Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 97115 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
ETRD EAGR ETTC EAID ECON EFIN ECIN EINV ELAB EAIR ENRG EPET EWWT ECPS EIND EMIN ELTN EC ETMIN EUC EZ ET ELECTIONS ENVR EU EUN EG EINT ER ECONOMICS ES EMS ENIV EEB EN ECE ECOSOC EK ENVIRONMENT EFIS EI EWT ENGRD ECPSN EXIM EIAD ERIN ECPC EDEV ENGY ECTRD EPA ESTH ECCT EINVECON ENGR ERTD EUR EAP EWWC ELTD EL EXIMOPIC EXTERNAL ETRDEC ESCAP ECO EGAD ELNT ECONOMIC ENV ETRN EIAR EUMEM ENRGPARMOTRASENVKGHGPGOVECONTSPLEAID EREL ECOM ECONETRDEAGRJA ETCC ETRG ECONOMY EMED ETR ENERG EITC EFINOECD EURM EENG ERA EXPORT ENRD ECONEINVETRDEFINELABETRDKTDBPGOVOPIC EGEN EBRD EVIN ETRAD ECOWAS EFTA ECONETRDBESPAR EGOVSY EPIN EID ECONENRG EDRC ESENV ETT EB ENER ELTNSNAR ECHEVARRIA ETRC EPIT EDUC ESA EFI ENRGY ESCI EE EAIDXMXAXBXFFR EETC ECIP EIAID EIVN EBEXP ESTN EING EGOV ETRA EPETEIND ELAN ETRDGK EAIDRW ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS EPEC ENVI ELN EAG EPCS EPRT EPTED ETRB EUM EAIDS EFIC EFINECONEAIDUNGAGM EAIDAR ESF EIDN ELAM EDU EV EAIDAF ECN EDA EXBS EINTECPS ENRGTRGYETRDBEXPBTIOSZ EPREL EAC EINVEFIN ETA EAGER EINDIR ECA ECLAC ELAP EITI EUCOM ECONEFINETRDPGOVEAGRPTERKTFNKCRMEAID EARG ELDIN EINVKSCA ENNP EFINECONCS EFINTS ECCP ETC EAIRASECCASCID EINN ETRP EAIDNI EFQ ECOQKPKO EGPHUM EBUD ECONEINVEFINPGOVIZ ENERGY ELB EINDETRD EMI ECONEFIN EIB EURN ETRDEINVTINTCS EIN EFIM ETIO ELAINE EMN EATO EWTR EIPR EINVETC ETTD ETDR EIQ ECONCS EPPD ENRGIZ EISL ESPINOSA ELEC EAIG ESLCO EUREM ENTG ERD EINVECONSENVCSJA EEPET EUNCH ECINECONCS ETRO ETRDECONWTOCS ECUN EFND EPECO EAIRECONRP ERGR ETRDPGOV ECPN ENRGMO EPWR EET EAIS EAGRE EDUARDO EAGRRP EAIDPHUMPRELUG EICN ECONQH EVN EGHG ELBR EINF EAIDHO EENV ETEX ERNG ED
KMDR KPAO KPKO KJUS KCRM KGHG KFRD KWMN KDEM KTFN KHIV KGIC KIDE KSCA KNNP KHUM KIPR KSUM KISL KIRF KCOR KRCM KPAL KWBG KN KS KOMC KSEP KFLU KPWR KTIA KSEO KMPI KHLS KICC KSTH KMCA KVPR KPRM KE KU KZ KFLO KSAF KTIP KTEX KBCT KOCI KOLY KOR KAWC KACT KUNR KTDB KSTC KLIG KSKN KNN KCFE KCIP KGHA KHDP KPOW KUNC KDRL KV KPREL KCRS KPOL KRVC KRIM KGIT KWIR KT KIRC KOMO KRFD KUWAIT KG KFIN KSCI KTFIN KFTN KGOV KPRV KSAC KGIV KCRIM KPIR KSOC KBIO KW KGLB KMWN KPO KFSC KSEAO KSTCPL KSI KPRP KREC KFPC KUNH KCSA KMRS KNDP KR KICCPUR KPPAO KCSY KTBT KCIS KNEP KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KNNB KGCC KINR KPOP KMFO KENV KNAR KVIR KDRG KDMR KFCE KNAO KDEN KGCN KICA KIMMITT KMCC KLFU KMSG KSEC KUM KCUL KMNP KSMT KCOM KOMCSG KSPR KPMI KRAD KIND KCRP KAUST KWAWC