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Viewing cable 08NAIROBI2200, KENYA'S REFORM CHALLENGE

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08NAIROBI2200 2008-09-18 11:25 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Nairobi
VZCZCXYZ0018
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHNR #2200/01 2621125
ZNR UUUUU ZZH (CCY - TEXT ADX DA3C20506A)
P 181125Z SEP 08   ZDS
FM AMEMBASSY NAIROBI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7080
INFO RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE
RUEHDR/AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM 6097
RUEHKH/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM 2160
RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA 0232
RUEHKM/AMEMBASSY KAMPALA 2960
RUEHDJ/AMEMBASSY DJIBOUTI 5389
RHMFIUU/CDR USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE
RHMFISS/HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE
RHMFIUU/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RHMFIUU/CJTF HOA
UNCLAS NAIROBI 002200 
 
C O R R E C T E D  C O P Y (TEXT) 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR AF/E, DRL 
 
Reference: A. NAIROBI 869 
B. 07 Nairobi 4652 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV SOCI KDEM ASEC KE
SUBJECT: KENYA'S REFORM CHALLENGE 
 
------- 
Summary 
------- 
 
1. (U) On September 17, President Kibaki and Prime Minister 
Raila Odinga received the final report from the commission 
investigating the conduct of Kenya's 2007 elections.  Kofi 
Annan was scheduled to arrive in Nairobi on September 18 to 
receive the report as well.  This report is the first to 
emerge from the commissions formed in response to Kenya's 
post-election political crisis, and it is expected to be 
made public on September 19.  This -- and the report of the 
Waki Commission on post-election violence, which is 
expected on or about October 22 -- will be a critically 
important step on Kenya's road to reform, and potentially a 
test for the coalition government.  Isolated incidents of 
violence and continued hostility among populations in the 
Rift Valley witnessed during a recent trip by the 
Ambassador point to the importance of enacting the agreed- 
upon constitutional and other reforms to redress the 
problems that led to violence in the first place.  Kenya's 
challenge will be to enact these reforms quickly without 
re-igniting open conflict.  End Summary. 
 
--------------------------- 
IREC Report: The First Test 
--------------------------- 
 
2. (U) On September 17, the Independent Review Commission 
(IREC, ref A), chaired by former South African Judge Johann 
Kriegler, presented a report detailing its findings 
regarding the conduct of the December 2007 General 
Elections.  These elections, which were disputed, sparked 
violence that resulted in the deaths of approximately 1,500 
and the displacement of over 600,000 Kenyans, predominantly 
in the Rift Valley Province. 
 
3. (SBU) President Kibaki publicly promised to make the 
Kriegler report public on September 19.   We expect the 
report to focus on recommendations for the future rather 
than to lay blame for actions in the past.  However, we 
also anticipate that the report will find that the 
electoral process lacked integrity, and that the Electoral 
Commission of Kenya (ECK) bears much of the responsibility. 
According to members of the Commission, the report will 
also make a series of recommendations for electoral reform 
that will result in a "material transformation" (read: 
complete overhaul) of the ECK.  The full implementation of 
these recommendations will be a critical step to ensuring 
free and fair elections in the future. 
 
4. (U) The report will not pronounce on who rightfully 
should have won the election.  Not only was this not part 
of IREC's mandate, but Kriegler has already said publicly 
that the process was so flawed that it is impossible to 
tell who won or lost.  In this regard, the release of the 
report will undoubtedly be a disappointment for many 
Kenyans, many of whom expect the commission to render a 
more definitive finding on the December 27 elections. 
 
5. (U) The report of the Waki Commission on post-election 
violence, which is expected on or about October 22, will be 
another important milestone.  The Commission took testimony 
until September 2 from a wide variety of people who 
discussed potentially volatile issues, such as the how 
local leaders encouraged and funded their communities to 
commit violence against one another. 
 
