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Viewing cable 08MUNICH319, GERMANY/BAVARIAN ELECTIONS - HISTORIC VOTE COULD END AN ERA

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08MUNICH319 2008-09-25 05:48 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Consulate Munich
VZCZCXRO1096
PP RUEHAG RUEHDF RUEHIK RUEHLZ RUEHPOD RUEHYG
DE RUEHMZ #0319/01 2690548
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 250548Z SEP 08
FM AMCONSUL MUNICH
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4509
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUCPDOC/USDOC WASHDC
RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE
RUCNMEU/EU INTEREST COLLECTIVE
RUCNFRG/FRG COLLECTIVE
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 MUNICH 000319 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV GM
SUBJECT: GERMANY/BAVARIAN ELECTIONS - HISTORIC VOTE COULD END AN ERA 
OR CONFIRM BUSINESS AS USUAL 
 
------- 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
1.  (SBU) Bavarian voters go to the polls September 28, but the 
election could have an impact beyond Bavaria's borders.  If the 
ruling Christian Social Union (CSU) falls below its own goal of 50 
percent of the vote, it could scuttle the careers of the CSU 
leadership duo and shake up the local government.  After forty-six 
years of holding an absolute majority in the state and one year 
before the German national elections, a bad CSU result would not 
only change the balance in the Bundesrat right away but also be an 
early sign of worsening prospects for a center-right national 
coalition in 2009.  End Summary. 
 
 
--------------------------------------- 
The Big 5-0: The CSU's Must-Have Target 
--------------------------------------- 
 
2.  (SBU) The Bavarian state election on September 28 is rousing 
voters not with hot topics but with tantalizing "what-if" 
speculations on how the political landscape in Bavaria and Germany 
might morph depending on the strength of the showing by the 
Christian Social Union (CSU).  Three questions dominate: a) will the 
CSU retain absolute control of the Landtag (parliament), b) are 
there signs that the new SPD leadership will improve its popularity, 
and c) if the CSU gets less than 50 percent of the vote, what will 
be the national repercussions? 
 
3.  (SBU) The CSU has singlehandedly led Bavaria for 46 years, 
purported to be the longest run for a party in all of Europe.  To 
drive the point home, the CSU's ad campaign emphasizes that the CSU 
is Bavaria and Bavaria is CSU.  In an historic shift, fifty percent 
of voters are reportedly undecided, apparently torn between a 
yearning for change for its own sake and a fear of changing a 
winning combination synonymous with prosperity.  The CSU fears 
having to share power with a coalition partner such as the FDP.  A 
sense of entitlement mixed with fear of the unknown could drive a 
decisive number of CSU voters to the polls and put the CSU over the 
top.  Moreover, owing to the arcane formulas that govern filling 
Landtag seats, it is unlikely that the CSU will have to share power 
with a coalition partner even if the CSU comes in just under 50 
percent.  If votes divide as polls suggest, five political parties 
will enter the Landtag:  CSU, SPD (Social Democratic Party) and 
Greens, along with a smattering of FDP (Free Democratic Party) and 
Independents ("Freie Waehler").  It is still open whether The Left 
Party will clear the five percent threshold.  If votes split as 
expected among various parties, even a showing of around 47 percent 
by the CSU might secure an absolute CSU majority in the Landtag. 
Most unlikely is a multi-party coalition led by the SPD, although 
this is the dream of SPD leader Franz Maget.  The new SPD leadership 
of former Labor Minister Franz Muentefering, as SPD 
Chairman-designee and Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier, has 
not yet managed to improve the party's 20 percent standing in the 
Bavarian polls. 
 
------------------------------------ 
Analysis of Voter Concerns: 
Worries of the Rich and Famous 
------------------------------------ 
 
3.  (SBU) At what may be the worst possible moment for the CSU, the 
global financial crisis hit just a week before the election.  The 
CEO of the Bavarian State Bank (BayernLB) had to concede that it had 
lent Euro 300 million to Lehman Brothers, bringing the bank's losses 
in the current crisis to Euro 5.2 billion.  A Landtag (Bavarian 
parliament) investigative committee already looked into the scandal 
earlier this year, trying to find out the extent of CSU chairman 
(and Bavarian Finance Minister) Erwin Huber's involvement.  The 
financial debacle might cost the CSU a decisive percentage point in 
the returns. 
 
4. (SBU) Besides this, Bavarian voters seem more interested in the 
American election than in their own, according to both press reports 
and an informal show of 500 hands at a recent Amerika Haus mock 
Republican versus Democrat debate in Munich.  Enjoying legendary 
prosperity, Bavarian voters have been half-heartedly debating what 
can be characterized as the problems of the well-to-do, such as the 
new smoking ban, overcrowded schools, continued use of nuclear 
power, or the failure to build the much-hyped maglev Transrapid 
train.  The opposition parties have tried to rally voters against 
what they have cast as the CSU's perceived arrogance.  Heavier than 
all this, however, weighs the impression that Bavaria has lost clout 
on the national and international political stage.  The leadership 
duo of Minister President Guenther Beckstein and CSU party chairman 
Erwin Huber is less impressive and powerful than its predecessors, 
 
MUNICH 00000319  002 OF 002 
 
 
famous national leaders like Edmund Stoiber, Theo Waigel or Franz 
Josef Strauss. 
 
---------------------------------------- 
National Fallout from a Weak CSU Showing 
---------------------------------------- 
 
5.  (SBU) A weak CSU showing in the elections would have both local 
and national ramifications.  Most immediately, it could end the 
careers of Beckstein and Huber, the latter of whom has had federal 
cabinet aspirations.  Nationally, a CSU "defeat" would have the 
immediate effect of reordering party proportional representation in 
the Bundesrat (the senate), decreasing CSU representation and 
increasing other party representation.  This could affect the 
balance of support in the next German Presidential elections in May 
2009, potentially improving SPD candidate Gesine Schwan's chances 
against incumbent Horst Koehler (CDU). 
 
6.  (SBU) This negative trend could also have a long-term effect on 
the outsized standing of the CSU at the federal level, and, should 
the trend continue, it could also produce a decrease in the number 
of CSU Bundestag deputies after the 2009 Bundestag elections. 
Stronger blocs would pay less attention to the CSU when filling 
federal ministerial and other important positions.  A weakened CSU 
would be less able to defend Bavarian interests at the federal level 
and could result in a less advantageous agreement with the CDU in a 
future CDU-led government. 
 
 
7.  (SBU) A weak CSU could also damage the sister party, CDU, on the 
national level, dimming the Chancellor's prospects for forming a 
center-right governing coalition with the Free Democrats after 2009 
elections.  CSU politicians regularly point out that their strength 
in Bavaria makes them a disproportionate contributor to the size of 
Merkel's CDU/CSU caucus in the Bundestag. 
 
------- 
Comment 
------- 
 
8.  (SBU) The powers of inertia are strong, in Bavaria probably even 
more than elsewhere.  The current uncertainties may favor the CSU, 
motivating the party faithful to vote.  There is also the lack of 
viable alternatives.  Despite a well-liked opposition leader, the 
SPD seems unable to overcome its 20 percent low point in the polls, 
and small parties like the FDP and Independents in Bavaria are 
collecting protest votes rather than voter magnets based on their 
own virtues.  Still, any figure for the CSU starting with a "4" 
instead of a "5" could lead to an interesting upheaval in local (and 
potentially national) German politics. 
 
9.  The Munich Consulate General coordinated this report with 
Embassy Berlin. 
 
10.  Find Munich's previous reporting at 
http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Germ any. 
 
NELSON