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Viewing cable 08ANKARA1747, TURKEY LIKELY TO SUPPORT CANCELLATION OF ANNUAL

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08ANKARA1747 2008-10-08 15:58 2011-05-28 00:00 SECRET Embassy Ankara
VZCZCXYZ0001
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHAK #1747 2821558
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 081558Z OCT 08
FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7620
INFO RUEHTH/AMEMBASSY ATHENS IMMEDIATE 9210
RUEHNC/AMEMBASSY NICOSIA IMMEDIATE 6704
RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 6741
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 3313
S E C R E T ANKARA 001747 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT. FOR EUR/SE 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/08/2028 
TAGS: PREL PM CY TU
SUBJECT: TURKEY LIKELY TO SUPPORT CANCELLATION OF ANNUAL 
MILITARY EXERCISES IN CYPRUS; BUT FORMAL DECISION PENDING 
 
REF: STATE 106964 
 
Classified By: POL Counselor Daniel O'Grady for reasons 1.4(b,d) 
 
1. (S) Turkey is likely to support the call for cancellation 
of the annual Turkey-Turkish Cypriot military exercise Toros, 
according to MFA DDG for Northeast Mediterranean Kerim Uras, 
though a formal decision has yet to be taken.  Uras told us 
the afternoon of October 8 that senior MFA colleagues were at 
Turkish General Staff (TGS) headquarters at the same time 
coordinating the decision on the issue.  Pointing out that 
Turkey had been a strong proponent of the mutual moratorium 
on mil exercises on the island until the Greek Cypriots 
unilaterally abrogated the agreement by carrying out 
Nikiforos in 2005, Uras said he did not see any reason why 
the GOT would not want to resume it.  He cautioned, however, 
that he could not authoritatively provide a positive response 
to Christofias' call, in support of our call (reftel) and 
that of HMG, until it was fully cleared throughout the GOT. 
Uras also said that when a decision is made, the Turks will 
want to make sure that it is Talat who makes the announcement. 
 
2. (C) Uras said the GOT and the Turkish Cypriots are a bit 
discouraged at the tactics adopted by Christofias and the 
Greek Cypriots, which do not lend themselves to moving ahead 
quickly toward a final settlement.  He lamented what he 
described as the constant "negativity" and "Turkey-bashing" 
in which the Greek Cypriots have engaged in recent months, 
citing negative G/C comments at UNGA, using negative 
influence in Strasbourg on ECHR cases, and blocking the 
inclusion of experts with any involvement in the Annan Plan 
negotiations from participating in a newly comprised EU panel 
of experts on Cyprus (e.g., Frank Hoffmeister).  However, 
Uras said Ankara's plan is to continue to give Talat the 
space he needs to negotiate a deal, and to remain in a 
supportive role.  He described the G/C side as a "reluctant 
seller," equating Nicosia to a carpet dealer who sets an 
initial (high) price as a final, take-it or leave-it offer. 
He described the Greek Cypriot approach to negotiations as 
being "top-down," with a focus on trying to solve all the 
major issues at once, making it difficult to achieve forward 
momentum anywhere.  Meanwhile, he claimed Talat is taking 
more of a "bottom-up" approach in which much of the 
underbrush can be quickly agreed to by the two sides, 
creating a sense that a deal is achievable with sufficient 
compromise from both sides.  He asked that the U.S. urge 
Christofias to take a more constructive approach so that 
momentum can be maintained. 
 
3. (S) Uras described UNSRG Downer as "pragmatic" and they 
have no real complaints about his efforts to date.  He noted 
that Downer, like anyone new in such a position, is 
constantly advocating "new approaches" and counseling against 
"clinging to old formulae."  However, Uras pointed out, it 
seems clear that after 40 years of Cyprob discussions, the 
superstructure of a settlement acceptable to all sides is 
largely known to everyone.  We just need to figure out a way 
to put a facade on it that can gain public acceptance on both 
sides.  Uras expressed concern about recent statements by HMG 
officials that have given Ankara the impression London no 
longer supports the long-standing principle of political 
equality between the two communities in Cyprus.  He noted 
several comments by senior British officials to Turkish 
counterparts in recent weeks to the effect that the ROC is an 
EU member state, has the upper hand, and is a reality with 
which the Turks will have to deal; that Turkish Cypriots have 
equality as citizens of a member state, etc.  The effect has 
been to raise GOT fears that the EU and others are willing to 
allow Nicosia to play a delaying game with a view to 
ratcheting up pressure on Turkey as 2009 progresses.  Uras 
expressed the hope that the USG still supports the concept of 
political equality between the two communities, which we 
assured him we do. 
 
Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at 
http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Turk ey 
 
WILSON