Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 97115 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
ETRD EAGR ETTC EAID ECON EFIN ECIN EINV ELAB EAIR ENRG EPET EWWT ECPS EIND EMIN ELTN EC ETMIN EUC EZ ET ELECTIONS ENVR EU EUN EG EINT ER ECONOMICS ES EMS ENIV EEB EN ECE ECOSOC EK ENVIRONMENT EFIS EI EWT ENGRD ECPSN EXIM EIAD ERIN ECPC EDEV ENGY ECTRD EPA ESTH ECCT EINVECON ENGR ERTD EUR EAP EWWC ELTD EL EXIMOPIC EXTERNAL ETRDEC ESCAP ECO EGAD ELNT ECONOMIC ENV ETRN EIAR EUMEM ENRGPARMOTRASENVKGHGPGOVECONTSPLEAID EREL ECOM ECONETRDEAGRJA ETCC ETRG ECONOMY EMED ETR ENERG EITC EFINOECD EURM EENG ERA EXPORT ENRD ECONEINVETRDEFINELABETRDKTDBPGOVOPIC EGEN EBRD EVIN ETRAD ECOWAS EFTA ECONETRDBESPAR EGOVSY EPIN EID ECONENRG EDRC ESENV ETT EB ENER ELTNSNAR ECHEVARRIA ETRC EPIT EDUC ESA EFI ENRGY ESCI EE EAIDXMXAXBXFFR EETC ECIP EIAID EIVN EBEXP ESTN EING EGOV ETRA EPETEIND ELAN ETRDGK EAIDRW ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS EPEC ENVI ELN EAG EPCS EPRT EPTED ETRB EUM EAIDS EFIC EFINECONEAIDUNGAGM EAIDAR ESF EIDN ELAM EDU EV EAIDAF ECN EDA EXBS EINTECPS ENRGTRGYETRDBEXPBTIOSZ EPREL EAC EINVEFIN ETA EAGER EINDIR ECA ECLAC ELAP EITI EUCOM ECONEFINETRDPGOVEAGRPTERKTFNKCRMEAID EARG ELDIN EINVKSCA ENNP EFINECONCS EFINTS ECCP ETC EAIRASECCASCID EINN ETRP EAIDNI EFQ ECOQKPKO EGPHUM EBUD ECONEINVEFINPGOVIZ ENERGY ELB EINDETRD EMI ECONEFIN EIB EURN ETRDEINVTINTCS EIN EFIM ETIO ELAINE EMN EATO EWTR EIPR EINVETC ETTD ETDR EIQ ECONCS EPPD ENRGIZ EISL ESPINOSA ELEC EAIG ESLCO EUREM ENTG ERD EINVECONSENVCSJA EEPET EUNCH ECINECONCS ETRO ETRDECONWTOCS ECUN EFND EPECO EAIRECONRP ERGR ETRDPGOV ECPN ENRGMO EPWR EET EAIS EAGRE EDUARDO EAGRRP EAIDPHUMPRELUG EICN ECONQH EVN EGHG ELBR EINF EAIDHO EENV ETEX ERNG ED
KMDR KPAO KPKO KJUS KCRM KGHG KFRD KWMN KDEM KTFN KHIV KGIC KIDE KSCA KNNP KHUM KIPR KSUM KISL KIRF KCOR KRCM KPAL KWBG KN KS KOMC KSEP KFLU KPWR KTIA KSEO KMPI KHLS KICC KSTH KMCA KVPR KPRM KE KU KZ KFLO KSAF KTIP KTEX KBCT KOCI KOLY KOR KAWC KACT KUNR KTDB KSTC KLIG KSKN KNN KCFE KCIP KGHA KHDP KPOW KUNC KDRL KV KPREL KCRS KPOL KRVC KRIM KGIT KWIR KT KIRC KOMO KRFD KUWAIT KG KFIN KSCI KTFIN KFTN KGOV KPRV KSAC KGIV KCRIM KPIR KSOC KBIO KW KGLB KMWN KPO KFSC KSEAO KSTCPL KSI KPRP KREC KFPC KUNH KCSA KMRS KNDP KR KICCPUR KPPAO KCSY KTBT KCIS KNEP KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KNNB KGCC KINR KPOP KMFO KENV KNAR KVIR KDRG KDMR KFCE KNAO KDEN KGCN KICA KIMMITT KMCC KLFU KMSG KSEC KUM KCUL KMNP KSMT KCOM KOMCSG KSPR KPMI KRAD KIND KCRP KAUST KWAWC