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Viewing cable 08ASMARA480, FRAUD SUMMARY - ASMARA

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08ASMARA480 2008-10-02 08:45 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Asmara
VZCZCXRO9950
PP RUEHROV
DE RUEHAE #0480/01 2760845
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 020845Z OCT 08 VOL ZDK DUE NUMEROUS SVCS
FM AMEMBASSY ASMARA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9923
RUEHPNH/NVC PORTSMOUTH NH 0321
INFO RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE
RUEHAD/AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI 0154
RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 0011
RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN 0069
RUEHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS 0229
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 0456
RUEHNY/AMEMBASSY OSLO 0214
RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA 0199
RUEHSA/AMEMBASSY PRETORIA 1439
RUEHRH/AMEMBASSY RIYADH 1308
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME 1763
RUEHYN/AMEMBASSY SANAA 1852
RUEHSM/AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM 0022
RUEHGA/AMCONSUL CALGARY 0028
RUEHTN/AMCONSUL CAPE TOWN 0048
RUEHDE/AMCONSUL DUBAI 0113
RUEHFT/AMCONSUL FRANKFURT 1345
RUEHIT/AMCONSUL ISTANBUL 0003
RUEHMIL/AMCONSUL MILAN 0040
RUEHNP/AMCONSUL NAPLES 0021
RUEHON/AMCONSUL TORONTO 0020
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 07 ASMARA 000480 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR AF/CA, AF/E, CA/FPP, CA/EX 
PASS TO INL/HSTC 
PASS TO KCC WILLIAMSBURG KY 
POSTS FOR FRAUD PREVENTION MANAGERS 
LONDON AND PARIS FOR AFRICA WATCHERS 
FRANKFURT FOR RCO 
 
E.O. 12958:  N/A 
TAGS: CVIS KFRD CPAS CMGT ASEC ER
SUBJECT:  FRAUD SUMMARY - ASMARA 
 
REFS:  A. Asmara 000346, B. Asmara 000204, C. 07 STATE 171211 
 
ASMARA 00000480  001.4 OF 007 
 
 
1.  (U) The following is a summary of fraud conditions in Asmara 
from April to September 2008.  Point of contact is Conoff Brian 
Shelbourn, shelbournbl@state.gov, 291-1-12-00-04. 
 
---------------------------- 
2.  (SBU) COUNTRY CONDITIONS 
---------------------------- 
 
The Government of the State of Eritrea's (GSE) economic policies led 
to increasing scarcity of basic goods and impoverishment of the 
people.  Employment prospects for the unemployed are virtually 
non-existent.  Of those employed, many work as draftees in the 
Eritrean national service which provides wa'e# barely a ste  !bove 
slave labor; $30 to $40 per month.  Basic commodities such as pasta 
and flour are strictly rationed and are sometimes unavailable due to 
restrictions on imports and the government's monopoly on possessing 
hard currency.  Propane, the basic cooking fuel, was unavailable for 
several weeks, leading to the use of kerosene (which was also 
unavailable for several weeks) and charcoal for heating food. 
President Isaias Afwerki recently stated that white bread and pasta 
are "luxuries."  In 2007 Eritrea's inflation rate was 25.6% and per 
capita GDP was only $220.  The GSE continues to press large numbers 
of citizens into long, undefined periods of military service. 
Disenchantment continues to build, especially among the young.  This 
has led to a massive illegal exodus across the borders of Sudan and 
Ethiopia, with as many as 2,000 leaving Eritrea illegally each 
month. 
 
Mandatory national service begins at the age of 17 for both boys and 
girls, and includes intensive mil)t!ry training.  W(ile the 
officially published maximum age is 40, in practice the term of 
national service currently extends up to 54 for men and 47 for 
women.  National service was originally intended to be only 18 
months, but currently has no end date; many individuals have been 
forced to work in national service for over a decade.  The GSE 
generally does not provide passports or exit visas to Eritreans who 
are not released from national service.  For these reasons, many 
parents seek any avenue to get their children out of the country 
prior to being conscripted, even at the risk of their own arrests. 
Those unable to obtain permission to leave Eritrea often illegally 
flee across the border to either Sudan or Ethiopia to escape the 
harsh conditions.  Many people with passports leave legally and do 
not return.  The desperation to leave Eritrea is felt at all levels 
of society. 
 
The consular section in Asmara has been closed to most visa services 
since January 2007, but (a# continued li-i$ed issuances for extreme 
humanitarian cases, adoptions, and for travel clearly in USG 
interests.  The section provides document intake services for 
Immigrant and Diversity visas, transfers cases to other posts upon 
request, and provides document verification services to other U.S. 
Embassies processing Eritrean applicants.  Post anticipates 
remaining closed for visa services for the immediate future, but 
continues to provide the full array of American Citizen Services. 
 
