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Viewing cable 08BRASILIA1356, BRAZIL: SCENESETTER FOR OCTOBER 16-17 VISIT OF
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| Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 08BRASILIA1356 | 2008-10-10 20:47 | 2011-07-11 00:00 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Brasilia |
VZCZCXRO4064
PP RUEHRG
DE RUEHBR #1356/01 2842047
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 102047Z OCT 08
FM AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2652
INFO RUEHAC/AMEMBASSY ASUNCION 7143
RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA 4766
RUEHBU/AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES 5876
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 4274
RUEHPE/AMEMBASSY LIMA 4005
RUEHMN/AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO 7564
RUEHZP/AMEMBASSY PANAMA 0308
RUEHQT/AMEMBASSY QUITO 2634
RUEHSG/AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO 0659
RUEHRG/AMCONSUL RECIFE 8583
RUEHRI/AMCONSUL RIO DE JANEIRO 6748
RUEHSO/AMCONSUL SAO PAULO 2910
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 10 BRASILIA 001356
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/10/2018
TAGS: PREL BR
SUBJECT: BRAZIL: SCENESETTER FOR OCTOBER 16-17 VISIT OF
UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS WILLIAM J.
BURNS
REF: A. BRASILIA 1265
¶B. BRASILIA 1267
¶C. BRASILIA 1301
¶D. BRASILIA 572
¶E. BRASILIA 645
¶F. BRASILIA 1314
¶G. BRASILIA 1315
Classified By: Ambassador Clifford M. Sobel, reasons 1.4(b) and (d).
¶1. (C) Summary: The relationship between the United States
and Brazil is as productive and broad-based as it as ever
been, the result of the excellent relationship between
President Bush and President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva, new
cooperation mechanisms on biofuels, the CEO Forum, racial
integration, and economic matters, and our shared goals of
fostering hemispheric stability, promoting democracy, and
achieving a mutually satisfactory conclusion to the Doha
round of WTO negotiations in the near term. Your visit comes
in the midst of an intense time of bilateral activity, with
senior-level visits occurring during October across the range
of our mutual interests. Although this activity is evidence
of the success we have achieved in strengthening U.S.-Brazil
cooperation, it continues to be uneven, limited by resistance
to closer U.S. ties in some areas of the Ministry of External
Relations (MRE, or Itamaraty) and among some senior GoB
officials. The GoB's unwillingness to speak out against
anti-democratic actions in the hemisphere (Venezuela and
Cuba), take proactive steps to address key issues such as
nuclear proliferation and counterterrorism concerns, and
expand its international leadership in meaningful ways also
reduces the effectiveness of our relationship.
¶2. (C) Senior Brazilian officials are watching the U.S.
election and transition to a new administration with concern
that the momentum built over the last several years continue
(see refs A and B on recent meetings with Senator Chuck
Hagel). Your visit will be welcomed as an opportunity to
review key bilateral matters (including energy and security
cooperation), regional issues (the crisis in Bolivia,
transition in Cuba, Haiti peacekeeping, regional integration,
and the upcoming Summit of the Americas), and global concerns
(the global financial crisis, Iran, the Middle East Peace
Process, energy security, and United Nations reform) with an
eye toward maintaining and expanding the bilateral
relationship following U.S. elections. End Summary.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Lula Popular, But What Comes Next?
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
¶3. (C) With a nearly 80 percent approval rating, President
Lula is more popular than at any other point since he took
office in 2003. Continuity and legacy are the guiding lights
of Lula's second term. Lula continues to shape his legacy as
a friend of the poor and builder of a foundation for
prosperity for the lower and middle classes through broad
social welfare programs and a vast, new economic growth
program of public works and growth incentives. At the same
time, Lula has failed to promote needed reforms to abolish a
political culture of corruption, clientelism, and spoils.
Although a seemingly endless series of corruption scandals
has not dented his personal popularity or that of his
government, these scandals have felled political allies,
including cabinet ministers, in recent years.
