Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 97115 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
ETRD EAGR ETTC EAID ECON EFIN ECIN EINV ELAB EAIR ENRG EPET EWWT ECPS EIND EMIN ELTN EC ETMIN EUC EZ ET ELECTIONS ENVR EU EUN EG EINT ER ECONOMICS ES EMS ENIV EEB EN ECE ECOSOC EK ENVIRONMENT EFIS EI EWT ENGRD ECPSN EXIM EIAD ERIN ECPC EDEV ENGY ECTRD EPA ESTH ECCT EINVECON ENGR ERTD EUR EAP EWWC ELTD EL EXIMOPIC EXTERNAL ETRDEC ESCAP ECO EGAD ELNT ECONOMIC ENV ETRN EIAR EUMEM ENRGPARMOTRASENVKGHGPGOVECONTSPLEAID EREL ECOM ECONETRDEAGRJA ETCC ETRG ECONOMY EMED ETR ENERG EITC EFINOECD EURM EENG ERA EXPORT ENRD ECONEINVETRDEFINELABETRDKTDBPGOVOPIC EGEN EBRD EVIN ETRAD ECOWAS EFTA ECONETRDBESPAR EGOVSY EPIN EID ECONENRG EDRC ESENV ETT EB ENER ELTNSNAR ECHEVARRIA ETRC EPIT EDUC ESA EFI ENRGY ESCI EE EAIDXMXAXBXFFR EETC ECIP EIAID EIVN EBEXP ESTN EING EGOV ETRA EPETEIND ELAN ETRDGK EAIDRW ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS EPEC ENVI ELN EAG EPCS EPRT EPTED ETRB EUM EAIDS EFIC EFINECONEAIDUNGAGM EAIDAR ESF EIDN ELAM EDU EV EAIDAF ECN EDA EXBS EINTECPS ENRGTRGYETRDBEXPBTIOSZ EPREL EAC EINVEFIN ETA EAGER EINDIR ECA ECLAC ELAP EITI EUCOM ECONEFINETRDPGOVEAGRPTERKTFNKCRMEAID EARG ELDIN EINVKSCA ENNP EFINECONCS EFINTS ECCP ETC EAIRASECCASCID EINN ETRP EAIDNI EFQ ECOQKPKO EGPHUM EBUD ECONEINVEFINPGOVIZ ENERGY ELB EINDETRD EMI ECONEFIN EIB EURN ETRDEINVTINTCS EIN EFIM ETIO ELAINE EMN EATO EWTR EIPR EINVETC ETTD ETDR EIQ ECONCS EPPD ENRGIZ EISL ESPINOSA ELEC EAIG ESLCO EUREM ENTG ERD EINVECONSENVCSJA EEPET EUNCH ECINECONCS ETRO ETRDECONWTOCS ECUN EFND EPECO EAIRECONRP ERGR ETRDPGOV ECPN ENRGMO EPWR EET EAIS EAGRE EDUARDO EAGRRP EAIDPHUMPRELUG EICN ECONQH EVN EGHG ELBR EINF EAIDHO EENV ETEX ERNG ED
KMDR KPAO KPKO KJUS KCRM KGHG KFRD KWMN KDEM KTFN KHIV KGIC KIDE KSCA KNNP KHUM KIPR KSUM KISL KIRF KCOR KRCM KPAL KWBG KN KS KOMC KSEP KFLU KPWR KTIA KSEO KMPI KHLS KICC KSTH KMCA KVPR KPRM KE KU KZ KFLO KSAF KTIP KTEX KBCT KOCI KOLY KOR KAWC KACT KUNR KTDB KSTC KLIG KSKN KNN KCFE KCIP KGHA KHDP KPOW KUNC KDRL KV KPREL KCRS KPOL KRVC KRIM KGIT KWIR KT KIRC KOMO KRFD KUWAIT KG KFIN KSCI KTFIN KFTN KGOV KPRV KSAC KGIV KCRIM KPIR KSOC KBIO KW KGLB KMWN KPO KFSC KSEAO KSTCPL KSI KPRP KREC KFPC KUNH KCSA KMRS KNDP KR KICCPUR KPPAO KCSY KTBT KCIS KNEP KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KNNB KGCC KINR KPOP KMFO KENV KNAR KVIR KDRG KDMR KFCE KNAO KDEN KGCN KICA KIMMITT KMCC KLFU KMSG KSEC KUM KCUL KMNP KSMT KCOM KOMCSG KSPR KPMI KRAD KIND KCRP KAUST KWAWC