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Viewing cable 08SANTIAGO955, AMBASSADOR SCHULTE OUTLINES IN CHILE USG NUCLEAR

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08SANTIAGO955 2008-10-24 17:56 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Santiago
VZCZCXYZ0017
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHSG #0955/01 2981756
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 241756Z OCT 08
FM AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3865
INFO RUEHBU/AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES 1094
RUEHPE/AMEMBASSY LIMA 5755
RUEHLP/AMEMBASSY LA PAZ OCT BRASILIA 0488
RUEHMN/AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO 4070
RUEHAC/AMEMBASSY ASUNCION 3583
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 1815
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA 0046
RHMCSUU/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC
UNCLAS SANTIAGO 000955 
 
STATE FOR WHA/BSC, WHA/EPSC AND EEB/ESC/IEC 
 
SIPDIS 
SENSITIVE 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ENRG SENV BTIO OEXC PGOV CI
 
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR SCHULTE OUTLINES IN CHILE USG NUCLEAR 
PROLIFERATION CONCERNS 
 
Summary 
 
1. (U) U.S. Ambassador to the IAEA Schulte October 14-16 reviewed 
with Chilean audiences Iran's ongoing failure to cooperate with the 
IAEA; USG and IAEA assessments of Tehran's attempts to develop 
nuclear weapons; and, the dual-track international effort to either 
bring Iran to the negotiating table or, in the alternative, impose 
sanctions.  Schulte also described IAEA's response to Syria's 
efforts to build a nuclear facility, with the assistance of North 
Korea, in violation of Syria's IAEA safeguards agreement. End 
summary. 
 
2. (U) Ambassador Greg Schulte, U.S. Ambassador to International 
Organizations in Vienna, including the International Atomic Energy 
Agency (IAEA), stopped in Santiago October 14 -16, 2008, as part of 
a regional visit to Chile, Argentina and Brazil.  The primary 
purposes of Ambassador Schulte's visit were bilateral consultations 
and public diplomacy on the Iran nuclear issue.  Ambassador Simons 
joined Ambassador Schulte in several meetings.  E/Pol officer 
accompanied Ambassador Schulte throughout his visit. Septel covers 
Ambassador Schulte's discussions on the IAEA's oversight role in 
regulating development of nuclear power facilities, regional energy 
concerns, as well as Chile's domestic energy crisis and its 
potential interest in developing nuclear energy. 
 
Chile Understands the Threat in Iran 
 
3. (SBU) At an October 15 breakfast hosted by Ambassador Simons, 
bringing together several Chilean energy experts to discuss a wide 
variety of topics (septel), MFA's Deputy Director in the Office of 
International Security, Matias Undurraga, highlighted Chile's stance 
against Iran's position on nuclear power during the U.N. Non-Aligned 
Movement (NAM) meeting in Tehran [Note:  Presumably a reference to 
Chile not joining in the July 2008 announcement that more than 100 
non-aligned nations backed Iran's right to pursue nuclear power, an 
endorsement sought by Tehran in its standoff with the U.N. Security 
Council over its refusal to freeze uranium enrichment.  End note.] 
Undurraga noted as well Chile's concern over Chavez's relationship 
with Iran.  Schulte replied it is helpful when countries such as 
Chile condemn Iran's enrichment program to avoid a race for nuclear 
technology in the Middle East and to ensure that Iran cannot just 
dismiss concerns as part of a U.S.-Iran fight. 
 
4. (SBU) When Lucia Dammert, Director of the Latin America Faculty 
of Social Science's (FLSACO) Security and Citizenship Program, 
observed that a benefit of the current global economic crisis was 
decreased oil revenues for Chavez, Schulte noted the impact is even 
stronger in Tehran and sanctions are having an impact in the form of 
increased debate and unrest within Iran. 
 
