Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 97115 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
ETRD EAGR ETTC EAID ECON EFIN ECIN EINV ELAB EAIR ENRG EPET EWWT ECPS EIND EMIN ELTN EC ETMIN EUC EZ ET ELECTIONS ENVR EU EUN EG EINT ER ECONOMICS ES EMS ENIV EEB EN ECE ECOSOC EK ENVIRONMENT EFIS EI EWT ENGRD ECPSN EXIM EIAD ERIN ECPC EDEV ENGY ECTRD EPA ESTH ECCT EINVECON ENGR ERTD EUR EAP EWWC ELTD EL EXIMOPIC EXTERNAL ETRDEC ESCAP ECO EGAD ELNT ECONOMIC ENV ETRN EIAR EUMEM ENRGPARMOTRASENVKGHGPGOVECONTSPLEAID EREL ECOM ECONETRDEAGRJA ETCC ETRG ECONOMY EMED ETR ENERG EITC EFINOECD EURM EENG ERA EXPORT ENRD ECONEINVETRDEFINELABETRDKTDBPGOVOPIC EGEN EBRD EVIN ETRAD ECOWAS EFTA ECONETRDBESPAR EGOVSY EPIN EID ECONENRG EDRC ESENV ETT EB ENER ELTNSNAR ECHEVARRIA ETRC EPIT EDUC ESA EFI ENRGY ESCI EE EAIDXMXAXBXFFR EETC ECIP EIAID EIVN EBEXP ESTN EING EGOV ETRA EPETEIND ELAN ETRDGK EAIDRW ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS EPEC ENVI ELN EAG EPCS EPRT EPTED ETRB EUM EAIDS EFIC EFINECONEAIDUNGAGM EAIDAR ESF EIDN ELAM EDU EV EAIDAF ECN EDA EXBS EINTECPS ENRGTRGYETRDBEXPBTIOSZ EPREL EAC EINVEFIN ETA EAGER EINDIR ECA ECLAC ELAP EITI EUCOM ECONEFINETRDPGOVEAGRPTERKTFNKCRMEAID EARG ELDIN EINVKSCA ENNP EFINECONCS EFINTS ECCP ETC EAIRASECCASCID EINN ETRP EAIDNI EFQ ECOQKPKO EGPHUM EBUD ECONEINVEFINPGOVIZ ENERGY ELB EINDETRD EMI ECONEFIN EIB EURN ETRDEINVTINTCS EIN EFIM ETIO ELAINE EMN EATO EWTR EIPR EINVETC ETTD ETDR EIQ ECONCS EPPD ENRGIZ EISL ESPINOSA ELEC EAIG ESLCO EUREM ENTG ERD EINVECONSENVCSJA EEPET EUNCH ECINECONCS ETRO ETRDECONWTOCS ECUN EFND EPECO EAIRECONRP ERGR ETRDPGOV ECPN ENRGMO EPWR EET EAIS EAGRE EDUARDO EAGRRP EAIDPHUMPRELUG EICN ECONQH EVN EGHG ELBR EINF EAIDHO EENV ETEX ERNG ED
KMDR KPAO KPKO KJUS KCRM KGHG KFRD KWMN KDEM KTFN KHIV KGIC KIDE KSCA KNNP KHUM KIPR KSUM KISL KIRF KCOR KRCM KPAL KWBG KN KS KOMC KSEP KFLU KPWR KTIA KSEO KMPI KHLS KICC KSTH KMCA KVPR KPRM KE KU KZ KFLO KSAF KTIP KTEX KBCT KOCI KOLY KOR KAWC KACT KUNR KTDB KSTC KLIG KSKN KNN KCFE KCIP KGHA KHDP KPOW KUNC KDRL KV KPREL KCRS KPOL KRVC KRIM KGIT KWIR KT KIRC KOMO KRFD KUWAIT KG KFIN KSCI KTFIN KFTN KGOV KPRV KSAC KGIV KCRIM KPIR KSOC KBIO KW KGLB KMWN KPO KFSC KSEAO KSTCPL KSI KPRP KREC KFPC KUNH KCSA KMRS KNDP KR KICCPUR KPPAO KCSY KTBT KCIS KNEP KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KNNB KGCC KINR KPOP KMFO KENV KNAR KVIR KDRG KDMR KFCE KNAO KDEN KGCN KICA KIMMITT KMCC KLFU KMSG KSEC KUM KCUL KMNP KSMT KCOM KOMCSG KSPR KPMI KRAD KIND KCRP KAUST KWAWC