¶4. (C) Lula is concerned with finding an electable successor
for 2010, and appears to be grooming his top domestic policy
adviser, Minister Dilma Rousseff, while keeping other options
open. Attention in the media and among the political elite
is already focused on the race, and persistent public worries
about chronic unaddressed domestic problems such as public
safety,
health care, and unemployment could defeat Lula's goal of
installing his chosen successor; the
opposition governor of Sao Paulo state and former
presidential candidate, Jose Serra, currently leads the pack
of possible presidential candidates. His position appears to
have been strengthened in the first round of country-wide
BRASILIA 00001356 002 OF 010
municipal elections held on October 5, and will be
strengthened further if the candidate he is backing for Sao
Paulo mayor wins in the second round election on October 26.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
An Emerging Global Economic and Energy Power House
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
¶5. (U) President Lula and his economic team,s prudent fiscal
and monetary policies and reform
efforts are a major reason for his popularity, and have
resulted in Brazil,s position as the
tenth largest economy in the world, with a trade surplus and
BB credit rating. Annual
GDP growth was 5.4 percent for 2007, and inflation
approximately 4 percent. Buoyed by exports
and investment inflows, Brazil's currency, the real, has been
strong, although it has recently
been weakened by the global financial crisis. The United
States is Brazil's top trading
partner and China has just moved in position as number two.
Brazil is both an investor
overseas and a destination for foreign direct investment, as
well as being both an assistance
donor and recipient. There are major structural challenges
to long term growth.
Real interest rates are among the highest in the world. The
informal sector constitutes an
estimated 40 percent of the economy, in part due to the tax
burden (approximately 37 percent
of GDP), one of the highest among large developing economies.
Brazil,s opaque and onerous
regulatory and legal system, as well as poor transport and
other infrastructure, continue to
constrain growth.
¶6. (SBU) Brazil's leadership in development and use of
biofuels and the recent discovery of potentially massive
offshore reserves of oil and gas have made Brazil, in a
relatively short period of time, into a potentially major
player on the global energy scene. Brazil's newfound energy
prowess, along with the success thus far of its economic
policies, is contributing to its growing confidence as a
global player. President Lula has invited President Bush to
attend an international biofuels conference that he will host
in Sao Paulo November 17-21 as a means to further enhance
leadership in that field. The new off-shore deepwater oil
reserves (known as pre-salt) are publicly estimated to
contain between 50-100 billion barrels of oil equivalent,
though some highly-placed insiders tell us they believe these
estimates may be the lower limit of the newly discovered
resources. The Lula government has great expectations for
the revenue that will eventually be gained through exploiting
these new areas, talking of a "Marshall Fund8 for education
and social projects, while other commentators advocate
military investment or infrastructure development. The GOB
is also planning major investments to support the industry
including development of ports and refineries ) all of which
represent opportunities for U.S. commercial interests.
Although industry observers caution that the technological
challenges involved with ultra-deepwater drilling are
extensive, meaning that developments will probably be slow in
coming, the oil discoveries could put Brazil within the top
ten oil countries by reserves.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Foreign Policy: Not Seeing Eye to Eye
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
¶7. (C) Although in many ways pragmatic, the Lula
administration harbors a strong leftist ideology on foreign
policy that has resulted in actively favoring South-South
relationships over those with the United States and Europe.
Coupled with Itamaraty's historic reticence to take
controversial positions and almost obsessive concern with
"even-handedness," this often leads Brazil to take positions
on key issues that we find disappointing. Continuing,
specific areas of disagreement, some of them significant,
will not be easily resolved in the short term.
BRASILIA 00001356 003 OF 010
-- Iran: Although careful to comply with UNSC sanctions,
Brazil does not seem to see Iran as as a serious threat.
Instead, the GoB is determined to maintain and even increase
ties with Iran, both for commercial reasons and because it
sees Iran as an independent, up-and-coming power in the
Middle East. GoB officials insist that Brazil is a friend
of both the United States and Iran, and they have been
reluctant to criticize Iran for flouting the international
community in its nuclear pursuits. President Lula has made
clear that he intends to visit Iran, probably in early 2009.
