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Viewing cable 08SANJOSE745, SUPREME COURT RULING DELAYS CAFTA IMPLEMENTATION

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08SANJOSE745 2008-09-12 23:49 2011-03-02 16:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy San Jose
Appears in these articles:
http://www.nacion.com/2011-03-02/Investigacion.aspx
VZCZCXYZ0000
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHSJ #0745/01 2562349
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 122349Z SEP 08
FM AMEMBASSY SAN JOSE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0103
INFO RUEHZA/WHA CENTRAL AMERICAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHDG/AMEMBASSY SANTO DOMINGO PRIORITY 1594
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
UNCLAS SAN JOSE 000745 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR WHA, WHA/CEN, WHA/EPSC AND EEB; PLEASE PASS TO 
USTR:AMALITO AND DOLIVER 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: CS ECON ETRD PGOV PINR PREL
SUBJECT: SUPREME COURT RULING DELAYS CAFTA IMPLEMENTATION 
PAST OCTOBER 1 
 
REF: SAN JOSE 634 AND PREVIOUS 
 
1.  (SBU) SUMMARY:  The Costa Rican Supreme Court has thrown 
up one more obstacle to CAFTA, ruling that one section of the 
final CAFTA implementation bill (on IPR and biodiversity 
issues) was unconstitutional.  The Constitutional Chamber 
(Sala IV) held that the GOCR should have consulted with Costa 
Rica,s indigenous communities, in compliance with the ILO 
Convention 169, about CAFTA-generated changes in the existing 
biodiversity law that could affect those communities.  The 
Sala IV,s action shocked the GOCR, pro-CAFTA legislators and 
the private sector.  While a definitive prognosis awaits 
publication of the full Sala ruling (expected on September 
16), VP Chinchilla told is September 12 that meeting the 
October 1 EIF deadline was now completely out of the 
question, even under the best case scenario.  She said the 
GOCR will need another 1-3 months to correct and re-approve 
the IPR bill.  Chinchilla and COMEX VM Pacheco did not ask us 
explicitly for an EIF extension (nor did we even hint at 
one), but they made clear that the GOCR was already laying 
the groundwork, and had received positive signals thus far 
from other CAFTA members.  They also stressed that the Arias 
administration, its pro-CAFTA allies in the legislature and 
the private sector had been re-galvanized into action by the 
Sala ruling, and were determined to wrap up this law and all 
the pending technical issues as quickly as possible.  COMEX 
Minister Ruiz is to call DUSTR Vereneau on September 15 to 
discuss the issue.  END SUMMARY. 
 
------------------------- 
Sala Surprise Attack 
------------------------- 
 
2.  (U) On September 11, the Sala IV (Constitutional Court) 
ruled 4-3 that one section of the final CAFTA implementation 
bill (on IPR and biodiversity issues) was unconstitutional. 
The majority opinion, written by Supreme Court President Luis 
Paulino Mora, held that the GOCR should have consulted with 
Costa Rica,s indigenous communities, in compliance with the 
ILO Convention 169, about CAFTA-generated changes in the 
existing biodiversity law that could affect those 
communities.  The Sala also ruled that proposed changes in 
the law had not been publicized adequately.  Details on the 
Sala,s decision are pending release of the full ruling, 
expected on September 16. 
 
3.  (U) NOTE:  The relevant portion of Article 6 of the 1989 
ILO convention, which is also known as the Indigenous and 
Tribal Peoples Convention, states that "governments shall 
consult the peoples concerned, through appropriate procedures 
and in particular through their representative institutions, 
whenever consideration is given to legislative or 
administrative measures which may affect them directly." 
This issue had not been raised in the Sala IV,s majority 
opinions on other CAFTA legislation.  END NOTE. 
 
4.  (SBU) The Sala IV,s action shocked the GOCR, pro-CAFTA 
legislators and the private sector, and generated a series of 
emergency meetings convened by VP Laura Chinchilla (acting 
for President Arias who was still in Europe).  In an evening 
press conference, a stunned-looking Chinchilla indicated that 
the GOCR respected the Court,s decision, but now doubted 
that Costa Rica could implement CAFTA in time for the October 
1 entry-into-force deadline.   She added that she would 
"explore the possibility" of extending the deadline in a 
meeting with the Embassy on September 12.   The press 
conference was followed by media releases on September 11 and 
12 noting that the Sala,s decision placed full 
implementation by October 1 in jeopardy, but underscoring the 
GOCR,s determination to do all it could do to complete CAFTA 
as quickly as possible. 
 