KTER KCHG KRDP KPAS KITA KTSC KPAOPREL KWGB KIRP KJUST KMIG KLAB KTFR KSEI KSTT KAPO KSTS KLSO KWNN KPOA KHSA KNPP KPAONZ KBTS KWWW KY KJRE KPAOKMDRKE KCRCM KSCS KWMNCI KESO KWUN KPLS KIIP KEDEM KPAOY KRIF KGICKS KREF KTRD KFRDSOCIRO KTAO KJU KWMNPHUMPRELKPAOZW KEN KO KNEI KEMR KKIV KEAI KWAC KRCIM KWCI KFIU KWIC KCORR KOMS KNNO KPAI KBWG KTTB KTBD KTIALG KILS KFEM KTDM KESS KNUC KPA KOMCCO KCEM KRCS KWBGSY KNPPIS KNNPMNUC KWN KERG KLTN KALM KCCP KSUMPHUM KREL KGH KLIP KTLA KAWK KWMM KVRP KVRC KAID KSLG KDEMK KX KIF KNPR KCFC KFTFN KTFM KPDD KCERS KMOC KDEMAF KMEPI KEMS KDRM KEPREL KBTR KEDU KNP KIRL KNNR KMPT KISLPINR KTPN KA KJUSTH KPIN KDEV KTDD KAKA KFRP KWNM KTSD KINL KJUSKUNR KWWMN KECF KWBC KPRO KVBL KOM KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KEDM KFLD KLPM KRGY KNNF KICR KIFR KM KWMNCS KAWS KLAP KPAK KDDG KCGC KID KNSD KMPF KPFO KDP KCMR KRMS KNPT KNNNP KTIAPARM KDTB KNUP KPGOV KNAP KNNC KUK KSRE KREISLER KIVP KQ KTIAEUN KPALAOIS KRM KISLAO KWM KFLOA
PHUM PINR PTER PGOV PREL PREF PL PM PHSA PE PARM PINS PK PUNE PO PALESTINIAN PU PBTS PROP PTBS POL POLI PA PGOVZI POLMIL POLITICAL PARTIES POLM PD POLITICS POLICY PAS PMIL PINT PNAT PV PKO PPOL PERSONS PING PBIO PH PETR PARMS PRES PCON PETERS PRELBR PT PLAB PP PAK PDEM PKPA PSOCI PF PLO PTERM PJUS PSOE PELOSI PROPERTY PGOVPREL PARP PRL PNIR PHUMKPAL PG PREZ PGIC PBOV PAO PKK PROV PHSAK PHUMPREL PROTECTION PGOVBL PSI PRELPK PGOVENRG PUM PRELKPKO PATTY PSOC PRIVATIZATION PRELSP PGOVEAIDUKNOSWGMHUCANLLHFRSPITNZ PMIG PREC PAIGH PROG PSHA PARK PETER POG PHUS PPREL PS PTERPREL PRELPGOV POV PKPO PGOVECON POUS PGOVPRELPHUMPREFSMIGELABEAIDKCRMKWMN PWBG PMAR PREM PAR PNR PRELPGOVEAIDECONEINVBEXPSCULOIIPBTIO PARMIR PGOVGM PHUH PARTM PN PRE PTE PY POLUN PPEL PDOV PGOVSOCI PIRF PGOVPM PBST PRELEVU PGOR PBTSRU PRM PRELKPAOIZ PGVO PERL PGOC PAGR PMIN PHUMR PVIP PPD PGV PRAM PINL PKPAL PTERE PGOF PINO PHAS PODC PRHUM PHUMA PREO PPA PEPFAR PGO PRGOV PAC PRESL PORG PKFK PEPR PRELP PREFA PNG PGOVPHUMKPAO PRELECON PINOCHET PFOR PGOVLO PHUMBA PRELC PREK PHUME PHJM POLINT PGOVPZ PGOVKCRM PGOVE PHALANAGE PARTY PECON PEACE PROCESS PLN PRELSW PAHO PEDRO PRELA PASS PPAO PGPV PNUM PCUL PGGV PSA PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA PGIV PRFE POGOV PEL PBT PAMQ PINF PSEPC POSTS PHUMPGOV PVOV PHSAPREL PROLIFERATION PENA PRELTBIOBA PIN PRELL PGOVPTER PHAM PHYTRP PTEL PTERPGOV PHARM PROTESTS PRELAF PKBL PRELKPAO PKNP PARMP PHUML PFOV PERM PUOS PRELGOV PHUMPTER PARAGRAPH PERURENA PBTSEWWT PCI PETROL PINSO PINSCE PQL PEREZ PBS

