Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 97115 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
ETRD EAGR ETTC EAID ECON EFIN ECIN EINV ELAB EAIR ENRG EPET EWWT ECPS EIND EMIN ELTN EC ETMIN EUC EZ ET ELECTIONS ENVR EU EUN EG EINT ER ECONOMICS ES EMS ENIV EEB EN ECE ECOSOC EK ENVIRONMENT EFIS EI EWT ENGRD ECPSN EXIM EIAD ERIN ECPC EDEV ENGY ECTRD EPA ESTH ECCT EINVECON ENGR ERTD EUR EAP EWWC ELTD EL EXIMOPIC EXTERNAL ETRDEC ESCAP ECO EGAD ELNT ECONOMIC ENV ETRN EIAR EUMEM ENRGPARMOTRASENVKGHGPGOVECONTSPLEAID EREL ECOM ECONETRDEAGRJA ETCC ETRG ECONOMY EMED ETR ENERG EITC EFINOECD EURM EENG ERA EXPORT ENRD ECONEINVETRDEFINELABETRDKTDBPGOVOPIC EGEN EBRD EVIN ETRAD ECOWAS EFTA ECONETRDBESPAR EGOVSY EPIN EID ECONENRG EDRC ESENV ETT EB ENER ELTNSNAR ECHEVARRIA ETRC EPIT EDUC ESA EFI ENRGY ESCI EE EAIDXMXAXBXFFR EETC ECIP EIAID EIVN EBEXP ESTN EING EGOV ETRA EPETEIND ELAN ETRDGK EAIDRW ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS EPEC ENVI ELN EAG EPCS EPRT EPTED ETRB EUM EAIDS EFIC EFINECONEAIDUNGAGM EAIDAR ESF EIDN ELAM EDU EV EAIDAF ECN EDA EXBS EINTECPS ENRGTRGYETRDBEXPBTIOSZ EPREL EAC EINVEFIN ETA EAGER EINDIR ECA ECLAC ELAP EITI EUCOM ECONEFINETRDPGOVEAGRPTERKTFNKCRMEAID EARG ELDIN EINVKSCA ENNP EFINECONCS EFINTS ECCP ETC EAIRASECCASCID EINN ETRP EAIDNI EFQ ECOQKPKO EGPHUM EBUD ECONEINVEFINPGOVIZ ENERGY ELB EINDETRD EMI ECONEFIN EIB EURN ETRDEINVTINTCS EIN EFIM ETIO ELAINE EMN EATO EWTR EIPR EINVETC ETTD ETDR EIQ ECONCS EPPD ENRGIZ EISL ESPINOSA ELEC EAIG ESLCO EUREM ENTG ERD EINVECONSENVCSJA EEPET EUNCH ECINECONCS ETRO ETRDECONWTOCS ECUN EFND EPECO EAIRECONRP ERGR ETRDPGOV ECPN ENRGMO EPWR EET EAIS EAGRE EDUARDO EAGRRP EAIDPHUMPRELUG EICN ECONQH EVN EGHG ELBR EINF EAIDHO EENV ETEX ERNG ED
KMDR KPAO KPKO KJUS KCRM KGHG KFRD KWMN KDEM KTFN KHIV KGIC KIDE KSCA KNNP KHUM KIPR KSUM KISL KIRF KCOR KRCM KPAL KWBG KN KS KOMC KSEP KFLU KPWR KTIA KSEO KMPI KHLS KICC KSTH KMCA KVPR KPRM KE KU KZ KFLO KSAF KTIP KTEX KBCT KOCI KOLY KOR KAWC KACT KUNR KTDB KSTC KLIG KSKN KNN KCFE KCIP KGHA KHDP KPOW KUNC KDRL KV KPREL KCRS KPOL KRVC KRIM KGIT KWIR KT KIRC KOMO KRFD KUWAIT KG KFIN KSCI KTFIN KFTN KGOV KPRV KSAC KGIV KCRIM KPIR KSOC KBIO KW KGLB KMWN KPO KFSC KSEAO KSTCPL KSI KPRP KREC KFPC KUNH KCSA KMRS KNDP KR KICCPUR KPPAO KCSY KTBT KCIS KNEP KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KNNB KGCC KINR KPOP KMFO KENV KNAR KVIR KDRG KDMR KFCE KNAO KDEN KGCN KICA KIMMITT KMCC KLFU KMSG KSEC KUM KCUL KMNP KSMT KCOM KOMCSG KSPR KPMI KRAD KIND KCRP KAUST KWAWC