-- Middle East Peace: Brazilian officials consider their seat
at the table in Annapolis as a foreign policy success and see
themselves as balanced in their dealings with Israel and the
Palestinians, but they have yet to define a substantive role
for Brazil. FM Amorim has suggested that Iran, Syria, Hamas,
and Hizbollah should be included in the negotiations, and GoB
officials are seeking to increase their engagement on the
issue. FM Amorim traveled to Israel and Palestine earlier
this year in preparation for a visit by President Lula,
probably around the Arab States-South America (ASSA) Summit
being hosted by Qatar in early 2009.
-- Cuba transition: Brazil continues to take a soft line on
the Cuba transition, refusing to raise in any significant way
the abuses that continue to occur. We have been told
repeatedly by senior GOB officials that they believe Cuban
leadership will opt for a "Vietnam" model of
transition, loosening economic control while maintaining
tight political control, rather than an "Eastern European"
model. The GoB has invited Cuba to participate in the
first-ever Latin America-Caribbean Summit that Brazil will
host in December (see para 9).
-- UNSC Reform: Attaining a permanent seat on the UN Security
Council has been a central tenet of Brazil's foreign policy
under Lula, and most of Brazil's actions on the international
stage are taken with that goal in mind. Brazil desperately
seeks U.S. support for its aspirations, and has been pleased
by comments by senior USG officials indicating that we see
Brazil as a viable candidate. However, Brazil has so far
largely failed to assume the international leadership role
that would make it a strong candidate for such a position.
Brazil's latest two-year stint on the UNSC, which ended in
January 2006, was characterized by caution and equivocation
rather than vision and leadership. The GoB has not yet used
its significant contribution to stability in Haiti as a step
along the road to becoming a champion of international peace
and security. Moreover, Brazil's single-minded focus has yet
to take into our broader interest in UN reform, an interest
which we need to discuss more fully with them.
-- Global Democracy, Peacekeeping, and Assistance
Initiatives: Brazil has joined the Partnership for Democratic
Governance and Community of Democracies, but has yet to take
action under these initiatives. Requests for assistance on
key global issues--peacekeeping in Darfur and assistance to
Afghanistan's army are two recent examples--have almost
without exception gone unanswered. Brazil often attends
donor conferences when asked, but generally does not respond
to requests to "cooperate" with countries outside the region
and the small group of Lusophone countries. (Note: Brazil
refuses to be classified officially as a "donor" that
provides "assistance," instead identifying such efforts as
"cooperation." End note.) Brazil has, however, warmed to
what it calls "trilateral cooperation," working together with
the United States and, separately, other donor countries on
discrete projects in third countries, especially other
Lusophone countries, as well as a few others in Africa,
Central America, and the Caribbean.
-- Trade and Climate Change: A significant exception to
Brazil's reticence has been in WTO Doha Round negotiations,
where Brazil has been a significant leader, and has opted to
focus on its own national interest in supporting a compromise
solution, despite the resistance of its Mercosul (Argentina)
and G-20 developing country partners (India and China).
Likewise, Brazil's significant interests in the climate
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change arena have led it to take a leadership role in
negotiations.
¶8. (C) Regionally, Lula has maintained Brazil's historic
focus on stability, seeing dialogue and good relations with
all parties as the best way to achieve this goal. As a
result, Brazil maintains an active dialogue with and refuses
to criticize human rights violations in Venezuela and Cuba,
has worked hard to restore and maintain relations with
Bolivia and Ecuador, even at the expense of its own economic
interests, and stood firmly on the principle of respect for
sovereignty, with no official mention of counterterrorism
concerns, in responding to the dispute between Colombia and
Ecuador. Brazilian interlocutors have made clear that
lobbying to secure Venezuelan entry into Mercosul is based on
political interest in containing Chavez, in full recognition
that Venezuela's membership will complicate internal and
external Mercosul trade negotiations.
