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Viewing cable 08DARESSALAAM647, TANZANIA BY-ELECTION: CHIEFS OF MISSION SEE CALM IN TARIME

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08DARESSALAAM647 2008-10-08 13:59 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Dar Es Salaam
VZCZCXRO2265
RR RUEHBZ RUEHDU RUEHJO RUEHMR RUEHRN
DE RUEHDR #0647/01 2821359
ZNR UUUUU ZZH ZDK CITE RUEHLG SVC
R 081359Z OCT 08
FM AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 7940
INFO RUCNSAD/SOUTHERN AF DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY COLLECTIVE
RUEHNR/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI 1014
RUEHKM/AMEMBASSY KAMPALA 3202
RUEHLGB/AMEMBASSY KIGALI 1133
RUEHJB/AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA 2695
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 DAR ES SALAAM 000647 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958:  N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL TZ
SUBJECT: TANZANIA BY-ELECTION: CHIEFS OF MISSION SEE CALM IN TARIME 
 
REFS: A) DAR ES SALAAM 635, B) FOX-LIDDLE e-mail dated 08OCT08 
 
DAR ES SAL 00000647  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
1. (U) SUMMARY & INTRODUCTION:  CDA and three heads of Diplomatic 
missions visited Tarime district to discuss the upcoming by-election 
with all concerned.  The playing field is tilted towards the ruling 
CCM party, but not grossly so.  Police presence is much greater than 
during the 2005 national elections.  The police appear to have a 
pro-ruling party bias.  However, the main opposition party in the 
district won its seat in parliament with 58 percent of the vote in 
2005.  Moreover, local ethnic Kurya people are well known for not 
being easily intimidated.  It is likely to be a close race.  END 
SUMMARY & INTRODUCTION. 
 
Our Delegation & Who We Talked to: 
2. (U) While we had hoped to arrange a more representative group of 
Heads of Mission, last minute dropouts left only the Canadian and 
British High Commissioners, the Swedish Ambassador and the American 
CDA.  We spent 48 hours in the district (3-5 October). 
3. (U) On the Government of Tanzania side, we met with the District 
Commissioner, Regional Commissioner, Returning Officer (senior 
National Electoral Commission official in the district), Commander 
of the Police Special Operations (Dar es Salaam-based) and the 
Police Officer Commanding District (senior local police official). 
 
4. (U) We met with the Chadema parliamentary candidate and had a 
briefing from Chadema election officials (with media present). 
Chadema, the second largest opposition party nationally, is the 
largest party in the district, has a slim majority in the local 
district council and is defending the parliamentary seat (see ref 
a). 
5. (U) We met with the CCM (national ruling party) parliamentary 
candidate, the CCM council candidate and a senior national-level CCM 
member (who is also a prominent local businessman and our 
hotelier). 
6. (U) Finally, we met with 30-plus residents of a remote rural 
community who freely and vocally shared their views on the campaign 
and the issues that matter to them. 
What We Learned: 
7. (SBU) All our interlocutors referred to the incidents of violence 
over the past several weeks (stone throwing, provocative language 
and gestures, i.e. burning of campaign material, dressing a dog in a 
CCM T-shirt, etc.) but suggested that calm had now been restored. 
The evening following our departure violence escalated again. Police 
reportedly used tear gas to break up a throng of Chadema supporters 
and arrested the Chadema candidates, among others.  They were later 
released on bail. 
8. (SBU) All our interlocutors made reference to the underlying 
propensity to violence and inter-clan rivalry amongst the Kuria as a 
contributing factor.  As noted in reftel and unanimously confirmed 
locally, the Kurya/Kuria clans feud over land, cattle, the marijuana 
trade and other grievances whether or not there is a political 
campaign afoot.  The clans of the two major contestants are solidly 
behind their "sons," but the other clans are divided in their 
sympathies. None of the Kuria will be easily intimidated. 
9.  (SBU) During our 48 hour visit, Tarime appeared calm.  We saw no 
acts of violence. Many of our interlocutors commented on the 
increased police presence.  The group of villagers we spoke with 
noted that they were uneasy when the police arrived in force.  They 
questioned why they never see such police numbers when clan fighting 
breaks out or during the last national campaign.  However, they went 
on to say that over time they became comfortable with the presence 
as they were largely left alone. 
Issues: 
10. (SBU) Chadema's main concern was their view that the police were 
not acting impartially and were quick to arrest and detain Chadema 
supporters and act on the complaints of the CCM but not on 
complaints filed by Chadema (see ref email attachment).  "Our 
complaints are always 'under investigation' with no follow up," they 
lamented.  A key concern was the alleged arrest and detention of two 
Chadema supporters who had been kidnapped, taken to the forest, 
beaten and stripped (allegedly by CCM supporters). On reporting to 
the police station, instead of being treated as victims, they were 
arrested and detained for the dog and t-shirt incident.  They 
believed that no action was taken to arrest the perpetrators whom 
they had named. While we had no way of ascertaining the truth of 
these allegations, the perception of police neutrality will be an 
important element in maintaining peace throughout the election 
period.  (All observers agreed as to the outline of the story, but 
CCM leaders insisted that the incident was Chadema-on-Chadema 
violence.)  Chadema expressed concern that they had submitted 
written complaints on all incidents to date to the Returning 
Officer, with copies to NEC HQ, but had not yet received a response 
and were concerned that no action was being taken. 
11. (SBU) Police advised that they were being criticized by both 
sides, but sought to reassure us that they were working fairly, 
impartially and in accordance with the law. In some cases police 
could make immediate arrests because they witnessed the offense.  In 
 
DAR ES SAL 00000647  002 OF 002 
 
 
other cases alleged offenses needed to be investigated. The local 
police commander told us that supporters of several parties, 
including CCM, had been arrested and charged for acts of violence 
but that everything had been brought under control. 
12. (SBU) The Returning Officer and the police provided slightly 
different information on allegations of buying of voter registration 
cards. The Returning Officer advised that the allegations had been 
investigated and were determined to be unfounded, while the police 
told us they were still under investigation.  The villagers told us 
that while all parties were attempting to buy voter registration 
cards, it was mainly CCM. We were impressed by the villagers' 
determination to use their right to vote even though they were 
critical of both CCM and Chadema for not delivering on their lavish 
campaign promises. 
Comment:  Worth the Trip; Likely to be a Close Race 
 
13. (SBU) This trip garnered considerable positive broadcast and 
print coverage, including a political cartoon (in possession of 
AF/E/Tanzania desk).  Our mission was accomplished.  Tanzanian 
officials are aware that we are closely following events.  They are 
also aware that several missions will send (NEC-accredited) 
observers to the district for the final day of the campaign and the 
election itself.  Our visit was immediately preceded by and followed 
by violence, but our presence contributed to the calm that reigned 
in Tarime for 48 hours. 
 
14. (SBU)   The race in Tarime is likely to be close, 
notwithstanding a playing field tilted somewhat towards CCM. 
Although Chadema won 58 percent of the parliamentary vote in 2005 
with the charismatic Chacha Wangwe, his would-be successor lacks 
charisma.  Moreover, Chadema is fractured over suspicions that their 
late MP was done in by one of their own.  Most of his family members 
have left the party.  CCM, using its significant financial 
resources, is bringing the weight of its ministers and senior-most 
party leaders to bear on the district.  Chadema's national 
leadership has campaigned locally, but has not maintained a 
long-term presence.  However, CCM in Tarime is reportedly divided 
into two rival factions.  One is backing the council and 
parliamentary candidates.  The other is backing Chadema ("CCM by 
day, Chadema by night") as payback against their CCM rival. 
ANDR