Eritrea has historically been considered a low to medium fraud 
country, with strong cultural inhibitions against fraudulent 
activities.  Due to deteriorating country conditions, however, 
Asmara is considered a medium fraud post, with potential to become 
 
ASMARA 00000480  002.4 OF 007 
 
 
high as profit-motivated fraud rings learn to take advantage of 
a population desperate to escape the GSE's oppressive policies. 
 
------------------- 
3.  (SBU) NIV FRAUD 
------------------- 
 
Post is not currently issuing NIVs in significant numbers.  The 
sole instance of fraud was misrepresentation during an interview 
by an LES sent to the U.S. by the Embassy for training.  Asmara 
is considered to be a medium fraud post for NIVs. 
 
Student visas - The University of Asmara provides reliable student 
record verification.  Posts interviewing Eritrean students should be 
aware that the University graduated its final class in 2007 and is 
no longer operating.  Eritrea currently has no accredited tertiary 
schools. 
 
Post received information during the reporting period that dozens of 
Eritreans purchased Turkish visas through the Turkish Embassy in 
Sana'a.  Although most of these visa recipients were reportedly 
using Turkey as a transit point for European Union (EU) countries, 
consular officers adjudicating NIVs for Eritreans should not 
consider visas to Turkey issued at the Turkish Embassy in Sana'a 
since May 2008 as an indication of legitimate international travel. 
 
Post also received reliable reports of at least 5 Eritreans who use 
false French or Belgian passports purchased in Dubai for travel from 
Asmara to the EU, where they claimed asylum upon arrival. 
 
----------------- 
4. (SBU) IV FRAUD 
----------------- 
 
Post is not currently issuing IVs in significant numbers and has not 
experienced fraud during the reporting period.  Asmara is considered 
to be a medium fraud post for IVs. 
 
Marriage fraud has always been a concern of the consular section due 
to the number of arranged marriages.  The fraud seen in Eritrea is 
typical of many other countries, except that it is neither highly 
organized nor sophisticated.  It tends to be fairly easy to detect, 
in that the Amcit in the relationship typically leaves Eritrea 
immediately after the wedding to file the petition and then 
maintains little or no contact until documentation is requested. 
Also, all weddings in Eritrea are grand affairs, with even 
impoverished families having elaborate ceremonies recorded on video. 
Any wedding not celebrated with an elaborate religious service or 
not having video documentation is highly suspect. 
 
------------------ 
5.  (SBU) DV FRAUD 
------------------ 
 
Post is not currently issuing DVs in significant numbers and 
has not experienced fraud during the reporting period. 
 
Forty percent of high school matriculation exam results for DV 
applicants sent to Asmara from other posts were fraudulent during 
the reporting period (see para 12).  Asmara is considered to be a 
medium fraud post for DVs. 
 
-------------------------------- 
 
ASMARA 00000480  003.4 OF 007 
 
 
6.  (SBU) ACS AND PASSPORT FRAUD 
-------------------------------- 
 
Post has experienced no cases of passport fraud during the reporting 
period. Asmara is considered to be a low fraud post for ACS and 
passports. 
 
Post notes a doubling of CRBA and passport applications during the 
reporting period compared to the same period in 2007.  Conoff's 
inquiries indicate the awareness level within the Eritrean diaspora 
regarding consular services hac increased.  Alco, non-resident 
fathers wish to have their Amcit children's U.S. passport in-hand 
should the economic or military situation in Eritrea deteriorate. 
 
Conoff remains vigilant in identifying passport/CRBA fraud 
indicators, and expects to see a future increase in fraudulent 
activity.  Eritrea's resident Amcit community is small and mostly 
static.  The majority of passport renewals are for individuals known 
by consular staff.  For CRBA applicants of recently born babies, the 
mother's hospital stay certificate is routinely requested and 
verified with the hospital as needed.  DNA is routinely requested 
for children born out of wedlock to non-resident fathers and first 
time applications for older children. 
 
------------------------ 
7.  (SBU) ADOPTION FRAUD 
------------------------ 
 
Post is currently accepting petitions for adoption cases of Eritrean 
children.  There have been few adoption cases during the reporting 
period.  Asmara is considered to be a medium fraud post for 
adoptions. 
 
Posd received one inquiry during the reporting period requesting a 
B1/B2 visa for a young Eritrean child to visit his brother in the 
U.S.  Conoff found that the child's brother was adopted by an 
American family, and that the child for whom travel was requested 
was legally adopted by the same family in Eritrea.  Conoff's 
investigation concluded the family was trying to circumvent the USG 
adoption process.  It also cannot be ruled out that the children's 
birth mother received payment to give up her children.  The family 
informed Conoff they will file an adoption petition for the child in 
the U.S. 
 