¶9. (C) Brazil is driving the creation of new regional
integration processes, including the Union of South American
Nations (UNASUL), the South American Defense Council (SADC)
and, most recently, the summit of Latin American and
Caribbean nations that Brazil will host in Salvador, Bahia in
December (ref C). Although Brazil insists that these
groupings are not exclusionary, President Lula and other
senior officials have made statements suggesting that, at
least to some extent, they are intended to diminish U.S.
influence in the region. Cuba has been invited to
participate in the December LAC summit, while the United
States and Canada were not. The other 32 countries invited
are identical to those participating in the 2009 Summit of
the Americas. Brazil remains lukewarm regarding the Summit
of the Americas process.
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Improving Relationship, But Cooperation Remains Uneven
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¶10. (C) In general, Brazil's foreign policy is dominated by
symbolic steps to burnish its South-South and global
credentials rather than by resolute attention to core
political and economic interests, including strengthening
bilateral political and trade relations with its principal
trading partner, the United States. Nonetheless, although
the GOB continues to favor building ties with developing
nations over closer relations with the United States and
other developed nations, it pursues friendly relations with
us and considers the bilateral relationship to be a good and
improving one. The result has been uneven in terms of
concrete cooperation. While seeking to expand our bilateral
dialogue, the GoB has studiously avoided working closely with
us on broad strategic issues important to us. Itamaraty, in
particular, continues to be problematic, both because of its
insistence on controlling as much of the relationship as
possible, and because of nationalist and leftist elements
scattered throughout the bureaucracy, including some at high
levels who remain opposed to strengthening the relationship
with the United States.
¶11. (C) Those issues on which it has been willing to work
with us--biofuels, for example--are areas where the GoB
considers itself a visibly equal partner. The appointment of
Nelson Jobim as Defense Minister has brought new interest in
security cooperation, but it appears that in this area, as
with our efforts on counternarcotics, environmental
protection, counterterrorism, and other issues, MRE is
seeking to maintain its historic dominance over relations
between the USG and other Brazilian agencies. Itamaraty does
this by controlling the agenda and throwing up barriers that
delay and sometimes scuttle bilateral efforts that other
ministries support. Despite the challenges, we have had some
important successes in establishing greater cooperation, and
continue to seek new areas where the GOB is amenable to joint
action (refs D and E).
¶12. (SBU) Economic cooperation is the principal driver of our
cooperative agenda. We continue to seek opportunities for
positive bilateral cooperation through the mechanisms
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including the Economic Policy Dialogue (EPD), with the third
session planned in for October 30 in Brasilia. The EPD
provides an important opportunity to reinforce our view of
Brazil as partner in areas of mutual interest. Cooperation
to foster innovation and agricultural coordination, to
possibly include assistance to African countries, are new
topics of conversation bilaterally. Additionally, we have
been working to develop a regional infrastructure initiative.
This past summer we succeeded in reaching an agreement to
significantly civil aviation opportunities between our two
countries. We have been exploring one another,s regulatory
frameworks in hopes of addressing barriers and achieving a
Bilateral Tax Treaty and a Bilateral Investment Treaty.
¶13. (C) The bilateral CEO Forum, which met most recently on
October 9-10 in Sao Paulo, is proving to be a valuable
mechanism for addressing issues of common interest to our
business communities. The Forum has worked with the GoB and
USG to increase airline flights, including establishing new
connections direct from the United States to Northeast
Brazil; has helped reinvigorate the Bilateral Tax Treaty
talks; and has encouraged the two governments to find
solutions to long waiting periods for visas. At a lunch with
CEOs on Oct 10, President Lula was extremely supportive of
the forum and discussed the possibility of adding energy to
the agenda, which the CEOs were already planning.
