Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 97115 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
ETRD EAGR ETTC EAID ECON EFIN ECIN EINV ELAB EAIR ENRG EPET EWWT ECPS EIND EMIN ELTN EC ETMIN EUC EZ ET ELECTIONS ENVR EU EUN EG EINT ER ECONOMICS ES EMS ENIV EEB EN ECE ECOSOC EK ENVIRONMENT EFIS EI EWT ENGRD ECPSN EXIM EIAD ERIN ECPC EDEV ENGY ECTRD EPA ESTH ECCT EINVECON ENGR ERTD EUR EAP EWWC ELTD EL EXIMOPIC EXTERNAL ETRDEC ESCAP ECO EGAD ELNT ECONOMIC ENV ETRN EIAR EUMEM ENRGPARMOTRASENVKGHGPGOVECONTSPLEAID EREL ECOM ECONETRDEAGRJA ETCC ETRG ECONOMY EMED ETR ENERG EITC EFINOECD EURM EENG ERA EXPORT ENRD ECONEINVETRDEFINELABETRDKTDBPGOVOPIC EGEN EBRD EVIN ETRAD ECOWAS EFTA ECONETRDBESPAR EGOVSY EPIN EID ECONENRG EDRC ESENV ETT EB ENER ELTNSNAR ECHEVARRIA ETRC EPIT EDUC ESA EFI ENRGY ESCI EE EAIDXMXAXBXFFR EETC ECIP EIAID EIVN EBEXP ESTN EING EGOV ETRA EPETEIND ELAN ETRDGK EAIDRW ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS EPEC ENVI ELN EAG EPCS EPRT EPTED ETRB EUM EAIDS EFIC EFINECONEAIDUNGAGM EAIDAR ESF EIDN ELAM EDU EV EAIDAF ECN EDA EXBS EINTECPS ENRGTRGYETRDBEXPBTIOSZ EPREL EAC EINVEFIN ETA EAGER EINDIR ECA ECLAC ELAP EITI EUCOM ECONEFINETRDPGOVEAGRPTERKTFNKCRMEAID EARG ELDIN EINVKSCA ENNP EFINECONCS EFINTS ECCP ETC EAIRASECCASCID EINN ETRP EAIDNI EFQ ECOQKPKO EGPHUM EBUD ECONEINVEFINPGOVIZ ENERGY ELB EINDETRD EMI ECONEFIN EIB EURN ETRDEINVTINTCS EIN EFIM ETIO ELAINE EMN EATO EWTR EIPR EINVETC ETTD ETDR EIQ ECONCS EPPD ENRGIZ EISL ESPINOSA ELEC EAIG ESLCO EUREM ENTG ERD EINVECONSENVCSJA EEPET EUNCH ECINECONCS ETRO ETRDECONWTOCS ECUN EFND EPECO EAIRECONRP ERGR ETRDPGOV ECPN ENRGMO EPWR EET EAIS EAGRE EDUARDO EAGRRP EAIDPHUMPRELUG EICN ECONQH EVN EGHG ELBR EINF EAIDHO EENV ETEX ERNG ED
KMDR KPAO KPKO KJUS KCRM KGHG KFRD KWMN KDEM KTFN KHIV KGIC KIDE KSCA KNNP KHUM KIPR KSUM KISL KIRF KCOR KRCM KPAL KWBG KN KS KOMC KSEP KFLU KPWR KTIA KSEO KMPI KHLS KICC KSTH KMCA KVPR KPRM KE KU KZ KFLO KSAF KTIP KTEX KBCT KOCI KOLY KOR KAWC KACT KUNR KTDB KSTC KLIG KSKN KNN KCFE KCIP KGHA KHDP KPOW KUNC KDRL KV KPREL KCRS KPOL KRVC KRIM KGIT KWIR KT KIRC KOMO KRFD KUWAIT KG KFIN KSCI KTFIN KFTN KGOV KPRV KSAC KGIV KCRIM KPIR KSOC KBIO KW KGLB KMWN KPO KFSC KSEAO KSTCPL KSI KPRP KREC KFPC KUNH KCSA KMRS KNDP KR KICCPUR KPPAO KCSY KTBT KCIS KNEP KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KNNB KGCC KINR KPOP KMFO KENV KNAR KVIR KDRG KDMR KFCE KNAO KDEN KGCN KICA KIMMITT KMCC KLFU KMSG KSEC KUM KCUL KMNP KSMT KCOM KOMCSG KSPR KPMI KRAD KIND KCRP KAUST KWAWC