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Viewing cable 08ROME1192, VELTRONI TO REMAIN CAPTAIN--FOR NOW, BUT PD IS

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08ROME1192 2008-09-24 08:50 2011-03-14 11:00 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Rome
VZCZCXRO0224
RR RUEHFL RUEHNP
DE RUEHRO #1192/01 2680850
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 240850Z SEP 08
FM AMEMBASSY ROME
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0933
INFO RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE
RUEHFL/AMCONSUL FLORENCE 3208
RUEHMIL/AMCONSUL MILAN 9565
RUEHNP/AMCONSUL NAPLES 3362
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ROME 001192 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/10/2018 
TAGS: PGOV PREL SOCI IT
SUBJECT: VELTRONI TO REMAIN CAPTAIN--FOR NOW, BUT PD IS 
ADRIFT 
 

Classified By: Ambassador Ronald P. Spogli for Reasons 1.4 (B) and (D) 
 


Summary 
- - - - - - - - 
 
1. (C) Having led the Democratic Party (PD) into defeat in 
national and local elections this spring, Walter Veltroni is 
proving no more adept in opposition. Veltroni has lost much 
of his support within the party and has until next spring's 
European Parliament elections to salvage his position and 
retain leadership of the party.  Local elections this fall 
will be an uphill battle for Veltroni, and although they have 
a different dynamic than national trends, they will foster 
the notion of Veltroni's weakness. Possible successors, 
including former Foreign Minister Massimo D'Alema, are not 
challenging Veltroni's position directly for the moment. 
Regardless of Veltroni's fate, the PD will endure, but will 
need to adapt to be a viable electoral challenger to the 
center right.  End Summary. 
 


Uncertain in Opposition 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 

2. (C) After the April 2008 defeat, Veltroni has appeared 
uncertain on strategy, trying out several tactics with little 
success. Shortly after the election, Veltroni created a 
shadow cabinet to strengthen internal discipline and develop 
policy expertise. Although a somewhat innovative move in 
Italian politics, the shadow cabinet failed to capture the 
attention of the media, and leading PD figures assailed it 
both because it discounted the value of coalition allies and 
because it bolstered Veltroni's leadership position. 
 


3. (C) Veltroni sought to enhance his profile as a new-style 
politician by shying away from harsh attacks on Prime 
Minister Silvio Berlusconi while announcing that he wanted to 
find opportunities to cooperate. Given the center-right's 
ample majority, it has not had to reach across the aisle to 
work with PD. Furthermore, Veltroni opened up his left flank, 
giving erstwhile coalition ally Antonio DiPietro and his 
Italy of Values party an opportunity to gain ground through 
populist attacks on the government. DiPietro, who has also 
launched withering attacks on Veltroni, will siphon off votes 
from the PD in local elections this fall and in the European 
Parliament elections unless PD and IdV reach a new accord. 
 


4. (C) To distract public attention from PD's internal 
squabbles, in July Veltroni launched the symbolic signature 
drive &Let,s Save Italy8 with a goal of gathering 5 
million signatures by October 25, when the effort will 
culminate in a large demonstration against the government. 
The initiative started off with a few negative notes as some 
local PD officials announced that they would not sign the 
petition because it would jeopardize their relations with the 
national government.  Thus far, the initiative has had a 
limited national profile. A leading political commentator 
also warned that rooting a petition in a critique of 
Berlusconi rather than a positive agenda could backfire if a 
majority of the public continues to assess that Berlusconi is 
going in the right direction. 
 


5. (C) PD officials are pessimistic and dispirited, feeling 
that Veltroni has done little to unify the new party, either 
by developing a consensus among the party heavyweights or 
forging a new PD culture after the union of the 
post-communist Democrats of the Left (DS) and the Daisy 
party, which emerged out of the left-wing elements of the 
centrist Christian Democratic party. In an August 4 meeting 
with the Ambassador, Senator Franco Marini described the PD 
as ""leaderless"" and said that ""Veltroni is no Obama."" Critics 
say that Veltroni has been too authoritarian, failing to 
listen to the opinions of the different strands of the party. 
 