KTER KCHG KRDP KPAS KITA KTSC KPAOPREL KWGB KIRP KJUST KMIG KLAB KTFR KSEI KSTT KAPO KSTS KLSO KWNN KPOA KHSA KNPP KPAONZ KBTS KWWW KY KJRE KPAOKMDRKE KCRCM KSCS KWMNCI KESO KWUN KPLS KIIP KEDEM KPAOY KRIF KGICKS KREF KTRD KFRDSOCIRO KTAO KJU KWMNPHUMPRELKPAOZW KEN KO KNEI KEMR KKIV KEAI KWAC KRCIM KWCI KFIU KWIC KCORR KOMS KNNO KPAI KBWG KTTB KTBD KTIALG KILS KFEM KTDM KESS KNUC KPA KOMCCO KCEM KRCS KWBGSY KNPPIS KNNPMNUC KWN KERG KLTN KALM KCCP KSUMPHUM KREL KGH KLIP KTLA KAWK KWMM KVRP KVRC KAID KSLG KDEMK KX KIF KNPR KCFC KFTFN KTFM KPDD KCERS KMOC KDEMAF KMEPI KEMS KDRM KEPREL KBTR KEDU KNP KIRL KNNR KMPT KISLPINR KTPN KA KJUSTH KPIN KDEV KTDD KAKA KFRP KWNM KTSD KINL KJUSKUNR KWWMN KECF KWBC KPRO KVBL KOM KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KEDM KFLD KLPM KRGY KNNF KICR KIFR KM KWMNCS KAWS KLAP KPAK KDDG KCGC KID KNSD KMPF KPFO KDP KCMR KRMS KNPT KNNNP KTIAPARM KDTB KNUP KPGOV KNAP KNNC KUK KSRE KREISLER KIVP KQ KTIAEUN KPALAOIS KRM KISLAO KWM KFLOA
PHUM PINR PTER PGOV PREL PREF PL PM PHSA PE PARM PINS PK PUNE PO PALESTINIAN PU PBTS PROP PTBS POL POLI PA PGOVZI POLMIL POLITICAL PARTIES POLM PD POLITICS POLICY PAS PMIL PINT PNAT PV PKO PPOL PERSONS PING PBIO PH PETR PARMS PRES PCON PETERS PRELBR PT PLAB PP PAK PDEM PKPA PSOCI PF PLO PTERM PJUS PSOE PELOSI PROPERTY PGOVPREL PARP PRL PNIR PHUMKPAL PG PREZ PGIC PBOV PAO PKK PROV PHSAK PHUMPREL PROTECTION PGOVBL PSI PRELPK PGOVENRG PUM PRELKPKO PATTY PSOC PRIVATIZATION PRELSP PGOVEAIDUKNOSWGMHUCANLLHFRSPITNZ PMIG PREC PAIGH PROG PSHA PARK PETER POG PHUS PPREL PS PTERPREL PRELPGOV POV PKPO PGOVECON POUS PGOVPRELPHUMPREFSMIGELABEAIDKCRMKWMN PWBG PMAR PREM PAR PNR PRELPGOVEAIDECONEINVBEXPSCULOIIPBTIO PARMIR PGOVGM PHUH PARTM PN PRE PTE PY POLUN PPEL PDOV PGOVSOCI PIRF PGOVPM PBST PRELEVU PGOR PBTSRU PRM PRELKPAOIZ PGVO PERL PGOC PAGR PMIN PHUMR PVIP PPD PGV PRAM PINL PKPAL PTERE PGOF PINO PHAS PODC PRHUM PHUMA PREO PPA PEPFAR PGO PRGOV PAC PRESL PORG PKFK PEPR PRELP PREFA PNG PGOVPHUMKPAO PRELECON PINOCHET PFOR PGOVLO PHUMBA PRELC PREK PHUME PHJM POLINT PGOVPZ PGOVKCRM PGOVE PHALANAGE PARTY PECON PEACE PROCESS PLN PRELSW PAHO PEDRO PRELA PASS PPAO PGPV PNUM PCUL PGGV PSA PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA PGIV PRFE POGOV PEL PBT PAMQ PINF PSEPC POSTS PHUMPGOV PVOV PHSAPREL PROLIFERATION PENA PRELTBIOBA PIN PRELL PGOVPTER PHAM PHYTRP PTEL PTERPGOV PHARM PROTESTS PRELAF PKBL PRELKPAO PKNP PARMP PHUML PFOV PERM PUOS PRELGOV PHUMPTER PARAGRAPH PERURENA PBTSEWWT PCI PETROL PINSO PINSCE PQL PEREZ PBS

