Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 97115 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
ETRD EAGR ETTC EAID ECON EFIN ECIN EINV ELAB EAIR ENRG EPET EWWT ECPS EIND EMIN ELTN EC ETMIN EUC EZ ET ELECTIONS ENVR EU EUN EG EINT ER ECONOMICS ES EMS ENIV EEB EN ECE ECOSOC EK ENVIRONMENT EFIS EI EWT ENGRD ECPSN EXIM EIAD ERIN ECPC EDEV ENGY ECTRD EPA ESTH ECCT EINVECON ENGR ERTD EUR EAP EWWC ELTD EL EXIMOPIC EXTERNAL ETRDEC ESCAP ECO EGAD ELNT ECONOMIC ENV ETRN EIAR EUMEM ENRGPARMOTRASENVKGHGPGOVECONTSPLEAID EREL ECOM ECONETRDEAGRJA ETCC ETRG ECONOMY EMED ETR ENERG EITC EFINOECD EURM EENG ERA EXPORT ENRD ECONEINVETRDEFINELABETRDKTDBPGOVOPIC EGEN EBRD EVIN ETRAD ECOWAS EFTA ECONETRDBESPAR EGOVSY EPIN EID ECONENRG EDRC ESENV ETT EB ENER ELTNSNAR ECHEVARRIA ETRC EPIT EDUC ESA EFI ENRGY ESCI EE EAIDXMXAXBXFFR EETC ECIP EIAID EIVN EBEXP ESTN EING EGOV ETRA EPETEIND ELAN ETRDGK EAIDRW ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS EPEC ENVI ELN EAG EPCS EPRT EPTED ETRB EUM EAIDS EFIC EFINECONEAIDUNGAGM EAIDAR ESF EIDN ELAM EDU EV EAIDAF ECN EDA EXBS EINTECPS ENRGTRGYETRDBEXPBTIOSZ EPREL EAC EINVEFIN ETA EAGER EINDIR ECA ECLAC ELAP EITI EUCOM ECONEFINETRDPGOVEAGRPTERKTFNKCRMEAID EARG ELDIN EINVKSCA ENNP EFINECONCS EFINTS ECCP ETC EAIRASECCASCID EINN ETRP EAIDNI EFQ ECOQKPKO EGPHUM EBUD ECONEINVEFINPGOVIZ ENERGY ELB EINDETRD EMI ECONEFIN EIB EURN ETRDEINVTINTCS EIN EFIM ETIO ELAINE EMN EATO EWTR EIPR EINVETC ETTD ETDR EIQ ECONCS EPPD ENRGIZ EISL ESPINOSA ELEC EAIG ESLCO EUREM ENTG ERD EINVECONSENVCSJA EEPET EUNCH ECINECONCS ETRO ETRDECONWTOCS ECUN EFND EPECO EAIRECONRP ERGR ETRDPGOV ECPN ENRGMO EPWR EET EAIS EAGRE EDUARDO EAGRRP EAIDPHUMPRELUG EICN ECONQH EVN EGHG ELBR EINF EAIDHO EENV ETEX ERNG ED
KMDR KPAO KPKO KJUS KCRM KGHG KFRD KWMN KDEM KTFN KHIV KGIC KIDE KSCA KNNP KHUM KIPR KSUM KISL KIRF KCOR KRCM KPAL KWBG KN KS KOMC KSEP KFLU KPWR KTIA KSEO KMPI KHLS KICC KSTH KMCA KVPR KPRM KE KU KZ KFLO KSAF KTIP KTEX KBCT KOCI KOLY KOR KAWC KACT KUNR KTDB KSTC KLIG KSKN KNN KCFE KCIP KGHA KHDP KPOW KUNC KDRL KV KPREL KCRS KPOL KRVC KRIM KGIT KWIR KT KIRC KOMO KRFD KUWAIT KG KFIN KSCI KTFIN KFTN KGOV KPRV KSAC KGIV KCRIM KPIR KSOC KBIO KW KGLB KMWN KPO KFSC KSEAO KSTCPL KSI KPRP KREC KFPC KUNH KCSA KMRS KNDP KR KICCPUR KPPAO KCSY KTBT KCIS KNEP KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KNNB KGCC KINR KPOP KMFO KENV KNAR KVIR KDRG KDMR KFCE KNAO KDEN KGCN KICA KIMMITT KMCC KLFU KMSG KSEC KUM KCUL KMNP KSMT KCOM KOMCSG KSPR KPMI KRAD KIND KCRP KAUST KWAWC