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Viewing cable 08MOSCOW2629, RUSSIA CAMPAIGNS FOR INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT ON

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08MOSCOW2629 2008-09-03 06:46 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Moscow
VZCZCXRO3984
PP RUEHIK RUEHLN RUEHPOD RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHMO #2629/01 2470646
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 030646Z SEP 08
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9806
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 002629 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL ECON AM GG TU UZ RS
SUBJECT: RUSSIA CAMPAIGNS FOR INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT ON 
GEORGIA 
 
REF: MOSCOW 2618 
 
1. (SBU) Summary:  Russia's President, Prime Minister and 
Foreign Minister fanned out in an effort to gain support for 
the Russian decision to recognize the independence of 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia.  Medvedev met with Armenian 
President Sargsyan in Sochi on September 2, while Putin went 
to Uzbekistan and Lavrov to Turkey.  The meetings with the 
Armenians and Uzbeks come just days before the Collective 
Security Treaty Organization's (CSTO) September 5 meeting in 
Moscow, where Russia hopes to gain the support of the 
organization for its actions in Georgia.  This event took on 
even greater importance after Russia failed to get the 
support of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) during 
its August 28 summit (reftel).  While neither Medvedev nor 
Putin said whether they expected Armenia or Uzbekistan's 
support, official statements suggested that Russia could link 
enhanced economic ties with this issue.  Lavrov, meanwhile, 
went to Turkey to discuss Ankara's proposal for a Caucuses 
stability organization and to possibly force a split in NATO 
on how to handle Russia.  End summary. 
 
Russia Looks Ahead to CSTO Meeting 
---------------------------------- 
 
2. (U) Russian President Medvedev said on September 2 that he 
expected the members of the CSTO to reach a consensus 
position on the situation in Georgia during their September 5 
meeting in Moscow.  Speaking following a meeting in Sochi 
with Sargsyan, Medvedev did not say whether he thought the 
CSTO would back Russian military action in Georgia or its 
recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.  The Russian media 
reported, however, that CSTO Secretary General Bordyuzha said 
that the organization would support Russia.  Meanwhile, MFA 
spokesman Nesterenko said that the foreign ministers of CSTO 
member-states would "analyze" the situation in South Ossetia 
during a preliminary meeting on September 4. 
 
Medvedev and Putin to "Brief" Leaders on Georgia 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
3. (U) Official statements on Medvedev and Putin's meetings 
with the Armenians and Uzbeks said the Russians would "brief" 
their counterparts on Russia's position on Georgia.  The 
statements went on to explain at length the nature of 
Armenian and Uzbek trade relations with Russia, seemingly 
linking the health of political and economic relations and 
suggesting that the reward for support of Russia's position 
could mean closer economic ties. 
 
4. (U) Putin went to Tashkent to meet Uzbek President Karimov 
and PM Mirziyoyev on September 2.  Traveling with a business 
delegation that included Lukoil chief Vagit Alekperov and 
Gazprom chairman Alexei Miller, Putin ostensibly went to 
discuss bilateral ties, but said he would take the 
opportunity to discuss Russia's decision to recognize 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia.  A GOR official told ITAR-TASS 
that the current position of the Uzbek government on Georgia 
"is quite balanced and at the same time neutral".  In 
separate statements, Putin and Medvedev praised Uzbekistan as 
being among Russia's most important partners and a key to 
Central Asian stability. 
 
Lavrov Heads to Turkey 
---------------------- 
 
5. (U) Lavrov went to Turkey for a September 2 visit that, 
according to the MFA, would focus on the "consequences of 
Georgian's military aggression" and discuss the Turkish 
proposal to establish a Caucasus Stability and Cooperation 
Platform.  While this visit will not have an impact on the 
upcoming CSTO meeting, commentators noted that Turkey offered 
to include Russia in its proposed regional organization when 
other NATO members were sharply critical of Russian actions 
in Georgia. 
 
6. (U) At the same time, bilateral trade tensions are 
increasing.  Russian customs officials have been delaying the 
clearance of Turkish trucks at Russia's border, and Turkey's 
Trade Minister stated August 29 that Turkey would impose 
similar measures on Russian imports and consider withdrawing 
its support for Russia's WTO entry.  At a joint press 
conference on September 2, Lavrov and Turkish FM Babacan 
noted that they had discussed the trade dispute.  Lavrov 
denied that the recent imposition of stricter customs 
controls on Turkish trucks was politically motivated. 
Babacan said they had discussed the problem in a sincere and 
constructed way and noted that it could be overcome with 
Russia's cooperation and flexibility. 
 
MOSCOW 00002629  002 OF 002 
 
 
 
7. (SBU) Comment:  The GOR is engaged in a full-court press 
to enlist support for its decision to recognize the Georgian 
breakaway regions' independence.  By underscoring the scope 
of its bilateral trade and economic cooperation, Russia is 
reminding regional partners what is at stake as they balance 
their proximity to Russia with their desire to deepen 
relations with the U.S. 
BEYRLE