------------------------------------------- 
GOCR Will Not Make the Deadline 
 ------------------------------------------ 
 
5.  (SBU) Meeting with the DCM and Emboffs on September 12, 
Chinchilla and COMEX Vice Minister Amparo Pacheco reiterated 
that they had no advance notice of the somewhat puzzling Sala 
IV decision.  The good news:  the Court had found only 
procedural problems, which were less difficult to correct. 
Court President Mora himself had assured Chinchilla that the 
correction process should be "manageable".  The bad news: 
meeting the October 1 EIF deadline was now completely out of 
the question, even under the best case scenario.  Chinchilla 
(who had been in contact with President Arias, COMEX Minister 
 
Ruiz and the other senior officials traveling in Europe) 
predicted it would take "another 1-3 months" to address the 
problems identified by the Court. 
 
6.  (SBU) According to Chinchilla, in the best case scenario, 
the Sala would provide its full ruling to the legislature 
ASAP; she had asked the Court to do so by September 16.  The 
Constitutional Consultation Committee would then take action, 
hopefully agreeing to strip out the problematic text and 
sending the modified bill for approval by a plenary vote. 
Given debate rules and the possibility of majority and 
minority reports issued by the committee, even this "fast" 
scenario could take a few weeks, and Chinchilla stressed that 
any changes to the law would have to be accepted by USTR as 
well.  She added that the highly legalistic pro-CAFTA 
Libertarian Movement (ML) party could be as problematic in 
thi scenario as the PAC-led opposition. 
 
7.  (SBU) n a worst case scenario, the law might have to be 
more extensively modified, which would take more tme, and/or 
the opposition might press for anothe 30-day Sala IV review. 
 If indigenous consultatons could not be handled in parallel 
(and separaely from the CAFTA bill itself), then additionaltime would be required before the bill was complete.  If 
comprehensive community-by-community consutations were 
required, the GOCR could find itsel holding the equivalent 
of a "mini-referendum" o CAFTA with the indigenous people. 
The GOCR wantd to avoid this at all costs: such a lengthy 
dela could invite new attacks from the small, but stil 
vocal, anti-CAFTA minority.  Chinchilla and Paceco seemed 
reasonably confident, however, that tis "worse-worst" case 
option would not be needed, pending analysis of the Sala 
IV,s full ruling. 
 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
Laying Groundwork for a Second Extension 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
 
8.  (SBU) Chinchilla and Pacheco did not ask us explicitly 
for an EIF extension (nor did we even hint at one), but they 
made clear that the GOCR was already laying the groundwork. 
Minister Ruiz and the Costa Rican Embassy in Washington had 
begun informal consultations with the other CAFTA members. 
The signals about a later entry for Costa Rica were positive 
thus far, according to Pacheco.   Echoing the earlier media 
releases, Chinchilla and Pacheco made clear that the Arias 
administration, its pro-CAFTA allies in the legislature and 
the private sector had been re-galvanized into action by the 
Sala ruling, and were determined to make the required 
corrections to this last law, plus resolve the pending 
technical issues on IPR, insurance and telecom, as quickly as 
possible.  Chinchilla acknowledged that "everything" had to 
be completed before CAFTA could enter into force for Costa 
Rica.   She added that Minister Ruiz would call DUSTR 
Vereneau on September 15 to discuss these issues further. 
 
--------------- 
COMMENT 
--------------- 
 
9.  (SBU) This ruling was clearly a surprising blow to the 
GOCR, which as recently as September 10 had been laying out a 
(very optimistic) timetable to complete all legislation and 
regulations by September 23.  But, there are some silver 
linings. The pro-CAFTA forces are energized and believe they 
can bring this to resolution.  The GOCR is doing its own 
heavy lifting to prepare the other CAFTA partners to permit 
later EIF by Costa Rica.  Under these circumstances, although 
they are not ideal, we recommend that President Arias be 
included in the September 24 AGP summit as planned.   Being 
in a room full of counterparts who have long since completed 
their FTAs with the United States, and hearing a strong 
pro-trade message from POTUS can only help. 
 
10. (SBU) Later, we (and the Arias administration, no doubt) 
will examine more closely why the Sala made this decision, 
and why President Mora (who acknowledged to the Ambassador 
recently the need to get CAFTA done) authored it. 
Interestingly, Sala IV President Ana Virginia Calzada, a 
biodiversity expert who had ruled (in the minority) against 
some of the earlier CAFTA bills, and who was judged most 
likely of all the magistrates to have voted no on this bill, 
ruled in favor this time.   Finally, for those keeping score, 
the legislature approved one additional bill since our last 
report (Reftel), bringing the total approved to 12, with nine 
of those actually signed into law. 
 
 
 
CIANCHETTE