KTER KCHG KRDP KPAS KITA KTSC KPAOPREL KWGB KIRP KJUST KMIG KLAB KTFR KSEI KSTT KAPO KSTS KLSO KWNN KPOA KHSA KNPP KPAONZ KBTS KWWW KY KJRE KPAOKMDRKE KCRCM KSCS KWMNCI KESO KWUN KPLS KIIP KEDEM KPAOY KRIF KGICKS KREF KTRD KFRDSOCIRO KTAO KJU KWMNPHUMPRELKPAOZW KEN KO KNEI KEMR KKIV KEAI KWAC KRCIM KWCI KFIU KWIC KCORR KOMS KNNO KPAI KBWG KTTB KTBD KTIALG KILS KFEM KTDM KESS KNUC KPA KOMCCO KCEM KRCS KWBGSY KNPPIS KNNPMNUC KWN KERG KLTN KALM KCCP KSUMPHUM KREL KGH KLIP KTLA KAWK KWMM KVRP KVRC KAID KSLG KDEMK KX KIF KNPR KCFC KFTFN KTFM KPDD KCERS KMOC KDEMAF KMEPI KEMS KDRM KEPREL KBTR KEDU KNP KIRL KNNR KMPT KISLPINR KTPN KA KJUSTH KPIN KDEV KTDD KAKA KFRP KWNM KTSD KINL KJUSKUNR KWWMN KECF KWBC KPRO KVBL KOM KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KEDM KFLD KLPM KRGY KNNF KICR KIFR KM KWMNCS KAWS KLAP KPAK KDDG KCGC KID KNSD KMPF KPFO KDP KCMR KRMS KNPT KNNNP KTIAPARM KDTB KNUP KPGOV KNAP KNNC KUK KSRE KREISLER KIVP KQ KTIAEUN KPALAOIS KRM KISLAO KWM KFLOA
PHUM PINR PTER PGOV PREL PREF PL PM PHSA PE PARM PINS PK PUNE PO PALESTINIAN PU PBTS PROP PTBS POL POLI PA PGOVZI POLMIL POLITICAL PARTIES POLM PD POLITICS POLICY PAS PMIL PINT PNAT PV PKO PPOL PERSONS PING PBIO PH PETR PARMS PRES PCON PETERS PRELBR PT PLAB PP PAK PDEM PKPA PSOCI PF PLO PTERM PJUS PSOE PELOSI PROPERTY PGOVPREL PARP PRL PNIR PHUMKPAL PG PREZ PGIC PBOV PAO PKK PROV PHSAK PHUMPREL PROTECTION PGOVBL PSI PRELPK PGOVENRG PUM PRELKPKO PATTY PSOC PRIVATIZATION PRELSP PGOVEAIDUKNOSWGMHUCANLLHFRSPITNZ PMIG PREC PAIGH PROG PSHA PARK PETER POG PHUS PPREL PS PTERPREL PRELPGOV POV PKPO PGOVECON POUS PGOVPRELPHUMPREFSMIGELABEAIDKCRMKWMN PWBG PMAR PREM PAR PNR PRELPGOVEAIDECONEINVBEXPSCULOIIPBTIO PARMIR PGOVGM PHUH PARTM PN PRE PTE PY POLUN PPEL PDOV PGOVSOCI PIRF PGOVPM PBST PRELEVU PGOR PBTSRU PRM PRELKPAOIZ PGVO PERL PGOC PAGR PMIN PHUMR PVIP PPD PGV PRAM PINL PKPAL PTERE PGOF PINO PHAS PODC PRHUM PHUMA PREO PPA PEPFAR PGO PRGOV PAC PRESL PORG PKFK PEPR PRELP PREFA PNG PGOVPHUMKPAO PRELECON PINOCHET PFOR PGOVLO PHUMBA PRELC PREK PHUME PHJM POLINT PGOVPZ PGOVKCRM PGOVE PHALANAGE PARTY PECON PEACE PROCESS PLN PRELSW PAHO PEDRO PRELA PASS PPAO PGPV PNUM PCUL PGGV PSA PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA PGIV PRFE POGOV PEL PBT PAMQ PINF PSEPC POSTS PHUMPGOV PVOV PHSAPREL PROLIFERATION PENA PRELTBIOBA PIN PRELL PGOVPTER PHAM PHYTRP PTEL PTERPGOV PHARM PROTESTS PRELAF PKBL PRELKPAO PKNP PARMP PHUML PFOV PERM PUOS PRELGOV PHUMPTER PARAGRAPH PERURENA PBTSEWWT PCI PETROL PINSO PINSCE PQL PEREZ PBS

