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Viewing cable 08BOGOTA4261, URIBE THIRD TERM SETBACK: 2010 REELECTION REJECTED

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08BOGOTA4261 2008-11-26 22:47 2011-04-29 00:00 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Bogota
Appears in these articles:
http://www.semana.com/wikileaks/Seccion/168.aspx
VZCZCXYZ0000
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHBO #4261/01 3312247
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 262247Z NOV 08
FM AMEMBASSY BOGOTA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5773
INFO RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA IMMEDIATE 8531
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS IMMEDIATE 1370
RUEHPE/AMEMBASSY LIMA IMMEDIATE 6784
RUEHZP/AMEMBASSY PANAMA IMMEDIATE 2727
RUEHQT/AMEMBASSY QUITO IMMEDIATE 7472
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RHMFIUU/FBI WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL IMMEDIATE
id: 180401
date: 11/26/2008 22:47
refid: 08BOGOTA4261
origin: Embassy Bogota
classification: CONFIDENTIAL
destination: 08BOGOTA4201
header:
VZCZCXYZ0000
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHBO #4261/01 3312247
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 262247Z NOV 08
FM AMEMBASSY BOGOTA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5773
INFO RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA IMMEDIATE 8531
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS IMMEDIATE 1370
RUEHPE/AMEMBASSY LIMA IMMEDIATE 6784
RUEHZP/AMEMBASSY PANAMA IMMEDIATE 2727
RUEHQT/AMEMBASSY QUITO IMMEDIATE 7472
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RHMFIUU/FBI WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL IMMEDIATE


----------------- header ends ----------------

C O N F I D E N T I A L BOGOTA 004261 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/25/2018 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PREF PTER PHUM CO
SUBJECT: URIBE THIRD TERM SETBACK: 2010 REELECTION REJECTED 
IN FIRST CONGRESS VOTE -- 2014 REELECTION APPROVED 
 
REF: BOGOTA 4201 
 
Classified By: Acting Political Counselor David M. Zimov 
Reasons 1.4 (b and d) 
 
SUMMARY 
------- 
1. (U)  The First Commission of the Colombian House of 
Representatives rejected in a razor thin vote on November 26, 
a proposal to change the constitution to allow President 
Uribe to run for a third term in 2010.  The Commission later 
approved language that would allow Uribe to seek reelection 
in 2014.  The votes in First Commission--the first of four 
votes in Congress required to pass a referendum 
proposal--followed intense lobbying against immediate 
reelection from the opposition and Cambio Radical Party 
leader German Vargas Lleras, and the last minute abstention 
of two key coalition members critical of Uribe's management 
of a recent pyramid scheme collapse.  In the wake of the 
setback, Uribe's supporters announced they will try to change 
the proposal language again in upcoming congressional debates 
to allow a 2010 run.  Still, the legality of such a maneuver 
remains questionable, and could be time consuming or 
challenged in court.  Barreras told us the First Commission 
vote makes immediate reelection in 2010 more unlikely--though 
still possible.  End summary. 
 
CONGRESS VOTES AGAINST 2010 THIRD TERM--FOR 2014 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
2. (U) The First Commission of the Colombian House of 
Representatives on November 26, voted against a proposal to 
hold a referendum to change the constitution to allow 
President Alvaro Uribe to run for a possible third term as 
president in 2010.  In a razor thin vote of 17-16, the First 
Commission rejected the immediate reelection language.  The 
Commission then immediately voted 29-4 in favor of different 
referendum language to allow a possible 2014 run, in the 
first of four votes in Congress that would be needed to move 
the referendum forward.  If passed in all four votes, the 
revised 2014 measure would then move to the Constitutional 
Court for approval, and finally to a referendum requiring a 
majority--with a required 25% turnout of registered voters 
(approximately 7.2 million). 
 
3. (C) Representative Nicolas Uribe announced that supporters 
of an immediate Uribe reelection would again try to modify 
the referendum language in the second congressional vote (in 
the full House in early December) to allow for immediate 
reelection.  Representative Oscar Arboleda, who favors 
immediate reelection, told us coalition members could legally 
modify the language in subsequent debates.  Still, Barreras 
and  Second Commission Secretary General Emiliano Rivera told 
us such a maneuver would probably be illegal, and could 
require time consuming Constitutional Court review if 
challenged.  Barreras said the Commission vote made immediate 
reelection more unlikely, though not impossible since Uribe 
supporters in Congress will look for creative ways to reverse 
the Commission vote. 
 
