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Viewing cable 08TAIPEI1470, Director's 10/6 Meeting with Kaohsiung Mayor Chen

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08TAIPEI1470 2008-10-15 07:11 2011-08-23 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
VZCZCXRO5900
RR RUEHCN RUEHGH RUEHHM
DE RUEHIN #1470/01 2890711
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 150711Z OCT 08
FM AIT TAIPEI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0119
INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 8649
RUEHHI/AMEMBASSY HANOI 3670
RUEHGH/AMCONSUL SHANGHAI 2264
RUEHCN/AMCONSUL CHENGDU 2856
RUEHSH/AMCONSUL SHENYANG 6814
RUEHGZ/AMCONSUL GUANGZHOU 1444
RUEHHK/AMCONSUL HONG KONG 0098
RUEHHM/AMCONSUL HO CHI MINH CITY 0387
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 TAIPEI 001470 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
DEPT FOR AIT/W, EAP/TC, INR/EAP 
 
FROM AIT KAOHSIUNG BRANCH OFFICE 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV ECON TW
SUBJECT: Director's 10/6 Meeting with Kaohsiung Mayor Chen 
 
SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED, PLEASE PROTECT ACCORDINGLY 
 
1.  (SBU) Summary:  In her October 6 meeting with Director Young, 
Kaohsiung Mayor Chen Chu briefed on the city's 2009 World Games 
preparations and sought U.S. help on counterterrorism information 
exchange and screening incoming foreign athletes.  Chen positively 
assessed DPP Chair Tsai Ing-wen's performance to date and agreed 
with the Director's comment that former President Chen's legal 
troubles would complicate Tsai's party reform efforts.  She hoped 
that Chen Shui-bian's case would wrap up quickly so that Tsai would 
have a stronger hand leading into December 2009 county/city/local 
elections.  Mayor Chen's own 2010 reelection prospects are still 
cloudy, but if she runs, she will need Tsai's help to protect her 
from the city's already fierce DPP intra-factional struggles.  End 
summary. 
 
2.  (SBU) During his October 6-7 visit to southern Taiwan, Director 
Young called on Kaohsiung City Mayor Chen Chu.  Chen has recently 
enjoyed a slight popularity uptick as she increases her public 
profile after months of limited visibility due to a stroke suffered 
late last year.  In a sign of her interest in a 2010 re-election 
bid, Chen last month replaced one of her two Deputy Mayors with a 
DPP stalwart who specializes in public relations.  Currently, Chen's 
main focus is preparing Kaohsiung for the 2009 World Games, during 
which the city will host 4,500 athletes from 100 countries competing 
in 37 sports. 
 
World Games: Seeking Help on Screening Athletes 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
3.  (SBU) Mayor Chen stressed that all of the city's World Games 
facilities would be completed on time and within budget.  A 
15,000-seat domed stadium, one of two large-scale infrastructure 
projects for the Games, had its soft opening on September 27, 
several weeks ahead of schedule.  Public financing covered USD50 
million of the domed stadium's USD 263 million price tag, she 
explained, with a leading local firm, Han Shen Corporation, funding 
the rest under a build-operate-transfer (BOT) model.  The other 
major project, a 40,000-seat main stadium, was 93% complete and 
would be finished by January 15, 2009, six months before the World 
Games' July 16 opening ceremony. 
 
4.  (SBU) Chen invited the Director and other U.S. officials to 
attend the games and encouraged U.S. businesses to come to Kaohsiung 
in the near future to participate in World Games sponsorship 
activities.  Chen insisted that the PRC should not have any problems 
with Kaohsiung hosting the games, since the Kaohsiung Organizing 
Committee (KOC) would abide by its commitment not to use the games 
as a political platform and would utilize the long-accepted IOC 
model for handling Taiwan.  The ROC flag would not be displayed at 
official World Games activities, she promised, but the KOC could not 
control ordinary Taiwan citizens who wanted to wave the ROC flag on 
their own accord. 
 
5.  (SBU) Noting that the KOC was pressing Taiwan's authorities to 
implement a visa-free regime for foreign athletes attending the 
games, Chen asked whether the U.S. could offer counterterrorism 
intelligence assistance.  She also solicited U.S. help in finding a 
way to "screen" athletes from higher-risk areas, like the former 
Soviet Union and eastern Europe.  Emphasizing our strong desire to 
see the Games proceed as safely as possible, as well as our global 
effort to combat terrorism, DIR promised to seek guidance on Mayor 
Chen's requests and get back to her later. 
 
