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Viewing cable 08KHARTOUM1582, MACHAR PROPOSES TO WAIT OUT LRA'S KONY

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08KHARTOUM1582 2008-10-27 10:27 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Khartoum
VZCZCXRO5456
OO RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #1582 3011027
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 271027Z OCT 08
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2174
RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA
UNCLAS KHARTOUM 001582 
 
DEPT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, SE WILLIAMSON, AF/SPG 
NSC FOR PITTMAN AND HUDSON 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ASEC PGOV PREL KPKO SOCI AU UNSC SU
SUBJECT: MACHAR PROPOSES TO WAIT OUT LRA'S KONY 
 
1. (SBU) Summary: In an October 22 meeting with ConGen Juba, GOSS 
Vice President Riek Machar said that The Lord's Resistance Army 
leader Joseph Kony had stopped communicating with him, and that he 
would not try to talk to him  again until Kony reached out to him. 
Machar said he believes Kony is running short on supplies, and that 
all that is needed is to wait him out.  In the meantime, Machar 
believes the LRA is really the DRC's problem and not that of South 
Sudan.  Thinking out loud for a moment, Machar wondered if it might 
not be best to give Kony a one year deferment of the ICC warrants to 
induce him to sign a peace accord.  Machar then rejected his own 
musing, partly based on the fact that he thought it would send the 
wrong message to GNU President Omar al Bashir. End summary. 
 
2. (SBU) Machar told ConGen Juba that UN Special Envoy Joaquim 
Chisanno would be in Juba to meet with him to compare notes on LRA 
issues on October 28.  He said that LRA leader Joseph Kony had 
stopped communicating with both him and Chisanno, and that that they 
had essentially given up on trying to induce Kony to sign the Juba 
Peace Accord.  "We are now waiting for him to contact us; we are not 
going to try to contact him anymore," said Machar. 
 
3. (SBU) Machar said he has not given up on the LRA peace process, 
despite a lack of contact with Kony.  The food that was to have been 
delivered to Kony in September was, in the end, never sent, and Kony 
is running very short on supplies of all kinds.  "If he gets no help 
from outside sources, he's going to have to reach out to us again." 
Asked if he thought that Kony was being supplied by the NCP as a 
means of destabilizing the South, Machar said he did not think so 
because the logistics of getting things to Kony in the DRC are very 
difficult and would very likely be detected. 
 
4. (SBU) Asked if he was willing to consider military options 
against Kony, Machar (as he always does) demurred.  "It's Congo's 
and Uganda's problem right now.  Why risk Sudanese lives and provoke 
Kony into a fight when we can try to wait him out?  My first 
priority is to protect Sudanese lives.  Let Kony remain in Congo. 
Hunger will force him to reach out eventually.  I don't want a war 
we can avoid.  I've seen enough of that."  Machar said he believes 
that, strategically, if the DRC and Uganda go after Kony and Sudan 
stays out of it, then Sudan remains a door to peace that Kony can 
still open if he wants to do so.  Keeping options on the table was, 
he said, the best means to finding an end to the conflict. 
 
5. (SBU) Thinking out loud about options, Machar speculated that 
perhaps the UNSC ought to suspend the ICC indictments against Kony 
for a year to see if that would entice him into finally signing the 
peace accord.  Machar then rejected that option himself on the 
grounds that not only was it highly unlikely that the UNSC would do 
it, but also it would send the wrong message to GNU President 
Bashir. 
 
6. (SBU) Comment: It is interesting that Machar rejected the idea of 
suspending ICC warrants against Kony on the basis that it would send 
the wrong message to Bashir.  Machar obviously believes that ICC 
indictments against Bashir put pressure on the NCP, which Machar 
views as being useful.  Many in the SPLM (including Salva Kiir) fear 
that indictments could push Bashir into taking dangerous actions, 
such as suspending the National Assembly and ruling Sudan by decree, 
while others believe that it is at least partially bluffing. It is 
somewhat surprising that Machar, instead, favors a warrant as a 
means of pressuring the NCP.  There is a great deal of dark 
speculation in South Sudan that Machar himself is working in league 
with the NCP against GOSS President Kiir.  Favoring ICC indictments 
against Bashir would seem to argue that this is not at all the case, 
though Machar may actually benefit from instability in GNU, seeking 
perhaps to interpose himself as a guarantor of security in the oil 
producing Nuer majority regions of Unity and Upper Nile States. 
 
FERNANDEZ