KTER KCHG KRDP KPAS KITA KTSC KPAOPREL KWGB KIRP KJUST KMIG KLAB KTFR KSEI KSTT KAPO KSTS KLSO KWNN KPOA KHSA KNPP KPAONZ KBTS KWWW KY KJRE KPAOKMDRKE KCRCM KSCS KWMNCI KESO KWUN KPLS KIIP KEDEM KPAOY KRIF KGICKS KREF KTRD KFRDSOCIRO KTAO KJU KWMNPHUMPRELKPAOZW KEN KO KNEI KEMR KKIV KEAI KWAC KRCIM KWCI KFIU KWIC KCORR KOMS KNNO KPAI KBWG KTTB KTBD KTIALG KILS KFEM KTDM KESS KNUC KPA KOMCCO KCEM KRCS KWBGSY KNPPIS KNNPMNUC KWN KERG KLTN KALM KCCP KSUMPHUM KREL KGH KLIP KTLA KAWK KWMM KVRP KVRC KAID KSLG KDEMK KX KIF KNPR KCFC KFTFN KTFM KPDD KCERS KMOC KDEMAF KMEPI KEMS KDRM KEPREL KBTR KEDU KNP KIRL KNNR KMPT KISLPINR KTPN KA KJUSTH KPIN KDEV KTDD KAKA KFRP KWNM KTSD KINL KJUSKUNR KWWMN KECF KWBC KPRO KVBL KOM KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KEDM KFLD KLPM KRGY KNNF KICR KIFR KM KWMNCS KAWS KLAP KPAK KDDG KCGC KID KNSD KMPF KPFO KDP KCMR KRMS KNPT KNNNP KTIAPARM KDTB KNUP KPGOV KNAP KNNC KUK KSRE KREISLER KIVP KQ KTIAEUN KPALAOIS KRM KISLAO KWM KFLOA
PHUM PINR PTER PGOV PREL PREF PL PM PHSA PE PARM PINS PK PUNE PO PALESTINIAN PU PBTS PROP PTBS POL POLI PA PGOVZI POLMIL POLITICAL PARTIES POLM PD POLITICS POLICY PAS PMIL PINT PNAT PV PKO PPOL PERSONS PING PBIO PH PETR PARMS PRES PCON PETERS PRELBR PT PLAB PP PAK PDEM PKPA PSOCI PF PLO PTERM PJUS PSOE PELOSI PROPERTY PGOVPREL PARP PRL PNIR PHUMKPAL PG PREZ PGIC PBOV PAO PKK PROV PHSAK PHUMPREL PROTECTION PGOVBL PSI PRELPK PGOVENRG PUM PRELKPKO PATTY PSOC PRIVATIZATION PRELSP PGOVEAIDUKNOSWGMHUCANLLHFRSPITNZ PMIG PREC PAIGH PROG PSHA PARK PETER POG PHUS PPREL PS PTERPREL PRELPGOV POV PKPO PGOVECON POUS PGOVPRELPHUMPREFSMIGELABEAIDKCRMKWMN PWBG PMAR PREM PAR PNR PRELPGOVEAIDECONEINVBEXPSCULOIIPBTIO PARMIR PGOVGM PHUH PARTM PN PRE PTE PY POLUN PPEL PDOV PGOVSOCI PIRF PGOVPM PBST PRELEVU PGOR PBTSRU PRM PRELKPAOIZ PGVO PERL PGOC PAGR PMIN PHUMR PVIP PPD PGV PRAM PINL PKPAL PTERE PGOF PINO PHAS PODC PRHUM PHUMA PREO PPA PEPFAR PGO PRGOV PAC PRESL PORG PKFK PEPR PRELP PREFA PNG PGOVPHUMKPAO PRELECON PINOCHET PFOR PGOVLO PHUMBA PRELC PREK PHUME PHJM POLINT PGOVPZ PGOVKCRM PGOVE PHALANAGE PARTY PECON PEACE PROCESS PLN PRELSW PAHO PEDRO PRELA PASS PPAO PGPV PNUM PCUL PGGV PSA PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA PGIV PRFE POGOV PEL PBT PAMQ PINF PSEPC POSTS PHUMPGOV PVOV PHSAPREL PROLIFERATION PENA PRELTBIOBA PIN PRELL PGOVPTER PHAM PHYTRP PTEL PTERPGOV PHARM PROTESTS PRELAF PKBL PRELKPAO PKNP PARMP PHUML PFOV PERM PUOS PRELGOV PHUMPTER PARAGRAPH PERURENA PBTSEWWT PCI PETROL PINSO PINSCE PQL PEREZ PBS

