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Viewing cable 08MANAGUA1327, UNDER PRESSURE, ORTEGA CHANGES TONE AND TACTICS IN

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08MANAGUA1327 2008-10-30 22:21 2011-06-23 08:00 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Managua
VZCZCXRO9537
PP RUEHLMC
DE RUEHMU #1327/01 3042221
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 302221Z OCT 08
FM AMEMBASSY MANAGUA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3311
INFO RUEHZA/WHA CENTRAL AMERICAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY
RUMIAAA/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEHLMC/MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE CORP WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MANAGUA 001327 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR WHA/CEN, DRL 
STATE PASS USAID FOR LAC 
NSC FOR FISK/GARCIA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/29/2018 
TAGS: PHUM PREL PGOV KDEM NU
SUBJECT: UNDER PRESSURE, ORTEGA CHANGES TONE AND TACTICS IN 
CAMPAIGN AGAINST NGOS 
 
REF: A. MANAGUA 1308 
     B. MANAGUA 1316 
 
Classified By: DCM Richard Sanders, reasons 1.4 (b,d) 
 
1. (C) Under sharp and growing international pressure over 
its campaign against civil society, the Ortega government 
appears to have made a decision to change its tone and 
tactics in the run-up to the November 9 municipal elections. 
The European Union, the U.S., the Carter Center, Friends of 
the Inter-American Democratic Charter and others have issued 
strong statements over the past two weeks denouncing the 
GON's campaign of investigations, raids and harassment of 
pro-democracy NGOs and its conduct in the pre-electoral 
environment.   Since these statements, criticism of NGOs in 
the semi-official media has dropped significantly.  In 
addition, on October 28, President Ortega, First Lady Rosario 
Murillo and other senior government officials attending a 
meeting with representatives of many NGOs (most pro-democracy 
groups stayed away) to pledge improved cooperation in the 
future and to stress that Nicaragua welcomes a role for civil 
society.  While the Ortega Government clearly continues to 
view NGOs as a threat, the events of the last few weeks 
indicate that international pressure may have some effect on 
the GON and allow Nicaraguan civil society a bit more space 
to operate.  End Summary. 
 
ORTEGA -- NGOS BENEFIT OUR COUNTRY 
----------------------------------- 
 
2. (U) In an October 28 event organized by Nicaragua's 
National Council for Social and Economic Planning (CONPES), 
President Daniel Ortega, First Lady Rosario Murillo, Minister 
of Government (MINGOB) Ana Isabel Morales, and Deputy Foreign 
Minister Valdrack Jaentschke met with selected 
representatives of NGOs working in Nicaragua.  CONPES is a 
pre-existing umbrella organization to funnel input from key 
sectors of Nicaraguan society into government policy.  Under 
Ortega it has become a vehicle to incorporate the Citizen 
Power Councils (CPCs) into the GON's social and economic 
sector activities.  At the meeting, Ortega appeared to be in 
a conciliatory mood, telling NGO leaders that in the current 
world economic crisis, "we should unite forces: the State, 
the CPCs, and NGOs."  Furthermore, he told the group "we all 
want the well-being of the people, of all Nicaraguans, 
without distinction for political ideology."  He stated that 
the Government should be thankful for the help it receives 
from NGOs.  He also directed MINGOB's Morales to "be more 
flexible" in its supervision of NGOs.  Despite the general 
conciliatory tone, Ortega also lashed out at foreign donors 
for imposing conditions on how donations and aid can be used 
and for trying to impose "a political order, an ideological 
order" via the aid they give to NGOs.  (Note: Ortega 
apparently may not be able to maintain this new attitude 
towards NGOs for very long.  Local media report that Ortega 
circulated a paper at the 18th Ibero-American Summit in El 
Salvador on October 30 in which he accused European 
Ambassadors in Managua of seeking to "destabilize" his 
government through their "illegal" support to certain NGOs. 
End Note.) 
 
3. (U) In the role of 'bad cop' to Ortega's 'good cop,' 
Deputy FM Jaentschke defended the GON's efforts to "impose 
order" over NGOs and foreign financing.  "When we came into 
power, we encountered disorder, a great disorder" in the 
oversight of NGOs and compliance with Nicaraguan law.  "There 
was too much discretion" and therefore there were abuses. 
Jaentschke announced that the GON, within the next two weeks, 
would issue a manual governing implementation of the laws on 
civil society and foreign financing.  While the new rules 
would not be "imposed" without consultation, Jaentschke 
promised those assembled that, in 2009, Nicaragua will have a 
system "more effective, more ordered, governing the flow of 
foreign finances to non-governmental organizations." 
 