4. (C) Barreras told us there was no pressure from the Palace 
to vote for the 2010 measure, but intense pressure from 
Cambio leader German Vargas Lleras to oppose immediate 
reelection.  Barreras said he met with President Uribe on 
November 20, pleading with Uribe to publicly state his third 
term intentions.  When Barreras asked Uribe how he should 
vote, Uribe refused even in private to state whether he was 
interested in a third term--whether in 2010 or 2014. 
Barreras said Uribe and Interior Minister Fabio Valencia 
Cossio (the GOC's main lobbyist in Congress) were "completely 
absent" from the third term debate. 
 
5. (C) Meanwhile, Barreras said Vargas-Lleras--who has 
already begun his own presidential campaign--publicly 
threatened to sanction Barreras for not supporting Cambio's 
position against a third term in 2010.  Barreras told us 
Vargas offered other swing voters (especially Rep. Edgar 
Gomez) "anything they wanted" to kill the referendum.   Gomez 
was later absent from some votes with a "medical problem." 
Separately, both the Inspector General (Procuraduria) and 
National Election Council have begun investigations into the 
signature collection process that began the referendum 
 
process.  The media is reporting that collapsed pyramid 
scheme company DMG may have supported the effort. 
 
URIBE INSIDERS PESSIMISTIC ON 2010 RUN 
-------------------------------------- 
6. (C) Presidential Communications Advisor Jorge Mario 
Eastman told us Uribe had not decided whether to run again, 
nor had he instructed Secretary of Government Bernardo Moreno 
or Interior Minister Valencia to lobby Congress to pass the 
constitutional amendment required.  Uribe Advisor Bernardo 
Moreno, who is under investigation for his contact with 
former Congresswoman Yidis Medina (convicted of accepting 
bribes during the first reelection effort), was not 
authorized to get involved without Uribe's instructions. 
Eastman said the amendment effort was being directed by U 
Party Secretary General Luis Giraldo and presidential advisor 
Jose Obdulio Gaviria. 
 
7. (C) Eastman told us he had been pessimistic that Congress 
would pass a constitutional amendment allowing Uribe to run 
in 2010.  Cambio Radical opposed the measure and the U Party 
lacked influence.   Members of Congress remained focused on 
trying to extract concrete benefits from the presidency in 
exchange for votes on political reform and the referendum. 
The danger, Eastman said, was that no one had started to 
develop a process to select a unified Uribe coalition 
presidential candidate if Uribe did not run in 2010.  Uribe 
continues to believe there is a capable successor within the 
coalition. 
 
URIBE CONFIDANT URGES URIBE NOT TO RUN 
-------------------------------------- 
8. (C) Separately, Uribe confidant Fabio Echeverri told us he 
urged Uribe to step down in 2010 and to set up a foundation 
that would advocate for democracy and free markets in the 
hemisphere.  Echeverri--who has known Uribe since childhood 
and managed his two previous presidential campaigns--told us 
he opposed a second Uribe reelection because it would 
endanger Uribe's legacy as well as his health.  Moreover, 
Colombia needed a break from Uribe's frenetic governing 
style. 
 
9. (C) Echeverri added that Uribe also had the luxury in his 
first two terms of focusing on one issue--security.  The 
current problems facing Colombia, including the economic 
slowdown and financial crisis, were not Uribe's forte. 
Echeverri said he has explained his opposition to reelection 
to Uribe on several occasions.  Uribe had listened, but had 
not given a clear signal of his intentions. 
 
"UNFAVORABLE CLIMATE" FOR THIRD TERM 
------------------------------------ 
10. (C) Jorge Londono, head of leading Colombian polling firm 
Invimar-Gallup, told us the third term effort was moving 
ahead at a difficult time for Uribe.  By the first quarter of 
2009, Londono expects the slowing economy and financial 
crisis, the collapse of a series of large pyramid schemes, 
and scandals over alleged extrajudicial killings by the 
military to cut into Uribe's approval ratings. 
 
11. (C) Eastman added that Uribe and his Cabinet remained 
worried over the pyramid scheme crisis, especially the fall 
of the largest of the schemes, DMG (reftel).  Polo Party 
President Carlos Gaviria told us DMG--which Eastman said "was 
winning the public relations battle" over the GOC--had used 
the media to turn many previous Uribe supporters against the 
president in regions like Putumayo where security used to be 
"the only issue."  Eastman added that the GOC needed to move 
fast to limit the damage from the DMG scandal.  Two 
Conservative Party coalition members of the First Commission, 
previously rock solid supporters of a 2010 Uribe reelection, 
abstained on the vote due to constituent protests against 
Uribe's management of the pyramid crisis. 
BROWNFIELD 

=======================CABLE ENDS============================