--------------------- 
Need For Reform Clear 
--------------------- 
 
6. (U) Unquestionably a sense of calm has returned to Kenya 
since President Mwai Kibaki and Prime Minister Raila Odinga 
signed a political accord in February.  The President and 
Prime Minister have both told the Ambassador the Grand 
Coalition Government is functioning "reasonably well," and 
E 
there is an ongoing dialogue across political lines on how 
to approach the constitutional and other structural reforms 
necessary to address the social inequities and power 
imbalances that contributed to the widespread violence. 
However, recent events have demonstrated that this calm is 
fragile and will likely remain so until deep and 
significant reforms are undertaken and reconciliation 
efforts begin to take root. 
 
7. (U) Many Kenyans are still deeply resentful of the 
underlying social conditions that fuelled the violence 
earlier this year.  Kalenjin youth told the Ambassador 
during an early September trip to the Rift Valley Province 
that political leaders have yet to address the fundamental 
issues that triggered the post-election violence in the 
first place.  In their minds, the main issues are 
inequitable resource allocation and political power.  "It's 
as if we (Kalenjins) own the cow, we milk it, and then (the 
Kikuyu) drink the milk," according to one of the youth. 
 
8. (U) Other signs of discontent were visible during the 
Ambassador's trip.  While religious organizations are key 
to the reconciliation process, it was clear that there are 
still intra- and inter-ethnic divisions among religious 
leaders (ref B).  Also, people still residing in camps for 
internally displaced persons (IDPs) have protested what 
they claim to be non-transparent handling of government- 
sponsored resettlement stipends.  IDPs residing in transit 
camps or with relatives are less visible, but still 
resentful of the way they have been treated.  (Note: Deputy 
Prime Minister Uhuru Kenyatta, who traveled to the Rift 
Valley just before the Ambassador, told Pol FSN that he was 
shocked to learn that so many IDPs had not been taken care 
of.  He used his own money to send blankets to the IDP camp 
in Eldoret.  End Note.) 
 
9. (U) As a sign of the volatility of land disputes (and 
the universally recognized need for land reform) an August 
barroom brawl between a Kikuyu man and a Maasai man that 
led to the Maasai man's death triggered wider clashes in 
the town of Maela, approximately 30 miles southeast of 
Naivasha in the Rift Valley Province.  Since September 7, 
several people have been killed and hundreds displaced from 
Maela, according to press reports.  The underlying conflict 
between the two communities is a land dispute that has 
erupted periodically since the 1980s. 
 
10. (U) The post-election violence created a new demand for 
small arms, which, according to a May report by the Peace 
and Development Network Trust (PEACENET), Kenya's well- 
established black market adapted to serve.  Rumors are now 
circulating that Kenyans of different ethnicities continue 
to arm themselves with machetes and guns. 
 
------- 
Comment 
------- 
 
11. (U) Kenyans have reason to be proud of the rapid 
improvement in the security situation in the wake of the 
post-election crisis.  Tensions that fuelled the violence 
earlier this year still simmer beneath the surface, 
however.  For this reason, Kenya's leaders will have to 
take into consideration the potential volatility of issues 
such as land, resettlement, and accountability as they move 
forward with the reform program. 
 
12. (U) The Government of Kenya does not have a strong 
track record of handling sensitive national issues 
transparently or equitably.  The pre-emptive shifting of 
many IDPs earlier this year from well-serviced camps back 
to their home areas -- where many now live in makeshift 
transit camps -- is just one example of how far the 
government has to go in its dealings with the public. 
However, much progress has been made since 1994, when 
security forces chased IDPs away from Maela at gunpoint. 
13. (U) If the Grand Coalition Government is to shepherd 
through meaningful reform without re-igniting conflict, it 
will have to be especially sensitive to potential trigger 
points.  We are reaching out to leaders in politics, 
business, and civil society, and urging them to set the 
example by encouraging their followers to keep up the 
pressure for reforms, but to do so peacefully. 
RANNEBERGER