil,s consent; and not consider any
political motive to aggravate the sentence.
--------------------------------------------
30 Years Limit on Sentencing: Stuck for Now
--------------------------------------------
¶3. (SBU) Of the various assurance requests currently impeding
the smooth processing of extraditions, the most difficult one
to resolve relates to the STF,s decision to require an
assurance that persons extradited from Brazil will not serve
BRASILIA 00001525 002 OF 006
a sentence of more than 30 years. (Note: The Brazilian
constitution gives the power to allow extraditions to the
STF. After the STF rules on the legality of the extradition,
and allows it to proceed, the decision to authorize the
extradition itself resides with the President. End note.)
The STF based its decision on the constitution,s prohibition
of life sentences (though the constitution is silent on the
maximum term of years that can be imposed) and a provision in
the penal code providing a 30 year maximum on the time a
person can serve in prison.
¶4. (SBU) The penal code limit of 30 years dates back to law
decree passed in 1940 (2.848/40) when life expectancy in
Brazil was 42 years. It was not until 2004, however, when
the STF decided to apply the 30-year maximum term to
extradition cases. (Note: The 30-year limit applies to time
served, not to the sentence. In Brazil, someone can be
sentenced for longer than 30 years, but they cannot serve
more than that. End note.) Since then, the STF has been
imposing, as a condition for approving extraditions, that the
requesting country had to commit to commute a sentence that
exceeded 30 years. Several bills have been proposed over the
years raising this limit to 40 or 45 years, but there has
been little enthusiasm or motivation for extending the
maximum term, and they have not been enacted.
¶5. (SBU) During the delegation,s meeting with National
Secretary of Justice Romeu Tuma Jr., the number two official
in the Ministry of Justice, he noted that, although these
requests for assurances fall outside the bilateral
extradition treaty, the STF ultimately decides whether
extradition requests comply with Brazilian law. As a result,
the executive,s hands are tied if the STF imposes conditions
based on the STF,s understanding of Brazilian law and the
constitution. Asked about the STF,s decision to apply the
30 year maximum to extradition cases, STF justice Ellen
Gracie Northfleet observed that it was justice Celso Mello,
whom she called the STF,s extraditions expert, who wrote the
decision based on the constitutional principle of treating
Brazilians and non-Brazilians equally (i.e., if the person
would be subject to a maximum penalty in Brazil, then that
limit should apply to wherever he is extradited).
¶6. (SBU) The delegation explained that assurances with
respect to 30 years are particularly difficult for the United
States because they are not provided for in the bilateral
treaty and sentencing is largely at the discretion of the
judge. The delegation noted that U.S. prosecutors and judges
had a difficult time understanding why a Brazilian constraint
on sentencing in Brazil, that was not provided for in the
treaty, should apply to a U.S. trial of a non-Brazilian for
serious crimes committed against U.S. victims in the United
States. The delegation indicated that the U.S. was prepared
to note in its extradition requests when the eligible
sentence for the underlying offense was below 30 years --
thereby obviating the need for an assurance request in such
cases. The delegation also noted that, to the extent Brazil
was able to reduce its routine request for multiple
assurances in most cases, it would be easier to seek 30-year
assurances in those cases where they were truly necessary.
As discussed below, Brazilian interlocutors were receptive to
decreasing the routine request of assurances where the
relevant information could be provided to Brazil through
separate means that enabled them to satisfy their domestic
legal requirements.
----------------------------------------
Article 91: A Way Forward in Short Term
----------------------------------------
¶7. (SBU) The remaining assurances often sought by Brazil
arise from the requirement contained in Law 6815/80
BRASILIA 00001525 003 OF 006
("Estatuto dos Estrangeiros" or Foreigners Law) obligating
countries to abide by the terms of Article 91 of that law.
During talks with Secretary Tuma, the delegation discussed
the difficulty that these conditions created for U.S.
authorities, particularly since the United States cannot
enforce a commitment to abide by foreign law. Instead, these
commitments have to be provided using either the terms of the
extradition treaty or U.S. law.
¶8. (SBU) Tuma stated maintaining and strengthening the
relationship was most important to him, and that he would be
happy to work with the United States on any changes in
language that would facilitate extraditions. The delegation
urged Brazil to reduce the number of routine requests for
assurances so as to focus requests on exceptional cases. The
delegation noted that the United States was prepared to
consider ways to provide Brazil with the information
necessary to show how the various provisions of Article 91
were met so as to obviate the need for separate assurance
requests. One approach proposed by the delegation would be
for the United States to issue a diplomatic note or document
that described the provisions in the treaty and U.S. law that
applied to all extradition cases and satisfied multiple
requirements of article 91. Extradition cases could then, as
needed, reference this note. The United States could also
include in its original extradition requests statements, when
applicable, confirming that the charges at issue did not
involve the death penalty and/or life (or 30 year) sentences.