KTER KCHG KRDP KPAS KITA KTSC KPAOPREL KWGB KIRP KJUST KMIG KLAB KTFR KSEI KSTT KAPO KSTS KLSO KWNN KPOA KHSA KNPP KPAONZ KBTS KWWW KY KJRE KPAOKMDRKE KCRCM KSCS KWMNCI KESO KWUN KPLS KIIP KEDEM KPAOY KRIF KGICKS KREF KTRD KFRDSOCIRO KTAO KJU KWMNPHUMPRELKPAOZW KEN KO KNEI KEMR KKIV KEAI KWAC KRCIM KWCI KFIU KWIC KCORR KOMS KNNO KPAI KBWG KTTB KTBD KTIALG KILS KFEM KTDM KESS KNUC KPA KOMCCO KCEM KRCS KWBGSY KNPPIS KNNPMNUC KWN KERG KLTN KALM KCCP KSUMPHUM KREL KGH KLIP KTLA KAWK KWMM KVRP KVRC KAID KSLG KDEMK KX KIF KNPR KCFC KFTFN KTFM KPDD KCERS KMOC KDEMAF KMEPI KEMS KDRM KEPREL KBTR KEDU KNP KIRL KNNR KMPT KISLPINR KTPN KA KJUSTH KPIN KDEV KTDD KAKA KFRP KWNM KTSD KINL KJUSKUNR KWWMN KECF KWBC KPRO KVBL KOM KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KEDM KFLD KLPM KRGY KNNF KICR KIFR KM KWMNCS KAWS KLAP KPAK KDDG KCGC KID KNSD KMPF KPFO KDP KCMR KRMS KNPT KNNNP KTIAPARM KDTB KNUP KPGOV KNAP KNNC KUK KSRE KREISLER KIVP KQ KTIAEUN KPALAOIS KRM KISLAO KWM KFLOA
PHUM PINR PTER PGOV PREL PREF PL PM PHSA PE PARM PINS PK PUNE PO PALESTINIAN PU PBTS PROP PTBS POL POLI PA PGOVZI POLMIL POLITICAL PARTIES POLM PD POLITICS POLICY PAS PMIL PINT PNAT PV PKO PPOL PERSONS PING PBIO PH PETR PARMS PRES PCON PETERS PRELBR PT PLAB PP PAK PDEM PKPA PSOCI PF PLO PTERM PJUS PSOE PELOSI PROPERTY PGOVPREL PARP PRL PNIR PHUMKPAL PG PREZ PGIC PBOV PAO PKK PROV PHSAK PHUMPREL PROTECTION PGOVBL PSI PRELPK PGOVENRG PUM PRELKPKO PATTY PSOC PRIVATIZATION PRELSP PGOVEAIDUKNOSWGMHUCANLLHFRSPITNZ PMIG PREC PAIGH PROG PSHA PARK PETER POG PHUS PPREL PS PTERPREL PRELPGOV POV PKPO PGOVECON POUS PGOVPRELPHUMPREFSMIGELABEAIDKCRMKWMN PWBG PMAR PREM PAR PNR PRELPGOVEAIDECONEINVBEXPSCULOIIPBTIO PARMIR PGOVGM PHUH PARTM PN PRE PTE PY POLUN PPEL PDOV PGOVSOCI PIRF PGOVPM PBST PRELEVU PGOR PBTSRU PRM PRELKPAOIZ PGVO PERL PGOC PAGR PMIN PHUMR PVIP PPD PGV PRAM PINL PKPAL PTERE PGOF PINO PHAS PODC PRHUM PHUMA PREO PPA PEPFAR PGO PRGOV PAC PRESL PORG PKFK PEPR PRELP PREFA PNG PGOVPHUMKPAO PRELECON PINOCHET PFOR PGOVLO PHUMBA PRELC PREK PHUME PHJM POLINT PGOVPZ PGOVKCRM PGOVE PHALANAGE PARTY PECON PEACE PROCESS PLN PRELSW PAHO PEDRO PRELA PASS PPAO PGPV PNUM PCUL PGGV PSA PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA PGIV PRFE POGOV PEL PBT PAMQ PINF PSEPC POSTS PHUMPGOV PVOV PHSAPREL PROLIFERATION PENA PRELTBIOBA PIN PRELL PGOVPTER PHAM PHYTRP PTEL PTERPGOV PHARM PROTESTS PRELAF PKBL PRELKPAO PKNP PARMP PHUML PFOV PERM PUOS PRELGOV PHUMPTER PARAGRAPH PERURENA PBTSEWWT PCI PETROL PINSO PINSCE PQL PEREZ PBS