DPP Reform: Grappling with CSB Legacy 
------------------------------------- 
 
6.  (SBU) Asked to assess DPP Chair Tsai Ing-wen's performance to 
date, Chen said that as a member of the DPP's Central Standing 
Committee, she could personally vouch for Tsai's effective party 
leadership.  Tsai represented a new generation of DPP leadership, 
and DPP supporters had high expectations of her.  Chen predicted 
that Tsai would have a positive impact on Taiwan's society because 
she had a clean reputation and was too young to harbor deep-seated 
feelings of retribution over the 1979 Formosa incident. 
 
7.  (SBU) Chen agreed with the Director's comment that former 
President Chen Shui-bian's ongoing legal troubles would complicate 
Tsai's DPP reform efforts.  Mayor Chen commented that former 
 
TAIPEI 00001470  002 OF 002 
 
 
President Chen and the DPP were closely intertwined.  Chen brought 
glory to the DPP by winning the Presidency and effected an historic 
peaceful transfer of power from the KMT to the DPP.  Over the last 
15 years, she explained, people had become used to having Chen as 
part of the political landscape.  Given Chen's prominence, his 
current fall from grace had been especially damaging to the party. 
DPP supporters needed to know why the Chen family transferred money 
overseas.  Those actions surprised the party faithful, since the DPP 
had long condemned such behavior by the KMT. 
 
8.  (SBU) Nevertheless, she stated, former President Chen still had 
many ardent supporters, especially in southern Taiwan.  They 
sympathized with Chen's line that the KMT was persecuting him 
unfairly.  However, she added, most DPP supporters agreed that 
Chen's case should be pursued through the legal process and that the 
party should not be forced to defend him.  The DPP therefore had no 
choice but to ask Chen to leave the party.  Asked whether Chen's 
case and Ma's declining popularity would encourage a return of the 
DPP's "old guard," Mayor Chen expressed her belief that the old 
guard would remain in the background and let a younger generation 
gain experience. 
 
2009 Elections: Eyeing DPP Future without CSB 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
9.  (SBU) The Director underscored to Mayor Chen that the U.S. 
viewed positively President Ma's current efforts to reduce 
cross-strait tensions and strengthen peaceful dialogue between the 
two sides.  Chen replied that a key question was whether Ma's 
cross-strait policy was actually in line with Taiwan's national 
interest.  She underscored her view that Ma should seek consensus in 
Taiwan on the substance of his dialogue with China before signing 
agreements.  While the DPP agreed with the need for peaceful 
dialogue, she explained, the party was primarily focused on whether 
Taiwan's interests were fully protected in the course of the 
dialogue. 
 
10.  (SBU) Chen declined to comment on her 2010 re-election 
prospects, noting that the DPP's main focus was December 2009 
county/city/local "3-in-1" elections.  She acknowledged that the 
specter of former President Chen's legal case posed a problem for 
the DPP.  She hoped that Chen's case would be resolved quickly so 
that Tsai could lead the party into those elections without such a 
burden.  Mayor Chen stressed that the DPP's future course should 
have nothing to do with former President Chen and that Taiwan's 
democratization process would benefit from consigning Chen to 
history. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
11.  (SBU) Mayor Chen's positive assessment of Tsai's performance 
contrasts with more lukewarm reactions the Director received from 
other southern Taiwan DPP officials we visited on this trip 
(septel).  Chen strongly supported Tsai's DPP chair candidacy, 
observing to us that Tsai's success could advance Chen's 2010 
reelection prospects.  Chen has long decried DPP factional politics, 
and fierce inter and intra-factional DPP squabbling in Kaohsiung has 
already given rise to widespread media rumors that Chen's DPP 
detractors are seeking to replace her with a stronger candidate to 
run in 2010.  Chen was not the party favorite when she first ran in 
2006, and with an opposing faction already having secured Kaohsiung 
City's DPP chairmanship, Chen will need the patronage of a secure 
and stable Tsai to bolster her reelection bid.  End comment. 
 
CASTRO 
 
WANG