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 08STATE100723, EXPANDING THE ADRIATIC CHARTER

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #08STATE100723.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08STATE100723 2008-09-19 21:04 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Secretary of State
VZCZCXRO7286
OO RUEHPOD
DE RUEHC #0723/01 2632108
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O P 192104Z SEP 08
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUEHBW/AMEMBASSY BELGRADE IMMEDIATE 0745
RUEHPOD/AMEMBASSY PODGORICA IMMEDIATE 1378
RUEHVJ/AMEMBASSY SARAJEVO IMMEDIATE 9856
RUEHSQ/AMEMBASSY SKOPJE IMMEDIATE 5815
RUEHTI/AMEMBASSY TIRANA IMMEDIATE 2068
RUEHVB/AMEMBASSY ZAGREB IMMEDIATE 1563
INFO RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 9051
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 STATE 100723 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: MARR NATO PREL MK HR AL SR MW BK
SUBJECT: EXPANDING THE ADRIATIC CHARTER 
 
REF: A. STATE 85946 
     B. ZAGREB 620 
     C. SKOPJE 519 
     D. TIRANA 649 
 
1. (U) This is an action request cable.  Please see paragraph 
8. 
 
2. (U) Objective: To capitalize on Albania, Croatia and 
Macedonia's affirmation that the Adriatic Charter should be 
expanded to include Bosnia and Herzegovina and Montenegro by 
outlining a process by which they will offer them full 
participation in the near-term while leaving the door open to 
Serbia to join at a later date. 
 
3. (SBU) BACKGROUND:  In response to our recent demarche (ref 
A), Albania, Croatia, and Macedonia confirmed they see 
continued value in the Adriatic Charter mechanism and support 
expansion to include Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and 
eventually Serbia.  The Adriatic Charter (A3) - signed on May 
2, 2003 in Tirana - has played an important role in promoting 
regional cooperation and furthering the Euro-Atlantic 
integration efforts of Albania, Croatia, and Macedonia.  The 
Charter, modeled on the Baltic Charter from 1998, has 
institutionalized peace and stability within the framework of 
joint efforts to fulfill NATO aspirations. It helped 
transform the A3 nations from consumers to producers of 
security by promoting reforms and supporting the efforts of 
state institutions, particularly in times of crises.  In 
addition, A3 exercises, deployments, and training activities 
have served as a litmus test for multinational 
interoperability, a core principle of NATO membership.  A 
joint A3 medical team has been deployed as part of ISAF in 
Afghanistan. 
 
3. (U) Since the Charter's inception, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Montenegro, and Serbia have participated as informal 
observers at Ministerial meetings and joint activities. 
Paragraph 13 of the Charter explicitly recognizes that the 
A3's efforts at Euro-Atlantic integration will be enhanced by 
the participation of all neighbors in regional and 
multilateral institutions. 
 
