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Viewing cable 08KHARTOUM1509, SE WILLIAMSON URGES BASSOLE TO BE PROACTIVE

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08KHARTOUM1509 2008-10-13 05:22 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Khartoum
VZCZCXRO4501
OO RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #1509 2870522
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 130522Z OCT 08
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2050
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA
UNCLAS KHARTOUM 001509 
 
DEPT FOR AF/SPG, A/S FRAZER, SE WILLIAMSON 
NSC FOR PITTMAN AND HUDSON 
ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ASEC PGOV PREL KPKO SOCI AU UNSC SU
SUBJECT: SE WILLIAMSON URGES BASSOLE TO BE PROACTIVE 
 
REF: KHARTOUM 1067 
 
1. (SBU) Summary: SE Williamson strongly urged Djibril Bassole to 
embrace his role as Chief Mediator and become proactive in engaging 
with key decision-makers in both the NCP and rebel movements, during 
a meeting in Khartoum October 8. He noted the likelihood for 
progress in Qatar is small and asked Bassole, who remains largely in 
listening mode, to use the discretion afforded by his role to 
explore and test new ideas between the two in a non-public setting. 
He cautioned Bassole not to allow the current window of opportunity 
to pass, and encouraged him to make use of resources that could 
strengthen his peace-making ability. End Summary. 
 
2. (SBU) Bassole, who had just come from a meeting with Presidential 
Advisor Dr. Nafie Ali Nafie, reported that Nafie has yet to respond 
to his September 16 letter urging GOS action in Darfur and told 
Bassole he was very partial on these issues. Bassole noted that the 
NCP was preparing to launch the Sudan People's Initiative on October 
16, and that he has been invited; he added that NCP officials said 
he "would be chief of the show". Bassole noted that during his 
meeting with Nafie, Nafie had stated that if they do not start 
talks, then they will not see progress on the ground. Bassole does 
not believe that the initiative will result in concrete proposals, 
but is optimistic that it will facilitate the exchange of ideas. 
"I've read the joint NCP-UMMA proposal, and the ideas presented are 
reasonable," he said, adding that he would likely use it as a 
framework for future negotiations. (Note: Bassole provide SE 
Williamson with an outline for a proposed framework. End Note.) He 
was less enthusiastic about the efforts of Qatar, which he 
characterized as lacking proper coordination. The fatal flaw of the 
Qatari initiative, he opined, is that it is grounded in efforts to 
invoke an Article 16 resolution at the UN Security Council: "The 
Qataris, the Arab League and the AU all made a mistake by focusing 
on Article 16." As a result, he thought the rebels were (rightly) 
suspicious. "JEM is not ready to go to Doha, and Abdul Wahid has 
serious reservations as well," he said. Nonetheless, Bassole stated 
that he planned to use the Qatari initiative to "try and make 
progress," though he provided scant detail on how he intended to do 
so. 
 
3. (SBU) SE Williamson thanked Bassole for his efforts and 
acknowledged the difficulty the Joint Mediator faced, but urged him 
to take a more proactive role in mediation. "We think you need to 
take control of the process" and pursue intensive shuttle diplomacy, 
he said, adding that too much time had been wasted in periodic 
meetings. While the launching of the Sudan People's Initiative on 
October 16 will create a "public spectacle," Williamson urged 
Bassole not to wait for this initiative and continue his mediation. 
He stressed that the Joint Mediator is in a unique position to 
provide leadership and facilitation for this process. He urged 
Bassole to maximize the discretion afforded by his role, his lack of 
any previous baggage on the issues, and the full support afforded 
him by the international community.  By doing so, Bassole could 
actively reach out to NCP-decision-makers as well as to the full 
spectrum of rebel movements to explore and test ideas in a 
non-public setting. SE Williamson also encouraged Bassole to make 
use of resources that could strengthen his ability to mediate, such 
as the Center for Humanitarian Dialogue, which hosted discussions 
between SLA/Unity and JEM in Geneva on greater security for 
humanitarian operations in Darfur (Reftel). He offered to help 
Bassole secure such resources, adding that "no one wants you to 
succeed more than the United States." He urged Bassole not to let 
the window of opportunity pass. SE Wililamson closed by saying the 
United States will support whatever the Chief Mediator does, but 
said the U.S. does not care about the "theatre."  He urged Bassole 
to leverage his unique position to provide leadership to end the 
conflict in Darfur. 
 
4. (SBU) Comment: Almost three months into the job (but 
newly-arrived on the scene fulltime in Sudan,) Bassole has shown 
determination, but to date, no great sense of urgency in mediating 
the peace process. It is clear he is eager to take advantage of the 
current dynamic created by the possibility of an ICC warrant and the 
regime's need to show progress in the search for peace in Darfur. 
Getting the rebels to the table will be exceptionally difficult. If 
Bassole is to have any chance of success in achieving the latter, he 
will need (and be willing to accept) assistance from the U.S., UK, 
France and others. 
 
5. (U) SE Williamson cleared this cable prior to transmission. 
 
ASQUINO