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Viewing cable 08AITTAIPEI1637, MEDIA REACTION: U.S. AND CROSS-STRAIT RELATIONS

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08AITTAIPEI1637 2008-11-23 21:28 2011-08-23 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
VZCZCXYZ0000
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHIN #1637/01 3282128
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 232128Z NOV 08
FM AIT TAIPEI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0407
INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 8752
RUEHHK/AMCONSUL HONG KONG 0206
UNCLAS AIT TAIPEI 001637 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR INR/R/MR, EAP/TC, EAP/PA, EAP/PD - NIDA EMMONS 
DEPARTMENT PASS AIT/WASHINGTON 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: OPRC KMDR KPAO TW
SUBJECT: MEDIA REACTION: U.S. AND CROSS-STRAIT RELATIONS 
 
Subject:  Taiwan's major Chinese-language dailies focused their 
November 21 news coverage on the looming economic recession in 
Taiwan, with its annual GDP growth expected to drop to a seven-year 
low for 2008; and on the continuing probe into the money laundering 
case allegedly involving the former First Family.  In terms of 
editorials and commentaries, an editorial in the mass-circulation 
"Apple Daily" discussed the possible impact on Taiwan caused by the 
fact that China is building its own aircraft carrier and has become 
the number one creditor nation of the United States in the aftermath 
of the financial crisis.  An op-ed in the pro-independence, 
English-language "Taipei Times," written by a Western writer in 
Taipei, said that all the goodwill gestures that China has extended 
to Taiwan lately, including sending Association for Relations across 
the Taiwan Strait officials to Taiwan and agreeing to Lien Chan's 
participation in the APEC summit, will not guarantee peace across 
the Taiwan Strait.  End summary. 
 
A) "A Horrifyingly Large Gap in Taiwan's National Defense" 
 
The mass-circulation "Apple Daily" [circulation: 520,000] 
editorialized (11/21): 
 
"The Ministry of National Defense has confirmed that China is 
building an aircraft carrier.  China's satellite reconnaissance and 
navigation skills have come to maturity, and it is capable of 
launching missiles to destroy the satellites of its enemies. 
Deployment of its newly developed aircraft carrier killer missiles 
has also started.  China has become the number one creditor nation 
of the United States in the aftermath of the financial crisis.  What 
are the messages that these four incidents are signaling to Taiwan? 
 
"The signals are clear enough.  Let's presume the following 
scenario:  Countdown of China's military attack against Taiwan has 
begun; politically and strategically, China has used deeply 
intertwined economic and financial relations between the United 
States  and China to restrain Washington from interfering with [the 
cross-Strait tension], making sure that Washington [knows] it will 
have to pay a [high] price for its troubled economy and finance 
should it intervene, and thereby creating psychological difficulty 
for the U.S. president to send troops to help defend Taiwan. 
 
"Strategically, [China's] satellites will identify the position of 
the U.S. aircraft carrier groups, and they can use swarm tactics to 
launch a massive amount of missiles to attack in a wide range the 
U.S. aircraft carriers coming to Taiwan's aid and thus deal a heavy 
blow on the U.S. military.  Such a capability will create 
psychological problems for the U.S. military when making decisions 
about helping Taiwan.  Perhaps the U.S. military will try to 
interfere or destroy Chinese satellites, radar systems and airborne 
electronic warfare reconnaissance aircraft, but still it has to do 
so under the risk of missing certain detection opening and thus 
being attack [by China].  China's military preparations are aimed at 
deterring the U.S. military coming to Taiwan's aid, so the more 
resourceful they are the more effective they will be. 
 
"Tactically, when the United States abandons the use of force to 
help defend Taiwan, China's aircraft carrier will be able to conduct 
a military operation against Taiwan on Taiwan's east coast by 
'turning Taiwan inside out'.  The Chia Shan military base [in 
Hualien], which Taiwan's fighter jets relied on for survival, will 
be exposed to the opponent fighters' direct bombardment.  Taiwan 
also possesses shore-base anti-ship missiles, with limited range 
though, while [China's] aircraft carrier is able to launch attacks 
from a secure distance. ... 
 