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 08KINSHASA786, Goma report September 22: Restiveness

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #08KINSHASA786.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08KINSHASA786 2008-09-23 06:51 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Kinshasa
VZCZCXRO9057
OO RUEHBZ RUEHDU RUEHGI RUEHJO RUEHMR RUEHRN
DE RUEHKI #0786/01 2670651
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 230651Z SEP 08
FM AMEMBASSY KINSHASA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8467
INFO RUEHXR/RWANDA COLLECTIVE
RUCNSAD/SOUTHERN AF DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY COLLECTIVE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RUZEJAA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KINSHASA 000786 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL MOPS KPKO PHUM PREF CG
SUBJECT:    Goma report September 22:  Restiveness 
            in Goma, More FARDC Action in Sake 
 
1.  (SBU) Summary:  FARDC launched indiscriminate barrages from Sake 
into the western heights September 22, uncoordinated with MONUC. 
Corpses arriving in Goma September 21 stirred angry mobs in the 
city, and MONUC restricted movement of its civilian employees.  Both 
the government and CNDP appear to have an interest instigating 
popular unrest focused on MONUC, making it likely that anti-MONUC 
restiveness in Goma will continue.  End Summary. 
 
2.  (SBU) After FARDC's major and unsuccessful offensive September 
20 against CNDP positions in the heights to the west and north of 
Sake, there were only minor skirmishes September 21.  However, the 
FARDC brought in additional heavy artillery to Sake on September 21, 
and at 03:35 in the morning of September 22 FARDC began an 
intermittent barrage against CNDP positions in a swathe ranging from 
south of Sake (hills above Kirotshe) to those over Sake to the west 
and north.  Some 146 rounds were fired from tanks, BMP's, and 
multi-barreled rocket launchers by mid-afternoon, when firing was 
still going on against the heights directly to the west of Sake. 
 
3.  (SBU) Unlike the offensive of September 20, however, on 
September 22 FARDC did not attempt to send troops up the escarpment, 
but rather restricted itself to the artillery barrage (described by 
Deputy Chief of Staff Col. Cunliffe as "fairly indiscriminate"). 
The North Kivu brigade observed CNDP forces moving closer to Sake in 
the heights above Kirotshe in the morning, but warned them to 
desist, and they appeared to have done so.  As occurred two days 
earlier, FARDC gave no warning to MONUC, was uncommunicative (or, as 
North Kivu brigade described it, was "in disarray"), and placed its 
artillery close to MONUC bases in the Sake area (with the result 
that North Kivu brigade was physically endangered and MONUC 
perceived to be intimately allied with FARDC). 
 