Upcoming Challenges 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 


6. (C) PD's national election defeat in April was followed by 
a loss in the Rome mayoral race and then defeats in local 
elections. That losing streak is set to continue this fall, 
albeit in races with limited national significance. PD is 
expected to lose in votes in Trentino in October and Abruzzo 
in November. The continuing losses will give Veltroni's 
critics plenty of room to continue beating Veltroni up in the 
press. 
 


7. (C) The center right has an aggressive legislative agenda 
to take advantage of the government's popularity and the 
opposition's disarray and, thus far, has effectively stifled 
opposition attempts to amend or delay legislation. Veltroni's 
best chance to demonstrate his relevance is to make good on 
 
ROME 00001192  002 OF 002 
 
 
his promise to have an effective dialogue with the government 
and influence the government's top legislative 
priorities--fiscal federalism, judicial reform, and a new 
electoral law for the European Parliament elections. The 
center right also would have something to gain by working 
with Veltroni on these issues as the center left has levers 
to complicate judicial reform if the government pursues a 
constitutional amendment, given the center-left's influence 
within the judiciary. On fiscal federalism and a reform of 
the electoral law, Veltroni and the center right would be 
likely to find some common ground, allowing Berlusconi to 
enhance his profile as a statesman by working with the 
opposition and Veltroni to potentially strengthen his 
position within the party by showing the rank and file that 
he can get results. 
 


No Reason to Knock off Veltroni--Yet 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 

8. (C) Veltroni has until the European Parliament elections 
to turn things around. The aspirants to Veltroni's throne 
know that there is nothing to be gained through a palace coup 
at this point. Instead, they would prefer that Veltroni stay 
in place to take hits from the left and right and absorb the 
defeats in the administrative and European Parliament 
elections. For now, Veltroni faces his harshest critiques 
from the periphery--Turin Mayor Chiamparino said PD risks an 
implosion; Venice Mayor Cacciari said the PD is so weak that 
it doesn't even really exist in northern Italy. However, the 
heavyweights in Rome have been more understated in their 
criticism, a sign that they are not ready for a leadership 
change just yet. 
 


9. (C) D'Alema is best positioned to challenge Veltroni for 
leadership. D'Alema has criticized Veltroni's tactics and 
leadership style. Should D'Alema launch a formal challenge, 
it would come in the form of calls for a party congress or 
even outright demands for a leadership change. These calls 
could come from D'Alema or his ally former Economic 
Development Minister Pierluigi Bersani, or D'Alema's top 
lieutenants--Nicola LaTorre or Luciano Violante. Party 
officials and journalists are discussing many post-Veltroni 
scenarios, including ones in which PD is led by someone 
without DS or Daisy baggage or by a young rising star, 
although no credible names in either category have been 
widely circulated. 



The View from where Veltroni sits 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - - - - - 


10. (C) In a July 29 meeting with the Ambassador, Veltroni 
dismissed internal rumblings about the future of the PD as 
the nervousness of young politicians inexperienced in the 
normal upturns and downswings in party fortunes. The press 
reports that Veltroni believes he is at a low point and will 
manage to regain some consensus during the fall legislative 
battles. He is also banking on center-right slip ups, 
including in the restructuring of Alitalia in which the 
center right has to negotiate with the interests of the 
entrenched unions. Italy's tenuous economic situation could 
lead to other cracks in the coalition as the government seeks 
to make some budget cuts. 
 

Comment 
- - - - - - - - 


11. (C) The first indicator of Veltroni's viability will be 
this fall's local elections, which have a different dynamic 
than national trends, but will be a struggle for Veltroni and 
will give his critics more ammunition. Then, the May 2009 
European Parliament elections will be of paramount 
importance, and Veltroni will not survive as party leader 
unless PD turns out a stronger performance than now expected. 
If the PD shows gains in that election, Veltroni's position 
will be strengthened significantly and he will keep his job. 
In the meantime, he could help his case by scoring 
legislative victories by working with the center right to 
shape legislation in ways that PD members judge to be 
victories. A final key factor is whether the center right 
stumbles and offers Veltroni an opening, which could come in 
the form of coalition squabbling or unpopular economic 
reforms. Over the long run, a strong PD is in America's 
interest because it is a center-left party that isolates the 
more populist and shrill far-left elements that have 
consistently been troublesome in center-left governments. 
 
 
SPOGLI 
"