4. (SBU) Specifically in response to our demarche, Croatia 
noted that it was already cooperating with Montenegro and has 
near-term plans to consult with Bosnia (ref B), and agreed 
that Macedonia could still serve as a mentor to new 
countries, even though it technically remains a NATO 
aspirant.  Albania raised concern about Macedonia's difficult 
position should its dispute with Greece not be resolved 
before the April summit and felt the time may not yet be 
right to invite Serbia, but still supported expansion to 
include the first two (ref C).  Macedonia stated willingness 
to support new Adriatic Charter participants but fretted 
about keeping Croatia and Albania fully engaged in the 
process (ref D).  END BACKGROUND. 
 
5. (SBU) The Allies intrinsically acknowledged the A3's 
successes at NATO's Bucharest Summit.  Invitations were 
granted to Albania and Croatia, but Macedonia was held back 
solely due to a bilateral issue with Greece over its name. 
Bosnia and Herzegovina and Montenegro moved into Intensified 
Dialogue (ID) with NATO, while the door remains open for 
Serbia to do the same. 
 
6. (SBU) In a region that recently experienced acute violence 
and dysfunctional institutions, the Charter has helped to 
amplify and concentrate NATO's effects on reforming military 
capabilities and building democratic institutions.  The U.S. 
participation helped guarantee the positive reform efforts of 
the A3, especially under difficult circumstances in each 
country.  The USG now places the emphasis on the A3 to work 
together and guarantee the pace and quality of reforms among 
its neighbors.  The Charter has been an effective forum for 
aspirants to share best practices, build trust, and further 
cooperation on common goals. We foresee the original A3 
countries would play a mentoring role to new participants. 
 
7. (SBU) As a next step, we envision a way to expand the 
Adriatic Charter would be an exchange of diplomatic notes, 
followed by a meeting of the expanded five countries before 
the end of 2008.  First, Bosnia and Herzegovina and 
 
STATE 00100723  002 OF 003 
 
 
Montenegro should be encouraged to formally request 
participation via diplomatic note.  Macedonia, as the 
rotating A3 chair, should coordinate with Croatia and Albania 
a response via diplomatic note extending the invitation to 
join.  This note could reference paragraph 13 of the Adriatic 
Charter, in which the A3 affirmed "their determination to 
further enhance bilateral, regional and multilateral 
relations between themselves and Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia 
and Montenegro and with other neighbors."  It might also note 
that the A3 countries would assist the new participants to 
pursue their NATO aspirations.  After Bosnia and Montenegro 
positively respond via diplomatic note, Macedonia should 
organize a meeting of the expanded Adriatic Charter countries 
before the end of 2008.  While we believe this process would 
be sufficient to make Adriatic Charter expansion official, it 
is possible the countries would prefer to formalize the 
expansion via a simple joint declaration at the expanded 
meeting or perhaps an addendum to the original Charter, to 
possibly include a signing ceremony. 
 
8. (U) The Department requests that Posts deliver the 
following talking points to appropriate officials in their 
host government. 
 
BEGIN TALKING POINTS 
 
Tirana and Zagreb: 
-- Bucharest decision rewarded your efforts and demonstrated 
the value and success of regional cooperation. 
-- You agreed again recently the Charter should be updated to 
include Bosnia and Herzegovina and Montenegro as full 
participants and the door should also be left open for Serbia. 
-- The U.S. believes the Charter can continue to provide a 
useful mechanism and support for developing NATO's 
relationship with the countries of the region, and therefore 
we intend to continue our active support for the Charter's 
activities.  We expect continued, serious participation on 
your part as well, including high-level representation and 
use of the rotating chair position to the fullest extent 
possible. 
-- Your role as a mentor to new participants will be vital to 
their progress. 
-- We believe that expansion of the Adriatic Charter could be 
achieved via an exchange of diplomatic notes and wanted to 
get your views on the way forward. 
-- For example, once Bosnia and Herzegovina and Montenegro 
formally request participation, Macedonia as the rotating 
chair could coordinate the response officially inviting them 
to join. 
-- Once the exchange of diplomatic notes was complete, a 
meeting of the expanded Adriatic Charter countries could be 
held. 
-- While we believe this process would make the Adriatic 
Charter expansion official, we are also open to other 
options, such as having Charter participants make a simple 
joint declaration at the expanded meeting to note the new 
participants.  Another option would be to further formalize 
the arrangement via an addendum to the charter.  We would be 
interested in your views on whether either a declaration or 
an addendum would be useful or necessary, or whether an 
exchange of diplomatic notes and an expanded meeting would be 
best. 
-- We urge that the process be completed by the end of 2008. 
 