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 08BERN527, LIECHTENSTEIN DIALOGUE: THE FUTURE OF BANK SECRECY

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #08BERN527.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08BERN527 2008-10-10 14:44 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Bern
VZCZCXYZ0012
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHSW #0527/01 2841444
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 101444Z OCT 08 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY BERN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 5379
INFO RHMFIUU/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
UNCLAS BERN 000527 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ECON EFIN ETRD SZ
SUBJECT: LIECHTENSTEIN DIALOGUE: THE FUTURE OF BANK SECRECY 
 
1.  (U) Summary.  At the annual forum "Liechtenstein 
Dialogue," bankers and financial wealth management companies 
met in Liechtenstein to discuss private wealth management, 
and more particularly the future vision of a financial center 
built on banking secrecy.  While the panel speakers ranged 
from die-hard defenders of banking secrecy to a 
representative of OECD's Centre for Tax Policy, the local 
consensus revealed that 1) Liechtenstein and Switzerland's 
banking secrecy policies are needed to keep these small 
countries competitive and should not be eliminated due to 
fears of having secrecy "criminalized by voices overseas." 
However, modifications to the system, such as tax sharing 
information agreements, may be necessary to meet modern 
demands and an ever-evolving financial system; 2) 
Liechtenstein views the U.S. Department of Justice's case 
against its largest bank, LGT, as an investigation not just 
of one bank, but an affront to Liechtenstein's financial 
center policies and country's culture of privacy; and 3) 
Switzerland sees the similar investigation of UBS, its 
largest bank, as an individual bank specific case and not a 
reflection on Switzerland's banking policies. End Summary. 
 
------------------------------------------- 
BANKING SECRECY: NOT TO BE GIVEN UP LIGHTLY 
------------------------------------------- 
 
2. (U) At the annual forum "Liechtenstein Dialogue," bankers 
and financial wealth management companies met in 
Liechtenstein to discuss private wealth management, and more 
particularly the future vision of a financial center built on 
banking secrecy.  Both Switzerland and Liechtenstein's 
financial centers have come under increasing attacks over the 
last few years for abetting tax evaders and harboring illicit 
funds; the most notable case being the current U.S. 
Department of Justice investigation of LGT and UBS, 
Liechtenstein and Switzerland's largest banks, respectively, 
for assisting U.S. taxpayers with tax evasion. 
 
3. (U) While the panel speakers ranged from die-hard 
defenders of banking secrecy to a representative of OECD's 
Centre for Tax Policy, Swiss Bankers Association Chairman 
Pierre Mirabaud's comments, which received much applause, 
appeared to sum up local sentiment on banking secrecy. 
According to Mirabaud, bankers have enormous amounts of 
detailed information on their clients that fully justify 
client privacy.  He questioned whether banks should play the 
role of "tax collectors, spies, and police of the state."  He 
also noted that "secrecy is a competitive advantage" that is 
"clearly one factor in the success of (Liechtenstein and 
Swiss) banking."  If small countries have this competitive 
advantage, "why give it up?" 
 