¶14. (C) USAID has been reduced to a small program, especially
in comparison with the scale of assistance activities in the
1960,s. USAID has sought to leverage its limited funds to
promoting sustainable livelihoods through working on issues
such as health, the environment, and small and medium-sized
enterprises. Most recently, as a means of better leveraging
these scarce funds, USAID has initiated a public-private
partnership, Mais Unidos, to coordinate efforts of over 100
U.S. companies in Brazil in addressing the pressing needs in
Brazil's impoverished Northeast. As in other areas,
development cooperation faces significant hurdles. The
Brazilian Government's multi-billion dollar poverty
alleviation program -- Bolsa Familia -- receives technical
assistance from the World Bank and IDB, but USG budget
constraints and the fact that it is a cash transfer program
(albeit with conditions) keep us from actively cooperating
with the initiative. The GoB also rejected our flagship
regional environmental program, the Amazon Basin Cooperation
Initiative, out of concerns over regionalization of Amazon
management. The program has been transformed into a
bilateral activity.
¶15. (SBU) The Brazilian public has a mixed view of the United
States. Seventy-five percent say relations between Brazil
and the U.S. are very good or fairly good, and Brazilians by
a wide margin consider the U.S. the most important country in
the region for Brazil. Those who follow the news know that
U.S.-Brazil cooperation on trade issues has global importance
and new areas of cooperation such as biofuels are potentially
significant. There has been a much more positive view of
U.S.-Brazil cooperation since the signing of the biofuels MOU
last year. On the other hand, there is a good deal of
skepticism about U.S. foreign policy, particularly on issues
such as Iraq and Cuba. Resentment over the long wait times
for U.S. visa applications, a product of a spike in demand
without commensurate increases in staffing, has been
mitigated in the last six weeks by a country-wide consular
surge initiative. Brazilians have a high degree of interest
in the U.S. presidential election, which has generated almost
as much press coverage in Brazil as the municipal elections.
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Shared Interests: Regional and Global Security
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¶16. (C) Brazil established a Ministry of Defense (MOD) for
the first time in June 1999, uniting the three services
(Army, Navy, and Air Force) under a single minister. Nelson
Jobim became Minister last year when the disastrous crash of
a Brazilian airliner highlighted weaknesses in the civil
aviation system, which comes under MOD purview. At
President Lula,s direction, Jobim and Strategic Planning
Minister Roberto Unger spearheaded are spearheading a new
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defense strategy document to set an overall course on
security issues. While not yet published (due to interagency
disagreements on several points), it is widely reported that
the strategy will have three main elements: modernization of
the armed forces, revitalization of defense industries and
implementation of a new regime of national service. We
expect that an important result of the new strategy will be
an increase in funding devoted to national defense, which has
been under-resourced since the end of the military government
over twenty years ago. However, there are also certain to be
nationalist elements to the strategy, including a commitment
to build a nuclear submarine, which is difficult to justify
on strictly security grounds. Nonetheless, the resurgence of
importance of the Brazilian military presents a unique
opportunity to increase our bilateral cooperation and defense
partnership.
¶17. (C) The first potential watershed in achieving a more
robust defense relationship with Brazil will be the decision
on a next generation fighter aircraft. Boeing,s F18 Super
Hornet is a finalist along with the French Rafale and Swedish
Gripen. A decision will be made in March 2009, with a final
contract award in October of next year. It would be
difficult to overstate the significance of Brazil,s Air
Force committing to a U.S. aircraft as its primary fighter
for the next generation. Boeing,s proposal combines cutting
edge technology with a strong package of industrial
cooperation. While the Super Hornet is clearly Brazil,s
best option both because of its capabilities and the
advantages that interoperability with the U.S. military will
bring, it is currently perceived as an underdog in the
competition. This is because of effective disinformation
that has led most Brazilian decision makers to believe that
the U.S. will not transfer superior military technology to
Brazil. Several Cold War era denials of military items (e.g.
Harpoon missiles), recent headaches with commercial exporters
of military items (Honeywell gyros), and in particular
Brazil's inability to transfer the Super Tucano, a
Brazil-produced plane, to Venzuela all seem to reinforce this
perception. Your visit offers an opportunity to drive home
the point that the U.S. is offering the best product, the
best prospects for long term cooperation and support and is
committed to transfer of the applicable technologies.