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 08STATE99734, TRAVEL WARNING - YEMEN

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #08STATE99734.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08STATE99734 2008-09-18 02:02 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED Secretary of State
VZCZCXRO5376
OO RUEHAG RUEHAO RUEHAP RUEHAT RUEHBC RUEHBI RUEHBL RUEHBZ RUEHCD
RUEHCHI RUEHCI RUEHCN RUEHDA RUEHDE RUEHDF RUEHDT RUEHDU RUEHED RUEHEL
RUEHFK RUEHFL RUEHGA RUEHGD RUEHGH RUEHGI RUEHGR RUEHHA RUEHHM RUEHHO
RUEHHT RUEHIHL RUEHIK RUEHJO RUEHJS RUEHKN RUEHKR RUEHKSO RUEHKUK
RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHLH RUEHLN RUEHLZ RUEHMA RUEHMC RUEHMJ RUEHMR RUEHMRE
RUEHMT RUEHNAG RUEHNG RUEHNH RUEHNL RUEHNP RUEHNZ RUEHPA RUEHPB RUEHPD
RUEHPOD RUEHPT RUEHPW RUEHQU RUEHRD RUEHRG RUEHRN RUEHROV RUEHRS
RUEHTM RUEHTRO RUEHVC RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHC #9734/01 2620209
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 180202Z SEP 08
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO ALL DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR POSTS COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI IMMEDIATE 2941
RUEHFSI/DIR FSINFATC
RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RUEHPH/CDC ATLANTA 6992
RUCPDOC/ALL USDOC DISTDIR COLLECTIVE WASHINGTON DC
RHMCSUU/CDRAMC FT BELVOIR VA//AMCMI-SS//
RUEAHQA/HQ USAF WASHINGTON DC//XOXXI//
RHMCSUU/HQ AFOSI DOQ ANDREWS AFB MD//IVOA//
RHMCSUU/FAA NATIONAL HQ WASHINGTON DC//ACI-400//
RHMCSUU/COMNAVAIRSYSCOM PATUXENT RIVER MD//AIR1031B//
RHMFIUU/NRC WASHINGTON DC//INFOSEC//
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL//CCJ2-JIT//
RUCPCIM/CIM NTDB WASHINGTON DC
RHMCSUU/COGARD INTELCOORDCEN WASHINGTON DC
RHMFIUU/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RHMFISS/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 STATE 099734 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: CASC PTER ASEC YM
SUBJECT: TRAVEL WARNING - YEMEN 
 
1. This Travel Warning updates information on security 
incidents in Yemen and reminds U.S. citizens of the high 
security threat level in Yemen due to terrorist 
activities.  The Department of State 
has authorized the departure of non-emergency personnel 
and eligible family members of the U.S. Embassy in 
Sana'a. 
The Department recommends that American citizens defer 
non-essential travel to Yemen.  U.S. citizens remaining 
in Yemen despite this warning should monitor the U.S. 
Embassy website at http://yemen.usembassy.gov and should 
make contingency emergency plans.  This supersedes the 
Travel Warning for Yemen issued August 13, 2008. 
 