Skopje: 
-- USG remains committed to your NATO membership aspirations; 
partnership agreement signed in May demonstrates unwavering 
support of USG. 
-- We are pleased that you agree the Charter should be 
updated to include Bosnia and Herzegovina and Montenegro as 
full participants, and that the door should also be left open 
for Serbia. 
-- Macedonia has made tremendous strides in working toward 
NATO membership; your neighbors need to learn from your 
efforts.  You can further demonstrate that you can shoulder 
the responsibilities of Alliance membership by using enhanced 
Adriatic Charter to mentor other NATO aspirants and advance 
regional stability efforts. 
-- The US believes the Charter can continue to provide a 
useful mechanism and support for developing NATO's 
relationship with the countries of the region, and therefore 
we intend to continue our active support for the Charter's 
activities. 
--- Your role as a mentor to new participants will be vital 
to their progress. 
-- We believe that expansion of the Adriatic Charter could be 
 
STATE 00100723  003 OF 003 
 
 
achieved via an exchange of diplomatic notes and wanted to 
get your views on the way forward. 
-- For example, once Bosnia and Herzegovina and Montenegro 
formally request participants, Macedonia as the rotating 
chair could coordinate the response officially inviting them 
to join. 
-- Once the exchange of diplomatic notes is complete, a 
meeting of the expanded Adriatic Charter countries could be 
held. 
-- While we believe this process would make the Adriatic 
Charter expansion official, we are also open to other 
options, such as having Charter participants make a simple 
joint declaration at the expanded meeting to note the new 
participants.  Another option would be to further formalize 
the arrangement via an addendum to the charter.  We would be 
interested in your views on whether either a declaration or 
an addendum would be useful or necessary, or whether an 
exchange of diplomatic notes and an expanded meeting would be 
best. 
-- We urge that the process be completed by the end of 2008. 
-- We urge you to take the lead as the current chair and look 
forward to working with you closely to make this happen. 
 
Bosnia and Montenegro: 
-- USG welcomes your deeper engagement with NATO and the 
Bucharest decision to start Intensified Dialogue (ID). 
-- The road ahead will be difficult, but your commitment to 
reform and your performance can demonstrate to Allies that 
you are serious about membership. 
-- You have the benefit of neighbors and Allies who have 
traveled this path ahead of you; it is critical that you 
follow their good examples and avoid the pitfalls they 
experienced. 
-- Understand your interest in joining Adriatic Charter as 
full participants; U.S. consulted with A3 to update Charter 
to reflect post-Bucharest situation and they agree that 
expansion is a good idea. 
-- We believe Charter remains useful mechanism for regional 
cooperation toward Euro-Atlantic integration and support your 
request to join. 
-- The door should also be left open for Serbia. 
-- Should the A3 countries agree to your participation in the 
Charter, we would expect serious participation on your part, 
including high-level representation and use of the rotating 
chair position to the fullest extent possible. 
 
Serbia: 
-- USG continues to view Serbia as an important member of the 
Euro-Atlantic community and supports your full integration 
into its institutions. 
-- Bucharest declaration made clear that the door remains 
open for deeper engagement between NATO and Serbia. 
-- The process is demand-driven; Allies recognize that Serbia 
will move forward at its own pace. 
-- We welcome GoS comments on intended further PfP 
engagement. 
-- We are working with participants in the Adriatic Charter 
to update the Charter to reflect post-Bucharest situation. 
-- We believe Charter remains useful mechanism for regional 
cooperation toward Euro-Atlantic integration and we support 
Bosnia and Herzegovina's and Montenegro's request to join the 
expanded A3 within their new status in ID. 
-- We also believe that Serbia should become a full 
participant after the GoS moves forward on its NATO path; 
until then, we look forward to your continued participation 
in observer status. 
 
END TALKING POINTS. 
RICE