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Viewing cable 08TELAVIV2120, KADIMA: FORWARD -- ON YOUR MARK, GET SET...

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08TELAVIV2120 2008-09-16 15:39 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Tel Aviv
VZCZCXRO4038
PP RUEHROV
DE RUEHTV #2120/01 2601539
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 161539Z SEP 08
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8449
INFO RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 TEL AVIV 002120 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINR IS
SUBJECT:  KADIMA: FORWARD -- ON YOUR MARK, GET SET... 
 
REF:  A) TEL AVIV 2078; B) TEL AVIV 1967 
 
------------------------ 
SUMMARY AND INTRODUCTION 
------------------------ 
 
1.  (SBU) Olmert recently reiterated his July 30 commitment to 
resign from the office of Prime Minister after the Kadima primaries 
for party leader, clarifying that he will do so "immediately" to 
enable the elected candidate to form a new government.  The first 
round of voting gets under way in less than 24 hours, and will 
conclude at 2000 (local time) on September 17.  Although polls favor 
Livni, most observers and political insiders continue to believe the 
race will be very close.  Definitive results are not expected 
earlier than the morning of September 18.  While the candidates are 
seized with the logistics of getting out the vote (low turnout may 
favor Mofaz; high turnout may favor Livni), Olmert is the 
beneficiary of a moment of grace.  On September 14, Olmert chaired 
what may have been his last cabinet meeting as the Kadima Party 
leader, which was followed on September 15 by his "last appearance" 
before the Knesset's Foreign Affairs and Security Committee.  Free 
of party political restraints, he is speaking out on policy, 
wrapping up loose ends, and laying down markers for the political 
transition that lies ahead.  Olmert will remain the caretaker prime 
minister until a new government is formed. 
 
------------------------ 
THE RESIGNATION SCENARIO 
------------------------ 
 
2.  (SBU) When the Kadima polls close on Wednesday evening the 
winner will need to have 40 percent of the turnout to claim the 
party leadership and the succession to the premiership.  If not, a 
second round of voting will be held on September 24th.  In either 
scenario, PM Olmert cannot make good on his July 30th promise to 
clear the way for his successor in a timely manner until a new 
government is in place.  Only in the most seamless scenario 
following a first-round primary winner and the current coalition's 
agreement to remain in power could a new government headed by the 
new Kadima leader be formed before the start of the Jewish High 
Holidays at the end of September.  This leaves Olmert at the helm 
for that period (or, more likely, until after the Knesset reconvenes 
at the end of October), and possibly into next year unless he is 
declared or declares himself incapacitated.  Olmert's associates 
continue to tell the press that he does not intend to do so. 
 
3.  (SBU) Olmert has assiduously ignored calls from both the 
political right and left to declare himself incapacitated.  MKs 
Gal-On and Eldad, of the Meretz and National Union parties 
respectively, reiterated such demands over the past year to no 
effect. Olmert, the pundits said, would not oblige because it would 
mean that Tzipi Livni would automatically take over as Acting Prime 
Minister. The only authority empowered to declare Olmert 
incapacitated, the Attorney General, is clearly unwilling to do so, 
despite the recommendations of the police that Olmert be indicted. 
 
4.  (SBU) Some media reports have speculated that Olmert could also 
resign his seat in the Knesset, leaving the impression that such a 
move would hasten the PM's departure since the head of government is 
required to be a serving member of the Knesset.  In fact, this 
(unprecedented) move would not change the transition scenario: 
Olmert would remain caretaker prime minister until a new government 
is formed.  Other arguments against resignation from the Knesset by 
the Prime Minister include the loss of parliamentary immunity and 
the loss of parliamentary benefits. 
 