KTER KCHG KRDP KPAS KITA KTSC KPAOPREL KWGB KIRP KJUST KMIG KLAB KTFR KSEI KSTT KAPO KSTS KLSO KWNN KPOA KHSA KNPP KPAONZ KBTS KWWW KY KJRE KPAOKMDRKE KCRCM KSCS KWMNCI KESO KWUN KPLS KIIP KEDEM KPAOY KRIF KGICKS KREF KTRD KFRDSOCIRO KTAO KJU KWMNPHUMPRELKPAOZW KEN KO KNEI KEMR KKIV KEAI KWAC KRCIM KWCI KFIU KWIC KCORR KOMS KNNO KPAI KBWG KTTB KTBD KTIALG KILS KFEM KTDM KESS KNUC KPA KOMCCO KCEM KRCS KWBGSY KNPPIS KNNPMNUC KWN KERG KLTN KALM KCCP KSUMPHUM KREL KGH KLIP KTLA KAWK KWMM KVRP KVRC KAID KSLG KDEMK KX KIF KNPR KCFC KFTFN KTFM KPDD KCERS KMOC KDEMAF KMEPI KEMS KDRM KEPREL KBTR KEDU KNP KIRL KNNR KMPT KISLPINR KTPN KA KJUSTH KPIN KDEV KTDD KAKA KFRP KWNM KTSD KINL KJUSKUNR KWWMN KECF KWBC KPRO KVBL KOM KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KEDM KFLD KLPM KRGY KNNF KICR KIFR KM KWMNCS KAWS KLAP KPAK KDDG KCGC KID KNSD KMPF KPFO KDP KCMR KRMS KNPT KNNNP KTIAPARM KDTB KNUP KPGOV KNAP KNNC KUK KSRE KREISLER KIVP KQ KTIAEUN KPALAOIS KRM KISLAO KWM KFLOA
PHUM PINR PTER PGOV PREL PREF PL PM PHSA PE PARM PINS PK PUNE PO PALESTINIAN PU PBTS PROP PTBS POL POLI PA PGOVZI POLMIL POLITICAL PARTIES POLM PD POLITICS POLICY PAS PMIL PINT PNAT PV PKO PPOL PERSONS PING PBIO PH PETR PARMS PRES PCON PETERS PRELBR PT PLAB PP PAK PDEM PKPA PSOCI PF PLO PTERM PJUS PSOE PELOSI PROPERTY PGOVPREL PARP PRL PNIR PHUMKPAL PG PREZ PGIC PBOV PAO PKK PROV PHSAK PHUMPREL PROTECTION PGOVBL PSI PRELPK PGOVENRG PUM PRELKPKO PATTY PSOC PRIVATIZATION PRELSP PGOVEAIDUKNOSWGMHUCANLLHFRSPITNZ PMIG PREC PAIGH PROG PSHA PARK PETER POG PHUS PPREL PS PTERPREL PRELPGOV POV PKPO PGOVECON POUS PGOVPRELPHUMPREFSMIGELABEAIDKCRMKWMN PWBG PMAR PREM PAR PNR PRELPGOVEAIDECONEINVBEXPSCULOIIPBTIO PARMIR PGOVGM PHUH PARTM PN PRE PTE PY POLUN PPEL PDOV PGOVSOCI PIRF PGOVPM PBST PRELEVU PGOR PBTSRU PRM PRELKPAOIZ PGVO PERL PGOC PAGR PMIN PHUMR PVIP PPD PGV PRAM PINL PKPAL PTERE PGOF PINO PHAS PODC PRHUM PHUMA PREO PPA PEPFAR PGO PRGOV PAC PRESL PORG PKFK PEPR PRELP PREFA PNG PGOVPHUMKPAO PRELECON PINOCHET PFOR PGOVLO PHUMBA PRELC PREK PHUME PHJM POLINT PGOVPZ PGOVKCRM PGOVE PHALANAGE PARTY PECON PEACE PROCESS PLN PRELSW PAHO PEDRO PRELA PASS PPAO PGPV PNUM PCUL PGGV PSA PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA PGIV PRFE POGOV PEL PBT PAMQ PINF PSEPC POSTS PHUMPGOV PVOV PHSAPREL PROLIFERATION PENA PRELTBIOBA PIN PRELL PGOVPTER PHAM PHYTRP PTEL PTERPGOV PHARM PROTESTS PRELAF PKBL PRELKPAO PKNP PARMP PHUML PFOV PERM PUOS PRELGOV PHUMPTER PARAGRAPH PERURENA PBTSEWWT PCI PETROL PINSO PINSCE PQL PEREZ PBS

