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Viewing cable 08SEOUL2016, IMPACT OF OLYMPICS ON ROK VIEWS TOWARD CHINA

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08SEOUL2016 2008-10-14 08:59 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Seoul
VZCZCXRO5010
OO RUEHGH
DE RUEHUL #2016/01 2880859
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 140859Z OCT 08
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1935
INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 4843
RUEHGZ/AMCONSUL GUANGZHOU 1329
RUEHHK/AMCONSUL HONG KONG 3687
RUEHGH/AMCONSUL SHANGHAI 0309
RUEHSH/AMCONSUL SHENYANG 3839
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 SEOUL 002016 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
D (LEE, KAYE) AND S/P (GREEN, JAMES) 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV KS
SUBJECT: IMPACT OF OLYMPICS ON ROK VIEWS TOWARD CHINA 
 
REF: A. STATE 105512 
     B. SEOUL 01681 (ROK RELATIONS WITH CHINA) 
 
1. (SBU) Summary:  Ref A requested an assessment of the 
effect that China's hosting of the Olympic Games had on 
Korean views of China.  The Korean public avidly followed the 
Korean Olympic team's historic success as it placed seventh 
in the overall medal count and second among Asian countries. 
There was in the press, nonetheless, a conspicuous storyline 
on what the Games revealed about China and its relationships 
with its neighbors.  To Korea's consternation, China played 
to the historic stereotype of a nationalistic, anti-Korean 
Chinese public rooting for Korea's opponents.  Koreans 
acknowledged China's managerial skills hosting the Games, but 
many seemed to conclude that China lacked the political and 
civic maturity to be a leading global power.  Despite 
misgivings awakened by the Olympics, Korea has no choice but 
to continue developing its already close ties to China, ties 
that in the context of geography and centuries of history are 
on a course practically impervious to the 2008 Olympics.  End 
Summary. 
 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
How closely did the public follow the Beijing Olympic Games? 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
 
2. (SBU) According to a survey of thirty-seven countries 
carried out by the Nielsen Company on September 18, South 
Korea ranked first with 94.3 percent of the total population 
tuning in to watch the Beijing Olympic Games between August 
8-24.  Korean interest in watching the Games was no doubt 
fueled by Korea's best ever Olympic performance: Korea took 
seventh place in the overall medal count and second place in 
Asia, behind China and ahead of Japan.  All four major 
networks carried the games, often at the same time. 
 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
How were China and the Games portrayed in the local media? 
Mostly as a sporting competition, or did coverage touch on 
changes in China, discussion of human rights, or China's 
position in the world, or none of the above? 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
 
3. (SBU) Koreans were genuinely interested in the Games as a 
sporting competition--in no small part due to the success of 
Korea's Olympic team--and the local media covered the games 
as a sporting event.  But China's position in the world, 
particularly vis-a-vis Korea, was a conspicuous sub-plot that 
Koreans anxiously followed. 
 
4. (SBU) The 1988 Olympic Games, hosted by Korea during its 
transformation from dictatorship to democracy, are widely 
regarded as a turning point in terms of Korea's development 
as a political democracy and economic powerhouse.  Koreans, 
therefore, were inclined to project a great deal of potential 
significance onto China's role as host and wondered whether 
the 2008 Games would mark a similar turning point for China 
as it did for Korea in 1988. 
 
5. (SBU) In the lead up to the 2008 Games, the South Korean 
press focused on the upsurge in Chinese nationalism.  In 
particular, press reports focused on the government's role in 
preparing for the Games, efforts to clean up Beijing, and 
restrictions on travel to China. The Korean press generally 
interpreted the Chinese preparations as a government 
obsession stemming from a hope to use the Games to mark the 
political, economic, and cultural revival of China as a 
global power. 
 
6. (SBU) Korean perceptions of the Games and China took a 
negative turn, however, when, during the April 27 torch run, 
thousands of Chinese students waving red communist flags 
filled the streets of downtown Seoul.  One government 
official described the students as a "mob invading Korea." 
Some of these students were engaged in acts of violence 
directed at Korean police and human rights activists 
demonstrating on behalf of Tibet. 
 