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 08BEIRUT1630, LEBANON: TELECOM PRIVATIZATION ON TRACK, BUT UNLIKELY

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #08BEIRUT1630.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08BEIRUT1630 2008-11-14 09:28 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Beirut
VZCZCXRO0918
RR RUEHAG RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDF RUEHIK RUEHKUK RUEHLZ RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHLB #1630/01 3190928
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 140928Z NOV 08
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3564
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC
RUCPDOC/USDOC WASHDC
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIRUT 001630 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR NEA/ELA, EEB/IFD/ODF, EEB/CIP/BA 
STATE PASS USTR FRANCESCKI 
STATE PASS USAID BEVER/LAUDATO/SCOTT 
TREASURY FOR PARODI/BLEIWEISS/AHERN 
USDOC FOR 4520/ITA/MAC/ONE 
NSC FOR ABRAMS/RAMCHAND/YERGER/MCDERMOTT 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ECON EFIN PREL PGOV LE
SUBJECT: LEBANON: TELECOM PRIVATIZATION ON TRACK, BUT UNLIKELY 
BEFORE THE ELECTIONS 
 
REF: BEIRUT 1627 
 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
1. (SBU) In recent weeks, Embassy contacts have publicly and 
privately expressed doubts that the privatization of mobile telecom 
licenses can take place before the spring 2009 parliamentary 
elections.  Most contacts blame poor market conditions following the 
international financial crisis for the likely delay.  Nonetheless, 
all government officials involved in preparing the privatization say 
there is political will to privatize, and that it will happen, most 
likely in the months following the elections.  Despite talk of the 
GOL imposing foreign ownership restrictions on the licenses or 
imposing revenue-sharing schemes, post believes the privatization 
will go through when the market improves, and the USG should not 
push the Siniora government to privatize too soon if it would hurt 
the government politically.  End summary. 
 
NO PRIVATIZATION BEFORE THE ELECTIONS... 
-------------------- 
 
2. (SBU) Privately and publicly, an increasing number of GOL and 
foreign officials have been expressing doubts about the likelihood 
of mobile privatization taking place before the 2009 elections.  On 
November 1, French daily L'Orient le Jour quoted SYG of the Higher 
Council for Privatization Ziad Hayek as saying that mobile 
privatization may be delayed.  He attributed the delay to current 
market conditions, which would make it difficult for interested 
companies to get financing.  However, Hayek commended the Minister 
of Telecommunications Gebran Bassil's efforts to improve the mobile 
network in the meantime. 
 
3. (SBU) World Bank country Manager Demba Ba told us November 4 that 
he concurred with Hayek, saying that international market conditions 
are not likely to attract investors for mobile privatization.  PM 
Senior Advisor Ghassan Taher shares Ba's views, and publicly said to 
donor country representatives at a Paris III donor meeting on 
October 23 that privatization could be difficult to achieve in 2009. 
 
 
4. (SBU) Hayek told us on November 10 that the GOL may want to wait 
for better market conditions, noting that current conditions could 
lower the valuation of the two mobile licenses.  Hayek said Bassil 
is nonetheless still building political support for mobile 
privatization, and will hold a workshop for stakeholders in early 
December. 
 
...BUT PERHAPS RIGHT AFTER 
------------- 
 
5. (SBU) Telecom Regulatory Authority (TRA) Chairman Kamal Shehadi 
believes mobile privatization is possible in the first half of 2009 
if the GOL can summon up political will.  He refuted claims that 
current market conditions make it difficult for investors to get 
financing, and told us November 4 that eight out of the ten 
companies that have expressed interest in bidding for a mobile 
license are from countries that have so far been only minimally 
affected by the financial crisis and thus would be able to bid. 
Regarding SYG Hayek's remarks, Shehadi said "he spoke too soon." 
 
6. (U) On November 8, Finance Minister Mohammad Chatah told 
English-language newspaper The Daily Star that although the legal 
and technical aspects of mobile privatization should be ready, 
privatization may not happen before the 2009 parliamentary 
elections.  Chatah said Paris III donor countries were not pressing 
Lebanon "to privatize the mobile networks before the election, but 
they want to see some steps taken by the government that will pave 
the way for the privatization." 
 
7. (SBU) In a November 11 meeting, Chatah told us there is support 
for telecom privatization across the political spectrum, and that it 
will go forward, though there may be restrictions on foreign 
ownership or other conditions set to ensure political consensus. 
Chatah said political and market conditions might affect the timing, 
but the sale still should go through either in the spring before the 
elections, or in the fall, soon after them.  He noted that if the 
sale went through under the current conditions, the GOL could be 
accused of cheating the people out of a receiving a fair price for 
 
BEIRUT 00001630  002 OF 002 
 
 
state assets. 
 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
8. (SBU) Post believes it is increasingly unlikely that mobile 
privatization will occur prior to the 2009 parliamentary elections. 
Though the USG has been anxious to see privatization sooner rather 
than later, to ensure disbursement of the final tranche of USG 
budgetary support funds pledged at Paris III, the main issue seems 
to be market conditions in the wake of the world financial crisis, 
and not a lack of political will.  If the GOL thinks a few extra 
months' wait can significantly increase the bids it can receive for 
the licenses, perhaps it is prudent for it, and the USG, to wait. 
Ultimately, forcing through a privatization under poor market 
conditions could hurt the Siniora government and all those working 
for reform and democracy in Lebanon.  End comment. 
 
SISON