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Viewing cable 08KINSHASA748, Meeting of Senior Advisor for

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08KINSHASA748 2008-09-12 07:08 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Kinshasa
VZCZCXRO1279
PP RUEHBZ RUEHDU RUEHGI RUEHJO RUEHMR RUEHRN
DE RUEHKI #0748/01 2560708
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 120708Z SEP 08
FM AMEMBASSY KINSHASA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8409
INFO RUEHXR/RWANDA COLLECTIVE
RUCNSAD/SOUTHERN AF DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY COLLECTIVE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RUZEJAA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KINSHASA 000748 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL MOPS KPKO CG
SUBJECT:    Meeting of Senior Advisor for 
            Conflict Resolution with CNDP 
 
1.  (SBU) Summary:  CNDP told Senior Advisor Shortley September 4 
that it agreed in principle to (1) withdrawal to positions held on 
August 28; (2) disengagement talks in Kimoka on the basis of a 
proposed plan by MONUC; (3) agreement in principle of the Phase 1 
disengagement, disarmament and integration with the agreement to 
further discuss timing and modalities; and (4) public statement 
reaffirming this agreement.  End summary. 
 
2.  (SBU) Senior Advisor for Conflict Resolution to the Assistant 
Secretary for African Affairs Tim Shortley led a U.S. - only team to 
meet CNDP political and military officials September 4 at CNDP 
headquarters at Bwiza, north of Kirolirwe.  CNDP Chairman, General 
Laurent Nkunda was unavailable (reportedly in Gungu).  Shortley 
regretted that much time had been lost in fulfilling the promise of 
the Goma agreement with all sides, including the international 
facilitation, responsible for missing many opportunities.  Shortley 
highlighted General Didier Etumba's insistence that all sides disarm 
without military disengagement as a critical reason for the present 
fighting and a reason for the failure of AMANI to date.  He noted 
that on his last visit the international facilitation had obtained 
both President Kabila's and General Nkunda's agreement to a phase 
one of the disengagement, disarmament and integration program that 
could test and build the system necessary to be successful. 
Shortley pressed CNDP to (1) return to positions held on August 28; 
(2) return to disengagement discussions; (3) affirm its agreement to 
implement Phase 1 of the disengagement, disarmament and integration 
program; and (4) make a public statement announcing this agreement. 
 
3.  (SBU) Ten of the CNDP officials spoke.  They lamented that the 
government co-chair of the Joint Technical Commission, General 
Etumba, had so narrowly focused on immediate disarmament, without 
disengagement and without appropriate capacities and agreements on 
brassage.  CNDP representatives stressed that there has been a total 
collapse of confidence between CNDP and Government officials as 
AMANI was more than just disarmament (and more than just disarmament 
of CNDP).  CNDP representatives stressed that the international 
facilitation bear responsibility as well for the state of AMANI 
stating that it allowed the domineering and uninterested leadership 
from Kinshasa to bankrupt dialogue in the AMANI process. 
 
4.  (SBU) Shortley stated that the Goma agreement was a ceasefire 
and a commitment to engage in dialogue in an effort to resolve 
underlying causes of conflict, and that a holistic approach was 
necessary.  Shortley reviewed efforts to fulfill the Nairobi 
communiqu, which he saw as parallel to the Goma agreement.  Deputy 
Executive Secretary Kambasu insisted that Nairobi was not parallel 
but integral to Goma and cited the reference to Nairobi in the Goma 
agreement (Article 2) and stressed that combating FDLR was a 
fundamental principle for CNDP.  Others cited the government's 
failure to meet CNDP's basic claims, some of which had been 
enshrined in the Acte d'Engagement (such as amnesty and lifting road 
blocks).  They noted that the AMANI program had lapsed in early 
August and a new framework was needed.  Shortley refused to consider 
a new framework, noting that Goma Agreement was not time-bound. 
They condemned the government for stirring up the populace and 
claimed that truckloads of soldiers had just passed through Goma 
shouting anti-CNDP slogans and that forty CNDP had been arrested in 
Goma.  CNDP spokesman Rene Abandi said CNDP agreed to withdraw to 
positions held as of the signing of the Acte d'Engagement on January 
23.  Shortley disagreed and said that both parties must agree to 
return to positions held two weeks ago and that anything else would 
be too difficult.  Shortley said that the government had a long list 
of its own criticisms of CNDP, such as Special Operations training, 
redeployment, violations of the ceasefire, nonparticipation in the 
Amani process, forcing human displacement, and recruitment of child 
soldiers. 
 
5.  (SBU) After a long break for internal discussion, Abandi said 
CNDP would agree to (1) withdrawal to positions held on August 28; 
(2) disengagement talks in Kimoka on the basis of a proposed plan by 
MONUC; (3) agreement in principle of the Phase 1 disengagement, 
disarmament and integration with the agreement to further discuss 
timing and modalities; and (4) a public statement reaffirming this 
agreement.  He said that CNDP believed that creation of buffer zones 
was a priority, but that, in areas where it faced FDLR, CNDP would 
not be able to withdraw.  It would agree only to Kimoka as the site 
for continuing technical work on disengagement.  Abandi said that a 
holistic approach, covering a range of issues beyond disengagement 
and integration, was fundamental. 
 
6.  (SBU) Shortley said it was possible to use the Nairobi process 
to seek disengagement of FDLR in areas bordering CNDP.  Shortley 
agreed to go on Radio Okapi to outline discussions and agreements 
and to call for immediate renewed efforts on AMANI.  He expressed 
support for CNDP's request that there be talks within the AMANI 
 
KINSHASA 00000748  002 OF 002 
 
 
process on broader political issues per the Goma agreement and said 
that the U.S. would approach Kinshasa on this point.  Shortley 
pressed that both sides must work together in the coming days to 
calm tensions, refrain from inflammatory rhetoric, and move swiftly 
into technical disengagement negotiations at Kimoka, with talks 
beginning on Monday 8 September. 
 
GARVELINK