¶18. (C) There are a number of areas with prospects for
cooperation, but progress has been slow. The bilateral
defense working group will meet for the first time in six
years in early. Although the Brazilians initially We are in
the process of pursuing information sharing agreements with
Brazilian military services -- potentially leading to a
GSOIA, although bureaucratic concerns have repeatedly caused
delays. We have been stalled on our Defense Cooperation
Agreement (DCA) for almost a year because of Itamaraty's
failure to take action and the MOD,s unwillingness to burn
political capital to push this. While this situation is
unlikely to change, the DCA is important for future
partnership, especially as it can shorten the process of
approval for various future cooperative activities. Brazil
has signed a large number of similar agreements this year, so
ours will not be a precedent and could be seen in the context
of normal friendly relations.
¶19. (SBU) The April announcement of the reactivation of the
Fourth Fleet caught Brazil by surprise and provoked much
negative commentary. Even some normally rational Brazilians
believe that the announcement, coming as it did almost
simultaneously with the discovery of more oil off the
Brazilian coast, could not have been a coincidence but was
somehow mysteriously related to the security of Brazil,s
oil. While Brazilian military leaders have said they
understand the reasons for the Fourth Fleet,s standup,
President Lula has recently stated again that it poses some
threat to Brazil. While Lula,s statement was pure domestic
politics and his advisors have assured us that he understands
the true nature and purpose of the Fourth Fleet, we need to
continue to remind Brazilian leaders that spreading such
inaccuracies is counter productive in terms of the
cooperative relationship we are trying to build. In a
similar vein, discoveries of oil off Brazil,s coast have
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been cited as justifications for increasing Brazil,s navy.
While the oil finds will almost certainly increase Brazil,s
future prosperity, we should seek to turn the strategic
dialogue in Brazil away from fantasies that another
country--potentially the United States--would try to seize
the oil fields to a productive discussion of energy security
and the importance of maintaining freedom of the seas.
Brazil,s more sensationalist press routinely covers
statements from environmentalists on preserving the
rainforest as though they were calls for invasion (presumably
by the United States).
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Shared Interests: Law Enforcement Cooperation
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¶20. (SBU) Bilateral work on law enforcement issues is a
highlight of the relationship, and a potential area for
increased cooperation, as public security is frequently cited
in opinion polls as the most pressing concern for Brazilians.
This concern reflects distressing crime statistics,
including a murder rate on the order of 25 per 100,000
people, over four times the murder rate in the United States
(5.7 per 100,000 in 2006). Newspapers earlier this year
trumpeted the headline that total homicides during the last
30 years are approaching the staggering figure of 1 million
(compared with a little over 500,000 for the U.S. in the same
time period). Since 1991, homicide trends in Brazil and the
United States have taken opposite courses: through 2006 the
number of homicides in the U.S. had dropped 31 percent, while
Brazil's rate increased 51 percent.
¶21. (SBU) The Resident Legal Advisor who arrived this year is
working in support of USG law enforcement agencies and the
political and economic sections to expand and intensify our
relations with the judiciary, prosecutors, and Brazilian law
enforcement. The Narcotics Affairs Section (NAS) recently
signed a new Letter of Agreement, which has allowed us to
move forward to expand cooperation on counternarcotics and
countercrime issues. New initiatives under this agreement
will seek to expand our Brazilian law enforcement
capabilities to stop the drug trade at air and seaports. The
new LOA will also expand our cooperation at the state level.
We plan to provide training and equipment to increase the
capabilities of local law enforcement to combat the growth of
organized crime in Brazil's major cities, as the same gangs
that are creating public security problems also control
trafficking and distribution of drugs.