Such an approach would reduce the number of assurances
sought; allow the USG to more effectively focus on, consider,
and consult with prosecutors and courts with respect to
assurances not addressed by these mechanisms (e.g. 30 year
assurances); create a routine way of handling these cases;
and avoid frenzied last minute negotiations on the eve of an
extraditee's transfer, as was the case in the Juan Carlos
Ramirez Abadia case. Tuma was receptive to such an approach
and the delegation agreed to prepare a draft of a diplomatic
note along the lines described. The idea of crafting a
diplomatic note to address some of the assurances was also
brought up in meetings at Itamaraty with Counselor Ralph
Peter Henderson, head of Itamaraty,s Immigration Division,
and with STF Justice Ellen Gracie Northfleet, and both agreed
that it would be worthwhile approach.
--------------------------------------------
Extradition of Nationals: Impossible, but...
--------------------------------------------
¶9. (SBU) Over the course of the delegation's meetings,
various interlocutors explained the difficulty of changing
the prohibition against extradition of Brazilian nationals
that is contained in the Brazilian constitution. Article 60
of the Brazilian constitution lays out the process for
amending the constitution; but it also limits, or outright
prohibits, amendments from being made to certain clauses of
the constitution known as the "Clausulas Petreas"
(essentially, inalterable clauses). One of these clauses is
the bill of rights which includes the protection against
extradition. As a result, the only way to alter the
fundamental individual right of Brazilians not to be
extradited from Brazil is for a new constituent assembly to
be convened to draft a new constitution. A simple amendment
to the constitution, a difficult process to begin with, will
not do.
¶10. (SBU) The issue of extradition of nationals arose in
nearly every meeting with the delegation in the context of
Brazilian suggestions that the existing 1960,s era
extradition treaty be updated to modernize the covered
offenses. The delegation said that, while the United States
shared an interest in expanding the scope of the treaty, any
such initiative was contingent on changes in Brazilian law
BRASILIA 00001525 004 OF 006
that would permit the extradition of nationals. The
delegation noted that the regional and world wide trend in
extradition was towards extraditing nationals and that this
was a fundamental element of U.S. extradition policy. The
delegation noted that recent notorious cases of fugitives
living in the United States for many years, holding U.S.
nationality, committing serious crimes in the United States
against other Americans, and then fleeing to another country
where they sought to claim foreign nationality to shield
themselves from extradition created a very negative
impression in the United States and the Congress. The
delegation made particular reference in this context to the
case of Claudia Hoerig, who fled to Brazil after killing her
husband in Chicago. As a result, it was not conceivable that
the U.S. Senate would approve a new or amended treaty that
did not provide for an extradition partner to extradite its
nationals in the same manner that the United States was
prepared to extradite its citizens.
¶11. (SBU) All of the delegation's interlocutors agreed that
the issue of changing the constitution to permit the
extradition of Brazilian nationals is highly unlikely to
happen anytime soon. Itamaraty was the most negative, with
Counselor Henderson stating matter-of-factly with regard to
the issue of extraditing nationals, "we don,t really have an
issue, because it is, in fact, impossible, therefore, there
is nothing to discuss." Most interlocutors, however,
recognized that it was a problematic provision in the
extradition context and suggested ways that its impact could
be moderated. Itamaraty encouraged the United States, in
cases involving naturalized Brazilians, to provide
information, if available that might provide a basis for the
GOB to revoke an individual's Brazilian nationality, based on
differential treatment afforded natural-born and naturalized
Brazilians. For example, both Counselor Henderson and
Federal Prosecutor Oliveira de Almeida, noted that a
naturalized Brazilian could have his citizenship removed upon
provision by the United States of information that the
citizen committed crimes prior to obtaining Brazilian
citizenship, or committed narcotics-related crimes, even
after obtaining the citizenship. Another instance that could
result in a favorable extradition of a Brazilian to the
United States would be in a situation where a Brazilian
national obtained a second citizenship and in the process
gave up Brazilian citizenship. If the United States can
document that the person took steps that amounted to a
voluntary surrender of Brazilian citizenship at the time of
obtaining U.S. citizenship, the Ministry of Justice and make
a determination that their Brazilian citizenship was
renounced, and thus the person becomes eligible for
extradition.
--------------------------------
Long-Term Hope Moving Forward
--------------------------------
¶12. (SBU) Several of the meetings shone a light on a possible
way forward in the long-term that could further reduce
complications stemming from the 30 year assurances, and from
some extradition cases involving naturalized Brazilians.
According to Marcio Pereira Pinto Garcia, a Senate aide, the
Supreme Court,s decision requiring 30 year assurances in
extradition cases was not compelled by the constitution and
involved an overly expansive interpretation of the penal
code. In fact, he noted that their interpretation could
violate Brazil,s commitments to the International Criminal
Court, which allows life sentences. Further, he noted that
there is some room to play around with legislatively both on
the 30 years and the extradition of nationals. For one, the
Congress could update the 30 year limit to conform to
today,s longer life expectancies. Congress could also carve
out an exception in the penal code that excludes extradition
BRASILIA 00001525 005 OF 006
cases from complying with the 30 years, or otherwise permits
extraditions pending an assurance that the country requesting
extradition will only apply a term of years sentence -- a
longer one than 30 years, but not a life sentence -- which
would not be ideal, but would improve the situation for the
United States somewhat.