Like other types of fraud, adoption fraud is neither organized nor 
sophisticated but it is becoming more prevalent.  The most common 
form of fraud is the classification of a child as an orphan while 
the birth parents are still alive.  The usual reasons for this type 
of fraud are to improve the economic condition of the child or to 
avoid national service.  Eridrean adoptions almost always take place 
within the family, and the courts readily grant them.  The Eritrean 
adoption is then used as the basis for a U.S. adoption case. 
 
Although the High Court or the Ministry of Labor and Human Welfare 
reviews all adoption cases, the corrupt legal system in Eritrea 
provides fraud opportunities for those with high-level GSE 
connections. 
 
--------------------- 
8.  (SBU) DNA TESTING 
--------------------- 
 
Post uses DNA testing primarily for out-of-wedlock births and for 
 
ASMARA 00000480  004.2 OF 007 
 
 
first-time citizenship applications for older children; there were 
no negative DNA results during the reporting period.  There are also 
many instances of aunts/uncles petitioning a niece/nephew as an IR2 
to provide better economic opportunity or to avoid the harsh 
conditions of mandatory military service.  Post will continue to 
liberally recommend DNA testing for 
IR2 applications if/when the visa section reopens, and advises posts 
procecsing Eritrean IFs to consider doing the same. 
 
Post notes Eritrean family and social structures are conducive to 
obtaining reliable DNA results.  Family relationships tend to be 
well-defined and along American norms, and there is no influx of 
refugees or migrants.  Eritrea has some isolated ethnic groups, such 
as the Saho and Nara, with which the consular section has little or 
no interaction. 
 
---------------------- 
9.  (SBU) ASYLUM FRAUD 
---------------------- 
Post is not currently issuing Visas 92#9# in significa&t&numbers and 
has not experienced fraud during the reporting period.  Asmara is 
considered a low fraud post for visas 92/93. 
 
Family members of some GSE officials are known to have applied for 
asylum in the U.S.  The GSE official is then listed as a family 
member for reunion.  Although Conoff understands that doubts 
regarding the asylum case are not pertinent to adjudicating Visas 92 
cases, post provides DHS with derogatory information regarding the 
asilee's family belationships in Eritrea if necessary. 
 
-------------------------- 
10.  (SBU) ALIEN SMUGGLING 
-------------------------- 
Eritrea is a source country for illegal travelers, but there are no 
indications of an organized system designed to facilitate travel to 
the U.S.  Most smuggling is geared toward getting people out of 
Eritrea; subsequent attempts to travel to the U.S. originate in 
third countries.  Eritrean men under 54 and unmarried women under 47 
(with some exceptions) generally cannot obtain passports or exit 
visas, but the specific rules are opaque and change frequently 
without notice.  Post estimates 2,000 Eritreans illegally cross the 
Sudanese and Ethiopian borders each month, with smugglers charging 
between $1,000 and $7,000 for the service.  The smugglers are 
reportedly Eritrean military, police, or national security officers, 
but there are also reports of Rashaida (a trans-national ethnic 
group known to be traders) involvement. 
 
ApproxQmQtely 5,000 So 
aQi refugees reside in a camp near Massawa. 
A UNHCR representative noted that an undefined number of Somalis in 
the camp have "moved on" to other countries.  A smaller camp of less 
than 100 Sudanese refugees is scheduled to be closed by UNHCR in the 
near future. 
 
------------------------------------------- 
11.  (SBU) DS CRIMINAL FRAUD INVESTIGATIONS 
------------------------------------------- 
Conoff and RSO have had reduced opportunities to collaborate on 
fraudgigvestigations gug to the closure of the visa section, but ACS 
case hits are immediately shared and discussed.  RSO responds to 
 
ASMARA 00000480  005.2 OF 007 
 
 
consular requests expeditiously. 
 
-------------------------------------- 
12.  (SBU) HOST COUNTRY PASSPORTS, 
IDENTITY DOCUMENTS, AND CIVIL REGISTRY 
-------------------------------------- 
The Eritrean passport has no identifiable security features.  Bio 
data is hand-written, physical photographs are used, and the 
lamination is of extremely poor quality.  In addition, an EritQeQn 
passport is 
Somali, Sudanese, Bedouins from the Arabian peninsula, and other 
non-Eritreans traveling on Eritrean tourist and diplomatic 
passports.  There are reports that the GSE may issue machine 
readable passports in 2009, but these reports have not been 
corroborated.  If the GSE issues machine readable passports, it is 
likely the old passport will continue to be valid, given the lack of 
GSE capacity to replace them.  GSE consular officials have rebuffed 
requests from Conoff to discuss the matter. 
 
The Eritrean national ID card is the only document proving !r!trean 
natio!a!ity, but it too is hand-written (only in Tigrinya and 
Arabic, not English), poorly laminated, and easily altered. 
 
