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Viewing cable 08BUENOSAIRES1398, Argentina Structures Modest Development Bank on Brazil

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08BUENOSAIRES1398 2008-10-09 20:30 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Buenos Aires
VZCZCXYZ0009
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHBU #1398/01 2832030
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 092030Z OCT 08
FM AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 2219
RUCNMER/MERCOSUR COLLECTIVE
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RUEHRC/DEPT OF AGRICULTURE WASHINGTON DC
UNCLAS BUENOS AIRES 001398 
 
SIPDIS 
SENSITIVE 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ECON EFIN ETRD EINV AR
SUBJECT: Argentina Structures Modest Development Bank on Brazil 
BNDES Model 
 
Ref:  Sao Paulo 522 
      Buenos Aires 1374 
 
------- 
Summary 
------- 
 
1. (SBU) Former Economy Minister Miguel Peirano is now working to 
transform Argentina's state-owned Bank for Commerce and External 
Trade (BICE) into a development bank on the model of Brazil's BNDES. 
 He argues that countries with such unstable economic and financial 
histories as Argentina and Brazil need state development bank 
institutions to provide the kinds of long-term infrastructure 
finance that would otherwise be unavailable from private sector 
sources.  Peirano is seeking substantial new capital and long-term 
loan financing in the US$500 - $600 million range from regional 
development bank CAF and from the IDB, but does not see BICE growing 
into the sort of behemoth that BNDES has become.  Nor does he see 
BICE challenging the hegemony of Argentina's two major state-owned 
lending banks, Banco de la Nacion and Banco de la Provincia de 
Buenos Aires.  Instead, BICE will focus on "cautious" long-term 
lending of 8-10 year money to Argentine private and public sector 
projects, primarily through other Argentine banks to use their 
management, credit analysis resources, and branch networks as force 
multipliers.  Peirano called "pragmatic" the GoA's establishment of 
Coordinating Table to organize GoA-wide management of currency, 
trade, budget, and debt policies in response to the international 
financial crisis.  A long-time promoter of building and protecting 
Argentina's industrial capacity, Peirano favors a "competitive" 
Argentine currency in the face of recent devaluations of the 
Brazilian real.  End Summary. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
Former Economy Minister to Build Development Bank 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
2. (SBU) In an October 7 meeting with Ambassador, former Economy 
Minister and current Banco de Inversion y Comercio Exterior (BICE) 
President Miguel Peirano reviewed his efforts to transform this 
little known state-owned entity into a substantial development bank 
that will help meet Argentine industry's need for long term 
capital. 
 
3. (SBU) BICE is a public entity created in 1991 with a mandate to 
finance productive investment, infrastructure and trade.  Under 
Argentine financial regulation, it is "second-story" financial 
entity, authorized to conduct all commercial banking activities with 
the exception of taking deposits.  It finances its longer-term 
lending via issues of debt securities and credit lines from other 
banks and IFIs.  BICE is currently a small player in Argentina's 
financial system: with total assets (as of May 2008) of +/- US$ 500 
million, it holds only 0.5% of total financial system assets. 
Peirano highlighted that BICE holds one of the lowest loan 
delinquency rates in the Argentine banking system. 
 
4. (SBU) Peirano outlined ambitious plans to substantially boost 
BICE's domestic profile by seeking substantial new capital and long 
term loan financing in the US$500 - $600 million range.  He plans to 
seek the funding mainly from regional development bank CAF 
(Corporacion Andina de Fomento) and the Inter-American Development 
Bank (IDB).  The Development Bank of China, Peirano noted, had just 
provided BICE with US$ 35 million in unconditioned long-term funding 
(10-year at Libor) for on-lending to Argentine companies. 
 
--------------------------------------- 
Molding Development Bank on BNDES Model 
--------------------------------------- 
 
5. (SBU) Peirano hopes to build BICE into an Argentine development 
bank on the Brazilian Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimiento (BNDES) 
model.  He recalled that President Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner 
and Brazilian President Lula da Silva had signed agreements during 
September meetings in Buenos Aires that called for joint financing 
of bilateral integration projects.  Following this accord, Peirano 
said he met with his BNDES counterpart to set up regional 
integration project financing working groups. 
 
6. (SBU) Countries with such unstable economic and financial 
histories such as Argentina and Brazil need state development bank 
institutions to provide the kinds of long term infrastructure 
finance that would otherwise be unavailable from private sector 
sources, Periano said.  Given their very short term deposit base, he 
said, private Argentine banks are only willing to lend out 3-4 
years, an inadequate tenor to support investment in new plant and 
capital equipment. 
 
7. (SBU) Peirano does not see BICE growing into the sort of behemoth 
that BNDES has become - he noted that BNDES had extended over US$50 
 
billion in credits over the past year. (Ref A notes BNDES disbursed 
a full 17% of total credits in Brazil in 2007, 40% for 
infrastructure projects, and 30% for private sector manufacturing 
and industrial projects.)  Nor does Peirano see BICE challenging the 
hegemony of Argentina's two major state-owned lending banks, Banco 
de la Nacion (federally owned) and Banco de la Provincia de Buenos 
Aires (provincially owned), which together account for 35% of system 
deposits and 20% of total lending in Argentina.  Instead, he said, 
BICE will focus on "cautious" long-term lending of 8-10 year money 
to support Argentine private and public sector infrastructure and 
industrial development projects. 
 