KTER KCHG KRDP KPAS KITA KTSC KPAOPREL KWGB KIRP KJUST KMIG KLAB KTFR KSEI KSTT KAPO KSTS KLSO KWNN KPOA KHSA KNPP KPAONZ KBTS KWWW KY KJRE KPAOKMDRKE KCRCM KSCS KWMNCI KESO KWUN KPLS KIIP KEDEM KPAOY KRIF KGICKS KREF KTRD KFRDSOCIRO KTAO KJU KWMNPHUMPRELKPAOZW KEN KO KNEI KEMR KKIV KEAI KWAC KRCIM KWCI KFIU KWIC KCORR KOMS KNNO KPAI KBWG KTTB KTBD KTIALG KILS KFEM KTDM KESS KNUC KPA KOMCCO KCEM KRCS KWBGSY KNPPIS KNNPMNUC KWN KERG KLTN KALM KCCP KSUMPHUM KREL KGH KLIP KTLA KAWK KWMM KVRP KVRC KAID KSLG KDEMK KX KIF KNPR KCFC KFTFN KTFM KPDD KCERS KMOC KDEMAF KMEPI KEMS KDRM KEPREL KBTR KEDU KNP KIRL KNNR KMPT KISLPINR KTPN KA KJUSTH KPIN KDEV KTDD KAKA KFRP KWNM KTSD KINL KJUSKUNR KWWMN KECF KWBC KPRO KVBL KOM KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KEDM KFLD KLPM KRGY KNNF KICR KIFR KM KWMNCS KAWS KLAP KPAK KDDG KCGC KID KNSD KMPF KPFO KDP KCMR KRMS KNPT KNNNP KTIAPARM KDTB KNUP KPGOV KNAP KNNC KUK KSRE KREISLER KIVP KQ KTIAEUN KPALAOIS KRM KISLAO KWM KFLOA
PHUM PINR PTER PGOV PREL PREF PL PM PHSA PE PARM PINS PK PUNE PO PALESTINIAN PU PBTS PROP PTBS POL POLI PA PGOVZI POLMIL POLITICAL PARTIES POLM PD POLITICS POLICY PAS PMIL PINT PNAT PV PKO PPOL PERSONS PING PBIO PH PETR PARMS PRES PCON PETERS PRELBR PT PLAB PP PAK PDEM PKPA PSOCI PF PLO PTERM PJUS PSOE PELOSI PROPERTY PGOVPREL PARP PRL PNIR PHUMKPAL PG PREZ PGIC PBOV PAO PKK PROV PHSAK PHUMPREL PROTECTION PGOVBL PSI PRELPK PGOVENRG PUM PRELKPKO PATTY PSOC PRIVATIZATION PRELSP PGOVEAIDUKNOSWGMHUCANLLHFRSPITNZ PMIG PREC PAIGH PROG PSHA PARK PETER POG PHUS PPREL PS PTERPREL PRELPGOV POV PKPO PGOVECON POUS PGOVPRELPHUMPREFSMIGELABEAIDKCRMKWMN PWBG PMAR PREM PAR PNR PRELPGOVEAIDECONEINVBEXPSCULOIIPBTIO PARMIR PGOVGM PHUH PARTM PN PRE PTE PY POLUN PPEL PDOV PGOVSOCI PIRF PGOVPM PBST PRELEVU PGOR PBTSRU PRM PRELKPAOIZ PGVO PERL PGOC PAGR PMIN PHUMR PVIP PPD PGV PRAM PINL PKPAL PTERE PGOF PINO PHAS PODC PRHUM PHUMA PREO PPA PEPFAR PGO PRGOV PAC PRESL PORG PKFK PEPR PRELP PREFA PNG PGOVPHUMKPAO PRELECON PINOCHET PFOR PGOVLO PHUMBA PRELC PREK PHUME PHJM POLINT PGOVPZ PGOVKCRM PGOVE PHALANAGE PARTY PECON PEACE PROCESS PLN PRELSW PAHO PEDRO PRELA PASS PPAO PGPV PNUM PCUL PGGV PSA PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA PGIV PRFE POGOV PEL PBT PAMQ PINF PSEPC POSTS PHUMPGOV PVOV PHSAPREL PROLIFERATION PENA PRELTBIOBA PIN PRELL PGOVPTER PHAM PHYTRP PTEL PTERPGOV PHARM PROTESTS PRELAF PKBL PRELKPAO PKNP PARMP PHUML PFOV PERM PUOS PRELGOV PHUMPTER PARAGRAPH PERURENA PBTSEWWT PCI PETROL PINSO PINSCE PQL PEREZ PBS