¶13. (SBU) On the issue of naturalized Brazilians, Garcia also
noted that naturalized Brazilians can be extradited if they
committed a common crime before being naturalized or if they
were involved in a crime involving narcotics, according to
the constitution, and as set down in law. Perhaps, he
suggested, this can be further fleshed out in legislation to
take the broadest possible view of what constitutes a
narcotics-related crime, hence expanding the universe of
crimes for which citizenship can be revoked.
¶14. (SBU) Three other interlocutors suggested a variation on
an idea for engaging on this issue in the long term. Jorge
Barbosa Pontes, head of Interpol at the Federal Police,
agreed with the delegation that Brazil,s restrictions on
extraditing nationals and its imposing of 30 year limits on
prison terms was wrongheaded and sent the wrong message
regarding Brazil,s tolerance of international crime. He
observed that it would be extremely difficult to change the
extradition of nationals, but that a movement or conferences
should be organized that could begin discussing these issues.
Separately, former head of Brazilian Federal Police (DPF)
and now Senator Romeu Tuma (PTB, Brazilian Labor Party,
government coalition; of Sao Paulo; and father of National
Secretary of Justice Tuma), and Federal Deputy Marcelo
Itagiba (PSDB, Brazilian Social Democracy Party, opposition;
of Rio de Janeiro), also a career DPF officer and formerly
Rio de Janeiro,s State Public Security Secretary suggested
holding a symposium on extradition issues. Finally, STF
Justice Ricardo Lewandowski suggested that a bi-national
commission might be an appropriate venue to hash out some of
these issues.
--------------------------
Comment: Seeds Planted
--------------------------
¶15. (SBU) The message exchanged between the delegation and
Brazilian officials from Supreme Court Justices, to Ministry
of Justice officials, to Senators and Federal Deputies, to
Federal Prosecutors and the Federal Police, was consistent:
the United States and Brazil have a good law enforcement
relationship and it is in both countries interests to do
everything possible to improve it. There was also agreement
among all parties on next steps. The State/L/LEI-DOJ/OIA
delegation agreed to craft language that hopefully will serve
as the basis for a diplomatic note or other official USG
communication that would front-load several assurances
issues, particularly those related to Article 91.
Additionally, in individual extradition cases the United
States will front-load information related to sentencing,
thus obviating (or at least minimizing) the need for Brazil
to request assurances at the back end of the process. While
such an approach will not address assurance issues in all
cases -- particularly with respect to 30 year assurances --
it should make Brazilian assurance requests more exceptional.
Its effectiveness will depend on how receptive the Ministry
of Justice is to the proposed note and its ability to bring
other players in the Brazilian extradition process on board.
We are optimistic that the GOB will be able to move forward
with us on this, as the delegation succeeded in the laying
the groundwork for such an approach in all of its meetings
and received preliminary buy-in to move ahead with it.
¶16. (SBU) Comment, continued. For meeting our longer term
objectives, the idea of holding conferences or symposia
BRASILIA 00001525 006 OF 006
merits consideration. During Post,s meetings with legal and
law enforcement contacts as well as during the delegation,s
visit, Post perceived that some of the issues involving
extraditions are not necessarily well understood even within
Brazilian legal circles. To wit, most of our interlocutors
(including National Justice Secretary Tuma, Federal Deputy
Itagiba, and Federal Prosecutor Oliveira de Almeida)
mistakenly stated that the sentence limitation of 30 years is
constitutional limitation, rather than a penal code one, and
some did not realize that it applied to extraditions via a
fairly recent STF decision, rather than being long-standing
precedent. Taking into account Senate aide Garcia,s
analysis, a symposium could bring to light for legislators
and other legal experts how there is, in reality, plenty of
room either to lift the restrictions legislatively, or bring
them up to date from their almost 70-year old framework. For
the symposium to be effective, however, it has to have a
regional presence, with experts from other countries that are
similarly affected and have found ways to change their laws
and/or constitutions to remove such constraints and comply
with their ICC obligations. Such a conference would have to
be carefully structured and focused, however, to avoid
highlighting the inconsistencies in international practice,
rather than the growing trend toward more consistent practice
regarding terms of extradition and extradition of nationals.
Embassy will begin to explore the possibility of a symposium
(or several) where broader issues relating to extradition of
nationals and the extradition practice of other countries can
be explored in a way that might encourage Brazil to
reconsider its own approach. The fact that STF and the
Federal police offered somewhat similar concepts, suggests
that there will be a willing cohort of law enforcement and
legal figures who could participate in such a forum and that
there could be receptive and broader audience for the message
the State/L/LEI-DOJ/OIA delegation brought to Brasilia. End
comment.
¶17. (U) This cable was cleared with State/L/LEI and DoJ/OIA.
KUBISKE