A passport recently issued by the Eritrean embassy in Khartoum may 
be a sign that the applicant has left Eritrea in violation of 
Eritrean immigration law, and therefore may have questionable ties 
to Eritrea.  The GSE issues passports to Eritrean naQinals living 
aQrad, even if they departed illegally.  Eritrean passports issued 
in Khartoum cost $50, and the applicant usually signs a document 
admitting to having left Eritrea illegally.  Reports indicate the 
Eritrean embassy in Khartoum maintains a list of persons the GSE 
deems hostile to the regime, and that Sudanese authorities have 
arrested and deported these individuals at the request of the 
Embassy.  Post speculates the government facilitates passport 
issuance abroad in hopes that these emigrants will remit hard 
currency after settlement in wealthier countries. 
 
Post received evidence that the GSE provides a certificate to 
Eritrean asylees living overseas to allow them entry/exit without an 
Eritrean entrance stamp being placed in their passport.  The 
certificate is written only in Tigrinya, is stamped for entrance and 
exit, and provides proof of the individual's payment of the 2% 
diaspora income tax.  The GSE's desperate lack of hard currency iQ 
Qhe governments 
asylees back to Eritrea. 
 
Adjudicating officers using completion of Eritrean National Service 
as a sign of ties to Eritrea should be aware of reliable reports 
that a source in Dubai supplies false national service completion 
certificates.  Conoff has yet to examine a false certificate, but 
official certificates have no known security features and are easily 
forged.  The GSE does not provide verification of these 
certificates. 
 
Officially issued birth and marriage certificates are available for 
sale for $330 from the Asmara (and presumably other) Eritrean 
municipalities. eTee GSE recentle eushed responsibility for ensuring 
the accuracy of applicant information down to the neighborhood level 
official in an effort to improve accuracy and accountability. 
Instead, the move created profit-making opportunities.  Information 
 
ASMARA 00000480  006.2 OF 007 
 
 
contained on official birth and marriage certificates can be 
completely altered as the payer desires. 
 
On a poQiQive note, the 
computerized birth, marriage, and divorce records, and is assigning 
a unique identification number to each person.  This system will 
eventually roll out to all towns and villages in Eritrea, and 
indicates the GSE's willingness to curb the falsification of legal 
documents. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ---------- 
13.  (SBU) COOPERATION WITH HOST GOVERNMENT AUTHORITIES 
--------------------------------------------- ---------- 
Post continues to receive no cooperation on consular issues from the 
host government, other than routine document verification, but 
because many legitimately issued governmental documents are suspect, 
this cooperation is of limited use.  School records are well kept 
and historically local schools have cooperated in verifying these 
documents.  Post believes that if we were to  d ntify organiz!d! 
fraud rings that the local authorities would take an interest, but 
to date, post has seen no evidence indicating t(e existence o& $his 
type of organized activity. 
 
-------------------------------------- 
14.  (SBU) AREAS OF PARTICULAR CONCERN 
-------------------------------------- 
The increasing desperation of Eritreans to leave the country so far 
has not led to a significant increase in fraud indicators, contrary 
to what we would expect.  Post remains vigilant in looking for fraud 
indicators, especially in new passport and CRBA applications, and 
assumes that an increase in fraudulent applications is highly likely 
given the current political and economic situation in Eritrea. 
 
Post believes we would experience a large number of NIV applicants 
if the consular section reopened for visa services.  The usual 
walk-in application process would not be able to accommodate the 
volume.  In this case, Post would employ the online NIV appointment 
system, an active public diplomacy program, and increased local 
guard force presence to avoid the common fraud opportunities 
associated with queuing. 
 
The GSE's restrictive pol)c)es continued $o hamper consular 
operations.  Although the Harris technicians were issued visas after 
three years of absence from Asmara, some applications for other TDY 
visas were denied or ignored.  GSE restrictions on diplomatic travel 
make it unlikely that an American citizen could rely on emergency 
consular assistance outside of the capital.  Consular notification 
and access to incarcerated American citizens was not provided for 
three known arrest cases during the reporting period. 
 
-------------------------------- 
15.  (SBU) STAFFING AND TRAINING 
-------------------------------- 
Brian Shelbourn - Consular Officer 
Anti-fraud conference, Accra, April 2007 
 
Tsehainesh Yacob - Consular Assistant 
Senior FSN Fraud Prevention Training - September 2002 
 
Tsegereda Tekle - Visa Assistant 
 
ASMARA 00000480  007.2 OF 007 
 
 
No formal fraud prevention training 
 
The section remains at a low staffing level and will remain so until 
the section fully opens for visa services.  Training options are 
currently limited to those availa"l% inside Eritr%a.  The Mission's 
restrictions on off-shore training, currently in place due to the 
number of LES not returning from training in the U.S., limits our 
staff to online courses and on-the-job learning opportunities. 
MCMULLEN