2. The security threat level remains high due to 
terrorist activities in Yemen.  On September 17 at 
approximately 9:15 a.m. local time, armed terrorists 
attacked the U.S. Embassy in Sana'a, Yemen.  A number of 
explosions occurred in the vicinity of the Embassy's main 
gate.  Several Yemeni security personnel were killed, as 
were a few individuals waiting to gain entry to the 
Embassy. 
3. U.S. embassy employees have been advised to exercise 
caution when choosing restaurants, hotels or visiting 
tourist areas in Sana'a in order to avoid large 
gatherings of foreigners and expatriates.  In addition, 
unofficial travel outside of the capital is not 
authorized at this time. 
4. U.S. citizens who travel to or remain in Yemen despite 
this warning should exercise caution and take prudent 
security measures, including maintaining a high level of 
vigilance, avoiding crowds and demonstrations, keeping a 
low profile, varying times and routes for all travel, and 
ensuring travel documents are current.  U.S. citizens in 
Yemen are advised to exercise particular caution at 
locations frequented by foreigners countrywide including 
restaurants and hotels.  From time to time, the Embassy 
may restrict official Americans from restaurants, hotels, 
or shopping areas.  The Department of State strongly 
encourages U.S. citizens to consult the most recent 
Warden Messages 
(http://yemen.usembassy.gov/service.html) 
 to get up-to-date information on security conditions. 
U.S. citizens who believe they are being followed or 
threatened while driving in urban centers should proceed 
as quickly as possible to the nearest police station or 
major intersection and request assistance from the 
officers in the blue-and-white police cars stationed 
there. 
5. The Department remains concerned about possible 
attacks by extremist individuals or groups against U.S. 
citizens, facilities, businesses, and perceived 
interests.  On January 17, 2008, suspected al-Qa'ida 
operatives ambushed a tourist convoy in the eastern 
Hadramout Governorate, killing two Belgians.  On July 2, 
2007, suspected al-Qa'ida operatives carried out a 
vehicle-borne explosive device attack on tourists at the 
Belquis Temple in Marib, which resulted in the deaths of 
eight Spanish tourists and two Yemenis.  The targeting of 
tourist sites by al-Qa'ida may represent an escalation in 
terror tactics in Yemen.  On February 3, 2006, 23 
convicts, including known affiliates of al-Qa'ida, 
escaped from a high-security prison in the capital city, 
Sana'a, some of whom remain at large.  Two of the 
escapees were later killed in vehicle-based suicide 
attacks on oil facilities near Mukalla and Marib on 
September 15, 2006.  Those attacks were followed by the 
arrest the next day in Sana'a of four suspected al Qa'ida 
operatives, who had stockpiled explosives and weapons. 
6. Since January 2007, the Government of Yemen has been 
battling al Houthi rebels in and around the northern 
governorate of Saada.  While foreigners have not been 
 
STATE 00099734  002 OF 002 
 
 
targeted, hundreds of soldiers and civilians have been 
killed in the violence.  U.S. citizens traveling in Yemen 
should be aware that local authorities occasionally place 
restrictions on the travel of foreigners to parts of the 
country experiencing unrest.  In addition, the U.S. 
Embassy itself often restricts travel of official 
personnel to the tribal areas north and east of Sana'a, 
such as the governorates of Amran, Al Jawf, Hajja, Marib, 
Saada, and Shabwa.  Travelers should be in contact with 
the Embassy for up-to-date information on such 
restrictions. 
7. U.S. citizens should register at the Consular Section 
of the U.S. Embassy in Sana'a and enroll in the warden 
system (emergency alert network) to obtain updated 
information on travel and security in Yemen.  This can be 
done online prior to arrival in Yemen at 
https://travelregistration.state.gov/ibrs. 
8. The U.S. Embassy is located at Dhahr Himyar Zone, 
Sheraton Hotel District, P.O. Box 22347.  The telephone 
number of the Consular Section is (967) (1) 755-2000, 
extension 2153 or 2266. The fax number is (967) (1) 303- 
175.  The after-hours emergency number is (967) (1) 755- 
2000 (press zero for extension) or (967) 733213509.  From 
time to time the Embassy may temporarily close or suspend 
public services for security reasons.  Emergency 
assistance to U.S. citizens during non-business hours (or 
when public access is restricted) is available through 
Embassy duty personnel. 
9. Current information on travel and security in Yemen 
may be obtained from the Department of State by calling 
1-888-407-4747 within the United States and Canada or, 
from outside the United States and Canada, 1-202-501- 
4444.  U.S. citizens should consult the Country Specific 
Information for Yemen and the Worldwide Caution on the 
Department's Internet site at http://travel.state.gov. 
Up-to-date information on security conditions can also be 
addressed at http://yemen.usembassy.gov/service.html. 
 
 
10. Minimize considered. 
RICE