"Therefore, there are many big gaps in Taiwan's defense 
[capability], almost to an extent of hopelessness.  First, [Taiwan] 
does not have the modern advanced military satellites required for 
warfare.  [Such a circumstance] is just like a blind person fighting 
against someone with normal eyesight.  Second, the joint operation 
capabilities of Taiwan's three services are poor.  It is difficult 
to bring the joint operation capability into full play with no 
satellite link or insufficient skills in electronic warfare.  Third, 
[Taiwan's] deterrence against attacks, the capability to undertake 
retaliatory strikes in deep inside the enemy's territory, is almost 
zero.  The ability to retaliate against China's shore bases alone 
does not constitute deterrence.  It is a significant strategic 
mistake for Taiwan to give up its research, development and 
deployment of middle-range cruise missiles. 
 
"Fourth, the second-generation fighter jets are lagging behind and 
there are no capabilities to improve them technically.  Fifth, 
[Taiwan] army has almost zero long-distance projection capability. 
[For Taiwan,] its every war zone can only fight for itself, let 
alone attack China's inland bases and its aircraft carrier.  Sixth, 
the anti-submarine [capability] and the number of submarines that 
[Taiwan's] navy possesses may just serve as a specimen and will not 
sustain in large-scale warfare.  Therefore, the mass production of 
middle- and long-range deterrent weapons, including the capability 
 
to strike far inland and against the aircraft carrier, is the key to 
the self-defense of an island." 
 
B) "Peace in the Strait? ORBAT Says No" 
 
ΒΆJ. Michael Cole, a writer based in Taipei, opined in the 
pro-independence, English-language "Taipei Times" [circulation: 
30,000] (11/21): 
 
"... All things being equal, the People's Liberation Army (PLA) 
Order of Battle (ORBAT) says it all.  Despite the cross-strait 
rapprochement that we have seen in recent months, the PLA has failed 
to deactivate or redirect the odd-1,300 ballistic missiles it aims 
at Taiwan, something that even Ma has said would be a road block to 
negotiations - that he has chosen to negotiate despite this speaks 
volumes.  In other words, where confidence-building measures would 
be expected to accompany diplomacy, we have seen nothing that 
suggests the PLA is reducing its threatening posture.  Furthermore, 
news this week that the PLA had deployed YJ-62A anti-ship missiles - 
that, with a reach of 400km, would bring most of Taiwanese ports 
within range - points to continued acceleration and refinement in 
range, precision and destructiveness of the arsenal at the PLA's 
disposal should it come to war. 
 
"Given the relatively weak Taiwanese navy, it is likely that the 
YJ-62As are meant to deter US Navy warships and aircraft carriers, 
which could be deployed to the Taiwan Strait should Washington feel 
compelled to come to Taiwan's assistance during a military crisis. 
Also, despite Beijing's longstanding claims that the modernization 
of its military is in line with its growing global responsibilities 
rather than directed at Taiwan, the YJ-62A's 400km range means that 
their only use is for a Taiwan contingency, as the distance between 
Fuzhou and Xianyou, Fujian Province, where most of its DF-11 and 
DF-15 short-range missiles - and the YJ-62s - are likely deployed, 
and the closest likely target after Taiwan, namely Okinawa, is 
between 834km and 903km respectively and thus well beyond range. 
 
"While analysts often confuse 'capability' - in other words, the 
ORBAT - with 'intent,' a growing and modernizing ORBAT with 
capabilities specific to a given target - in this instance Taiwan - 
that occurs parallel to 'peace talks' is either an indication of 
malicious intent or the belief by one of the parties to the talks 
that a diplomatic resolution to the Taiwan question is unlikely." 
 
YOUNG