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 08NAIROBI2366, COMMISSION OF INQUIRY INTO POST-ELECTION VIOLENCE PRESENTS

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #08NAIROBI2366.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08NAIROBI2366 2008-10-15 13:36 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Nairobi
VZCZCXRO6197
OO RUEHROV
DE RUEHNR #2366/01 2891336
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 151336Z OCT 08
FM AMEMBASSY NAIROBI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7298
RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE
RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA 0273
RUEHDR/AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM 6129
RUEHDJ/AMEMBASSY DJIBOUTI 5422
RUEHKM/AMEMBASSY KAMPALA 2998
RUEHKH/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM 2186
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 2938
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 2831
RHMFIUU/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RHMFIUU/CJTF HOA
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 NAIROBI 002366 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM KDEM KE
SUBJECT: COMMISSION OF INQUIRY INTO POST-ELECTION VIOLENCE PRESENTS 
 
REPORT TO PRESIDENT AND PRIME MINISTER 
 
1. On September 15, the Commission of Inquiry into Post-Election 
Violence (CIPEV) -- which was formed as part of the Kofi 
Annan-mediated settlement of Kenya's post-election crisis (reftel) 
-- presented its report to President Mwai Kibaki.  Kibaki then 
ordered the report to be released immediately.  The report 
recommends concrete measures to improve performance and 
accountability of state security agencies and enhance coordination 
within state security mechanisms, including: strengthening joint 
operational preparedness arrangements; developing comprehensive 
operational review processes; merging the Administration Police and 
the Kenya Police Service; and establishing an Independent Police 
Complaints Authority. The report also recommends the creation of a 
special tribunal with the mandate to prosecute crimes committed as a 
result of post-election violence. The tribunal will have an 
international component in the form of the presence of non-Kenyans 
on the senior investigations and prosecution staff.  The text of the 
Executive Summary follows at paragraph 3. 
 
2. Poloff spoke to George Kegoro, the Secretary to the CIPEV. 
Kegoro stated that Kibaki and Odinga have already positively 
commented on the report and its recommendations.  According to 
Kegoro, Odinga indicated that the report will be discussed at the 
next Cabinet meeting. 
 
3. To follow is the text of the Executive Summary. 
 
Begin text. 
 
The mandate of the Commission of Inquiry into Post-Election Violence 
(CIPEV) was to investigate the facts and circumstances surrounding 
the violence, the conduct of state security agencies in their 
handling of it, and to make recommendations concerning these and 
other matters. 
 
The Report comprises 5 Parts. Part I of the Report is an 
Introduction which discusses the historical context of the violence; 
Part II is a narration of the violence province by province. Part 
III deals with four cross cutting issues: sexual violence, 
internally displaced persons, the media and the nature and impact of 
the violence. Part IV 
deals with acts and omissions of state security agencies and 
impunity; and Part V contains recommendations made with a view to 
the prevention of future reoccurrence of large scale violence; the 
investigation of alleged perpetrators; and how to tackle the culture 
of impunity that has become the hallmark of violence and other 
crimes in the country. 
Sadly, violence has been a part of Kenya's electoral processes since 
the restoration of multi party politics in 1991. However, the 
violence that shook Kenya after the 2007 general elections was 
unprecedented. It was by far the most deadly and the most 
destructive violence ever experienced in Kenya. Also, unlike 
previous cycles of election related 
violence, much of it followed, rather than preceded elections. The 
2007-2008 post-election violence was also more widespread than in 
the past. It affected all but 2 provinces and was felt in both urban 
and rural parts of the country. Previously violence around election 
periods concentrated in a smaller number of districts mainly in Rift 
Valley, Western, and Coast Provinces. 
 