5. (SBU) At a meeting at La Moneda (the presidential palace) later 
that day, Marcos Robledo, Presidential Advisor on Foreign and 
Defense Policy, listened attentively to Ambassador Schulte's review 
of the issues with Iran and Syria.  (Robledo and Schulte also 
discussed the IAEA's role in helping countries make decisions on use 
and development of nuclear energy, and the proposal for a nuclear 
fuel bank - septel).  Robledo said his office is in close contact 
with Chile's Resident Representative (and Chair of the IAEA Board of 
Governors for 2007-2008) Ambassador Milenko Skoknic.  Robledo 
suggested the NAM has become weaker in the past few years due to 
increasingly complex political dynamics.  Chile is committed to 
non-proliferation goals but will weigh regional concerns, including 
its relationship with Venezuela and other countries, when making 
decisions regarding Iran.  On Syria, Robledo indicated Chile's 
preference to wait for the IAEA Secretary General's report to 
determine if Syria violated international law. 
 
MFA Supports Non-Proliferation and Disarmament 
 
6. (SBU) At the MFA, Ambassador Schulte met with Director of Special 
Policies Ambassador Juan Eduardo Eguiguren and Undurraga.  Schulte 
reviewed concerns with Iran and Syria and expressed his appreciation 
for Chile's support at the IAEA.  Eguiguren worried about Syria's 
lack of cooperation concerning site inspection.  Eguiguren served in 
Damascus and noted the Ba'ath Party's secretive nature can be 
detrimental to Syria's interests; Damascus "must recognize there are 
consequences for its actions."  Ambassador Schulte pointed out 
construction of the facility probably started in 2000 and the 
decision to construct it may have been made by Hafez al-Asad, who 
died that year and was succeed by his son Bashar.  Eguiguren agreed 
 
Bashar al-Asad might not be totally aware of the project and 
suggested France was a good interlocutor to engage with Syria. 
 
7. (SBU) Eguiguren said Iran knows that the international community 
is following its activities and expressed optimism that Iranian 
elections might bring new leadership.  Ambassador Schulte praised 
Chile's role in the NAM, but noted concern that Iran is rapidly 
gaining technical expertise.  Eguiguren lamented difficulties 
operating in the NAM as a single country and said it is not always 
possible to bring the group together because if an issue is not 
counter to a country's policy some will not bother to oppose it. 
The ambassadors discussed Iran's use of the NAM to prove that it is 
not isolated.  Discussion of IAEA functions reported septel. 
 
Military Analysts Views on Iran's Nuclear Program 
 
8. (SBU) Ambassador Schulte also met with several academics and 
analysts working on non-proliferation from a military standpoint. 
The group included:  Col. Jorge Pena, Associate Professor and Head 
Department of Military History, Strategy and Geopolitics at of 
Chilean War College, Ricardo Neeb, Professor at Pontifica 
Universidad Catolica and Non-Proliferation Analyst for Ministry of 
Interior, retired General Alvaro Guzman, Nuclear Engineer from 
Centro de Estudios Nucleares del Ejercito (CENE), a military think 
tank.  On the issue of trade sanctions, Neeb pointed out Chile's 
relative distance from Iran and that the GOC is more concerned about 
proliferation in general.  He asked whether, if Iran did not change 
its posture due to sanctions, the U.S. was still considering other 
options.  Schulte assured Neeb diplomacy is a preferred first 
option, but noted the current administration and both presidential 
candidates have taken a tough stance on Iran that includes all 
options and that Israel would be compelled to consider all options 
if threatened. 
 
Nuclear Energy Commission Asks Tough Technical Questions 
 
9. (SBU) In contrast with other meetings, discussion during the 
working lunch with representatives of Chile's Nuclear Energy 
Commission (Comisisn Chilena de Energa Nuclear - CChEN), was more 
technical.  After a brief introduction by CChEN Director Lopez, 
Ambassador Schulte launched into his presentation on Iran and Syria. 
 He was interrupted by Board of Director member Dr. Julio Vergara, 
who asked about the reliability of U.S. intelligence on Iran, and 
explained that the U.S. is only one of ten countries providing 
information to the IAEA on Iran.  Vergara agreed with Ambassador 
Schulte that Iran's uranium enrichment does not make sense in the 
absence of nuclear reactors in the country. 
 