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 08MOSCOW2802, SECHIN AS ENERGY CZAR: MORE POWERFUL, MORE VULNERABLE

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #08MOSCOW2802.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08MOSCOW2802 2008-09-17 14:20 2011-06-29 07:00 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Moscow
Appears in these articles:
http://www.novayagazeta.ru/data/2011/075/15.html
VZCZCXRO4853
PP RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHMO #2802/01 2611420
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 171420Z SEP 08
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0027
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L  MOSCOW 002802 

SIPDIS 

DEPT FOR EUR/RUS, FOR EEB/ESC/IEC GALLOGLY AND WRIGHT EUR/CARC, SCA (GALLAGHER, SUMAR) DOE FOR FREDRIKSEN, HEGBORG, EKIMOFF 

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/08/2018 
TAGS: EPET ENRG ECON PREL PINR RS
SUBJECT: SECHIN AS ENERGY CZAR: MORE POWERFUL, MORE VULNERABLE 

REF: A. MOSCOW 2759 B. MOSCOW 2183 C. MOSCOW 1385

Classified By: Ambassador John R. Beyrle for Reasons 1.4 (b/d) 

SUMMARY  

1. (C) In ref A, we examined questions about Deputy Prime Minister Sechin's career and reputation and discussed whether his current, more public duties, would bring him into better focus. In this cable, we look at those new duties and the possible effects Sechin may have on Russia's all-important energy sector. Sechin has long been a force in the energy sector, but despite his chairmanship of Russia's largest oil company, Rosneft, he has largely operated behind the scenes. His new duties enhance Sechin's influence but also make it more visible and hence subject to greater scrutiny. Sechin has recently given support for important energy sector reforms. Of particular note are his efforts to force Gazprom to allow third-party access to its pipeline network. Echoing the debate about Sechin's political role, some observers see his embrace of reform as being driven by Russia's need for a more efficient and productive energy sector. However, other observers see Sechin as driven more by self-interest and animosity toward Gazprom. Regardless of his motivations, Sechin is the first senior Russian official to take on Gazprom publicly and this fight could either demonstrate the limits of Sechin's power or of Gazprom's influence over GOR policies. End summary. 

SAINT OR SINNER 

2. (C) Igor Sechin has played an important role in shaping and carrying out GOR energy policies since the beginning of Prime Minister Putin's first presidential administration. However, as deputy head of Putin's Presidential Administration, few outside the inner circle knew about, let alone were able to assess, his activities. During much of Putin's first term, Sechin was so shadowy that it was joked he may not actually exist but rather was a sort of urban myth, a bogeyman, invented by the Kremlin to instill fear. 

3. (C) Adding to this malevolent aura, most observers believe it was Sechin who engineered Yukos' demise, a signal turning point in Putin's approach to governance. These same observers also believe Sechin has orchestrated the hard-core statist and silovik opposition to foreign investment in strategic sectors, including especially oil and gas. Sechin is also widely believed to have directed oil exports towards Kremlin-favored traders like Gunvor and to have ordered oil traders to cut-off certain customers. Many also believe he was behind the downfall of Russneft's leadership and the more recent attacks on Mechel and TNK-BP. In all these reported endeavors, Sechin faced no public scrutiny or accountability. 

4. (C) Where he has had a semi-public role, as Rosneft's chairman, other observers claim Sechin has performed more openly and more admirably. In that role, he unquestionably transformed Russia's most dismal oil company into a globally competitive state champion (albeit with Yukos' assets). He also protected Rosneft from its putative merger with Gazprom in apparent contradiction to Putin's desires. Sechin also defied Putin in choosing to partner financially with a Chinese company when their funds were needed for Rosneft's expansion even though China had been consistently rebuffed by the Kremlin during years of attempted purchases of upstream assets. Another example of Sechin's enlightened management of Rosneft that close industry observers, such as RenCap's Deputy Chairman Bob Foresman, point to was hiring Peter O'Brien, an Amcit, as Rosneft's CFO. O'Brien, with Sechin's backing has since instituted international accounting standards in the company. Sechin is also credited with listening to minority shareholders in the company; a relatively rare occurrence in corporate Russia. 

NEW POWERS  

 5. (C) As Deputy Premier in charge of energy and industrial policy and head of the government's energy policy commission, Sechin's powers over the country's most important economic sector have been formalized. He has been given broad oversight over the energy sector, the foundation of strong economic growth and the source of the revenue that has strengthened the GOR both domestically and internationally. As a member of the new GOR commission to oversee foreign investment in strategic sectors, he also has an important voice in shaping Russia's investment climate. 

