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Viewing cable 08BOGOTA3728, GAINS OF POLICE REESTABLISHMENT PROGRAM JEOPARDIZED BY

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08BOGOTA3728 2008-10-09 21:17 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Bogota
VZCZCXYZ0009
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHBO #3728/01 2832117
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 092117Z OCT 08
FM AMEMBASSY BOGOTA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 5041
INFO RHEHOND/DIR ONDCP WASHINGTON DC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEABND/DEA HQS WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
RHMFISS/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL
UNCLAS BOGOTA 003728 
 
SIPDIS 
SENSITIVE 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR INL/LP 
DEPARTMENT FOR WHA/AND 
 
E.O. 12958:  N/A 
TAGS: SNAR PREL PGOV CO
SUBJECT:  GAINS OF POLICE REESTABLISHMENT PROGRAM JEOPARDIZED BY 
UNCERTAIN FUNDING 
 
------- 
SUMMARY 
------- 
1. (SBU) SUMMARY:  Since its inception six years ago, the 
Reestablishment of Police Presence in Conflictive Zones program has 
achieved impressive successes in restoring government control 
throughout rural Colombia.  This program has also begun to play a 
major role in other high-priority missions, including manual 
eradication security, narcotics interdiction and pursuit of high 
value narcoterrorist targets.  Sustained USG support remains a key 
enabler to this program.  However, the zeroing-out of USG support to 
this program in FY08, and an uncertain USG funding future, 
undermines ongoing efforts to gradually shift USG-GOC 
responsibilities as part of our sustainable nationalization strategy 
and places this program's continued success at risk.  END SUMMARY. 
 
-------------------------------------- 
Establishing Permanent Police Presence 
-------------------------------------- 
2. (SBU) Prior to the initiation of the Police Reestablishment 
program in 2002, there were 158 Colombian counties with no police 
presence, and many others in which the police presence amounted to 
little more than isolated outposts which were subject to frequent 
guerrilla attacks.  The Police Reestablishment program, which 
consists of both rural municipal police and mobile Carabinero 
squadrons (composed of 120-policemen each), has facilitated the 
return of a robust Colombian police presence to previously lawless 
conflictive zones.  In fact, in breaking a historical trend of more 
than a decade, insurgents have not successfully overrun any police 
base since 2006.  Today all of Colombia's 1099 municipalities are 
under GOC control and violence nationwide has plummeted.  This 
police presence has significantly decreased the freedom of movement 
of illegal armed groups in these rural zones and set the conditions 
for the safe arrival of follow-on GOC social services to meet the 
needs of citizens within these largely undeveloped areas. 
 
------------------------------- 
Putting Narcos on the Defensive 
------------------------------- 
3. (SBU) The Police Reestablishment program also plays an increasing 
role in GOC antinarcotics efforts.  After President Uribe initiated 
a national manual eradication campaign in 2006, the FARC retaliated 
by launching repetitive attacks and emplacing mines in the coca 
fields to drive off manual eradication workers.  In response, 
Carabinero squadrons were dispatched to help provide security for 
these civilian manual eradicators; today fully half of the total 
sixty-eight squadrons are engaged in this vital security mission. 
Carabinero squadrons have also taken the fight to narcoterrorist 
organizations in Colombia.  In 2008 alone, these squadrons seized 
over nine metric tons of cocaine, 7.5 metric tons of marijuana, 
destroyed 36 HcL and base laboratories, captured more than 1135 
weapons and over 300,000 rounds of ammunition.  Additionally, they 
captured a number of high level narcoterrorists, most recently alias 
"Memin" in September 2008, who was the leader of the Black Eagles 
(in Spanish, Aguilas Negras) criminal band and is currently facing 
extradition to the U.S.  Although these types of emerging missions 
were not part of the original Police Reestablishment charter, they 
reflect some of the beneficial by-products of this program. 
 
-------------------- 
Underfunding Success 
-------------------- 
4. (SBU) Sustained USG support to the Police Reestablishment program 
has been a key enabler to GOC efforts to develop this program so 
well and so quickly.  USG funding has totaled $91.6M USD since 2002, 
and averaged between $13M and $19M annually during fiscal years 
2004-2007.  This USG funding was essential to the expeditious 
equipping and training of the thousands of policemen in the program, 
as well as in providing continuous operational support.  In FY 2008, 
though, this USG funding was reduced to zero and since then NAS has 
attempted to stretch remaining program funds by reducing or 
eliminating several initiatives, such as the establishment of a long 
range communications network and base security upgrades.  Despite 
this reduced burn-rate, we anticipate our remaining Police 
Reestablishment program funds to be exhausted by late 2009. 
 
-------- 
Comment 
------- 
5. (SBU) COMMENT:  NAS efforts to transition costs from the USG to 
GOC as part of the sustainable nationalization process are 
contingent on a gradual shift of responsibilities over a multi-year 
 
period.  The unexpected zeroing-out of USG support to the Police 
Reestablishment program, particularly given its recent assumption of 
several additional - and costly - antinarcotics missions, 
complicates our ability to provide needed assistance today and 
jeopardizes our ability to ensure a gradual transition of 
responsibilities in the future.  In the absence of such a glide 
path, the potential for a major disruption to the program's rural 
security and antinarcotics missions is all but certain. 
 
6. (SBU) COMMENT (Continued):  The Police Reestablishment program 
has enabled the extension of the Rule of Law throughout rural 
Colombia and set the stage for social and economic development and 
the delivery of justice.  The expansion of the program into 
antinarcotics work is both important to the USG and a positive 
derivative of the program's original intent.  Future USG funding of 
this program will help ensure its continued success in all mission 
areas; the alternative would result in an unlikely GOC ability to 
single-handedly maintain the program at its current level of 
effectiveness.  END COMMENT. 
 
BROWNFIELD