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Viewing cable 08JAKARTA1940, Bracing for Longer-Term Fall-Out from the Financial

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08JAKARTA1940 2008-10-21 03:18 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Jakarta
VZCZCXRO0152
PP RUEHCHI RUEHDT RUEHHM RUEHNH
DE RUEHJA #1940/01 2950318
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 210318Z OCT 08
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0366
INFO RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC PRIORITY
RUCPDOC/USDOC WASHDC 1540
RUCNASE/ASEAN MEMBER COLLECTIVE
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 2622
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 5508
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 3176
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 5025
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 JAKARTA 001940 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR EAP/MTS, EAP/EP, EEB/IFD/OMA, E 
TREASURY FOR M.NUGENT AND T.RAND 
COMMERCE FOR 4430 BERLINGUETTE/KELLY 
DEPARTMENT PASS FEDERAL RESERVE SAN FRANCISCO FOR CURRAN 
DEPARTMENT PASS EXIM BANK 
SINGAPORE FOR S. BAKER 
TOKYO FOR MGREWE 
USDA/FAS/OA YOST, MILLER, JACKSON 
USDA/FAS/OCRA CRIKER, HIGGISTON, RADLER 
USDA/FAS/OGA CHAUDRY, DWYER 
USTR WEISEL, EHLERS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: EFIN ECON ETRD EINV ID
 
SUBJECT:  Bracing for Longer-Term Fall-Out from the Financial 
Crisis 
 
1. (SBU) SUMMARY:  Indonesian financial officials and private-sector 
economists are bracing for longer-term negative impacts of the 
current global financial crisis.  The Yudhoyono administration 
continues to take comprehensive action designed to minimize the 
impacts of the crisis on the real economy, including a new 
regulation establishing a Financial System Safety Net to establish a 
legal basis for government and Bank Indonesia (BI) officials to 
provide emergency financing facilities during a financial crisis. 
Separately, a possible government attempt to bail out the Bakrie 
Group may undercut the very market confidence the government is 
attempting to build (see septel).  The risk that a serious economic 
slowdown will result in a current account deficit that will 
negatively impact capital flows and put pressure on the currency 
remains the key concern of both the government and the private 
business sector.  One observer noted, only half-jokingly, that 
Indonesia must now compete for needed capital with the newest 
emerging market -- the United States.  END SUMMARY. 
 
ENGAGING WITH INDONESIAN "MODERNIZERS" ON 
FINANCIAL MARKET TURMOIL 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
2. (U) At an October 15 discussion convened by the Indonesian 
"Modernisator" reform organization on the impact of the financial 
crisis, the main message was the same:  Indonesia would not be able 
to avoid the fall-out from the current global financial crisis, 
especially since the crisis coincides with a significant drop in the 
prices of many of Indonesia's main commodity exports.  However, 
Indonesia may be able to limit negative impacts by avoiding panic in 
the financial sector, maintaining a sound budget, embracing good 
policies to attract greater investment and deepening the domestic 
bond market. 
 
3. (U) One speaker, Dr. Raden Pardede, Chairman of Indonesia's 
Financial System Stability Forum, provided a sharp critique of the 
"new financial system" and financial innovations which contributed 
to the U.S. financial crisis by providing the wrong incentives, 
including short-term bonuses and golden parachutes.  He argued that 
implicit credit subsidies had distorted the sub-prime mortgage 
market and encouraged speculative greed/mania, and that loose 
monetary policy and lax supervision allowed the problem to grow.  He 
noted that the U.S. housing market correction and the resulting 
liquidity crunch, with massive deleveraging and fear/panic in 
international markets, will impact Indonesia by lowering growth due 
to reduced exports, increasing competition for and raising the costs 
of credit as capital moves away from emerging markets into "safe 
havens", and reducing prospects for obtaining capital through 
initial public offerings and bond issuances.  These developments are 
likely to lead to current account and balance of payments pressures 
which would weigh on exchange rates and constrain monetary policy. 
 
