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Viewing cable 08RABAT852, SPECIAL MEDIA REACTION: VISIT OF SECRETARY

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08RABAT852 2008-09-10 15:55 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Rabat
VZCZCXRO9836
PP RUEHTRO
DE RUEHRB #0852/01 2541555
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 101555Z SEP 08
FM AMEMBASSY RABAT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9094
INFO RUCNMGH/MAGHREB COLLECTIVE
RUEHLB/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT 0569
RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS 0737
RUEHDE/AMCONSUL DUBAI 0147
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 RABAT 000852 
 
SIPDIS 
SENSITIVE 
 
STATE FOR NEA/PPD, NEA/MAG, NEA/PI AND DRL/NESCA 
LONDON FOR MOC 
DUBAI FOR PELLETIER 
 
E.0. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL OVIP PHUM KDEM KPAO EAID KMPI MO
SUBJECT: SPECIAL MEDIA REACTION: VISIT OF SECRETARY 
OF STATE RICE TO MOROCCO, SEPTEMBER 6-7, 2008 
 
RABAT 00000852  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
1.  Summary: Moroccan press coverage of Secretary 
Rice's September 6-7 visit to Morocco was 
principally factual and positive, focused on 
statements she made that the press described as 
supportive of the Moroccan perspective on Western 
Sahara negotiations.  The Moroccan press also 
highlighted her stated support for Moroccan reform. 
A few newspapers viewed the Secretary's visit as an 
afterthought and doubted the USG would engage more 
robustly on Western Sahara.  End summary. 
 
2.  The Moroccan press, both print and broadcast, 
provided substantial and sustained coverage of the 
Secretary's visit to Morocco, as well as her 
previous stops in Libya, Tunisia and Algeria.  Local 
television provided lengthy, prime-time news 
coverage at the top of their broadcasts following 
the obligatory reports on royal activities; most 
print articles were placed on page one.  Practically 
every word of the Secretary's remarks on Morocco 
made during her joint press conference with Moroccan 
Foreign Minister Fassi Fihri was widely quoted in 
the press.  The coverage was principally factual, 
focused on two primary themes: 
 
-- Western Sahara:  The press universally 
highlighted Secretary Rice's statement that "there 
are good ideas on the table, and we don't need to 
start over."  This was widely portrayed in the local 
press as indicating support for Morocco's autonomy 
proposal as the basis for future negotiations.  The 
Moroccan press took this as a positive signal that 
despite the recent end of UNSYG Personal Envoy for 
Western Sahara Peter Van Walsum's mandate, there 
would soon be a next round of negotiations, and that 
they would not have to start over from scratch, 
incorporating perspectives favorable to Morocco. 
 
-- Moroccan reform:  Secretary Rice and Fassi Fihri 
both highlighted USG support for Morocco's reform 
agenda, as evidenced by the Millennium Challenge 
Account Compact signed last year.  The press widely 
quoted the Secretary as saying, "Everyone has been 
impressed by the reforms that have been launched 
under His Majesty King Mohammed VI."  The local 
press also highlighted Fassi Fihri's comments 
praising the success of the U.S.-Morocco Free Trade 
Agreement. 
 
3.  The limited commentary in the Moroccan print 
media focused on the sense that Secretary Rice's 
visit -- coming as it did so soon before the end of 
her mandate -- was made principally for protocol 
purposes.  Some dailies averred that this was the 
reason the Secretary was not received by the King. 
Independent daily "Al Massae" stated the fact that 
the Secretary's visit came so late during her tenure 
demonstrated the lack of USG strategic interest in 
addressing the Western Sahara conflict, especially 
given oil and gas interests in Algeria, and 
concluded that the countries of the region had to 
rely on themselves to solve the conflict.  Pro- 
palace daily "Le Matin" opined that, as a result of 
the Secretary's visit, she better understood the 
importance of resolving the Western Sahara conflict 
for rQional stability.  Moroccan National Press 
Union head Younes M'Jahed argued in socialist party 
daily "Liberation" that the core tenets of U.S. 
foreign policy did not change much from 
administration to administration, and thus though 
the Secretary's visit appeared tactical, it was in 
fact strategic. 
 
4.  Independent daily "Aujourd'hui le Maroc" 
commented sarcastically on Secretary Rice's 
statement in Algiers that Algerian President 
Bouteflika was a "wise" man, arguing that his wisdom 
has not been in evidence in the way he has ruled 
Algeria.  The newspaper wrote, "Closed borders, 33 
years of a false fratricidal conflict, a Maghreb 
ideal that has been knocked off, a latent civil war, 
an eroded civil society, a despoiled economy, a 
political life that has been eradicated, etc.  We do 
not see where the president's wisdom resides." 
 
RABAT 00000852  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
 
5.  The local press also widely, although far less 
prominently, covered a sit-in on Sunday, September 7, 
in front of Parliament to protest the Secretary's 
visit.  A communique distributed by a group of 
Moroccan non-governmental organizations (NGOs) 
participating in the protest said, "Legal activists 
staged [Sunday] a protest sit-in at the Parliament 
to condemn the U.S. Secretary of State's visit to 
Morocco and to make heard the voice of Moroccan 
civil society, [which] reject[s] U.S. foreign policy 
in the region, characterized by its absolute bias in 
favor of Israel, its aggressive policy against Arab 
and Muslim peoples, especially in Iraq, Afghanistan, 
the Sudan and Somalia."  (Comment:  This same small 
group of NGOs periodically demonstrates against USG 
policies, and also promotes -- largely 
unsuccessfully -- a boycott of USG activities in 
Morocco.  End comment.) 
 
Riley