4. (C) In organizing the event, the GON appeared to be 
picking and choosing NGOs to create a more docile audience 
and to divide the pro-democracy groups.  A leading health 
sector NGO that has been critical of the government was asked 
to provide a list of its board members.  Ultimately, the 
group was not formally invited but potentially sympathetic 
board members were.  The Institute for the Development of 
Democracy (IPADE), which has criticized the Ortega Government 
over its refusal to grant the organization permission to 
observe the municipal elections, was not invited, but its 
executive director, a former Sandinista, was.  An American 
humanitarian aid worker, who runs a series of faith-based 
humanitarian programs in the Leon and Matagalpa departments, 
told us on October 29 that his organization was invited but 
could not attend.  Others organizations with whom he works 
did send representatives who commented that Ortega was more 
conciliatory in tone and appeared to welcome NGO assistance, 
a change he suggested was driven by the international 
pressure. 
 
TURNING DOWN THE RHETORIC 
------------------------- 
 
5. (C) Since mid-August, the Ortega Government and the FSLN 
have waged a virulent media campaign via the semi-official 
media (Television Channel 4, Radio Ya, and the new weekly El 
19) against civil society groups and their leaders.  Morales, 
Jaentschke and other senior officials have publicly accused 
leading NGO leaders, such as press activist Carlos Fernando 
Chamorro and women's leader Sofia Montenegro (reftels) of 
being agents of the U.S., as well as attacking other 
prominent NGOs of being in the pay of the USG to 
"destabilize" the Ortega Government.  In the October 16 
edition of El 19, one article falsely claimed that a poloff 
who recently left post was an intelligence agent directing 
the activities of Sofia Montenegro and other women's movement 
leaders and provided explicit directions to her former 
residence.  Embassy sent a letter to the Foreign Ministry on 
October 17 protesting the article and reminding the GON of 
its Vienna Convention obligations to provide protection to 
diplomats.  Following the letter and the outpouring of 
international criticism over the GON's treatment of NGOs, 
there has been a noticeable drop in the use of these 
semi-official media outlets to criticize civil society groups. 
 
 
GOVERNMENT STILL "AT WAR" 
------------------------ 
 
6. (C) Marcus Carmona, executive director of the Nicaraguan 
Permanent Commission on Human Rights (CPDH), dismissed the 
meeting with the NGOs as a GON effort to "save face" with the 
international community without really changing its 
intentions.  "The reality is that Ortega has declared war on 
us" and won't be satisfied until "we are broken."  Carmona 
said he had been invited to the October 28 meeting, but did 
not attend "on principle."  The pressure against his 
organization, and other pro-democracy groups, continues but 
in a less public manner.  CPDH has been called to appear 
before the Prosecutor's office multiple times in connection 
with the investigation of the International Republican 
Institute (IRI) and the visit of former Mexican President 
Vincente Fox.  Furthermore, CPDH was called to appear before 
MINGOB to answer accusations that CPDH had violated a 
citizen's rights.  When CPDH appeared, there was no 
information to substantiate the charge, but CPDH was still 
required to present an array of documents regarding its 
current activities.  Furthermore, the case against CINCO, MAM 
and OXFAM (reftels) has caused a project between CPDH and 
OXFAM to be frozen and all documents related to the project 
were turned over by OXFAM to the Prosecutor's office. 
Carmona expects these documents will generate yet another 
round of investigation against his organization and possibly 
threaten his group's legal status. 
 
7. (C) Carmona believes that, in part, the pressure directed 
at NGOs is the result of the pro-democratic organizations 
working together more effectively over the last three months. 
 They have held joint demonstrations, coordinated 
get-out-the-vote efforts, aided each others investigations, 
and provided defense when attacked by the government.  "They 
know they must break us apart."  According to Carmona, the 
FSLN's weak standing in key municipal races, and their desire 
to force constitutional changes quickly after the elections, 
are also driving factors in the current pressure tactics 
against civil society. 

COMMENT 
-------- 
 
8. (C) The Ortega government continues to view civil society, 
particularly those groups which challenge its policies or 
which it cannot control, as threats to its short term goal of 
winning the November 9 municipal elections and to its longer 
term goal of consolidating and perpetuating Ortega's 
political power.  However, events of the last several weeks 
lead us to also believe that coordinated and direct pressure 
from the international community, especially with the U.S. 
and EU working in concert, can bring about a change in the 
GON's behavior.  While the change is modest at best, any 
extra breathing room that the international community can 
gain for Nicaragua's democratic civil society is welcome and 
needed. 
CALLAHAN