4. (U) Pardede briefed on the many steps the Indonesian government 
had already taken to respond to the crisis and outlined remaining 
tools in its arsenal, including possible interest rate cuts and 
capital injections into the banking system.  Pardede characterized 
international efforts to date as lacking in sufficient leadership. 
He said the next steps to the crisis will include counter-cyclical 
fiscal policy, balancing growth and stability, improving household 
balance sheets, creation of a new regulatory regime to limit 
leverage and off-balance sheet accounting and to strengthen 
supervision.  Lessons for the future included the need to act 
decisively and avoid denial.  On the last point, he cited favorably 
approaches taken by Sweden and the U.K. vs. approaches taken by 
Japan and the U.S. 
 
5. (U) Dr. Chatib Basri, Director of the Institute for Social and 
Economic Research and government advisor, expressed his hope that 
"bad times will make good policies."  He urged Indonesia to improve 
its investment climate to attract additional foreign direct 
 
JAKARTA 00001940  002 OF 002 
 
 
investment and to begin to address supply constraints such as 
critical infrastructure development. 
 
6. (U) Purbaya Yudi Sadewa, Head of Danareksa Research Institute, 
provided additional insights into the contractionary effects of the 
government account, which rose to over IDR 200 trillion in BI in 
August 2008 due to slow budget disbursement and significant revenue 
over-performance.  He advised that Danareksa's Early Warning System, 
which includes leading economic indicators and confidence levels, 
showed slowing domestic demand and forecast an economic slowdown, 
although not a sharp one.  He noted that eroded purchasing power, 
higher interest rates due to monetary tightening, and tighter 
liquidity were contributing to a slowdown in the domestic economy. 
 
 
ECONOMIST VIEWS:  BOND AND CURRENCY MARKETS MATTER MOST 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
7. (SBU) In a separate conversation, Basri told Embassy on October 
14 that the Indonesian government remains most concerned about 
developments in the bond and currency markets.  Government officials 
are closely monitoring the government bond market as increased risk 
aversion has weighed on the prices of emerging market bonds, driving 
up the costs of financing budget deficits.  (Note:  In the past 
year, the yield on Indonesia's benchmark ten-year government bond 
has increased by more than 600 basis points.)  According to Basri, 
the government recognizes developments in the stock market will be 
largely driven by the private sector, although the government can 
boost demand at the margin for shares by encouraging share-backs. 
 
NEW FINANCIAL SYSTEM SAFETY NET:  BID TO 
PREVENT REPEAT OF BI LIQUIDITY SCANDAL 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
8. (SBU) Although the Yudhoyono administration had sought 
legislation to provide a legal umbrella for government and Bank 
Indonesia officials to act to prevent or manage a financial crisis, 
current market conditions and the anticipated lengthy process for 
securing passage of financial system legislation prompted SBY to 
issue a regulation (Perpu #4/2008) in lieu of legislation on October 
15.  The regulation provides guidelines and mechanisms for extending 
liquidity or injecting capital into banks or non-bank financial 
institutions of systemic importance; authorizes the government to 
provide funds from the state budget (with agreement from the 
parliament) or from issuance of State Treasury notes; establishes a 
Financial System Stability Committee, consisting of the Finance 
Minister and Bank Indonesia Bank governor, to ensure coordination; 
authorizes Bank Indonesia to take management control of banks 
receiving liquidity assistance; and authorizes provision of fiscal 
and/or administrative incentives to encourage financially sound 
firms to take over unsound financial institutions, thereby 
minimizing costs to the state. 
 
9. (SBU) The business community, which had advocated for a clear 
legal basis authorizing officials to take needed action in the event 
of a financial crisis, welcomed issuance of the new regulation.  It 
is intended to prevent a repeat of the misuse of Bank Indonesia 
Liquidity Assistance provided in the wake of the Asian Financial 
Crisis, which has led (thus far) to the prosecution of at least one 
former Bank Indonesia governor and several other BI officials. 
 
HUME