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Viewing cable 08KINSHASA838, Goma Report October 3: Belligerent

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08KINSHASA838 2008-10-03 16:05 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Kinshasa
VZCZCXRO8119
OO RUEHBZ RUEHDU RUEHGI RUEHJO RUEHMR RUEHRN
DE RUEHKI #0838/01 2771605
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 031605Z OCT 08
FM AMEMBASSY KINSHASA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8538
INFO RUEHXR/RWANDA COLLECTIVE
RUCNSAD/SOUTHERN AF DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY COLLECTIVE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RUZEJAA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KINSHASA 000838 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL MOPS KPKO PHUM PREF CG
SUBJECT:    Goma Report October 3:  Belligerent 
            Statements, Quiet Battlefield 
 
1.  (SBU) Summary:  North Kivu has had it fourth quiet day 
militarily October 3, even while Nkunda has called for national 
liberation, and FARDC claims an imminent CNDP attack, for which 
North Kivu brigade sees no evidence.  The little ceasefire augurs 
well, but the belligerent language augurs badly, for military or 
political dialogue.  End Summary. 
 
2.  (SBU) The ceasefire held on October 3, for the fourth straight 
day without any exchange of fire in any of the four sectors around 
the CNDP territory, nor any significant move of forces by either 
side observed by the North Kivu brigade.  However, FARDC's General 
Mayala warned North Kivu brigade commander Rawat on the morning of 
October 2 that FARDC had information that "CNDP was massing for a 
large offensive" against the newly-held FARDC position at Tongo, as 
well as near Rutshuru and Masisi, and that FARDC would have to react 
to "protect itself." 
 
3.  (SBU) Mayala made this warning before Nkunda's BBC interview, 
broadcast on the afternoon of October 2.  Mayala repeated it to 
Rawat October 3.  North Kivu brigade continues to observe no 
significant CNDP build-up.  Humanitarians who recently traveled 
through CNDP territory in Masisi and Rutshuru also did not notice 
signs of any military build up.  Rawat noted to poloff October 2 
that when either side speaks of imminent attacks by the other, such 
language often means it is about to attack the other.  Rawat said he 
was blunt with Mayala, that if FARDC commenced further attacks, 
North Kivu would leave FARDC entirely to its own fate and could 
expect no assistance from MONUC.  He also made it clear that FARDC's 
continued occupation of Tongo was an extremely serious violation of 
the disengagement plan and impediment to dialogue and that North 
Kivu brigade had confirmed that CNDP had withdrawn from both Kanombe 
and Himbi Height in the Rutshuru corridor. 
 
4.  (SBU) In Nkunda's telephonic interview with BBC October 2, 
Nkunda said that an extraordinary congress of the CNDP had occurred 
the previous day, which had decided that CNDP would transform itself 
from a movement of "revendications" (demands) to one of national 
liberation.  Reflecting recent CNDP statements, it characterized the 
Amani program as dead (citing in this case the change of government 
in Kinshasa).  BBC interpreted the interview to mean that CNDP had 
changed its name (to Mouvement de Liberation Totale du Congo, or 
Mouvement de Liberation Totale de la Republique). 
 
5.  (SBU) CNDP spokesman Bertrand Bisimwa affirmed to Deputy Eastern 
Coordinator M'hand Ladjouzi October 3 that CNDP had not changed its 
name, but only expanded its focus to national liberation.  There has 
been much speculation in Goma whether the interviewee really was 
Nkunda, as several francophones who had previously met Nkunda say 
the interviewee did not sound like Nkunda.  However, Bisimwa assured 
Ladjouzi that the interview was indeed with Nkunda.  It is not known 
where Nkunda was during the telephonic interview, nor where the 
claimed congress took place.  General Rawat personally helicoptered 
to Kirolirwe and Kitchanga on October 2 to investigate whether 
anyone there had recently detected Nkunda or any significant CNDP 
military or political movement, with nil evidence of either. 
 
6.  (SBU) Such pronouncements (Defense Minister Chikez and even 
Father Malu Malu have also made unhelpful statements) send a chill 
over efforts of the previous days to coax both sides toward 
dialogue.  General Etumba, in separate conversations with Ladjouzi 
and EU representative Dumont before departing to Kinshasa September 
30, had seemed convinced that there was no military solution and 
amenable to conducting talks on the disengagement plan with CNDP. 
In several telephonic contacts with CNDP (variously, Abandi, 
Bisimwa, Muiti, and Kambasu), Ladjouzi had communicated FARDC's 
desire to have dialogue.  CNDP had given Ladjouzi a positive, if 
noncommittal, response.  British representative Pravda had also 
apprised CNDP of the arrival October 4 of EU Special Envoy van de 
Geer and his desire to meet Nkunda (with of course no response yet 
from Nkunda). 
 
7.  (SBU) Meanwhile, for the first time since the Task Force of the 
Joint Monitoring Group began its weekly meetings in Goma last 
December, the Rwandan delegation called poloff on the evening of 
October 2 (before the scheduled meeting October 3) to say that it 
could not come to Goma due to insecurity.  (It also cited lack of 
progress in combating FDLR.)  In fact, Goma is quiet, and the 
Rwandan delegation was willing to come in previous weeks when the 
situation in Goma was much more precarious.  The meeting has been 
rescheduled for October 4 across the border in Gisenyi.  More will 
follow in a separate cable. 
 
8.  (SBU) As part of MONUC's efforts to sensitize belligerents on 
the ground of the disengagement plan, francophone officers traveled 
to the western sector October 1 all the way to Kashuga (which on 
 
KINSHASA 00000838  002 OF 002 
 
 
August 28 was the furthest northwest point of CNDP control).  They 
found that CNDP was not present and that the officer in charge of a 
group calling itself "Mai Mai Mongol" was in fact FDLR.  They came 
to this conclusion, since the officer went on at some length, in 
Kinyarwanda, about the political claims of FDLR. (Note: There had 
been earlier varying reports that PARECO was in control, or that 
CNDP had regained control, of Kashuga.) 
 
BROCK