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Viewing cable 08KINSHASA750, Senior Advisor for Conflict Resolution Meeting

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08KINSHASA750 2008-09-12 07:22 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Kinshasa
VZCZCXRO1287
PP RUEHBZ RUEHDU RUEHGI RUEHJO RUEHMR RUEHRN
DE RUEHKI #0750/01 2560722
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 120722Z SEP 08
FM AMEMBASSY KINSHASA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8412
INFO RUEHXR/RWANDA COLLECTIVE
RUCNSAD/SOUTHERN AF DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY COLLECTIVE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RUZEJAA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KINSHASA 000750 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL MOPS KPKO CG
SUBJECT:    Senior Advisor for Conflict Resolution Meeting 
            on September 4 with Etumba and Facilitation 
 
1.  (SBU) Summary:  General Etumba said that CNDP's participation in 
the Amani process was essential, but he balked at disengagement 
talks being held at Kimoka, noting CNDP had already agreed to an ad 
hoc process in Goma.  International Facilitation team expressed 
surprise at the lack of a meeting with Nkunda and doubted the 
government would accept Kimoka. End summary. 
 
2.  (SBU) After meeting a CNDP team near Kirolirwe September 4, 
Senior Advisor for Conflict Resolution for the Assistant Secretary 
for African Affairs Tim Shortley had a brief meeting with General 
Didier Etumba, co-chairman of the Joint Technical Commission on 
Peace and Security, and the commander and deputy commander of the 
Eighth Military Region, General Mayala and Col. Delphin, followed by 
a meeting with the international facilitation team and MONUC/Goma. 
 
3.  (SBU) Shortley told Etumba that he had just spoken to Kabila's 
senior counselor Tshibanda, who had requested a greater U.S. 
involvement, including with the CNDP, to ensure that the parties 
quickly got down to defining disengagement zones.  Shortley said it 
was essential that all sides work to reduce tensions, for example by 
avoiding indulging in rumors that were not backed up by solid 
evidence (a similar position taken by the international facilitation 
in the Joint Monitoring Group).  Disengagement was, he said, the 
only way to prevent the clashes that had occurred over the past ten 
days, and it was the essential step toward disarmament.  Shortley 
said CNDP had committed to withdraw to positions held two weeks ago; 
return to disengagement, but in Kimoka (not Goma) due to security 
concerns;  Phase 1 disarmament and integration exercise and would 
make a press statement to that effect.  Disengagement in areas of 
FDLR presence would, however, present difficulties but could be 
achieved through the Nairobi process. 
 
4.  (SBU) Etumba responded that, as for the government, it would do 
everything within its power to reduce tensions, which were, indeed, 
quite high.  CNDP was awaited in the peace process at every moment. 
CNDP was essential to that process, and Etumba was glad that CNDP 
had agreed to return to disengagement talks.  Etumba said that CNDP 
had a greater weight than other groups, although the others could 
not be excluded.  However, Etumba said, he was concerned at 
Shortley's mention of Kimoka.  CNDP had agreed ten days earlier to 
participate in technical work on disengagement in ad hoc groups in 
Goma, while now it appeared to want yet a different arrangement. 
Shortley said that, after the clashes of the past week, CNDP was 
afraid to come to Goma even with MONUC escort.  He urged Etumba to 
press for confidence-building measures such as release of CNDP 
political prisoners.  Etumba presented Shortley with a photograph of 
soldiers in purportedly Rwandan uniforms killed the previous day at 
Ntamugenga (south of Rutshuru) saying that it was "proof of Rwandan 
support for the CNDP."  Shortley said he would present it to Rwandan 
officials in Kigali the next day (see Kigali reporting).  Etumba 
declined to attend the follow-on meeting with the facilitation 
team/MONUC. 
 
5.  (SBU) Following Shortley's debrief to MONUC and the 
international facilitation, French diplomat Bernard Sexe gave voice 
to general surprise that Nkunda had not shown up at Shortley's 
meeting in Kirolirwe.  "You met with the same lower-level CNDP 
people we have been seeing repeatedly in Goma or Kimoka, who are now 
backing off on their agreement to meet in Goma?"  Shortley explained 
that both military and civilians were present to include Nkunda's 
security officer John Muhire and that Nkunda was reportedly in 
Gungu.  Sexe charged that "CNDP is making fools of us and are not to 
be trusted."  British diplomat Tom Pravda asked for clarification on 
CNDP's insistence on Kimoka (where the CNDP has failed to live up to 
its promise to withdraw its forces four kilometers to the north and 
ensure a neutral zone acceptable to the government).  Shortley 
explained that CNDP has refused to come to Goma because of hostile 
environment and threat posed to their personnel.  Shortley stated 
that CNDP could still disengage from Kimoka and that it would 
suffice as an interim site to get the disengagement discussions 
moving until the situation calmed.  Pravda characterized the CNDP's 
insistence on Kimoka as a major backsliding from the previous week. 
 
6.  (SBU) Eastern Coordinator Alpha Sow said that both sides 
appeared to have soured on the Goma process.  The trend in Kinshasa 
was increasingly hardline (including Etumba), impatient to finish 
with the CNDP by December.  Sow charged that Etumba behaved as if he 
were commander of the 8th military region rather than co-chair of 
the technical commission.  CNDP wanted direct dialogue, to which the 
government was inflexibly opposed.  Sow's deputy, M'hand Ladjouzi, 
added that it appeared that the government was using every means at 
its disposal (including stirring up the populace to block, stone, 
and demonstrate against North Kivu brigade) to pressure MONUC into a 
more aggressive military stance against CNDP.  He did not believe 
that the government was prepared to participate honestly in any 
 
KINSHASA 00000750  002 OF 002 
 
 
disengagement negotiations.  Shortley recommended that MONUC put 
observers directly with the 8th military region and with CNDP and 
that it formalize a structure for ceasefire violation monitoring. 
North Kivu brigade commander Brigadier General Bipin Rawat said that 
the brigade already had means of observing and communicating in the 
event of violations, with each side always laying entire blame on 
the other.  The real problem, he said, was the absence of effective 
means of punishing violators. 
 
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