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Viewing cable 08KHARTOUM1588, CHD HOPES TO REDUCE HIJACKINGS IN DARFUR

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08KHARTOUM1588 2008-10-28 09:51 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Khartoum
VZCZCXRO6415
OO RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #1588/01 3020951
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 280951Z OCT 08
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2181
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 001588 
 
DEPT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, SE WILLIAMSON, AF/SPG, DRL 
NSC FOR PITTMAN AND HUDSON 
ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ASEC PGOV PREL KPKO SOCI AU UNSC SU
SUBJECT: CHD HOPES TO REDUCE HIJACKINGS IN DARFUR 
 
REF: A) KHARTOUM 1438 
 
1. (SBU) Summary: The Geneva-based Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue 
(CHD) is on track to restart negotiations to   improve humanitarian 
security by focusing on measures against vehicle hijackings.  Dennis 
McNamara told donors in Khartoum October 23 that CHD representatives 
intend to travel to Darfur for talks with rebel movements in late 
November.  He added that CHD has received guarantees from government 
officials that the GOS will d participate in full-blown humanitarian 
security workshops with Darfuri rebel movements in January/February. 
 Looking further afield, CHD's ambitions include restarting the 
moribund ceasefire commission and peace process.  CHD asked the 
diplomatic community for assistance in bringing these  efforts to 
fruition.  End Summary. 
 
2. (SBU)  In the short-term, CHD intends to create a "mechanism" to 
address vehicle hijackings, which CHD views as the key humanitarian 
problem in Darfur, and the first step towards achieving humanitarian 
security.  With support from the UN's Office of Coordination of 
Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), CHD's "mechanism" will seek to ensure 
accountability from rebels and armed militias by sequentially 
incorporating them into agreements to refrain from hijacking 
vehicles of humanitarian organizations, and by sharing information 
on hijackings with OCHA and other members of the monitoring 
mechanism to remove the rebels' plausible deniability of 
participating in hijacking vehicles.  McNamara addressed the concern 
that CHD's "mechanism" will end up creating another lethargic, 
bureaucratic body unable to solve problems quickly: "We are trying 
to keep this light - no bodies, no hearings, but practical 
agreements that reduce hijackings." 
 
3. (SBU) Following CHD's productive workshops in Geneva with JEM and 
SLA/Unity in July in which both pledged "full support for the 
efforts of the humanitarian organizations to assist the people of 
Darfur," McNamara announced plans for follow-on meetings with rebel 
groups in November.  McNamara predicts representatives from JEM, 
SLA/Unity and AbdulWahid will take part at yet-to-be-determined 
locations within rebel territory, but added that the participation 
of SLA/Minni Minnawi (MM) remained a question mark.  McNamara did 
not describe Minnawi as reticent to engage in the talks, but said 
instead that his standing as a GOS representative supercedes his 
participation as a leader of an active rebel movement in Darfur. 
McNamara acknowledged that in areas of Darfur controlled by SLA/MM, 
there would be a need for "something special" shaped specifically 
for SLA/MM, given the fact that   "Minnawi's people have been 
running loose in some areas with no real control."  Antoine Gerard 
of OCHA requested the U.S. Embassy's assistance in contacting SLA/MM 
leaders on the ground with whom CHD could engage. 
 
4. (SBU)  McNamara was cautiously optimistic that the NCP would 
support CHD's initiative on increasing humanitarian security.  He 
said that the notorious Adbul Rahman Hasabo, Commissioner of the 
Humanitarian Affairs Commission (HAC), had given it his informal 
blessing and has promised the participation of NISS, HAC, the 
Department of Military Intelligence, and the governors of the three 
states of Darfur when CHD returns in January for further 
negotiations.  McNamara asked Khartoum's diplomatic community for 
support: "Some discrete political backing might be useful - we need 
friends who can weigh in." 
 
5.  (SBU)  On October 22, Theo Murphy of CHD told poloffs that as 
CHD slowly builds a consensus on humanitarian security, it also 
continues to look at how humanitarian needs can provide the 
foundation for a peace process in Darfur.  Murphy stated that CHD 
has recently explored the possibility of establishing "the 
humanitarian equivalent of the ceasefire commission."  Murphy stated 
that this commission would be composed of representatives from 
UNAMID, the GoS, and non-signatory rebel movements (JEM, SLA/Unity, 
and SLA/Abdul Wahid.)  Murphy acknowledged that UNAMID may be 
reluctant to establish such a body, "as it does not have the 
necessary helicopters, nor the prerequisite ceasefire needed for 
such work."  Murphy believes, however, that even if it lacks the 
capacity to  thoroughly investigate and  monitor , the international 
community should still form such a body and use the best available 
information at hand to monitor humanitarian access and security. 
Murphy hoped that, at the very least, CHD's initiative will spark a 
discussion on restarting the ceasefire commission. 
 
6. (SBU) Comment: CHD's ambitious goals and perpetual optimism are 
commendable but most likely very unrealistic.  We find it highly 
unlikely that the noxious Hasabo (who has routinely obstructed INGO 
work over the last two years) of the HAC will be cooperative, for 
example.  Nevertheless, a pragmatic plan to start small with 
humanitarian access and vehicle hijackings, and then move towards 
the larger goal of a humanitarian ceasefire, deserves at least 
 
KHARTOUM 00001588  002 OF 002 
 
 
notional support.  Post will encourage this effort in our meetings 
with regime officials, and we will also encourage Minawi to 
participate fully.  It is certainly true that the areas nominally 
under his control are some of the most insecure in the Darfur 
region.  We fear rather that the regime hopes to use this process 
perhaps as a convenient club to beat rebel groups over the head, 
distracting attention from its own frequent actions hostile to 
humanitarian access. 
 
FERNANDEZ