8. (SBU) Peirano plans to do this primarily through other Argentine 
banks, in order to use their management, credit analysis resources, 
and branch networks as force multipliers.  "Reasonable" interest 
rates would be subsidized by retained earnings.  In answer to 
Ambassador's questions on lessons learned from the failure of 
Argentina's earlier development bank BANADE (Banca Nacional de 
Desarrollo), Peirano agreed that asset concentration and corruption 
were contributing factors to BANADE's demise. (BANADE, created in 
1970, was liquidated in 1993 due to solvency and financial problems. 
 BANADE was implicated in corruption scandals and had a portfolio of 
unpaid loans in judicial process for ARP 5.7 billion, of which a 
full 60% were concentrated in only 20 companies.  In October 2005, 
Banade was finally closed via a resolution from then-Economy 
Minister Lavagna.) 
 
-------------------------------------------- 
Peirano on GoA's Financial Crisis Management 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
9. (SBU) Peirano called "pragmatic" the GoA's move to establish an 
inter-agency "Coordinating Table" chaired by Chief of Cabinet Sergio 
Massa.  The group, to include senior Economy Ministry, Central Bank, 
and financial sector regulatory officials, will organize GoA-wide 
management of currency, trade, budget, and debt policies in response 
to the international financial crisis.  "Better a coordinating table 
than a crisis committee, no?" he quipped.  Peirano made clear he 
favored a "competitive" Argentine currency in the face of recent 
devaluations of the Brazilian real (Ref B).  He called China's huge 
trade and capital flows a "threat" to global markets and called for 
a new global financial regulatory system to monitor and control 
potentially destabilizing capital flows. 
 
10. (SBU)  Finally, Peirano noted his warm relations with the U.S. 
Embassy, first as Industries Secretary, later as Economy Minister 
and currently as BICE President.  "Argentina has got to stay close 
to the United States and Brazil - I've always said this." 
 
----------------------------------- 
Peirano Background and Bio Material 
----------------------------------- 
 
11. (SBU) Miguel Peirano was appointed to head BICE (Banco de 
Inversisn y Comercio Exterior) in April 2008.  Prior to that he 
served as Minster of Economy from July - December 2007, elevated 
from his Secretary of Industry post to replace the scandal-weakened 
Felicia Miceli.  Analysts agreed that Peirano was selected for the 
Minister position as a loyal, non-controversial placeholder to see 
the Kirchner administration through to October 2007 elections and to 
signal continuity of the GoA's signature economic policy formula 
that promotes consumption-led growth (via price controls and 
subsidies) and protects job-creating industrial development (via 
"administered" trade and a "competitive" undervalued currency).  In 
a cabinet increasingly riven by factional strife between Planning 
Minister De Vido and then-Chief of Cabinet Fernandez, Peirano was 
reportedly on good terms with all key inner-circle players, 
including De Vido, Fernandez, Presidential Legal Secretary Zannini, 
and Central Bank Governor Redrado.  Although initially touted as the 
lead candidate for Economy Minister in the follow-on a Cristina 
Fernandez de Kirchner administration, Peirano resigned in December 
2007 after publicly battling with Internal Commerce Secretary 
Guillermo Moreno over control of Argentine national statistics 
agency INDEC. 
 
12. (SBU) As Economy Minister, Peirano retained the majority of the 
Economy Ministry's appointed lieutenants and publicly affirmed key 
GoA economic policy tenets.  He called widely questioned lowball 
official inflation statistics "credible," the energy crisis 
"manageable," and protection of Argentina's growing industrial base 
"fundamental" to the nation's welfare.  Young (43), single, and a 
reputed workaholic, Perano shares a strong industrial policy bias 
with Planning Minister De Vido.  He was previously well known to the 
Embassy's Economic Section from his tenure as the Economy Ministry's 
Industry Secretary, where his mandate was to promote the rapid 
growth and consolidation of Argentina's industrial base by shielding 
it from international competition via a hard line on WTO Doha NAMA 
trade negotiations and by policing a series of "voluntary" private 
 
sector and otherwise managed trade agreements with Mercosur 
neighbors.  In discussions with EconCouns, Peirano's points were: 
(1) Argentina requires a diverse and deep industrial base to 
increase domestic value-added and decrease Argentina's dependence on 
primary commodity (primarily agricultural) exports; (2) current high 
global commodity prices are a probably transient phenomena to be 
enjoyed and exploited via high export tariffs on primary commodity 
exports.  These windfall revenues are providing the GoA the 
wherewithal to provide targeted subsidies to develop this industry. 
These subsidies, including domestic energy prices well below world 
market levels, combine with a dedicated policy to maintain 
Argentina's currency.  A strong industrial base, in Peirano's view, 
is the key to improving the terms of trade that will see middle 
income Argentina increase its wealth base to eventually graduate 
into the ranks of developed nations. 
 
13. (SBU) Prior to entering the Ministry in 2003 under ex-Economy 
Minister Roberto Lavagna, Peirano served as an economic advisor to 
the powerful Argentine Industrial Union (UIA), whose senior 
membership -- a "who's who" of Argentina's industrial oligarchy -- 
celebrated his ascension.  While at UIA, Peirano also worked as an 
advisor to the chamber of footwear (1996-1999) and the chamber of 
wood products (1999-2001).  Peirano has advised the Banco de la 
Provincia de Buenos Aires Board (1999-2001), the City of Buenos 
Aires Government's Directorate of Industry (1997-1998) and the 
Buenos Aires City Business Association (1998-2000).  After 
graduating with honors in Economics in the early 1990s from the 
Universidad Nacional de Buenos Aires (UBA), he worked on financial 
issues at Techint International for two years. 
WAYNE