¶22. (C) Cooperation on counterterrorism matters remains good
at the operational level, and we regularly obtain valuable
information from GoB sources on terrorism. The Lula
administration recently re-structured its intelligence
apparatus to beef up their counterterrorism focus, although
this has been stalled by a recent wiretapping scandal
involving Brazil's intelligence agency (refs F and G). The
senior policy levels of the GoB, however, have refused to
publicly endorse U.S. counterterrorism initiatives and, wary
of offending Brazil's large, prosperous and influential Arab
population, make every effort to downplay in public even the
possibility of terrorist fund-raising going on inside Brazil,
a situation exacerbated by their refusal to consider
Hizballah or HAMAS as terrorist organizations. The Lula
administration failed to introduce long-delayed draft
legislation outlawing terrorist-related activity, including
its financing.
¶23. (C) In the 1990s the governments of Argentina, Brazil,
and Paraguay established a mechanism, which the US joined in
2002 at their invitation, to address illicit activities in
the tri-border area (TBA) joining Foz de Iguacu in Brazil,
Ciudad del Este in Paraguay, and Puerto Iguazu in Argentina.
The TBA concentrates a range of organized criminal
activities, including arms and narcotics trafficking,
document fraud, money laundering, as well as the
manufacture and movement of contraband goods. A wide variety
of counterfeit goods, including cigarettes, CDs, DVDs, and
computer software, are moved from Asia into Paraguay and
transported primarily across the border into Brazil. The
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United States remains concerned that Hizballah and HAMAS are
raising funds in the TBA by participating in illicit
activities and soliciting donations from extremists within
the sizable Muslim communities in the region. The
effectiveness of this group is hampered by GoB denials of any
potential terrorist activity taking place in their territory.
Last year, the GOB rejected a USG suggestion to broaden the
scope of the 3 Plus 1 meeting beyond counterterrorism
cooperation in the TBA. The United States will host the next
meeting of the 3 Plus 1 group in spring 2009, giving us an
opportunity to reinvigorate this process.
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Shared Interests: Fighting Discrimination
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¶24. (SBU) During her visit in April, Secretary Rice signed a
bilateral Joint Action Plan to Eliminate Racial and Ethnic
Discrimination and Promote Equality (JAPER) with Brazilian
Minister of Racial Equality Edson Santos. On October 31, WHA
Assistant Secretary Shannon will lead the U.S. delegation to
the first meeting of the bilateral steering committee created
to supervise the JAPER. Comprising close to half of
Brazil,s population, over 90 million people, Afro-Brazilians
are widely discriminated against by the broader society.
Brazilians often reject the notion that discrimination is
widespread, both as a result of differing conceptions of race
from that generally accepted in the U.S.--officially, only
seven percent of Brazilians are considered
Afro-Brazilian--and because of the overlap of racial
discrimination with poverty. Nonetheless, there is
increasing recognition that discrimination is tarnishing
Brazil,s image as a modern, multi-racial, multi-ethnic
democracy. President Lula is personally committed to
tackling Brazil,s racism issue. He has appointed more
Afro-Brazilian members to his cabinet than any previous
president, named the first black justice to the Supreme
Federal Tribunal, and created the Cabinet-level position of
Special Secretariat for Policies to Promote Racial Equality
(SEPPIR).
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Shared Interests: Nuclear Non-Proliferation
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¶25. (C) Brazil has recently announced its intentions to
resurrect its long dormant civilian nuclear program. Brazil
does not currently have an active nuclear weapons program,
having voluntarily closed their program decades ago.
Although Brazil currently only has 2 plants operating in Rio
State, contributing just 2 percent to the electrical supply,
it has recently announced its intention to complete the third
planned reactor and build 4-8 new ones by 2014. The GOB has
expressed interest in working with the United States as they
move toward developing their nuclear sector. Brazil would
like to master uranium enrichment technology so that it can
convert its large uranium reserves into nuclear fuel. For
the time being, Brazil is looking at providing fuel for its
own reactors and building up a strategic reserve, though
sometime in the future it may be interested in exporting
nuclear fuel. Currently, Brazil turns to Canada and Europe
to process uranium into fuel.