7. (SBU) Newspaper editorials used harsh language to condemn 
the behavior of the Chinese supporters.  Moderate daily 
JoongAng Ilbo said the Chinese protestors' "violent rallies" 
"once again" portrayed the PRC as a country "not quite 
developed" on the international stage.  Center-left daily 
Hankyoreh criticized the Chinese for "excessively excited" 
behavior which caused "damage to China's dignity."  Citing 
Korean bloggers, the conservative daily Chosun Ilbo lambasted 
 
SEOUL 00002016  002 OF 003 
 
 
the Chinese people's "lawless, irrational, and beastlike" 
"riotous behavior" and declared the PRC lacks the 
"conscience" and "common sense" of a nation worthy of hosting 
the Olympics. 
 
8. (SBU) The torch run incident sparked a rancorous blogging 
war of sorts between Korean and Chinese netizens arguing over 
ownership of common culture and historical traditions.  The 
situation in Tibet fed anxiety about China's fitness as a 
regional or global power.  Then a few days before the opening 
ceremony, a Korean television network, SBS, released footage 
of the opening ceremony rehearsals--outraging Chinese 
citizens. 
 
9. (SBU) Once the Games started, Chinese fans often 
enthusiastically supported Korea's opponents.  Chinese fans 
even cheered for Japan in its baseball match with Korea.  On 
August 27, the center-left daily Hankyoreh ran a story 
headlined "Anti-Korean Sentiment Spreads through China" which 
explored possible explanations for Chinese fans rooting 
against Korea in the games. 
 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
Was Beijing city or China seen as modern, wealthy, developed? 
 Portrayed as an economic threat or opportunity? 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
 
10. (SBU) Koreans generally thought that China did an 
impeccable job managing the Olympics.  But there was also the 
sense that China tried too hard and acted as if it had 
something to hide, according to one government official and 
China watcher.  For example, too much effort was made to 
clean up Beijing by evicting small merchants and migrant 
workers, as if the Chinese government did not want the 
outside world to know that these people existed. 
 
11. (SBU) The resulting impression was that China erected a 
facade of development, illustrated by the fake fireworks and 
lip-syncing school girl singing the national anthem.  But to 
become a leading global country, more is needed than economic 
development, one government official said.  The most 
important result of the 1988 Olympics for Korea was the 
development of Korea's political system.  It is not clear to 
the Korean public that Chinese citizens will be so motivated. 
 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
Did the Olympics change Korea's approach to dealing with 
China? 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
 
12. (SBU) Since establishing diplomatic ties with China in 
1992, the ROK-PRC relationship has undergone tremendous 
development.  The relationship is so important and runs so 
deep (Ref B) that, whatever anxieties might have been stirred 
by the Olympics, Koreans must continue to engage China. 
 
--  China is the ROK's biggest trading partner and the ROK is 
China's third biggest trading partner.  Total bilateral trade 
last year totaled $145 billion and is growing at an annual 
rate of 20%. The ROK's annual bilateral trade with the U.S. 
and Japan combined is approximately $165 billion. 
 
--  China is Korea's most popular tourist destination.  Last 
year 5 million Koreans visited China and 1 million Chinese 
traveled to Korea. 
 
--  Korean students comprise the largest number of foreign 
students in China, totaling more than a third of all foreign 
students. 
 
--  Between Korea and thirty Chinese cities, there are on 
average 113 flights per day. 
 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
Have expectations of China's global role and position changed 
in the view of elites after the Games? 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
 
13. (SBU) Expectations of China have not changed, but in the 
aftermath of the Games a number of Korean academics and media 
outlets are engaged in retrospective analysis of the causes 
of anti-Korean sentiment in China.  For example, the JoongAng 
Ilbo, a major South Korean daily, has started a campaign 
called "Approaching China with a Humble and Warm Heart."  As 
one government official said, the 2008 Olympic Games 
reinforced many negative sentiments Koreans have about China 
 
SEOUL 00002016  003 OF 003 
 
 
but Korea has no choice but to endeavor to put a good face on 
its relationship with China. 
STEPHENS