As regards the conduct of state security agencies, they failed 
institutionally to anticipate, prepare for, and contain the 
violence. Often individual members of the state security agencies 
were also guilty of acts of violence and gross violations of the 
human rights of the citizens. 
 
In some ways the post-election violence resembled the ethnic clashes 
of the 1990s and was but an episode in a trend of 
institutionalization of violence in Kenya over the years. The fact 
that armed militias, most of whom developed as a result of the 1990s 
ethnic clashes, were never de-mobilized led to the ease with which 
political and business leaders reactivated them for the 2007 
post-election violence. Secondly, the increasing personalization of 
power around the presidency continues to be a factor in facilitating 
election related violence. 
 
The widespread belief that the presidency brings advantages for the 
President's ethnic group makes communities willing to exert violence 
to attain and keep power. Inequalities and economic marginalization, 
often viewed in ethnogeographic terms, were also very much at play 
in the post-election violence in places like the slum areas of 
Nairobi. 
 
NAIROBI 00002366  002 OF 002 
 
 
 
One of the main findings of the Commission's investigations is that 
the postelection violence was spontaneous in some geographic areas 
and a result of planning and organization in other areas, often with 
the involvement of politicians and business leaders. Some areas 
witnessed a combination of the two forms of violence, where what 
started as a spontaneous violent reaction to the perceived rigging 
of elections later evolved into well organized and coordinated 
attacks on members of ethnic groups associated with the incumbent 
president or the PNU party. This happened where there was an 
expectation that violence was inevitable whatever the results of the 
elections. 
 
The report concludes that the post-election violence was more than a 
mere juxtaposition of citizens-to-citizens opportunistic assaults. 
These were systematic attacks on Kenyans based on their ethnicity 
and their political leanings. Attackers organized along ethnic 
lines, 
assembled considerable logistical means and traveled long distances 
to burn houses, maim, kill and sexually assault their occupants 
because these were of particular ethnic groups and political 
persuasion. Guilty by association was the guiding force behind 
deadly "revenge" attacks, with victims being identified not for what 
they did but for their ethnic association to other perpetrators. 
This free-for-all was made possible by the lawlessness stemming from 
an apparent collapse of state institutions and security forces. 
 
In general, the police were overwhelmed by the massive numbers of 
the attackers and the relatively effective coordination of the 
attacks. However, in most parts of the country affected by the 
violence, failure on the part of the Kenya Police and the Provincial 
Administration to act on intelligence and other early warning signs 
contributed to the escalation of the violence. 
 
The post-election violence is also the story of lack of preparedness 
of, and poor coordination among, different state security agencies. 
While the National Security Intelligence Service seemed to possess 
actionable intelligence on the likelihood of violence in many parts 
of the country, it was not clear whether and through which channel 
such intelligence was shared with operational security agencies. The 
effectiveness of the Kenya Police Service and the Administration 
Police was also negatively affected by the lack of clear policing 
operational procedures and by political expediency's adverse impact 
on 
their policing priorities. 
 
The report recommends concrete measures to improve performance and 
accountability of state security agencies and coordination within 
the state security mechanism, including strengthening joint 
operational preparedness arrangements; developing comprehensive 
operational review processes; merging the two police agencies; and 
establishing an Independent Police Complaints Authority. 
 
To break the cycle of impunity which is at the heart of the 
post-election violence, the report recommends the creation of a 
special tribunal with the mandate to prosecute crimes committed as a 
result of post-election violence. The tribunal will have an 
international component in the form of the presence of non-Kenyans 
on the senior investigations and prosecution staff. End Text. 
 
4. Post will continue to monitor closely public reaction to the 
report and government actions to implement it.   We are coordinating 
with resident diplomatic missions on a joint Heads of Mission 
statement of support for the CIPEV report and urging implementation 
of its recommendations. Post will transmit the contents of the 
statement septel. 
RANNEBERGER