¶26. (C) Brazil has not signed an IAEA Additional Protocol,
despite our continued urging that they do so, but neither
have they officially refused. The GoB is cautious about
taking an active role on non-proliferation and has
consistently refused to take a strong position against Iran's
nuclear efforts. Although the GoB has been careful to comply
fully with UN sanctions against Iran and has asserted the
importance of Iranian compliance with UN resolutions, the GOB
has also stressed Iran's right to develop nuclear energy for
peaceful purposes. Citing efforts with North Korea, the GoB
has made clear that it believes dialogue is the best option
to ensure Iran is not a threat to the global community. In
discussions on non-proliferation, GOB officials generally
stress the importance of pursuing disarmament at the same
time.
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Shared Interests: Biofuels Cooperation
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¶27. (SBU) Under Secretary for Economic Affairs Jeffery met
with his counterpart in Brasilia on October 3 for a meeting
of the bilateral Biofuels Steering Committee created by our
March 2007 Biofuels MOU. The initiative has provided the
groundwork for increasingly positive bilateral relations and
has produced some notable results, including a model for
biofuels standard regimes internationally, cooperative
efforts to aid Haiti, El Salvador, St. Kitts and Nevis, and
the Dominican Republic in developing their own ethanol
capacity. The GoB and USG are pursuing cooperative
scientific activities to develop the next generation of
biofuels. The October meeting achieved agreement to expand
third country cooperation to a new tranche of countries
(Guatemala, Guinea-Bissau, Honduras, Jamaica, and Senegal),
to be announced at the upcoming international biofuels
conference. The National Renewable Energy Laboratory and
Petrobras' CENPES lab have agreed to a MOU to coordinate
research on next generation technologies to be announced at
the November biofuels conference.
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Shared Interests: Global Financial Crisis
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¶28. (U) The fact that your trip coincides with the escalating
financial crisis means this will be an inescapable topic in
some of your meetings. In response to the financial crisis,
Brazil's Central Bank has partially reversed its hawkish
anti-inflationary policies by adding 13.2 billion reais to
the financial system in hopes of freeing up credit and has
indicated that future interest rate hikes are unlikely given
the diminishing threat of inflation due to a global slowdown
and falling commodity prices, though most observers expect to
see one last hike in interest rates at the end of October.
Brazil's Finance Minister continues to assert that Brazil is
well-positioned to weather the crisis. President Lula
continues to criticize the
United States publiclyfor a lack of financial regulation,
calling for a global regulatory body is needed to address the
situation. Lula has finally admitted that the Brazilian
economy may be adversely impacted by the crisis, drawing
widespread criticism for not having a real grasp on the
potential of the crisis. Although Brazilian markets have
taken a beating in recent days and the real has seen an
erosion of its strength from earlier this year, large
Brazilian companies are confident that they will weather the
storm, though there are worries about the effect of a
tightened credit market for smaller enterprises.
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Shared Interests: Reducing Visa Wait Times
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¶29. (U) The State Department has been working with the GoB to
resolve a growing problem caused by a near tripling in
non-immigrant visa loads over the last several years. With
support from CA and WHA, the Mission is in the midst of a
visa "surge" that has already brought wait times down
significantly from well over 100 days to more reasonable wait
times. The surge has garnered positive press and, with the
addition of six new consular positions, we expect to be able
to maintain wait periods at the new levels. In addition, we
have now reached agreement with Itamaraty on language for an
agreement that will allow us move toward a ten-year visa, one
of the top priorities for companies participating in the
bilateral CEO forum.
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Conclusion: A Partner in Need of Attention
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¶30. (C) The breadth and depth of relations between the United
States and Brazil have grown enormously in the past few
years, and Brazilian officials from the President down are
genuinely concerned that the next administration continue and
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build on the achievements we have made. Although cooperation
with Brazil is rarely easy to achieve, our successes
demonstrate what is possible, and Brazil's growing economic
and political clout on the global stage have increased the
value to U.S. interests of cultivating this partnership.
Your visit offers an opportunity to point Brazil in
directions that will make our relationship even more
productive, and will allow the senior Brazilian policymakers
and thinkers you meet an opportunity to brief us on what they
believe to be the most promising areas for cooperation in the
coming years.
SOBEL