4.  (U) UBS Board Member Jurg Zeltner supported Mirabaud by 
adding that secrecy should not be "played down" as it 
protects client privacy and that it should not be eliminated 
for fear of having secrecy "criminalized by voices overseas." 
 While Zeltner sympathized with the tax authority of the 
state, he also questioned whether UBS is co-responsible for 
tax evasion or fraud, and if, yes, where does the 
responsibility start and when should it override the 
protection of clients. 
 
5. (U) Despite this local pro-banking rhetoric in support of 
secrecy, all panelists agreed that banking secrecy alone was 
not the only advantage to their local financial centers. 
While the bankers were not yet willing to admit that more 
transparency is needed, they agreed that to lose secrecy 
would not mark the demise of their financial centers.  As one 
speaker noted, many other positives could be highlighted, 
such as political stability.  More importantly, there was a 
general understanding that banking secrecy needed to evolve 
along with financial systems.  For example, mechanisms, such 
as the tax information sharing agreement being negotiated 
between Liechtenstein and the U.S., were likely to provide 
the necessary state enforcement tools without fully breaching 
secrecy and client privacy. 
 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
LGT: REPRESENTING LIECHTENSTEIN'S BANKING SYSTEM 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
6.  (U) It became apparent from panel discussions that 
Liechtenstein views the U.S. Department of Justice's case 
against its largest bank, LGT, as an investigation not just 
of one bank, but an affront to Liechtenstein's financial 
center policies and the country's culture of privacy. 
According to Fritz Kaiser, Founder of Liechtenstein's Private 
Wealth Council, the investigation did not just call into 
question banking secrecy, but the country's culture of 
privacy.  Fritz noted third party information is always kept 
in confidence and that transparency challenges this 
fundamental ideal. He highlighted that Liechtenstein did not 
want an American or German culture that praises transparency 
over privacy rights. 
 
7.  (SBU) Urban Eberle, CEO of Bank Alpinum, took pains is 
assuring the DCM on the margins of the meetings that LGT was 
not operated like UBS, whose bankers intentionally skirted 
U.S. tax laws by aiding and abetting its U.S. clients through 
measures such as smuggling diamonds out of the U.S. in 
toothpaste.  Eberle said, "I would never smuggle anything to 
one of my clients" as if that was a measure of responsible 
banking practices.  Fritz defended Liechtenstein banking 
practices by commenting, "Liechtenstein is not the bad guy. 
Around the world big law firms stretched tax planning and 
used Liechtenstein and Switzerland." 
 
---------------------------------- 
UBS:  AN ANOMALY IN SWISS BANKING? 
---------------------------------- 
 
8.  (U) Switzerland, on the other hand, views, at least 
publicly, the similar investigation of UBS, its largest bank, 
as an individual bank specific case and not a reflection on 
Switzerland's banking policies. UBS Board Member Zeltner, 
although couching his comments with "I am not a UBS 
spokesperson", noted that "what has happened in the U.S. is a 
bilateral matter between the bank and the U.S. government and 
does not affect Swiss banking as a whole and it does not 
affect the Swiss as a government or financial center."  His 
statement received general agreement from the audience, which 
may be wishful thinking. 
 
9.  (SBU) Wishful thinking was very much in evidence at the 
two day event.  The first two speakers initially declined to 
field questions from the Luxembourg Ambassador on the current 
financial crisis.  When the Ambassador walked out in 
frustration after the first two sessions, the organizers 
quickly huddled, agreed to take those questions, and invited 
the Ambassador to rejoin the dialogue (all in front of the 
journalists also in attendance).  The mood remained 
optimistic: "despite the turmoil, there will be a tomorrow!" 
 
------- 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
9.  (SBU) Despite panelists providing both points of view on 
banking secrecy, the overall impression given by the banking 
industry audience was that secrecy should remain an advantage 
to Switzerland's and Liechtenstein's financial centers and 
that resistance must be weathered against U.S. and other 
European pressure to change for their "political whims." 
However, as US embassy Bern has often seen, there is a 
disconnect between the public dialogue and the reality of 
what the professionals and government representatives have 
actually accepted: in this case, modifications of banking 
secrecy through a tax information exchange agreement. 
CONEWAY