6. (C) His direct influence over the energy sector is not lost on industry players. Various contacts have told us they see Sechin, who continues to be Rosneft Chairman in addition to his "day job," as the ultimate decision maker on key energy issues. Shell Russia Vice President Alf D'Souza told us recently, "there's no doubt, Sechin's in charge" when it comes to energy. Cambridge Energy Research Associates' Russia specialist John Webb agreed, telling us recently that Sechin "clearly has the lead on energy now," while acknowledging that Putin himself is also playing a more hands-on role. Chevron's lead executive XXXXXXXXXXXX also told us Sechin is the key player on energy issues, noting that it will be Sechin who decides Russia's position on CPC expansion (ref B). XXXXXXXXXXXX said he has heard that most major energy sector reforms and projects are on hold while Sechin and his team mull over Russia's long-term energy strategy. 

MOTIVATED TO DELIVER REFORMS... 

 7. (C) That long-term strategy is both a challenge and an opportunity for Sechin. Excessive state control and interference have hobbled Russia's oil and gas sector. Upstream investments in particular have languished even as production has stagnated and threatens to fall. With prices softening globally, Russia can ill afford to see production and exports drop. Sechin's new job and his new responsibilities give him the chance to reverse this decline through much needed reforms. 

8. (C) To date, Sechin has been out in front on some needed energy sector reforms. He has pushed for lower oil sector taxes (ref C) and championed incentives for green-field development. With Gazprom's gas production stagnating and Russia increasingly needing to import gas from Central Asia to meet its commitments, it is Sechin who is leading the charge to spur gas production by independents and oil companies by securing third-party access (TPA) to Gazprom's pipelines. Putin has been very public about the need to move Russia toward a more value-added economy, and in his sector Sechin is working towards more refining and oil product exports and correspondingly less crude exports. 

9. (C) The failure to reform the sector could expose Sechin to a level of public criticism from which he has been previously immune. The Carnegie Moscow Center's lead senior energy researcher, Nina Poussakova, told us recently that while Sechin "was and is behind every conflict over major assets," he will now be held more accountable for the results of these conflicts. Political Analyst Dmitri Oreshkin told us recently that Sechin would have to become more of a politician, balancing competing interests, if he is to succeed. XXXXXXXXXXXX told us that Sechin's public exposure could result in his fall from power within a year or two. "Leaders sometimes do stupid things in public," he told us, adding he believes that Sechin is in over his head -- "the long-term game is not Sechin's strong suit." 

 OR TO STOP "THE GAZPROM STEAMROLLER" 

 10. (C) In assessing Sechin's potential as a reformer, many observers question his motives. They point especially to Sechin's long rivalry with Gazprom as the real explanation for his support of third-party access to Gazprom's pipelines. Although TPA is justified by economic considerations, in this view, Sechin is not driven by a sense of duty to improve the sector but by a desire to contain Gazprom and enhance his company's fortunes. Adding another layer to this is Sechin's well-known personal animosity toward Gazprom's leadership, especially its Chairman Alexey Miller. 

11. (C) Many contacts with whom we spoke have noted Sechin's interest in containing Gazprom. XXXXXXXXXXXX told us he believes one of Sechin's goals as Deputy Premier is "to stop the Gazprom steamroller from taking over the entire industry," and that TPA is just one tactic. Foresman told us Sechin "hates Miller," but more importantly sees Gazprom and its leadership as threats to, rather than the source of, Russia's future prosperity. 

12. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX, however, told us he is convinced "one hundred percent that Sechin will lose this battle." Despite Oreshkin's suggestion that Sechin was put in the job because of his ability to "get things done" by the sheer power of his orders, XXXXXXXXXXXX discounts this ability in the case of TPA. According to Milov, Putin built up Gazprom as a system "immune to influence." He predicted a cadre of Gazprom officials will say TPA is not possible, citing technical and other reasons, and thus killing the idea. 

COMMENT 

13. (C) As is the case with his political role, the greater exposure that Sechin faces in his new duties may bring into greater focus his role in the energy sector. In that regard, Sechin's initial forays into energy sector reform efforts are laudable and necessary, and while his motivations may be suspect, reforming the sector probably requires tackling Gazprom's inefficient monopolistic practices. Entrenched state-owned monoliths such as Gazprom and Transneft are inconsistent with the dynamism needed to boost the productivity and efficiency of Russia's oil and gas sector. Presumably, Sechin has backing from Putin in this regard. (It would be the height of folly for him to tackle Gazprom without it.) Putin may have realized that Russia's energy sector is beginning to stumble and he may believe that Sechin is the man to get it back on track. Sechin may fail not because he lacks power, competency, or support but rather because those entrenched interests, especially Gazprom, are simply too powerful to reform from the outside and too corrupt to reform form within. If he does fail, it would mark the limits of Sechin's power and influence within the GOR. End Comment. 
BEYRLE