10. (SBU) Board members asked a number of questions about the Syrian 
facility that was destroyed, including whether the U.N. Security 
Council (UNSC) had been informed about it.  Ambassador Schulte 
explained that the UNSC would likely be informed after the IAEA 
Secretary General's written report is released in November. 
 
Influential Senator Supports Position Against Iran 
 
11. (SBU) Senator Jaime Gazmuri, Head of the Chilean Senate's 
International Relations Commission, assured Schulte Chile shares 
similar views on Iran and Syria, but questioned why the U.S. does 
not have similar concerns about Israel proliferating nuclear 
technology.  The Ambassador noted that Pakistan, India and Israel 
have not signed the NPT and that Israel maintains it will not be 
first in the Middle East to "introduce" nuclear weapons.  He further 
elaborated that there is little concern in the region about Israel 
using offensive nuclear weapons, but there is concern that having 
nuclear weapons capability will make Iran more aggressive.  When he 
pointed out the need to be realistic about a nuclear-free zone in 
the Middle East because Israel will not give up while Iran is 
seeking a nuclear capability, the Senator countered that the reverse 
is also true. 
 
12. (SBU) In response to Gazmuri's questions about how to move past 
the seeming impasse, Ambassador Schulte expressed several reasons 
why Iran might seek nuclear weapons: prestige, security and 
domination (regional homogeny).  He explained that rather than 
allowing Iran to use Israel to change the subject, there is a need 
to use diplomacy to convince Iran that it gains prestige by 
negotiating, security though improved relations and that pursuing 
nuclear weapons is counter-productive.  Gazmuri agreed, but 
also commented "but if my enemy has the bomb, then I need the bomb" 
and said a different relationship is need with Iran, but depends on 
Iran's leader, e.g., Khatemi. 
 
Schulte Wins Tough Competition for Media's Attention 
 
13. (U) Ambassador Schulte held a press roundtable that included 
five journalists from major press outlets and more specialized 
publications.  Despite having to compete with news of Chile's 
first-ever soccer victory over Argentina and the U.S. Presidential 
debate, his visit got good press coverage.  La Nacion, a 
government-owned, editorially independent paper (circulation 4,200), 
wrote that Ambassador Greg Schulte at the IAEA said Iran must comply 
with all United Nations resolutions and end its uranium enrichment 
program.  It also quoted him as saying Iran could have "highly 
enriched uranium for a nuclear weapon by 2010," and added that the 
United States is trying to encourage Iran to cooperate through a 
combination of negotiations, strong sanctions, and isolation. 
 
14. (U) On October 17, El Mercurio, a conservative, influential 
newspaper-of-record (circulation 129,000) highlighted Schulte's trip 
to the region "to inform the government officials and experts of 
Iran's nuclear program and garner diplomatic support to exert more 
pressure on the Iranian government and that Iran will have enough 
enriched uranium and the technology to manufacture nuclear weapons 
by 2010."  In addition to outlining the dual-track strategy for 
engaging Iran, El Mercurio noted that Schulte explained the progress 
in Iran's nuclear plans, labeling the situation "dangerous and 
worrisome for global peace and stability." 
 
15.  (U) Ambassador Schulte's media roundtable is viewable in its 
entirety on the Santiago web site. 
 
Comment 
 
16. (U) Ambassador Schulte's visit provided opportunities to engage 
influential Chileans on both nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear 
energy issues.  The visit got good press coverage and the bilateral 
meetings provided a chance to clarify the IAEA and U.S. position on 
Iran's pursuit of nuclear technology and to address Chile's specific 
concerns about rights of access to nuclear technology.  End 
comment. 
 
17. (U) Ambassador Schulte did not clear this message. 
 
SIMONS