4.  (SBU) The North Kivu brigade commander and Col. Cunliffe met 
with General Lukama (in command of FARDC in the Kivus) on the 
evening of September 21.  They hoped that they had "made good 
progress" with him on coordination, but Lukama also claimed he was 
"having difficulties" getting the message to his subordinates (in 
particular, Col. Padiri, in charge of the 82nd brigade at Sake). 
They met Lukama again on the afternoon of September 22, as the 
barrage was occurring, and Lukama said that the barrage was in 
reaction to intelligence reports of an imminent CNDP attack from 
Mushake.  He noted that, in any case, he had never received an order 
from his chain of command for a ceasefire (despite the Minister of 
Defense's "reaffirmation" of the ceasefire on September 19). 
However, he said that he would be meeting all five of his sectoral 
commanders (including Padiri) the following day September 23 to 
instruct them to pre-warn MONUC of any further actions. 
 
5.  (SBU) Meanwhile, restiveness in Goma mounted significantly 
September 21-22.  Fighting in the Sake area, 15 kilometers along the 
lakeshore west of the outskirts of Goma, has historically always 
raised the anxiety level in Goma.  But in the present case, the 
government has been stirring up the populace, and the CNDP may also 
be sowing discord in the city.  The immediate spark was the bringing 
to Goma September 21 of bodies of soldiers killed the previous day 
in the Sake area, an event mismanaged by the government.  Notified 
that the bodies were arriving at the Kakatindu military camp, 
located at the beginning of the western road in Goma, a large group 
of wives of soldiers gathered at the camp to stage a protest. 
(Note:  the women have long been angry over lack of payment of their 
husband's wages, and have staged earlier protests.)  The wives of 
the dead soldiers wanted to take possession of the bodies, but FARDC 
refused the request.  (Some of the bodies were reportedly 
decapitated by CNDP who had infiltrated Sake on the evening of 
September 20). 
 
6.  (SBU) The Minister of Defense and Governor of North Kivu 
appeared on the scene, hoping to placate the women.  The Minister of 
Defense handed over 2,000 in cash to the women, who pocketed the 
money but nevertheless hurled stones at the minister and governor, 
who hastily retreated (suffering smashed windows to their vehicles). 
 The women's protest soon turned into a general riot along the 
western road, with young men getting into the fray.  A passing MONUC 
convoy was stoned, and three gas stations owned by Tutsis (or, as 
the crowd seemed to believe, "owned by Nkunda") demolished.  The 
police attempted with little success to control the crowd by firing 
into the air. 
 
7.  (SBU) The women resumed their protest on the morning of 
September 22, by blocking the western road, and angry crowds also 
gathered on the northern road (to the airport and MONUC 
headquarters).  MONUC ordered its civilian employees to keep to 
their residences.  The western road remained blocked by the women 
protesters throughout the day. 
 
 
KINSHASA 00000786  002 OF 002 
 
 
8.  (SBU) A separate message follows with an account of a 
conversation in Goma today that amplifies some of the above 
narrative and contains knowledgeable (but unconfirmable) perspective 
on the events of the past 48 hours and of possible trends going 
forward.  In this account, note is taken of the availability in Sake 
of CNDP sleepers able to engage FARDC within the town limits.  This 
presence is linked to relationships CNDP (and Nkunda personally) 
have been developing over several years with trades people and 
pastors moving  between Sake and Kitchanga, and parallels are drawn 
with potential future developments in Goma itself.  A source claimed 
to have been called by Nkunda earlier today and to have received 
word of Nkunda's exasperation with MONUC's (and the international 
facilitation's) failure to publicly condemn FARDC's repeated 
cease-fire violations and his determination to take control of Goma. 
 According to the source, Nkunda said, "Out of respect for MONUC, I 
have not yet shot down their helicopters, but I have the means and 
intend to do so if necessary."  Taking Goma, Nkunda went, is the 
only way to get enough attention and respect to ensure that serious 
discussions with the government will ensue. 
 
GARVELINK