---------------------------------------- 
WHAT OLMERT KNEW WHEN HE MADE HIS PLEDGE 
---------------------------------------- 
 
5.  (SBU) The remaining resignation scenario is the one PM Olmert 
detailed on May 8th when he declared that despite the fact that the 
law does not require it, he would be ready to resign "immediately," 
if indicted by the Attorney General (ref B).  A seasoned lawyer and 
veteran politician, Olmert knew then that the likelihood of an 
indictment preceding a transition to a new administration, with or 
without early elections, would be slender indeed.  The Israel Police 
have only recently submitted their recommendations in two of the 
investigations against him. Olmert is well-versed in the workings of 
the State Attorney's office, which is not known for its alacrity in 
filing charges -- least of all when they involve the senior 
political echelon. 
 
-------------------- 
A CHANGE OF SCHEDULE 
-------------------- 
 
6.  (SBU) Olmert is leaving the political echelon guessing as to 
just when he will depart the arena but some preparations are 
unavoidable.  A trip to Russia scheduled to take place the week of 
September 15 was postponed.  The anticipated participation of the 
 
TEL AVIV 00002120  002 OF 002 
 
 
prime minister in the UN General Assembly and meetings with 
high-level foreign dignitaries there will also not take place. 
Olmert has asked President Shimon Peres to travel to New York and 
address the UNGA on September 24th. 
 
---------------------------- 
OLMERT'S UNFINISHED BUSINESS 
---------------------------- 
 
7.  (SBU) PM Olmert's original political agenda, as laid out in a 
Knesset speech in early May 2006, is still far from complete. 
Olmert, who became acting prime minister upon the incapacitation of 
Ariel Sharon, viewed his mission - following his election in March 
2006 -- as the implementation of Sharon's disengagement doctrine. 
Addressing what the pundits chose to term "his final cabinet 
meeting" (as Kadima Party leader and before he becomes a caretaker 
prime minister) on September 14, in which voluntary evacuation and 
compensation for West Bank settlers was discussed, Olmert restated 
the Sharon doctrine with unprecedented bluntness: "Greater Israel is 
finished.  There's no such thing.  Whoever talks this way is 
deluding himself...The strategic threats against us are not derived 
from the question of where the border passes." 
 
8.  (U) A leading commentator, Aluf Benn of Ha'aretz, noted that 
Olmert's tone and substance was identical to his May 2006 Knesset 
speech, in which he presented his government and cautioned that 
"continued dispersed settlement throughout Judea and Samaria creates 
an inseparable mixture of populations which will endanger the 
existence of the State of Israel as a Jewish state." In fact, 
Olmert's track record for consistent thinking on disengagement goes 
back three years earlier to the now-forgotten Olmert Plan of 
December 2003. In it he advocated large-scale withdrawal from the 
West Bank and Gaza Strip in advance of Ariel Sharon's unveiling of 
his own Disengagement Plan at the Herzliya Conference later the same 
month. 
 
---------------- 
SEE HOW THEY RUN 
---------------- 
 
9.  (SBU) With only hours to go to the opening of the polls, all 
four candidates are focused on how to get the seventy thousand 
Kadima Party voters to the ballot.  Front-runner Tzipi Livni had to 
refute charges of anti-Sephardic prejudice arising out of comments 
by an aide who chose to refer to rival Mofaz supporters in 
politically incorrect language.   Iranian-born Shaul Mofaz chose to 
hit back with an extraordinarily precise prediction that he would 
claim the leadership by taking 43.7 percent of the vote in the first 
round. The figure, reportedly based on polling by Mofaz advisor 
Arthur Finkelstein, deviates dramatically from the most recent polls 
(Maariv and Yediot) which put Mofaz at 32 percent behind Livni's 47 
percent.  Most of our political contacts agree, however, that polls 
of the Kadima electorate are not reliable indices - particularly as 
this will be the first primary of the party, whose make-up is new 
and untested in internal elections.  They assess that heavy turnout 
will benefit Livni, while Mofaz, who benefits from a more organized 
political machine, will triumph if Kadima turnout is low. 
 
CUNNINGHAM